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Central Asia

Turkmenistan- a brand in the making?

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Turkmenistan can be labeled as the most traditional society in the Caspian area. As a country, somewhere between historical tribalism and current authoritarianism, Turkmenistan has yet to establish a clear image of itself beyond state borders.

With the power change in 2007, following the death of the former president-for-life Niyazov, many political analysts claim Turkmenistan entered a new era of alternated and to some extent softened internal politics, accompanied with the process of establishing the country`s image on the international stage, as a reassuring sign of the country`s willingness to open up to the world.

Turkmenistan is also one of the most homogenous countries of Central Asia and is fiercely proud of its traditions and culture. Turkmen people are well known for their generosity and hospitality, as witnessed by the growing number of tourists in the country. Besides the many historical and cultural sights the country can offer, some even protected as UNESCO world heritage sites, along with the famous authentic horse breed Akhali- Teke and world renowned rugs, one of the well-known ones is definitely the so called Door to hell, a burning natural gas field in the middle of the Karakum desert, burning continuously after being lit by the Soviet petroleum engineers back in 1971. More vivid tourism activity in the future would arguably benefit the soft power of the country, but for now remains only one possible future outcome. Many prospective tourists are namely deterred by the very strict visa regime.

This seems to be perpetually more and more understood by the Turkmenistan regime that is looking for ways to diversify and strengthen the soft power tools of the country. After being somewhat isolated for a long period of time, this goal seems a bit distant for now, but there are signs of setting the course for different trends in the future. For example, with a new mega-project named “Avaza National Touristic Zone”, which started back in 2009, country wishes to establish a chain of hotels, entertainment structure and casinos to transform the area by the Caspian Sea to Turkmenistan Las Vegas in the next decade. First important international event was held there last year, when 12th of August was marked as “The day of the Caspian Sea” and the ceremony was attended by the diplomatic delegations of Caspian littoral countries and representatives from Asia Development Bank, World Bank, UNDP, OSCE and German Society for International Cooperation. Accompanied conferences on the ecological issues of the Caspian Sea were also held.

Besides tourism attractions and renowned hospitality of local people, Turkmenistan has various other means to help boost the soft power country has in international community, which is for now still to a large extent power in the making. One of them is certainly expanding and enlarging the prospects for (still very careful and monitored) cooperation with international scientific community on various topics, but most prolifically on the cultural identity of peoples, dialogue of civilizations and preserving the national heritage. Most of the international scholarly mingling is still being held inside the Turkmenistan state borders, for example, in 2015 only we can list almost 30 different international exhibitions and conferences on vastly different array of topics, from sports, trade, tourism, art to gas and oil. This can be identified as the first step towards a broader and more prolific international engagement.

Turkmenistan is also very proud of its neutral foreign policy and is highlighting their direction of positive neutrality in international relations as many times as possible. The regime proclaimed the year 2015 as the Year of Peace and Neutrality and President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov was promoting this brand in a series of official visits to Austria, Italia and Slovenia, in addition to exploring possibilities for energy cooperation with the selected countries.

One of the most fruitful cooperations and arguably an additional display of attention the soft power tactics have in the country`s establishment is the relationship with Germany. Bilateral cultural links include Turkmen- German Forum and the Turkmen- German Cultural Institute, founded for attaining the goal of closer ties between the countries` people. The latter is based in Cologne, Germany, with a special endeavor of promoting Turkmen culture and cultural heritage in Germany and concentrating on creating and enhancing ties between Turkmen and German artists, poets, sportsmen and students by organizing events, festivals and exhibitions. Similar events were held this year in May in Zagreb, Croatia and in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan titled “Days of the Turkmenistan Culture”, presenting work from various Turkmenistan artists, poets, singers and musicians.

In addition to substantial cultural exchange there were also events, focusing on the economics. One was the so called “The Day of Turkmenistan Economy in France”, held last year in Paris and an economic forum in Ashgabat, titled “The Day of the German Economy in Turkmenistan”, attended by some 350 people, including representatives from around 90 German companies. Germany is arguably the biggest European presence in Turkmenistan with businesses in oil and textile industry, healthcare, communication, transportation and agriculture. With the current (ongoing) desire of the EU to diversify its energy supply chain, the significance of bond between Germany, as one of the leading countries of the EU, and Turkmenistan is even more important.

If Turkmenistan is a country somewhere between tribalism and authoritarianism, then its energy policy is somewhere in between soft and hard power tactics. Traditionally, the buyer of the Turkmen gas was Russia, which left the country with little maneuvering space. After a dispute with Gazprom on the prices and quantity of the purchased Turkmen gas, which reached its high in an explosion on the common pipeline infrastructure in 2009 that the Turkmen authority labeled as a deliberate act of technical sabotage, Turkmenistan had to reduce its gas production and distribution, causing a big hole in the country`s budget. Consequently, Turkmenistan started looking east and west to diversify its options, making China the number 1 supplier of its gas and vocally lobbying for the Trans- Caspian Pipeline, also supported by Azerbaijan, which is very intriguing for European markets.

Here, we enter another important loop for Turkmenistan; the not yet agreed upon border limitation on the energy-rich Caspian Sea. The clearly marked borders between the five littoral states would immensely strengthen the negotiating position of the country when closing and proposing new gas deals to potential buyers, be it Iran, China or the EU. Therefore, we can mark the latest alleged agreement on the maritime border between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as a great success for both.

Relationship with Kazakhstan can be described as the warmest of all the Caspian states with countries having good railroad and highway infrastructural connectivity. Arguably, the toughest issue with demarcating the border has been between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan and this issue has pitted the countries against each- other since the 1990s. It reached a very hostile stage in 2001, when the rhetoric on both sides implied gestures aiming at military threats and the leadership of both countries publicly accusing each other of illegal exploration, development and/or operation on the disputed oil fields, in addition to violation of territorial waters with military and non- military vessels. Situation worsened with Baku purchasing two American military boats, which was viewed as a provocation on the Turkmen side and ignited the arms race between the countries, the only significant time Turkmenistan applied somewhat hard power tactics since becoming independent. Luckily, in 2003 and 2004 the situation shifted towards efforts for the diplomatic solution, but the countries have yet to find a satisfactory long-term answer to these pending issues, which is also of great importance for the feasibility of the Trans- Caspian Pipeline. Armed conflict seems unlikely though, especially (but not exclusively) because of the Turkmenistan devotion to its policy of positive neutrality. So hard power in any sense of the word, both economic and especially military, is not a viable option for Turkmenistan.

After years of isolation, the new president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov is making great efforts to increase the ties Turkmenistan has with the outside world. Mainly, we have to mention the relationship and regional cooperation with Central Asian states, Russia and many high level commercial ties and political visits to China. Additionally important are financial investments from Iran and Saudi Arabia, but Turkmenistan has to carefully balance out the potential islamization spill-over effect within the country`s (preferred secular) borders. Also very crucial are the ties with neighboring Afghanistan, where Turkmenistan is helping with the reconstruction process, investing in schools, hospitals and other vital infrastructure projects, providing electricity and issuing grants for Afghan students to study on Turkmenistan university programs. Turkmenistan also, although staying loyal to its neutral status, enhanced its activities inside the Commonwealth of Independent States, cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an observer member and within NATO infrastructure as a Partnership- for- Peace country.

Arguably then, with the new leadership, Turkmenistan is reforming its relationship with the broader international community and trying to establish a specific kind of brand for the country and its internationally- recognized image. With enhanced relationship with various countries, Turkmenistan is hoping to enhance its soft power capabilities, which could result in more prolific FDIs to important infrastructure and technological projects and the reinforcing of the negotiating power when it comes to pipeline diplomacy for country`s rich energy resources. We have yet to witness the success and outreach of the changes in Turkmenistan and whether or not they represent a successful tactic for deviating away from the isolationistic status the country was confined in for a significant amount of time.

Central Asia

Kazakhstan, like Ukraine, spotlights the swapping of the rule of law for the law of the jungle

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When a Russian-led military force intervened earlier this month, it did more than help Kazakh President Qasym-Johart Toqayev restore and strengthen his grip on power following days of protest and violent clashes with security forces.

The intervention brought to the fore a brewing competition for spheres of influence in Eurasia between perceived Russian and Turkish worlds whose boundaries are defined by civilization and /or language rather than a nation state’s internationally recognized borders.

It is a competition that also impacts China, whose troubled Turkic north-western province of Xinjiang borders Kazakhstan.

Although not incorporated in the Turkey-led Organisation of Turkic States (OTS), the group, which also includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan, recently signalled its affinity to China’s Turkic Muslims.

China’s brutal crackdown on religious and ethnic expressions of Uighur identity has sparked public dissent in Kazakhstan and Turkey and forced the two governments to perform a delicate balancing act to not always successfully avoid the People’s Republic’s wrath.

Countering perceptions that the Russian-led intervention in Kazakhstan boosted Moscow’s security primacy in Central Asia and weakened Turkish aspirations, widely respected Russia scholar Dmitri Trenin suggested that salvaging Mr. Toqayev was the best of President Vladimir Putin’s bad options.

“In order to preserve stable relations with an important ally, partner, and neighbour, official Russia has often turned a blind eye to the rise of ethnic Kazakh nationalism and reports of de facto discrimination against ethnic Russians in the country. Toqayev is by no means Moscow’s client, yet allowing him…to be toppled would, in Moscow’s thinking, allow the forces of ultra-nationalism to come to the fore,” Mr. Trenin said.

Kazakhstan and other Central Asian nations, seeking to balance their relationships with Moscow and Beijing in the wake of the United States’ abandonment of the region with the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, see Ankara as a potential hedge.

Led by authoritarians who fear anti-government protests at home, Russia and Turkey had a common interest in beating back a popular revolt in Kazakhstan. As a result, standing aside as Russia stepped in may have best served Turkey’s interests.

Despite its close military ties with Kazakhstan, a Turkish intervention may have upset the delicate management of the Turkey-Russian relationship. The relationship is fraught with disputes in which the two countries are often on opposite sides of the divide.

While Turkish support for Mr. Toqayev may not have gone down well with Kazakh protesters, it is not likely to have put much of a dent in Turkish soft power in Central Asia that is built on linguistic and ethnic affinity, the popularity of Turkish music and cinematic productions, and investment in glitzy shopping malls.

Turkey also benefits from being a player that has successfully challenged Russia in regional conflicts such as the Caucasus, where it backed Azerbaijan in its 2020 war with Armenia, and further afar in Libya and Syria.

In a rivalry for dominance of the Black Sea, Turkey has also backed Ukraine and forged close defense ties with the embattled country. Home to a large Crimean Tatar diaspora, Turkey has vocally supported the Turkic community on the Ukrainian peninsula that Russia annexed in 2014.

Finally, Turkey has at times, albeit intermittently, taken China to task for its brutal crackdown on ethnic and religious expression of Turkic Muslim identity in Xinjiang. China sees the projection of a Uyghur ethnic, cultural, and religious identity as a mortal threat.

Turkish assertiveness seemingly emboldened Central Asian members of the Organisation of Turkic States, the formal Turkic equivalent of Mr. Putin’s notion of a Russian World that defines its frontiers defined by the geography of Russian speakers and adherents to Russian culture rather than international law.

Central Asian members of the organisation, a brainchild of the now embattled former president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, joined Turkey at its recent summit in November in Istanbul in sending subtle and less subtle signals to both Russia and China as well as Iran, countries with Turkic-speaking minorities.

By deciding to restrict association with the organisation to Turkic-speaking countries, the group hopes to keep Russia, China, and Iran at bay despite their being home to Turkic-speaking minorities.

Moreover, the Central Asians took no exception when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s far-right nationalist ally, Devlet Bahlevi, released a picture on Facebook at the time of the summit of him gifting the Turkish leader a map of the Turkic world that included chunks of Russia. The picture capped a year of the trumpeting of irridentist claims to Russian territory by nationalist Turkish media close to Mr. Erdogan.

Similarly, the Central Asians participated in the summit even though it opened on November 12, a politically sensitive date for China. Uighurs in Xinjiang twice declared their short-lived independence on November 12, first in 1993 and again in 1944.

Three weeks before the summit, Turkey joined 42 other, mostly Western countries in a United Nations statement that condemned the Chinese crackdown in Xinjiang.

Raising the stakes further, 19 Uighur exiles have filed a criminal complaint with a Turkish prosecutor against Chinese officials, accusing them of committing genocide, torture, rape, and crimes against humanity.

Turkey is home to some 50,000 Uighurs, the largest community outside of China. Long a supporter of Uighur religious and cultural aspirations, Turkey has been careful not to allow the groups’ plight to rupture its relations with Beijing.

At the same time, it has not followed the example of the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain, as well as the secretary-general of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GGC), who on a visit to China this week reportedly expressed support for Chinese policy in Xinjiang.

Responding in October to assertions by China’s deputy ambassador to the United Nations, Geng Shuang, that Turkey had illegally invaded north-eastern Syria and was depriving Kurds of water, Turkish representative Feridun Sinirlioglu thundered that his country would not be lectured by “those who violate international human rights law and international humanitarian law.”

It was a war of words in which the kettle was calling the pot black. It’s not human rights, violated with abandon by all the region’s players, that are at stake. What is at stake is an international order based on legally defined nation-states that civilisational leaders like Messrs. Putin and Erdogan seek to rejigger with the law of the jungle that allows them to shift state boundaries at will in geopolitical jockeying.

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Central Asia

Kazakhstan has lessons for the Gulf

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Russia’s intervention in Kazakhstan contains a cautionary message for Gulf foreign ministers visiting Beijing this week.

The intervention to stabilize the government of Kazakh President Kassym-Johart Tokayev, following mass protests, cemented Russia’s primacy when it comes to security in Central Asia, a swathe of land that is as much Russia’s backyard as it is China’s.

At least 164 people were killed in the protest, thousands wounded, and some 10,000 arrested. Mr. Tokayev described the protests as a foreign-instigated coup attempt involving terrorists.

The intervention reaffirmed a long-standing understanding that Russia, at least for the short-term, shoulders responsibility for security while China focuses on economic development in the region.

China is happiest when someone else is dealing with Central Asian security questions,” noted Central Asia scholar Raffaello Pantucci. Like in Kazakhstan, “in the immediate fallout from the collapse of the government in Afghanistan, it was not Chinese soldiers or weapons that were rushed to Central Asian borders, but Russian ones.”

The question ministers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain and the secretary-general of the Gulf Cooperation Council ought to ask themselves is why China would wish to adopt a different approach toward security in the Middle East if it is reluctant to play an upfront role in its own backyard.

The Gulf ministers may point out that their region is key to China’s energy supply and increasingly important for its geopolitical influence. But that does not explain why China played second security fiddle to Russia in Central Asia, a region of equal strategic importance.

China’s problem and the Gulf’s bet have to be that there is no alternative to the United States, the Middle East’s current, increasingly unreliable security guarantor, which leaves both with few good choices.

With Russia having neither the apparent will nor the wherewithal to commit to a role in the Middle East similar to that it plays in Central Asia, China may have little choice but to step up to the plate ultimately.

As the United States, NATO, and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) this week discuss with Russia the crisis over Ukraine, the Gulf states will likely closely monitor US and European responses to a possible Russian invasion of the East European state or efforts to destabilise it further.

The Gulf states are likely to find little reassurance in what already is evident with the massing of some 100,000 Russian troops on Ukraine’s border.

The US and European response will be limited to economic sanctions against Russia and military support for Ukraine but will stop short of direct military confrontation to reverse any Russian action.

Gulf states may be betting on a possible silver lining. China has much at stake in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. It has invested billions of dollars in the region central to its Belt and Road initiative that is designed to tie Eurasia to China through infrastructure, telecommunications, information technology, and energy.

Moreover, Central Asia borders on China’s strategic but troubled province of Xinjiang, with which it has close ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious ties.

In a rare move, China reportedly offered to send law enforcement and special forces to Kazakhstan, although only after Mr. Tokayev’s Russian-backed crackdown had already brought the situation under control.

The Gulf states are likely to hope that a greater, albeit gradual and discreet Chinese engagement in Central Asia, where it already before the Kazakh crisis had begun to expand its security presence, will persuade China to be more assertive in protecting its investments, assets, and interests further afield, including in the Middle East.

China established its first foreign military base in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa several years ago, just opposite the Gulf.

Yet, greater Chinese assertiveness is hardly a panacea. It won’t happen overnight and, therefore, will not help the Gulf deal with immediate threats, including a rise in regional tension should the Vienna talks between Iran and world powers fail to revive a 2015 international agreement that curbed the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme.

Initial greater Chinese engagement is likely to focus on internal security in Central Asia by further assisting in creating surveillance states in a swathe of land prone to popular revolts.

That focus may be welcomed in the Gulf. Yet, with surveillance already a fact of life, that may not be what the Gulf most wants from China.

Like the United States, China could also attempt to improve the Gulf states’ ability to defend themselves through enhanced arms sales, joint exercises, and training.

Meanwhile, China has already exploited the US reluctance to sell certain weapons systems or to do so only under strict conditions. For example, China has in recent years opened its first overseas weapons facility for the production of drones in Saudi Arabia and is enabling the kingdom to manufacture ballistic missiles. In doing so, China risks fueling a Middle Eastern arms race.

Undoubtedly, Chinese engagement will come with strings. Unlike the United States, the Chinese won’t make pesty demands related to human and other rights but will want to ensure that Gulf states do not divert from the broad lines of Chinese policy.

As a result, the best the Gulf can hope for is that greater Chinese assertiveness will create an environment in which they have margins of manoeuvrability to play one against the other. It’s a modus vivendi, but not an ideal one.

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Central Asia

A Reflection on President Xi’s message to Kazakh President Tokayev

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Image source: Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Since 1949 when the People’s Republic of China was founded, the political elite in Beijing has crafted foreign policy and military strategy in consistency with its core interests and national security. For example, China was involved into four wars along its east, south, west and north borders primarily due to its vulnerability of national security. Given this, Chinese security concerns have never gone beyond the peripheral areas.

American scholar Robert Ross once argued, China is an Asian country. With many neighbors surrounding all its sides, China pays close attention to security, economic and diplomatic issues. In light of this, the Korean peninsula and Vietnamese region are of grace concerns to Beijing during the 1950s-60s. Then China sees APEC as a vital economic bloc since the 1970s. Now given that China is the second largest economy of the world and a rapidly rising military power in the world, Beijing has come to see West Asia with increasing strategic consideration. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the very showcase that China along with Russia and Iran will not allow the transatlantic power to stay militarily in Central Asia, which is the land bridge between China and the Middle East and beyond. As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the visiting Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretary-General Nayef bin Falah Al-Hajraf that Beijing firmly opposes any country’s interference in the internal affairs of the countries in the Middle East.

It is true that over the past decades, China’s security horizon and strategic depth have expanded farther and deeply. Since the Belt and Road initiative (BRI) develops well into Eurasia, the Central Asia which is located in the heart of the region has been saliently within the geostrategic thinking of Chinese policy-making circle. On January 7, Chinese President Xi conveyed his confidential message to Kazakh President Tokayev as his country was in danger of internal violence. This is really rare for the top leader of China to act this way. It is noted that Xi Jinping said in his message that considering a large-scale riot occurred in Kazakhstan recently which has caused heavy casualties and property damages, Chinese government and people including himself highly spoke of Tokayev’s having taken decisive and strong action at the critical moment, quickly calming down the situation, which has shown his courage and caliber as a statesman and his responsible stance towards the country and the people. To be sure, this is truly a strong message sent by the top leader of a major power who is seen widely as a decisive and resolute statesman.

Xi stressed that China firmly opposes any forces undermining Kazakhstan’s internal stability, threatening Kazakhstan’s security, and damaging the peaceful life of the Kazakh people. China firmly opposes any deliberate attempt by external forces to provoke unrest and instigate a “color revolution” in Kazakhstan, as well as any attempt to harm the China-Kazakhstan friendship and disrupt the cooperation between the two countries. As a fraternal neighbor and permanent comprehensive strategic partner of Kazakhstan, China is ready to provide necessary support to the best of its capacity to help Kazakhstan tide over the difficulties. No matter what risks and challenges Kazakhstan encounters, China will always be a trustworthy friend and reliable partner of Kazakhstan, and the Chinese people will forever stand with the Kazakh people.

Although China and Kazakhstan are the member states of the SCO, they are not the allies in a traditional sense. However, according to the rhetoric of the message from President Xi, China has vowed to offer what the allies would be able to provide to each other. Owing to this, it is unexaggerated to argue that Xi’s message to his Kazakh counterpart Tokayev might be interpreted as a milestone in China’s policy towards its neighbors including Chinese position on the issue of Afghanistan reconstruction in the upcoming decade.

Now it needs to answer why China has intended to show to the world through its firm rhetoric and position on the Kazakhstan issue? Then what have Beijing generally and President Xi particularly wanted to reveal through the strong support to Kazakh President and its people? Finally how has China been so confident to display its support to the neighboring countries on its western borders which accesses to the Middle East through Central Asia.

In an anarchic world where power matters substantially and military capabilities are more salient. Now China is an economic superpower in a traditional measurement, next to the United States only. In the meantime, as the U.S. elite observe that Chinese military has transformed “from a peasant-based infantry army that was very, very large in 1979 to a very capable military that covers all the domains and has global ambitions.” Indeed, recently China has made great leaps forward—from rapidly constructing hundreds of missile silos to successfully testing a nuclear-capable Fractional Orbital Bombardment System equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle. Both advancements surely took America’s China-watchers by surprise. Though debatable, the harsh reality remains that for nearly three decades China has undertaken a massive military buildup to offset America’s advantages—with notable success. Moreover, according to Graham Allison who worked out a report titled with “The Great Rivalry: China vs. the United States in the 21st Century”, for decades the U.S. has enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain. It could generally deploy the forces whenever, wherever and whatever it wants or needs. Yet, today the United States and China have contested in every domain—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.

Except increasing the hard power, China has dedicated to create what Chinese scholar called “Eurasian Quad”—China, Russia, Pakistan and Iran—to make sure the Eurasian mass free from any military involvement from the countries outside the region. As China and Russia are not only the permanent members of the UN Security Council and friendly neighbors of Central Asian countries, Beijing and Moscow have vowed to take all necessary means to “prevent chaos or war from erupting in Central Asia” during the phone talks between Chinese FM Wang Yi and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov on January 10 when they discussed the issues concerned.

Additionally, since China has endorsed collective security in the region, the SCO and OSTO have been the most efficient tools to play in the grand chessboard of Eurasia as it is dubbed. To that end, China has agreed and firmly endorsed the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in assisting Kazakhstan in fighting violent terrorist forces and playing a positive role in restoring stability in Kazakhstan on the premise of respecting Kazakhstan’s sovereignty. Meanwhile, China supports the SCO in strengthening coordination and cooperation with the CSTO to jointly address various challenges to regional security. This is indeed a case unprecedented in the past decades because China has been active involved into the chaos in Kazakhstan from the very beginning through a consultation and coordination with Russia and other member states of the SCO. As Lavrov said that Russia is sure to keep close communication with China to make preparations together in tackling the bilateral and multilateral issues.

In sum, Chinese President Xi’s message to the President of Kazakhstan expressed his sympathies to his counterpart and the people of Kazakhstan. Yet, more than that is Xi was adamant that China rejects any attempt by external forces to provoke unrest and instigate a “color revolution” in Kazakhstan which is a sovereign country. Due to the fact that the United States has grown more belligerent toward both Russia and China, Kazakhstan, since it borders both, would be an ideal candidate for government change. As part of the larger policy of encirclement, Kazakhstan would be vital for U.S. interests in the region.

Accordingly, Xi’s message to Tokayev reveals his geostrategic thinking that China in aligning with Russia will never allow any sort of “color revolution” in Central Asia including Kazakhstan which is of critical geostrategic importance to the two largest Eurasian powers: a vital bridge between China and Europe and a critical component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and CSTO.

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