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The two turbans – what to expect from hard power in Iran

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The Islamic Republic of Iran has, undoubtedly, faced hard times and what came lately is no exception to that. The country, governed by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (military, judiciary, broadcasting services) and President Hassan Rouhani, undergoes a period of suffocated economy, alert troops and pressured judiciary.

It has now become a boiling cauldron where national security, journalism, money and energy sources intersect and interfere with each other; unfortunately, there is no better spell than time to give it a chance to recover and a clear direction to follow.

The long-lasting flavour of biting the Uranium bullet

The multilateral discussion about Iran’s uranium enrichment program has been in vogue for over a decade. After suffering sanctions related to a supposedly pacific energy program since 2006, negotiations with F5+1 (France, United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China and Germany) were expected to reach a result on June 30th, after some previous agreements in Lausanne, on April 2nd. On a sad note, the conjoint signature of an official document does not seem to be possible for now, since some primordial and most sensitive points were still not discussed nor accorded.

It is true that Iran does not use its hard power to take countries into accepting its nuclear condition. Whether it could or not do so is still a mystery. In early February this year, Ayatollah Khamenei told economists and officials in Tabriz that the western sanctions will never come to an end, since the countries do not approve the Islamic revolution in the first place. Additionally, he said that if the embargoes were to be maintained, Iran could also follow this path and stop commercializing gas with the European nations, among others. In this point, hard and soft power strategies – or, at least, intentions – in Iran are not balanced, but mixed. President Rouhani’s negotiators try to diplomatically find a solution to the impasse, whereas the supreme leader accuses ‘the enemy’ of using sanctions to the hilt – for that reason, some even predict that there might be a rift between those two sides of the government, instead of the so called ‘smart power’, the ideal soft-hard power balance.

Despite of making its own threats, the country continues to face embargoes due to refusing the proposal of an international team interviewing its scientists as well as an ‘anywhere, anytime’ inspection in military sites by foreign experts. As a signatory of the NPT (1968), it could not develop nuclear activities that do not meet pacific ends; even so, the sort of the researches made in Iranian territory has been doubted since 2002. It is impossible to say and useless to speculate what is being produced there, however it must be taken into account that the technology used to generate nuclear energy for pacifistic purposes takes a lot of time and funding to convert into military one (costs are connected mainly to the uranium enrichment process and actually building a sophisticated weapon system; a reason why countries start off with a military nuclear programme to obtain the nuclear weapon in the first place and afterwards comes the pacifistic nuclear energy part of the story).

Iran is a great regional force in the Middle East and has a profound influence over its Arab neighbours, having trained various militias around the Arab World. It is also militarily well-equipped and prepared, counting on a strong Army and Navy, which makes the other countries very uncomfortable, especially those from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (this is not to say that they are not making Iran nervous with their close bond to the US). Tehran has ambitions of fully controlling the Strait of Hormuz, an important choke point from the Persian Gulf, that would not only enable the country economical control over the whole region, controlling the exports of energy reserves by sea routes, but also militarily one, by barring the American presence there. It also has great ambition towards its due part of the rich Caspian Sea, claiming 20% of it against the 12% already offered by its Caspian neighbours. In all of those cases, it seems right to say that having a nuke would be, in turn, a way of reassuring its power, but, more than meaning the rise of its hard power, a way of coercing and threatening the Gulf countries, the thought creating friction with their main Western ally, the US. In this equation, we cannot forget about the one regional force that has both, nuclear weapons and a very offensive foreign policy strategies: Israel.

Lately, the mounting tension among these nations resulted in the use of Saudi-led forces to control a group of rebels based in Yemen, allegedly supported by Iran. That shows the power of the forces in Saudi Arabia, but it also evidences a paramilitary campaign from Iran’s side that has been developed long ago and all its influence over the region – and it is not because of dialogue.

In addition to all of the above mentioned reasons and the fact that Iran is on the “wrong” side of the alliance axis in the Middle East, standing opposite to Saudi Arabia, Israel and the US, help build arguments – veiled or not- for the continuous and gradual use of hard power towards Iran, through economic bans. On the other hand, it is still to be thought why such countries do not seem to worry so much about the non-signatory nations of the NPT, where the presence of nukes is concrete and not a secret. It is even more ironical if the affinities between those territories and the Western, principally the American leadership, are perceived.      

The perks of being a military wall

As a country of regional importance, Iran seems to be the only nation geographically present and militarily might enough to fight the ISIS spreading – it counts on a huge reservoir of manpower (according to the CIA factbook, 1,4 million people reach military significant age annually and, according to the Iran Intelligence website, 520,000 people are in active duty, being, by far, the most significant number in the region), masters the use of drones and counts on missiles, too – an arsenal that tends to increase, once Russia opted for lifting its 5-year ban and proceed with the sales of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles.

Also, the Persian nation has an old and close liaison with the militias in Iraq and Syria, in addition to Hezbollah and other groups. Its main influence can be noticed in the training of the soldiers, the financing of weapons and staff. Even though it is the ideal nation to recur to – either for its experience in fighting ISIS on the ground level, or for being the one which is aiding military efforts against it – the Western coalition against ISIS, led by the United States, resists Iran`s joining in the effort of mitigating the actions of the jihadists.  

It is clear that the ISIS threat to the Arab world tends to bring historical foes closer, as it may happen to Iran and Iraq due to the Iranian help during the Iraqi occupation – commander and national figure Qassim Soleimani, from the Quds Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, was a resource offered by Iran to direct the Shiite militias against the extremists. This is not the first time Iran uses its military power in Iraq, though. The Iran-Iraq war, that was long, albeit not beneficial for any of the parts involved, was a major example of how both of these countries were able to use their hard power on each other for eight years. The United States that, at the time, was politically and financially involved in the conflict, now assumes a more discrete role with air strikes and assistance to the local Iraqi Army, partly because of its unhealed wounds from the war in Iraq (ended in 2011), partly because of its own internal conflicts at the Congress.

Say it all or not at all

War and firepower are not the only issues that currently worry Iran. Since ten months ago, when the Iranian-American journalist Jason Rezaian, his wife and a photographer were arrested under the charges of betrayal and spying, the world turns its eyes with antipathy to Ayatollah Kahmeini’s judiciary. Both of the ladies were set free after paying a fee, but the Iran-based Washington Post reporter was kept in prison and, since May 25th, is being judged in a court that could only be attended by himself, the judge, the prosecutor and an attorney who he could not choose, in a room reserved for the prosecution of political crimes.

The media worldwide speaks of strong governmental presence in the charges pressed, and the need for such a case is also put into question. Double citizenship of Rezaian is not recognized either, which makes it impossible for the diplomatic service of America to interfere. If convicted, the journalist can face up to six years in prison. But we are still to follow how the community is going to claim his rights – if at all.

Finally, what can be said about Iran is that it is a country that has been through hard probations since 1979 with the fall of Reza Pahlevi. The latest elections, though, show a moment in which the republican government is more open to dialogue and, therefore, can be expected to soothe some of its positions, yet it must count on gradual and homeopathic changes once it is also administrated by the ‘divine’, religious power, that tends to be stricter because of its doctrines. Therefore, Tehran still has a way to go when it comes to choosing its weapons in order to achieve an objective. Maybe this is the time for it to start boosting its willingness to dialogue and its impressive influence with a wiser, more goal-oriented mindset.

Luísa Monteiro is a bachelor in Social Communication and is currently taking a Master's degree in Communication and Politics at PUC São Paulo. Her researches are closely linked to the studies of internet as a democratic agora and her latest academic production correlates the (offline) social movements and their exposure on the net.

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Middle East

Saudi Arabia and Iran want to be friends again

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Eventually the ice-cold relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia began to melt. The two countries sat at the negotiating table shortly after Biden came to power. The results of that discussion are finally being seen. Trade relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia have already begun to move. Although there has been no diplomatic relationship between the two countries since 2016, trade relations have been tense. But trade between Iran and the two countries was zero from last fiscal year until March 20 this year. Iran recently released a report on trade with neighboring countries over the past six months. The report also mentions the name of Saudi Arabia. This means that the rivalry between the two countries is slowly normalizing.

Historically, Shia-dominated Iran was opposed to the Ottoman Empire. The Safavids of Persia have been at war with the Ottomans for a long time, However, after the fall of the Ottomans, when the Middle East was divided like monkey bread, the newly created Saudi Arabia did not have much of a problem with Iran. Business trade between the two countries was normal. This is because the rulers of Saudi Arabia and Iran at the time were Western-backed. That is why there was not much of a problem between them. But when a revolution was organized in Iran in 1979 and the Islamic Republic of Iran was established by overthrowing the Shah, Iran’s relations with the West as well as with Saudi Arabia deteriorated. During the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini called for the ouster of Western-backed rulers from the Middle East. After this announcement, naturally the Arab rulers went against Iran.

Saddam Hussein later invaded Iran with US support and Saudi financial support. After that, as long as Khomeini was alive, Saudi Arabia’s relations with Iran were bad. After Khomeini’s death, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatemi tried to mend fences again. But they didn’t get much of an advantage.

When the Bush administration launched its invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran’s influence in Shiite-majority Iraq continued to grow. Since the start of the Arab Spring in 2011, Iran’s influence in the region has grown. Saudi Arabia has been embroiled in a series of shadow wars to reduce its influence. It can be said that Iran and Saudi Arabia are involved in the Cold War just like the United States and the Soviet Union. Behind that war was a conflict of religious ideology and political interests. Diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran came to a complete standstill in 2016. Iranians attack the Saudi embassy in Tehran after executing Saudi Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimar al-Nimar.  Since then, the two countries have not had diplomatic relations.

Finally, in April this year, representatives of the two countries met behind closed doors in Baghdad. And through this, the two countries started the process of normalizing diplomatic relations again. The last direct meeting between the two countries was held on September 21.

Now why are these two countries interested in normalizing relations? At one point, Mohammed bin Salman said they had no chance of negotiating with Iran. And Khomeini, the current Supreme Leader of Iran, called Mohammed bin Salman the new Hitler. But there is no such thing as a permanent enemy ally in politics or foreign policy. That is why it has brought Saudi Arabia and Iran back to the negotiating table. Prince Salman once refused to negotiate with Iran, but now he says Iran is our neighbor, we all want good and special relations with Iran.

Saudi Arabia has realized that its Western allies are short-lived. But Iran is their permanent neighbor. They have to live with Iran. The United States will not return to fight against Iran on behalf of Saudi Arabia. That is why it is logical for Iran and Saudi Arabia to have their ideological differences and different interests at the negotiating table. Saudi Arabia has been at the negotiating table with Iran for a number of reasons. The first reason is that Saudi Arabia wants to reduce its oil dependence. Prince Salman has announced Vision 2030. In order to implement Vision 2030 and get out of the oil dependent economy, we need to have good relations with our neighbors. It is not possible to achieve such goals without regional stability, He said.

Saudi Arabia also wants to emerge from the ongoing shadow war with Iran in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon to achieve regional stability. The war in Yemen in particular is now a thorn in the side of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are unable to get out of this war, nor are they able to achieve the desired goal. Saudi Arabia must normalize relations with Iran if it is to emerge from the war in Yemen. Without a mutual understanding with Iran, Yemen will not be able to end the war. That is why Saudi Arabia wants to end the war through a peace deal with the Houthis by improving relations with Iran.

Drone strikes could also have an impact on the Saudi Aramco oil field to bring Saudi Arabia to the negotiating table. Because after the drone attack, the oil supply was cut in half. The Saudis do not want Aramco to be attacked again. Also, since the Biden administration has no eye on the Middle East, it would be wise to improve relations with Iran in its own interests.

Iran will benefit the most if relations with Saudi Arabia improve. Their economy has been shaken by long-standing US sanctions on Iran. As Saudi Arabia is the largest and most powerful country in the Middle East, Iran has the potential to benefit politically as well as economically if relations with them are normal.

While Saudi Arabia will normalize relations with Iran, its allies will also improve relations with Iran. As a result, Iran’s political and trade relations with all the countries of the Saudi alliance will be better. This will give them a chance to turn their economy around again. The development of Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia will also send a positive message to the Biden administration. It could lead to a renewed nuclear deal and lift sanctions on Iran.

Another reason is that when Saudi Arabia normalizes relations with Iran, it will receive formal recognition of Iran’s power in the Middle East. The message will be conveyed that it is not possible to turn the stick in the Middle East by bypassing Iran. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran need to be normalized for peace and stability in the Middle East.

But in this case, the United Arab Emirates and Israel may be an obstacle. The closeness that Saudi Arabia had with the UAE will no longer exist. The UAE now relies much more on Israel. There will also be some conflict of interest between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Prince Salman wants to turn Saudi into a full-fledged tourism and business hub that could pose a major threat to the UAE’s economy and make the two countries compete.

Furthermore, in order to sell arms to the Middle East, Iran must show something special. Why would Middle Eastern countries buy weapons if the Iranian offensive was stopped? During the Cold War, arms dealers forced NATO allies to buy large quantities of weapons out of fear of the Soviet Union. So it is in the Middle East. But if the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia is normal, it will be positive for the Muslim world, but it will lead to a recession in the arms market.

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Turkey and Iran find soft power more difficult than hard power

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The times they are a changin’. Iranian leaders may not be Bob Dylan fans, but his words are likely to resonate as they contemplate their next steps in Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, Lebanon, and Azerbaijan.

The same is true for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The president’s shine as a fierce defender of Muslim causes, except for when there is an economic price tag attached as is the case of China’s brutal crackdown on Turkic Muslims, has been dented by allegations of lax defences against money laundering and economic mismanagement.

The setbacks come at a time that Mr. Erdogan’s popularity is diving in opinion polls.

Turkey this weekend expelled the ambassadors of the US, Canada, France, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden for calling for the release of philanthropist and civil rights activist Osman Kavala in line with a European Court of Human Rights decision.

Neither Turkey nor Iran can afford the setbacks that often are the result of hubris. Both have bigger geopolitical, diplomatic, and economic fish to fry and are competing with Saudi Arabia and the UAE as well as Indonesia’s Nahdlatul Ulama for religious soft power, if not leadership of the Muslim world.

That competition takes on added significance in a world in which Middle Eastern rivals seek to manage rather than resolve their differences by focusing on economics and trade and soft, rather than hard power and proxy battles.

In one recent incident Hidayat Nur Wahid, deputy speaker of the Indonesian parliament, opposed naming a street in Jakarta after Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the general-turned-statemen who carved modern Turkey out of the ruins of the Ottoman empire. Mr. Wahid suggested that it would be more appropriate to commemorate Ottoman sultans Mehmet the Conqueror or Suleiman the Magnificent or 14th-century Islamic scholar, Sufi mystic, and poet Jalaludin Rumi.

Mr. Wahid is a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and a board member of the Saudi-run Muslim World League, one of the kingdom’s main promoters of religious soft power.

More importantly, Turkey’s integrity as a country that forcefully combats funding of political violence and money laundering has been called into question by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international watchdog, and a potential court case in the United States that could further tarnish Mr. Erdogan’s image.

A US appeals court ruled on Friday that state-owned Turkish lender Halkbank can be prosecuted over accusations it helped Iran evade American sanctions.

Prosecutors have accused Halkbank of converting oil revenue into gold and then cash to benefit Iranian interests and documenting fake food shipments to justify transfers of oil proceeds. They also said Halkbank helped Iran secretly transfer US$20 billion of restricted funds, with at least $1 billion laundered through the US financial system.

Halkbank has pleaded not guilty and argued that it is immune from prosecution under the federal Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act because it was “synonymous” with Turkey, which has immunity under that law. The case has complicated US-Turkish relations, with Mr.  Erdogan backing Halkbank’s innocence in a 2018 memo to then US President Donald Trump.

FATF placed Turkey on its grey list last week. It joins countries like Pakistan, Syria, South Sudan, and Yemen that have failed to comply with the group’s standards. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) warned earlier this year that greylisting would affect a country’s ability to borrow on international markets,  and cost it an equivalent of up to 3 per cent of gross domestic product as well as a drop in foreign direct investment.

Mr. Erdogan’s management of the economy has been troubled by the recent firing of three central bank policymakers, a bigger-than-expected interest rate cut that sent the Turkish lira tumbling, soaring prices, and an annual inflation rate that last month ran just shy of 20 per cent. Mr. Erdogan has regularly blamed high-interest rates for inflation.

A public opinion survey concluded in May that 56.9% of respondents would not vote for Mr. Erdogan and that the president would lose in a run-off against two of his rivals, Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavas and his Istanbul counterpart Ekrem Imamoglu.

In further bad news for the president, polling company Metropoll said its September survey showed that 69 per cent of respondents saw secularism as a necessity while 85.1 per cent objected to religion being used in election campaigning.

In Iran’s case, a combination of factors is changing the dynamics of Iran’s relations with some of its allied Arab militias, calling into question the domestic positioning of some of those militias, fueling concern in Tehran that its detractors are encircling it, and putting a dent in the way Iran would like to project itself.

A just-published report by the Combatting Terrorism Center at the US Military Academy West Point concluded that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) faced “growing difficulties in controlling local militant cells. Hardline anti-US militias struggle with the contending needs to de-escalate US-Iran tensions, meet the demands of their base for anti-US operations, and simultaneously evolve non-kinetic political and social wings.”

Iranian de-escalation of tensions with the United States is a function of efforts to revive the defunct 2015 international agreement to curb Iran’s nuclear program and talks aimed at improving relations with Saudi Arabia even if they have yet to produce concrete results.

In addition, like in Lebanon, Iranian soft power in Iraq has been challenged by growing Iraqi public opposition to sectarianism and Iranian-backed Shiite militias that are at best only nominally controlled by the state.

Even worse, militias, including Hezbollah, the Arab world’s foremost Iranian-supported armed group, have been identified with corrupt elites in Lebanon and Iraq. Many in Lebanon oppose Hezbollah as part of an elite that has allowed the Lebanese state to collapse to protect its vested interests.

Hezbollah did little to counter those perceptions when the group’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, threatened Lebanese Christians after fighting erupted this month between the militia and the Lebanese Forces, a Maronite party, along the Green Line that separated Christian East and Muslim West Beirut during the 1975-1990 civil war.

The two groups battled each other for hours as Hezbollah staged a demonstration to pressure the government to stymie an investigation into last year’s devastating explosion in the port of Beirut. Hezbollah fears that the inquiry could lay bare pursuit of the group’s interests at the expense of public safety.

“The biggest threat for the Christian presence in Lebanon is the Lebanese Forces party and its head,” Mr. Nasrallah warned, fuelling fears of a return to sectarian violence.

It’s a warning that puts a blot on Iran’s assertion that its Islam respects minority rights, witness the reserved seats in the country’s parliament for religious minorities. These include Jews, Armenians, Assyrians and Zoroastrians.

Similarly, an alliance of Iranian-backed Shiite militias emerged as the biggest loser in this month’s Iraqi elections. The Fateh (Conquest) Alliance, previously the second-largest bloc in parliament, saw its number of seats drop from 48 to 17.

Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi brought forward the vote from 2022 to appease a youth-led protest movement that erupted two years ago against corruption, unemployment, crumbling public services, sectarianism, and Iranian influence in politics.

One bright light from Iran’s perspective is the fact that an attempt in September by activists in the United States to engineer support for Iraqi recognition of Israel backfired.

Iran last month targeted facilities in northern Iraq operated by Iranian opposition Kurdish groups. Teheran believes they are part of a tightening US-Israeli noose around the Islamic republic that involves proxies and covert operations on its Iraqi and Azerbaijani borders.

Efforts to reduce tension with Azerbaijan have failed. An end to a war of words that duelling military manoeuvres on both sides of the border proved short-lived. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, emboldened by Israeli and Turkish support in last year’s war against Armenia, appeared unwilling to dial down the rhetoric.

With a revival of the nuclear program in doubt, Iran fears that Azerbaijan could become a staging pad for US and Israeli covert operations. Those doubts were reinforced by calls for US backing of Azerbaijan by scholars in conservative Washington think tanks, including the Hudson Institute and the Heritage Foundation.

Eldar Mamedov, a political adviser for the social-democrats in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, warned that “the US government should resist calls from hawks to get embroiled in a conflict where it has no vital interest at stake, and much less on behalf of a regime that is so antithetical to US values and interests.”

He noted that Mr. Aliyev has forced major US NGOs to leave Azerbaijan, has trampled on human and political rights, and been anything but tolerant of the country’s Armenian heritage.

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Process to draft Syria constitution begins this week

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The process of drafting a new constitution for Syria will begin this week, the UN Special Envoy for the country, Geir Pedersen, said on Sunday at a press conference in Geneva.

Mr. Pedersen was speaking following a meeting with the government and opposition co-chairs of the Syrian Constitutional Committee, who have agreed to start the process for constitutional reform.

The members of its so-called “small body”, tasked with preparing and drafting the Constitution, are in the Swiss city for their sixth round of talks in two years, which begin on Monday. 

Their last meeting, held in January, ended without progress, and the UN envoy has been negotiating between the parties on a way forward.

“The two Co-Chairs now agree that we will not only prepare for constitutional reform, but we will prepare and start drafting for constitutional reform,” Mr. Pedersen told journalists.

“So, the new thing this week is that we will actually be starting a drafting process for constitutional reform in Syria.”

The UN continues to support efforts towards a Syrian-owned and led political solution to end more than a decade of war that has killed upwards of 350,000 people and left 13 million in need of humanitarian aid.

An important contribution

The Syrian Constitutional Committee was formed in 2019, comprising 150 men and women, with the Government, the opposition and civil society each nominating 50 people.

This larger group established the 45-member small body, which consists of 15 representatives from each of the three sectors.

For the first time ever, committee co-chairs Ahmad Kuzbari, the Syrian government representative, and Hadi al-Bahra, from the opposition side, met together with Mr. Pedersen on Sunday morning. 

He described it as “a substantial and frank discussion on how we are to proceed with the constitutional reform and indeed in detail how we are planning for the week ahead of us.”

Mr. Pedersen told journalists that while the Syrian Constitutional Committee is an important contribution to the political process, “the committee in itself will not be able to solve the Syrian crisis, so we need to come together, with serious work, on the Constitutional Committee, but also address the other aspects of the Syrian crisis.”

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