Connect with us

Energy

Oil price and the potential impacts to the global economy

Published

on

It seems one cannot go a day without seeing a headline about the low price of oil and the potential impacts to the US and global economy and the oil and gas industry. In order to help make sense of the myriad of information available, we have broken down the issue into the following fundamental questions.

Why did oil prices correct so suddenly? Is the current low price environment due to lower demand or increased supply or a combination of both?

The answer is a combination of both. The correction is a net result of lower-than-projected demand growth and a remarkable increase in supply. On the demand side, in July 2014 the Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Agency (IEA), and OPEC forecast 2015 global liquids growth to be 1.7 percent on average. However, these expectations declined to just 1.1 percent by December 2014, despite a low price environment that typically would have been conducive to boosting demand.i One reason for the muted demand response to the low price signal has been the increasing strength of the US dollar relative to other major world currencies. Notably, the US Dollar Index has risen nearly 15 percent to 97.4 since July 2014. A stronger dollar makes dollar-denominated crude more expensive for buyers using foreign currency. Consequently, while the United States is enjoying the full benefit of low prices, many other countries are only experiencing a portion of the price decline, giving them less reason to consume more petroleum products.

On the supply side, several years of $100/bbl oil drove tremendous production growth in many countries. US crude output, including lease condensate production, increased by over 2 MMbbl/d from 2012 to 2014. This domestic supply surge greatly offset US net crude oil imports, shrinking them from 8.5 MMbbl/d in 2012 to less than 7 MMbbl/d in 2014. Meanwhile, Brazil, Iraq, and Canada collectively added nearly 1 MMbbl/d over the same two-year period.

All told in 2014, production growth of 1.9 percent exceeded demand growth of 1 percent, leading to an inventory build-up of 500 thousand bbl/d with another 400 thousand bbl/d projected for 2015.

Is OPEC content to wait it out until high-cost producers fall by the wayside? Or, will OPEC cut production?

When oil prices first started to fall, many thought OPEC members might agree to cut production to support prices. However, members rejected that idea during their regularly scheduled meeting in November 2014, leaving OPEC’s official crude production target unchanged at 30 MMbbl/d. In light of the news, the market responded with an immediate 10 percent decline in the price of WTI crude.

Why couldn’t OPEC members agree on a strategic response despite the urgency of the situation? The opposing concerns of two different factions split the camp.

The fiscal breakeven cost is the price that OPEC producers need to receive for their oil in order to balance their government budgets, which are heavily reliant on oil revenue. When prices fall below the fiscal breakeven cost, oil-exporting economies must make up for the shortfall by drawing on cash reserves or reducing expenditures. Countries such as Iran, Venezuela, and Nigeria have high social costs and low cash reserves. The collapse in oil prices not only puts them under financial pressure but also potentially threatens the stability of their governments if transfer payments cannot be made. These fears make them more amenable to crying “uncle” and cutting production to boost prices.

Meanwhile, other OPEC members, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the U.A.E., have cash reserves to finance the shortfall for many months. Their biggest fear is not near-term financial collapse, but instead long-term loss of market share. Here, the strong oil prices over the last few years have worked against them in some ways. Prices in the neighborhood of $100/bbl have facilitated significant growth in global crude production, particularly in North America. Today, the increasing volume of unconventional production in the US and Canada is changing import/export dynamics and decreasing western reliance on OPEC producers.

Rather than acting to defend prices, the Gulf producers within the organization, led by Saudi Arabia, are working to defend their global market share. In doing so, they are gambling that as the lower cost producers, OPEC members will ultimately prevail over more costly unconventional operators. Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s oil minister Ali al-Naimi has stated directly that the kingdom will not intervene to support prices. “Whether it goes down to $20, $40, $50, $60, it is irrelevant … it is not in the interest of OPEC producers to cut their production, whatever the price is”.

However, conventional oil field development generally requires years of planning and construction before the first barrels of oil are produced. Today’s low prices may not be enough to curtail the numerous development projects already underway.

What is happening in China, the leading contributor to global growth? Is it rebalancing its economy or has it started a painful correction?

In 2014, the Chinese economy officially grew at a rate of 7.4 percent, down from 7.7 percent, which represented the slowest rate of growth in 24 years.ix In the fourth quarter of 2014, the economy was up 7.3 percent from a year earlier, a figure that was a bit better than what investors had expected, but still indicative of a continuing slowdown.x Moreover, the IMF now predicts that GDP growth will fall below the psychologically important 7.0 percent level in 2015.

This raises questions about China’s future oil demand. In the past, China’s focus on infrastructure and capital projects made it the second largest consumer of crude oil in the world, and it imported large volumes of it at market prices—however high. But its transition to a more consumer-oriented economy might make it more price-sensitive in the future. Regardless, industry stakeholders should stay abreast of economic developments in China, since the nation has been responsible for 55 percent of total growth in oil consumption worldwide between 2005 and 2013.

How much new supply is poised to come online in 2015 and 2016?

In 2014, new non-OPEC large-field projects (i.e., those producing over 25 thousand bbl/d each) collectively brought on 2.3 MMbbl/d in new supply. These efforts spanned diverse geographies and production methods, ranging from Brazil’s offshore projects in the Roncador, Parque, Iracema, and Sapinhoa fields to Mars B in the Gulf of Mexico, and to Russian and Canadian oil sands projects. Notably, these supply additions excluded the numerous shale oil fields being developed in the US. OPEC also contributed to the expanding large-field supply picture, adding another 1.4 MM bbl/d of new oil production capacity in 2014.

For 2015, a Deloitte MarketPoint analysis suggests large-field projects could bring on 1.835 MMbbl/d in new supply (i.e., 1.2 MMbbl/d from non-OPEC producers and 0.635 MMbbl/d from OPEC members). These projects are well underway and are unlikely to be halted, even in the current low-price environment. Taking this momentum into account, the analysis further forecasts large-field production additions of 2.676 – 3.434 MMbbl/d from non-OPEC producers and 0.759 MMbbl/d from OPEC members in 2016.

For the past two years, US tight oil production has grown at an annual rate of approximately 1 MMbbl/d. This growth is expected to continue in 2015, but at a slower rate.xvii While the recent drop in crude prices has squeezed the capex budgets of shale producers, some reportedly have been able to lower their operating costs to below $40/bbl through efficiency gains and better economics in the “sweet spots” of the shale plays. As a result, production growth is expected to continue in the short term despite low prices, albeit more slowly than in prior years. While there is no consensus on the extent to which growth will slow, many analysts expect declines of 300-500 thousand bbl/d off the 2014 pace.

It is important to note that the world experiences a four to five percent production loss per year just from normal depletion. So the added production has to equal this amount if we are to stay even with no additional growth.

Will the industry stabilize and balance after 2016?

Based on current data, demand should grow faster than supplies starting in 2016. Low prices over the next few years will likely inhibit investment in new projects—especially those in the early stages of discussion or in the engineering and design phases. It should also bolster demand, due to price elasticity,much faster than otherwise would be the case.

What does the future look like in 2020?

By simulating how the aforementioned variables could affect market conditions, the Deloitte MarketPoint World Oil Model (the Model) provides some insight into where prices might be headed. The findings from the Model’s output include the following:

•     Based on the EIA’s estimates, production is expected to continue to outpace demand in 2015 by approximately 400 thousand/bbd. This assumption is driven largely by continued production growth through the first half of 2015 as many producers strive to complete projects falling into the “too late to turn back” category and as yet-to-expire hedging contracts allow them to continue producing despite uneconomic market conditions.

•     On a half-cycle basis, oil prices could fall below $40 bbl. There have been several periods in the last 25 years where prices have dipped well below this level. However, in the current market environment, some of the very low prices witnessed in the past are unlikely to reappear, at least on a sustained basis. Since oil markets are self-correcting, market forces should trigger an adjustment, mainly through low prices that engender more demand, decrease marginal, high-cost supply, and encourage supply depletion. This suggests that historically low prices could not be sustained for more than 3 to 12 months, absent other drivers affecting demand.

•     If the low-price environment continues as expected through the first half of 2015, it should trigger a demand response that will likely be felt in the second half of the year. This is the same time period when cut-backs on the number of shale drilling rigs in operation, expiring hedging contracts, and other production-related belt-tightening should start to have a more prominent effect on production growth and market perception.

•     As a result, Deloitte MarketPoint forecasts crude prices to rise in the second half of 2015, elevating the average annual price above present levels. Additionally, the forecast expects the average 2015 WTI price to reach $62/bbl and then to rise gradually over the next few years until it reaches a new steady range of $75-$80/bbl (i.e., combined WTI and Brent world crude price) as early as 2018. This new equilibrium price is approximately $20/bbl lower than the steady state achieved in previous years, because it reflects two new circumstances in the marketplace:

Prior to the “shale revolution,” there was a scarcity premium of $10-$20/bbl in place. With the newfound abundance of tight oil in the US and potentially in other areas around the globe, that scarcity premium has been reduced.

Producers in high-cost regions, such as the Canadian oil sands and certain tight oil plays in the US, have continued to improve their margins through technological innovation. While their margins will be lower in the new equilibrium-price environment, they should still be able to operate profitably.

The Deloitte MarketPoint price forecast is only one possibility among a multitude of potential outcomes. Changes in key assumptions, such as the magnitude of the demand response as well as the trajectory of tight oil production growth, would greatly change this picture. With only negligible shifts in demand or production in the next 12 to 18 months, the average price could likely be lower, and the recovery would likely be “U” shaped, reinforcing the price signal to shale producers to decrease production.

Forces that could potentially make upside price scenarios more likely include any number of black swan events affecting supply or the perception of supply scarcity. However, since oil markets are highly cyclical, they tend to overshoot or undershoot most long-term outlooks. The current price environment has, or soon will, curb many development plans. These can be restarted in the future once the pricing environment becomes more favorable, but the lag could just be the catalyst for pushing the market back into a scarcity mindset sooner than expected.

History has demonstrated that the oil and gas industry is resilient. Oil prices are rarely stable for extended periods of time, and the industry has shown a remarkable ability to adapt and thrive as cycles change. Even after analyzing market fundamentals and other variables, the questions keep coming: Will demand continue to moderate or grow in the face of lower gasoline prices? Will companies become more efficient, leading to lower breakeven prices for US shale plays? How will global/political circumstances change?

While forecasts can be helpful for thinking about possibilities, the future is never entirely visible. However, one thing is clear: Many oil and gas companies will need to retrench and determine how they can best adapt and manage change in this challenging environment. Enlightened companies will use this time as an opportunity to improve their organizations by continuing to focus on:

•     Enhanced efficiency and performance through business process and/or supply chain optimization

•     Strategic and operational improvements

•     Reduced and/or refocused capital expenditures

•     Portfolio upgrades through acquisitions and/or divestitures

•     Talent acquisitions

Continue Reading
Comments

Energy

Gazprom and Europe

Published

on

Football in the 21st Century is not only a sport but a global brand in itself. Football allows others to feed and profit off of it as well. Global corporations have used this opportunity to leverage into newer markets and, or, improve their reputation in existing markets.

Gazprom; it is on players’ jerseys in Germany, in Russia, in Serbia, at games in England, and on side-lines in Italy. Gazprom is a Russian natural gas company. Teams make money offering jersey space to sponsors selling things like credit cards, cars, insurance companies and cell phones. But Gazprom is not like most sponsors: private companies with products football fans can buy. Instead, it is a company owned by the Russian government that makes money selling natural gas to foreign countries. It is everywhere in European football. So, if football fans cannot buy what they’re selling, why is Gazprom spending millions to sponsor games?

The answer is part of a larger story that’s changing the sport. Gazprom’s partnership with these clubs is mutually beneficial because they provide a crucial revenue stream to the football club while in turn gaining publicity and a foothold in key target markets in which they are hoping for an increasing profit margins they represent a successful confident company that yields significant power and influence.

It is a corporation that reflects the values and ambitions of the Russian state the company via a series of commercial partnerships and high-profile sponsorship deals is now firmly in the collective conscience of European football fans few are quite sure whatthe company stands for or what this foothold means and in any case they are largely apathetic which oddly mirrors the aims of Vladimir Putin and increased influence in Western culture becoming a major player in events without the stigma of political connections or ulterior motives. Foreign countries use companies they own to burnish their reputations abroad, and to understand why Russia is involved, one needs to closely observe a  map. Russia has the world’s largest natural gas reserves and most of the mare located in Arctic gas fields controlled by Gazprom. The company is led by Alexey Miller, a close ally of Vladimir Putin. Since 2005, the Russian government has owned a majority stake in Gazprom. Meaning company profits are under Putin’s control and gas sales, along with oil,account for around 40% of Russia’s annual budget.

Various maps showcase how European countries are on Russian gas and Eastern European countries are more dependent than countries further west. At the end of the 20th century, Germany represented the biggest opportunity for Gazprom. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder had announced plans to phase out coal and nuclear power, which meant Germany would need more natural gas to maintain their energy supply. Gazprom wanted to get it to them, but there was a problem. To get to Germany, Russia’s gas needed pass to through pipelines crossing countries charging Gazprom transport fees. And most of them went through Ukraine, a country that has a complicated relationship with Russia. Today, Ukraine still charges Russia $2-3 billion dollars every year to pump gas through to Europe. So, starting back in 2005, Russia began working on a strategy to bypass Ukraineand ship their gas directly to Western Europe.

This led to the birth of the Nord Stream pipeline,  a route through The Baltic Sea straight to Northern Germany.In late 2005, Gazprom was in the final stages of financing the project and Germany’s chancellor was preparing for an election. During his time in office, Gerhard Schroeder had become friendly with Putin and critics in Germany were increasingly concerned about the Russian leader’s growing influence.

Just a few weeks before the election, Schroeder met with Putinto sign an agreement officially approving the pipeline. Two months later, Schroeder lost his re-election but by March he had found a new job: overseeing Gazprom’s pipeline to Germany. It also came out that, before leaving office, Schroeder had approved a secret Gazprom loan that provided over a billion euros to finance the project. Soon, the story of Gazprom’s big project in Germany was becoming a story of scandal, corruption, and the creeping influence of Russia. But then the story changed.

In 2006, Gazprom signed a deal to sponsor the German team FC Schalke 04.At the time, Schalke’s finances were worrying team officials and Gazprom’s sponsorship provided money the team desperately needed. At a press conference announcing the deal, a Gazprom chairman said Schalke’s connections with the German energy sector were why they decided to become their sponsor. Schalke plays in Gelsenkirchen – a town in Germany’s Ruhr Valley, where much of the country’s energy industry is based. It’s also close to the town of Rehden, a hub for pipelines to the rest of Europe and home to Western Europe’s largest natural gas storage facilities.

Interestingly, Schalke was not Gazprom’s first deal. The year before, they had bought a controlling stake in a team on the other end of the Nord Stream route: the Russian team Zenit St. Petersburg. Gazprom’s investment made Zenit a major force in soccer. Two years after taking control, Zenit won their first-ever league championship. They’ve been able to sign expensive foreign stars, like Belgian midfielder Axel Witseland the Brazilian forward Hulk, and Gazrpom uses Zenit for marketing stunts: like having players scrimmage on the side of their offshore gas platform.

In 2006, as Gazprom logos were revealed around Schalke’s stadium, German headlines were hailing the Russian gas giant for pumping millions into the German team. To celebrate the deal, Schalke’s new jersey was unveiled in a ceremony before Schalke and Zenit played a friendly match in Russia. And, over the next few years, the Gazprom logo would become a team symbol displayed at Schalke games and printed on official merchandise. Schalke also won a championship in 2011 and by then, Nord Stream had been completed, and that year, Gerhard Schroeder, Angela Merkel and other European officials gathered to celebrate as it began pumping gas to Germany. There was also another struggling team whose jerseys started featuring Gazprom’s logo: The Serbian team Red Star Belgrade. Red Star was about 25 million dollars in debt when Gazprom signed to become their jersey sponsor.

And, again, there was also another pipeline: The South Stream would have bypassed Ukraine by going directly through Serbia to Southern Europe. That project closed in 2014, but Gazprom has continued increasing their access to Europe by building Nord Stream 2, a second pipeline doubling the amount of gas flowing from Russia to Germany. Gazprom has also expanded their empire to include energy partnerships with Chelsea Football Club[1], Champions League and the sport’s most famous tournament: the FIFA World Cup.

These sponsorships have made Gazprom’s logo familiar not just to fans in Europe, but across the world.“We light up the football. Gazprom. Official partner.”It’s in commercials before games, and on jerseys and sidelines once it starts. FC Schalke fans have also started to see Nord Stream 2 ads at home games. And, while climate activists like Greenpeace have staged protests to point out Gazprom’s threat to Arctic resources, Gazprom had no trouble renewing their sponsorships.

Now, Russia controls nearly half the gas consumed by Europe and other countries are learning from their example. Etihad, Emirates, and Qatar Airways all are owned by sovereign states in the Middle Eastwith interests that go beyond selling airline tickets. As the example of Gazprom shows, having a prominent footballing sponsorship offers a way around bad publicity by winning approval on the field. If you’re a fan, that can feel like a big opportunity: their money helps teams win major tournaments, but it’s starting to change the sport itself. Gazprom like so many others, is an opportunist who strives to be linked to sporting successes. Gazprom’s reasons for investing so heavily in sport could be compared to any global organization. It is a fascinating  means of advertising. It has become common to see a Serbian team sponsored by Russia’s gas company facing off against a French team sponsored by Dubai’s state-owned airline, it’s starting to seem like the field is hosting two competitions at once: A match between two teams, and a larger play for foreign influence that continues long after the final whistle.


[1] Owned byRoman Abramovich since 2012 seven years prior to this deal Abramovich sold his shares in Sibneft his oil-producing company to Gazprom for an estimated 10.4 Billion Euros.

Continue Reading

Energy

New oil pipeline in northern Thailand may worsen flooding

Published

on

A pipeline stretching from central to north-east Thailand promises to “promote Thailand as an energy hub in the region” and “increase energy security”, according to the Ministry of Energy. Construction began in mid-2019, despite local communities objecting that the largely Chinese-financed project could worsen flooding and contaminate water.

The 342km pipeline will run two metres underground and link Thailand’s north-eastern province of Khon Kaen to an existing pipeline in the central province of Saraburi. Energy Minister Sonthirat Sonthijirawong attended a ceremony on 5 February to lay the foundation of a 140 million litre oil tank in Khon Kaen’s Ban Phai district at the end of the pipeline.

Altogether, it will pass through 70 towns in five provinces including Lopburi, Nakhon Ratchasima and Chaiyaphum.

The route was agreed in August 2016, when the energy ministry signed a deal with the project investor, Thai Pipeline Network (TPN).

The ministry has promoted the pipeline as a more efficient means of transporting oil to the north-east, claiming it will lower oil prices and cut down on accidents involving road tankers.

TPN director Panu Seetisarn said the pipeline will avoid 88,000 road tanker journeys each year.

The THB9.2 billion (US$300 million) project is largely funded by a loan from the Chinese government, which stipulates that at least 35% of the equipment used must come from China. The precise details of the deal have not been made public. However, Panu revealed that TPN and undisclosed investors are investing about THB1 billion each.

The project has been progressing quickly since January last year when the government approved the environmental impact assessment (EIA) report.

In February, TPN – a subsidiary of Power Solution Technologies (PSTC) – signed a contract with China Petroleum Pipeline Engineering (CPP) to construct the pipeline within a 30-month period. And then works commenced in mid-2019.

Panu also revealed that the company wants to link the pipeline to the capital of Laos, Vientiane, and to southern China.

As well as the controversial north-eastern route, the first phase of another route, from central to north, is also under construction. The northern route is being developed with the ultimate aim of linking Tak province into Myanmar’s Kayin state at Myawaddy.

Flood risk

“This will lead to a big flood, bigger than the recent one,” said Ow, a local resident of Khon Kaen’s Ban Phai district, recalling flash flooding following tropical storm Podul that put homes under more than 1.5 metres of water for over a month last summer.

She fears the construction of an oil tank a few kilometres away will worsen flooding in future.

“Looking at its huge area and how high they have raised the land to level it for construction, [it] will definitely block all waterways,” she said, adding: “What will happen to us if there’s a big storm again?”

“After discussion with my neighbours, we [all] share the same concern and decided to file a complaint to the local authority but nothing happened,” said Ow.

The villagers’ concerns are justified, according to Jaroonpit Moonsarn, an environmental official at the Department of Environmental Quality Promotion (DEQP).

“There are two creeks, the Huay Bandoo and the Huay Khamrian, in the area that are natural waterways helping to drain waters in the district. The construction has blocked these significant waterways,” said Jaroonpit.

She believes another tropical storm in the area would create a bigger flood than the one last August.

Dust, pollution and public safety

Flooding is tomorrow’s fear, but dust is today’s suffering, said Ow, referring to air pollution caused by the construction of the oil tank that is affecting surrounding communities.

“We filed a complaint to the construction company, but they told us to complain and seek compensation from their subcontractors. It’s still unresolved. We don’t know who to talk to,” she said.

Jaroonpit also noted local concerns about the project once it’s finished, such as explosions, chemical contamination of local groundwater and heavy traffic. Road tankers will still be needed to distribute oil from the pipeline to nearby provinces, and additional tankers are expected to operate if the road to Laos is improved.

“Public safety should be seriously studied and discussed, including how to manage such risks and how to compensate,” she said.

“This involves the daily life of local people and they should have been informed clearly before the project’s construction approval, otherwise it leaves all the burden on them,” said Thawisan Lonanurak, former secretary general of the North-eastern Chamber of Commerce.

Apart from the risks to public safety, there are several basic questions about the project that need answering, according to Thawisan.

“Will oil prices in this area really be cheaper? How cheap? And most important, how transparent is the deal between the state and private investor?” Thawisan said.

“These questions should be answered at least during the EIA and hearing process, but it hasn’t happened,” he added.​

Witoon Kamonnarumet, senior advisor to the Khon Kaen Federation of Industry, said hearings for the EIA were conducted twice among a small group of people selected by the project owner and the company contracted to produce the EIA. They were not open to the general public.

“Even local businessmen in my network said they know very little about this project and are not clear on what it will really look like. We heard it would come two years ago and then there was a long silence and then construction started recently,” Witoon said.

“At the EIA hearing, most of the time was used for a company presentation focusing on what they had done in other areas,” said Paitoon Mahachuenjai, Nakhon Ratchasima’s Dan Khun Thod District head. They said that if there was “any problem during construction they would be ready to help,” he added.

Local activist Suwit Kularbwong, chairman of the Human Rights and Environment Association, said communities affected by the project have limited access to information about it.

“Where will the pipeline pass through exactly? How much area will be expropriated or compensated, and at what rate? They still don’t know. This goes against the [country’s] 2017 Constitution on public information and public participation for such a project,” Suwit said.

“This project has been initiated by the state and developed with a top-down approach, without sufficient consideration of its impacts, and with poor public participation. What will happen if more and more people along the pipeline know about the real impacts after construction and learn that they were not informed beforehand? Local opposition is foreseen. And government should be aware of this as it could affect the ongoing construction of the project,” he said.

Chinese investment and public discussion

Suwit said there is inadequate public awareness and discussion about projects and Chinese investment.

“The influence of Chinese investment in this region as well as the Mekong has been growing rapidly in recent years, without taking human rights violations and environmental impacts into account. And [it’s been] actively supported and facilitated by our Thai government.

“The key question is how ready are we for such massive investment from China? How ready is our government to protect its people’s interests from developments like this one where they are losing their land?” asked Suwit.

To address public concerns, Suwit suggested open public forums so that discussion could take place on the controversial oil pipeline and broader development plans for the north-eastern region.

“That which is missing from the past EIA process should be fixed there. At the forum, all basic project information should be available beforehand. It should be open to participation and discussion from all groups,” Suwit said.

Thawisan shared the same suggestion. “Local universities and academics should also play an important role to help digest technical and academic information for local people to understand the project properly,” he said.

From our partner chinadialogue.net

Continue Reading

Energy

How Turk Stream is forcing Europe on its heels

Sisir Devkota

Published

on

Russia laid down two gas pipelines from its territory, one from the topmost northern hemisphere, famously named as “Nord Stream” and the most advanced, latest with all rights “Turk Stream”; that passes through Turkey, a nation that now finds pride in being able to connect Russia with the rest of Europe. In recent years, European nations have heavily relied on American natural gas supplies and new set of renewables; while sanctions over Russia in the past decade primarily stalled business on both sides, Europe has now changed its language on Russia’s desire to sell oil to the continent. On paper, Europe is openly welcoming a new source of energy supplies in the name of profitable competition, yet changesare only the tip of deep lying geopolitical stakes. Turkstream was launched in the beginning of January; and so, did a brand-new Russian policy take effect that could change foreign relations in the years to come. But, why is Europe changing course suddenly?

Geographically, between the two pipelines on the north and south is Ukraine sitting ignored by Russia’s willingness, more so; it is also a statement of available options at Putin’s hand. It is well noted that Russian aspirations are serious; investing on two different routes has been costly, but the oil rich nation has caught all eyes. While Turkey is flaunting a newfound friendship on the East, other nations in the region, including Ukraine, are assessing exact Russian interests; a major miss out on economic benefits would not be rational for a set of other rather neutral nations than Ukraine. Consider the politics of language, while Nord Stream is still very vague and could include Baltic and western Scandinavia, “Turk Stream” is a prize won in the eyes of a shared Mediterranean neighborhood. It is like saying that Turkey won the rights to sell Russian reserves to European clients, that also have inhibitions against historical Turkish aspirations in the EU. Still, other reasons are held higher.

Uncharacteristically, China is behind all the insecurities in Europe. There is no secret on whether Sino-Russian ties could yield a similar energy route between two nations, both infrastructural might and President Xi’s willingness to expand the Belt & Road projects could easily accommodate energy linkups. For European leaders have realized that such possibilities could most possibly deteriorate Europe’s energy as well as economic balance. By 2030, Chinese energy needs are going to double from what it is now; Europe does not desire a vociferous Chinese demand taking away Russian reserves to the East. Alarmingly, European nations also realize that soon, a proposition as such is highly likely, given how current competition has taken down prices. After a decade of disturbing sanctions testing Russian sanctions, it will be waiting patiently for an overhaul in the form of ceiling new rate of prices. For Europe, America still might not have been redundant, but the US-Ukraine soft spot, certainly has.

The European dilemma does not end yet, for Russia has played the cards on both sides; it will have to forge a face-saving approach with Turkey, given how it has treated Ankara over issues relating to EU membership. Like an astute capitalist, Moscow is promising to feed Europe, whilst also biting into its wounds, forcing to deal with problems that may allow Russia an affirmation to jump over Chinese demands. On the backdrop of a successful Brexit, Turkey will be teasing at the European sanctity, a group that has continuously reminded it of being unsuitable. For Europe’s dislike, Russian reserves now flow through Turkish territories and might successfully ruin newly established competitors in the energy market. Underestimation has cost Europe again while Russia has lastly taken afoot. It is only the beginning of a grand Russian policy.

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Style1 hour ago

The Breitling AVI Ref. 765 1953 Re-Edition

In 1953, Breitling launched its Ref. 765 AVI, a pilot’s watch (AVI stood for “aviation”) known as the “Co-Pilot”. It...

African Renaissance3 hours ago

The Fort: The Oliver Tambo University

The main reason for this proposal is that many, if not all, my teachers at the South End High School...

Defense5 hours ago

“Westlessness” of the West, and debates on China during Munich Security Conference

The Munich Security Conference, which traditionally brings together heads of state and government, foreign and defense ministers in February, is...

Hotels & Resorts7 hours ago

Discover Ateshgah Historical Architectural Reserve with Four Seasons Hotel Baku

The capital of Azerbaijan, beautiful Baku is known for its ancient and rich culture. It’s the city where centuries-long history is combined with modern...

Americas9 hours ago

How Bernie Sanders Will Destroy the Deep State if He Becomes President

Joe Lauria at Consortium News headlined on February 21st, “Apparent US Intel Meddling in US Election With ‘Report’ Russia is...

South Asia11 hours ago

Pakistan- Afghanistan- Turkey Trilateral Summits and its implication for the region

This essay aims to critically explain the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Turkey Trilateral Summits and its implications for the region. These summits were initiated...

Style14 hours ago

Celebrate Time With A Personalised Engraving On Your Jaeger Lecoultre Reverso

When Jaeger‑LeCoultre introduced the Reverso almost 90 years ago, its blank metal flip side was designed purely as a functional...

Trending