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Turkey – EU – Russia triangle: Geometry changed?

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The “new Turkey” of the president Erdogan

The past year can arguably be considered a turning point in the political history of Turkey. In August, the president Recep Tayyp Erdogan has been elected president of the Republic, after serving three terms as prime minister, the first directly elected by Turkish citizens.

Such an institutional step marked a substantive strengthening of the very president Erdogan and his party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), as the former foreign affairs minister and Erdogan’s right-hand man, Ahmet Davutoglu, has been named as new prime minister. Since the last electoral campaign, “new Turkey” has become an important concept in the political Turkish lexicon. As an editorial in the pro-Erdogan daily Yeni Safak argues, «if the attack [on New Turkey] is coming from within, this is called betrayal. New Turkey is not a slogan. It’s not a party expression or a political show. New Turkey is a project. This is the redesigning and re-establishing of Turkey after a century».[1] The recent restrictive action of the government against the press seems to match some features of this insight of the State. On December 14, the Turkish police have arrested twenty-five members of the daily Zaman’s redaction and TV station, including its editor in chief, Ekrem Dumanli. Admittedly, the raids can be easily interpreted as addressed against Fethullah Gulen, the US-based islamic cleric, to which Zaman is closely tied. The move has been sharply criticized by the European Union. Additionally, the Turkey’s parliament has been discussing an “internal security” reform that is going to strengthen the powers of the police in handling demonstrations. The organization “Reporters Without Borders” points out that: «If the bill is passed as it stands, police officers will be allowed “in emergencies” to conduct searches of places, persons or vehicles on nothing more than a verbal order from a superior that must subsequently be confirmed in writing. Arbitrary searches of news organizations and journalists’ homes, which are already common, would inevitably be facilitated, at the expense of the confidentiality of journalists’ sources.[2]

The socio-economic agenda

One of the most thorny issues the Turkish government has to tackle is constituted by the socio-economic agenda. The question has been strongly raised, among others, on the occasion of the Taksim square’s demonstrations in 2013. The prime minister Davutoglu has recently formulated his economic priorities, as Turkey has been taking the G20’s presidency in 2015. It pivots on inclusiveness, implementation, and investment for growth.[3] Despite of political declarations, growth has lost momentum in 2014. After the high rates registered in 2010 and 2011 (around 10%), in 2012 the economy grew around 2%. In 2014 the target of 4% has been revised by the government. A relevant factor in such a drop is the fall of domestic demands and investments. Turkish economy is highly dependent on foreign capital (the current-account deficit hit 7.9% of GDP in 2013). According to the state statistics agency, Turkey’s unemployment rate stood at 10.9% in December 2014 rising from 10.7% in November. The issues of refugees and its economic and humanitarian implications is worth to be mentioned. Over 1.700.000 million Syrians have taken refugee in Turkey since the war began in March 2011. Nearly 30% of these live in twenty-two camps near the Syrian-Turkish border. In September 2014, attacks by the Islamic State against Kurdish towns and villages close to the Turkish border brought hundreds of thousands of Kurds to flee to Turkey. As the Danish Refugee Council reports: «In Turkey, refugees outside of camps face integration challenges such as language barriers and very few social ties, resulting in higher tensions with local communities and difficulty finding employment. Syrians in Turkey have very few opportunities to access credit with shops, and landlords generally demand rent/utility payments every month without exception or flexibility. Syrian men who do manage to find temporary jobs (daily, weekly, or sometimes monthly) often complain that they are not paid at the end of the work, and they cannot pursue any legal recourse because they have no right to work in Turkey. They say the Turkish employer will just find another Syrian to replace him, and generally not pay him either».

This issue triggers new dynamics in the labour market and in the very Turkish society. The huge increase of labour supply pushes wages down. A sudden upsurge of Turkey’s population by 1 million people has soared rents by 40-50%, especially in the provinces of Gaziantep, Sanliurfa and Hatay. The rising rent and increasing unemployment particularly hit the poorer portions of the local population. The chairman of the Mersin Chamber of Retailers and Artisans, Talat Dincer points out that the «refugees working at wages below the minimum wage and without social insurance cause the increase in unemployment. A solution has to be found soonest».[4]

The next June 2015, the general elections will constitute a significant test in order to assess the real grip of AKP’s power. It will be the occasion to test the institutional Turkish path to a presidential system, with the president Erdogan’s proposal to emend the constitution, and the challenges which the regional panorama presents.

Ankara and Brussels: accession process and common regional challenges

The EU-Turkey relations have recently showed interesting developments after a phase of substantial stalemate mainly registered on the issue of Turkey’s accession to the European Union. Remarkable changes have characterized the political life of the two actors in the last year. While a new Commission installed in Brussels, after Erdogan sworn in as president of the Republic and the new prime Minister Davutoglu took his charge, Ankara published a document containing the new strategy of Ankara toward Europe. It highlighted, among others, that «Turkey and the EU are encountering common challenges that underline the importance of Turkey’s accession process in shaping the EU project».[5] In the last period, EU-Turkish relations have been characterized by a certain diplomatic freeze. The crackdown of the nationwide demonstrations of Gezi Park, domestic scandals of corruption and the issue of press freedom have contributed to hamper a constructive dialogue. Although such elements of contrast, the situation seems to be address toward new scenarios. On December 2014, for instance, the EU High Representative, Federica Mogherini, visited Ankara and held a meeting with Davutoglu. The visit constituted the precious occasion for Mogherini to highlight «the strategic importance EU-Turkish relations and our desire to step up engagement in view of shared interests and common challenges». Then, she added that «we need to improve on the alignment onforeign policy and security policy. It’s never been so low and this is a problem for the European Union, but it is mainly a problem for Turkey». Surely, the essential core of such a renewed European approach toward Ankara has to be found in the increasing threat of the Islamic State. It is a major security concern for the European Union. The reluctance of Turkey in dealing with this issue in a coordinated multilateral effort has prompted the Western leaders to a closer engagement with Ankara. An important in the Turkish-EU relations involves the very perception of Europe by the Turkish public opinion. According to a public opinion survey conducted by the Centre of Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) at the beginning of 2015, Turkey should cooperate with the European Union to have a stronger economy and foreign policy.

Economic and trade ties with EU

With the accession process still alive, some instruments shape the current relations between EU and Turkey.[6] First, they are linked by a Customs Union Agreement, which came in force on 31 December 1995. The agreement covers all the industrial goods and provides for a common external tariff. In the past years, it has been underlined the importance to upgrade the Customs Union into a deeper Union including also the liberalization of services and public procurement. On 9 January, Commissioners Johannes Hahn and Cecilia Malmström met Turkish Minister of Economy Nihat Zeybekçi. During the meetings the functioning and improvement of the Customs Union were discussed. The EU is Turkey’s number one import and export partner while Turkey ranks 7th in the EU’s top import and fifth in export markets. Turkey’s main exports markets are the EU, Iraq, Russia, USA, United Arab Emirates and Iran. Turkey’s exports to the EU are mostly machinery and transport equipment, followed by manufactured goods. In the meantime, with reference to gas supply, Turkey has formally started the construction of the Trans Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which when operational by the end of 2018 will carry Azerbaijani gas to European markets and reduce the bloc’s energy dependence on Russia.[7]

Turkey and Russia: competition and cooperation

The aftermath of the crisis in Ukraine entailed a meaningful change in the very relation between Ankara and Moscow, particularly opening a specific dialogue on gas’ dossier between the two countries. On 1 December 2014, Alexey Miller, chairman of the Gazprom Management Committee, and Mehmet Konuk, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Botas Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, signed in Ankara a memorandum of understanding on constructing an offshore gas pipeline across the Black Sea towards Turkey. The agreement marks the end of the South Stream project, which had to transport natural gas from Russia, through the Black Sea, directly to Bulgaria and Europe.[8] «Turkish Stream is now the only pipeline», Gazprom’s chief executive, Aleksei B. Miller, stated. «There are no other variants possible. Our European partners have been notified of this, and their task now is to establish the necessary gas-transporting infrastructure from the borders of Turkey and Greece»[9]. As Alexey Grivach, Deputy General Director of Gas Projects at Russia’s National Energy Security Fund, argues: «This huge project brings the Turkish dream of becoming the huge gas transit hub to Europe closer. But first it was based on the gas from the Middle East and the Caspian, and now it is occurring that this hub will be based on the Russian gas. The first loser is Europe which will not have such a great project for the European economy, and even more importantly for some countries, not very rich countries of the EU, like Bulgaria. And they will lose the investments and transit fees, and this will go to Turkey and enforce the Turkish position in the market, and in the region as well».[10]

In the framework of the December 2014’s last diplomatic meeting in Ankara, Putin and Erdogan agreed on some chapters of the bilateral relations. Despite of disagreements on some foreign policy issues like Syria and Ukraine, the two leaders opted to focus on areas of mutual interests as gas and trade relations. On Syria, for instance, Turkey is critical toward al-Assad regime and pushes for his removal. On the other hand, Putin is convinced that a lasting settlement cannot be achieved without Assad. Also, Turkey raised tough criticisms to Moscow about the annexation of Crimea as well as there are disagreements on border disputes in the Caucasus. Although such contentions, there are sound economic ties between the countries. Turkey is the second trading partner of Russia after Germany. The two governments expect to foster their bilateral trade relations from $33 billion to $100 billion by 2020. Moscow will invest $20 billion in constructing the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, the first project of this kind in Turkey.

 


[1]Akin, Ezgi, What exactly is “New Turkey”?, Al-Monitor, 26 August 2014.

[2]Reform package would leave police even freer to harass journalists, Reporters without borders, 17 February 2015.

[3] Turkish G20 Presidency Priorities for 2020, For the whole document see: https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2015-TURKEY-G-20-PRESIDENCY-FINAL.pdf.

[4] Cetingulet, Mehmet, Syrian refugees aggravate Turkey’s unemployment problem, 9 July 2014, Al-Monitor.

 

[5] Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs, “Turkey’s New European Union Strategy,” September 2014.

[6] Turkey assumed “candidate status” during the Helsinki Summit on 10-11 December 1999. At the Brussels Summit on 16-17 December 2004, the Council affirmed that Turkey fulfilled the political criteria and decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005.

[7]O’Byrne, Davis, EU energy dream made real as Turkey breaks ground on Azeri gas export route to Europe, Business New Europe Intellinews, 17 March 2015.

[8] Among the obstacles to the realization of the South Stream there was the EU third energy package. It stipulates the separation of companies’ generation and sale operations from their transmission networks.

[9] Reed, Stanley, Arsu, Sebnem, Russia Presses Ahead With Plan for Gas Pipeline to Turkey, New York Times, January 21, 2015.

[10] Kudashkina, Ekaterina,Turkey Hopes to become a Gas Market-Maker Expert says, Sputniknews, 2 December 2014.

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Iceland’s Historic(al) Elections

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The morning of September, 26 was a good one for Lenya Run Karim of the Pirate Party. Once the preliminary results were announced, things were clear: the 21-year-old law student of the University of Iceland, originating from a Kurdish immigrant family, had become the youngest MP in the country’s history.

In historical significance, however, this event was second to another. Iceland, the world champion in terms of gender equality, became the first country in Europe to have more women MPs than men, 33 versus 30. The news immediately made world headlines: only five countries in the world have achieved such impressive results. Remarkably, all are non-European: Rwanda, Nicaragua and Cuba have a majority of women in parliament, while Mexico and the UAE have an equal number of male and female MPs.

Nine hours later, news agencies around the world had to edit their headlines. The recount in the Northwest constituency affected the outcome across the country to delay the ‘triumph for women’ for another four years.

Small numbers, big changes

The Icelandic electoral system is designed so that 54 out of the 63 seats in the Althingi, the national parliament, are primary or constituency seats, while another nine are equalization seats. Only parties passing the 5 per cent threshold are allowed to distribute equalisation seats that go to the candidates who failed to win constituency mandates and received the most votes in their constituency. However, the number of equalisation mandates in each of the 6 constituencies is legislated. In theory, this could lead to a situation in which the leading party candidate in one constituency may simply lack an equalisation mandate, so the leading candidate of the same party—but in another constituency—receives it.

This is what happened this year. Because of a difference of only ten votes between the Reform Party and the Pirate Party, both vying for the only equalisation mandate in the Northwest, the constituency’s electoral commission announced a recount on its own initiative. There were also questions concerning the counting procedure as such: the ballots were not sealed but simply locked in a Borgarnes hotel room. The updated results hardly affected the distribution of seats between the parties, bringing in five new MPs, none of whom were women, with the 21-year-old Lenya Run Karim replaced by her 52-year-old party colleague.

In the afternoon of September, 27, at the request of the Left-Green Movement, supported by the Independence Party, the Pirates and the Reform Party, the commission in the South announced a recount of their own—the difference between the Left-Greens and the Centrists was only seven votes. There was no ‘domino effect’, as in the case of the Northwest, as the five-hour recount showed the same result. Recounts in other districts are unlikely, nor is it likely that Althingi—vested with the power to declare the elections valid—would invalidate the results in the Northwest. Nevertheless, the ‘replaced’ candidates have already announced their intention to appeal against the results, citing violations of ballot storage procedures. Under the Icelandic law, this is quite enough to invalidate the results and call a re-election in the Northwest, as the Supreme Court of Iceland invalidated the Constitutional Council elections due to a breach of procedure 10 years ago. Be that as it may, the current score remains 33:30, in favor of men.

Progressives’ progress and threshold for socialists

On the whole, there were no surprises: the provisional allocation of mandates resembles, if with minor changes, the opinion polls on the eve of the election.

The ruling three-party coalition has rejuvenated its position, winning 37 out of the 63 Althingi seats. The centrist Progressive Party saw a real electoral triumph, improving its 2017 result by five seats. Prime-minister Katrín Jakobsdóttir’s Left-Green Movement, albeit with a slight loss, won eight seats, surpassing all pre-election expectations. Although the centre-right Independence Party outperformed everyone again to win almost a quarter of all votes, 16 seats are one of the worst results of the Icelandic ‘Grand Old Party’ ever.

The results of the Social-Democrats, almost 10% versus 12.1% in 2017, and of the Pirates, 8.6% versus 9.2%, have deteriorated. Support for the Centre Party of Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson, former prime-minister and victim of the Panama Papers, has halved from 10.9% to 5.4%. The centrists have seen a steady decline in recent years, largely due to a sexist scandal involving party MPs. The populist People’s Party and the pro-European Reform Party have seen gains of 8.8% and 8.3%, as compared to 6.9% and 6.7% in the previous elections.

Of the leading Icelandic parties, only the Socialist Party failed to pass the 5 per cent threshold: despite a rating above 7% in August, the Socialists received only 4.1% of the vote.

Coronavirus, climate & economy

Healthcare and the fight against COVID-19 was, expectedly, on top of the agenda of the elections: 72% of voters ranked it as the defining issue, according to a Fréttablaðið poll. Thanks to swift and stringent measures, the Icelandic government brought the coronavirus under control from day one, and the country has enjoyed one of the lowest infection rates in the world for most of the time. At the same time, the pandemic exposed a number of problems in the national healthcare system: staff shortages, low salaries and long waiting lists for emergency surgery.

Climate change, which Icelanders are already experiencing, was an equally important topic. This summer, the temperature has not dropped below 20°C for 59 days, an anomaly for a North-Atlantic island. However, Icelanders’ concerns never converted into increased support for the four left-leaning parties advocating greater reductions in CO2 emission than the country has committed to under the Paris Agreement: their combined result fell by 0.5%.

The economy and employment were also among the main issues in this election. The pandemic has severely damaged the island nation’s economy, which is heavily tourism-reliant—perhaps, unsurprisingly, many Icelanders are in favor of reviving the tourism sector as well as diversifying the economy further.

The EU membership, by far a ‘traditional’ issue in Icelandic politics, is unlikely to be featured on the agenda of the newly-elected parliament as the combined result of the Eurosceptics, despite a loss of 4%, still exceeds half of the overall votes. The new Althingi will probably face the issue of constitutional reform once again, which is only becoming more topical in the light of the pandemic and the equalization mandates story.

New (old) government?

The parties are to negotiate coalition formation. The most likely scenario now is that the ruling coalition of the Independence Party, the Left-Greens and the Progressives continues. It has been the most ideologically diverse and the first three-party coalition in Iceland’s history to last a full term. A successful fight against the pandemic has only strengthened its positions and helped it secure additional votes. Independence Party leader and finance minister Bjarni Benediktsson has earlier said he would be prepared to keep the ruling coalition if it holds the majority. President Guðni Jóhannesson announced immediately after the elections that he would confirm the mandate of the ruling coalition to form a new government if the three parties could strike a deal.

Other developments are possible but unlikely. Should the Left-Greens decide to leave the coalition, they could be replaced by the Reform Party or the People’s Party, while any coalition without the Independence Party can only be a four-party or larger coalition.

Who will become the new prime-minister still remains to be seen—but if the ruling coalition remains in place, the current prime-minister and leader of the Left-Greens, Katrín Jakobsdóttir, stands a good chance of keeping her post: she is still the most popular politician in Iceland with a 40 per cent approval rate.

The 2021 Althingi election, with one of the lowest turnouts in history at 80.1%, has not produced a clear winner. The election results reflect a Europe-wide trend in which traditional “major” parties are losing support. The electorate is fragmenting and their votes are pulled by smaller new parties. The coronavirus pandemic has only reinforced this trend.

The 2021 campaign did not foreshadow a sensation. Although Iceland has not become the first European country with a women’s majority in parliament, these elections will certainly go down in history as a test of Icelanders’ trust to their own democracy.

From our partner RIAC

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EU-Balkan Summit: No Set Timeframe for Western Balkans Accession

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From left to right: Janez JANŠA (Prime Minister, Slovenia), Charles MICHEL (President of the European Council), Ursula VON DER LEYEN (President of the European Commission) Copyright: European Union

On October 6, Slovenia hosted a summit between the EU and the Western Balkans states. The EU-27 met with their counterparts (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Kosovo) in the sumptuous Renaissance setting of Brdo Castle, 30 kilometers north of the capital, Ljubljana. Despite calls from a minority of heads of state and government, there were no sign of a breakthrough on the sensitive issue of enlargement. The accession of these countries to the European Union is still not unanimous among the 27 EU member states.

During her final tour of the Balkans three weeks ago, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that the peninsula’s integration was of “geostrategic” importance. On the eve of the summit, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz backed Slovenia’s goal of integrating this zone’s countries into the EU by 2030.

However, the unanimity required to begin the hard negotiations is still a long way off, even for the most advanced countries in the accession process, Albania and North Macedonia. Bulgaria, which is already a member of the EU, is opposing North Macedonia’s admission due to linguistic and cultural differences. Since Yugoslavia’s demise, Sofia has rejected the concept of Macedonian language, insisting that it is a Bulgarian dialect, and has condemned the artificial construction of a distinct national identity.

Other countries’ reluctance to join quickly is of a different nature. France and the Netherlands believe that previous enlargements (Bulgaria and Romania in 2007) have resulted in changes that must first be digested before the next round of enlargement. The EU-27 also demand that all necessary prior guarantees be provided regarding the independence of the judiciary and the fight against corruption in these countries. Despite the fact that press freedom is a requirement for membership, the NGO Reporters Without Borders (RSF) urged the EU to make “support for investigative and professional journalism” a key issue at the summit.”

While the EU-27 have not met since June, the topic of Western Balkans integration is competing with other top priorities in the run-up to France’s presidency of the EU in the first half of 2022. On the eve of the summit, a working dinner will be held, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, called for “a strategic discussion on the role of the Union on the international scene” in his letter of invitation to the EU-Balkans Summit, citing “recent developments in Afghanistan,” the announcement of the AUKUS pact between the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, which has enraged Paris.

The Western Balkans remain the focal point of an international game of influence in which the Europeans seek to maintain their dominance. As a result, the importance of reaffirming a “European perspective” at the summit was not an overstatement. Faced with the more frequent incursion of China, Russia, and Turkey in that European region, the EU has pledged a 30 billion euro Economic and Investment Plan for 2021-2027, as well as increased cooperation, particularly to deal with the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Opening the borders, however, is out of the question. In the absence of progress on this issue, Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia have decided to establish their own zone of free movement (The Balkans are Open”) beginning January 1, 2023. “We are starting today to do in the region what we will do tomorrow in the EU,” said Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama when the agreement was signed last July.

This initiative, launched in 2019 under the name “Mini-Schengen” and based on a 1990s idea, does not have the support of the entire peninsular region, which remains deeply divided over this project. While Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro are not refusing to be a part of it and are open to discussions, the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, who took office in 2020, for his part accuses Serbia of relying on this project to recreate “a fourth Yugoslavia”

Tensions between Balkan countries continue to be an impediment to European integration. The issue of movement between Kosovo and Serbia has been a source of concern since the end of September. Two weeks of escalation followed Kosovo’s decision to prohibit cars with Serbian license plates from entering its territory, in response to Serbia’s long-standing prohibition on allowing vehicles to pass in the opposite direction.

In response to the mobilization of Kosovar police to block the road, Serbs in Kosovo blocked roads to their towns and villages, and Serbia deployed tanks and the air force near the border. On Sunday, October 3, the conflict seemed to be over, and the roads were reopened. However, the tone had been set three days before the EU-Balkans summit.

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German Election: Ramifications for the US Foreign Policy

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Image source: twitter @OlafScholz

In the recent German election, foreign policy was scarcely an issue. But Germany is an important element in the US foreign policy. There is a number of cases where Germany and the US can cooperate, but all of these dynamics are going to change very soon.

The Germans’ strategic culture makes it hard to be aligned perfectly with the US and disagreements can easily damage the relations. After the tension between the two countries over the Iraq war, in 2003, Henry Kissinger said that he could not imagine the relations between Germany and the US could be aggravated so quickly, so easily, which might end up being the “permanent temptation of German politics”. For a long time, the US used to provide security for Germany during the Cold War and beyond, so, several generations are used to take peace for granted. But recently, there is a growing demand on them to carry more burden, not just for their own security, but for international peace and stability. This demand was not well-received in Berlin.

Then, the environment around Germany changed and new threats loomed up in front of them. The great powers’ competition became the main theme in international relations. Still, Germany was not and is not ready for shouldering more responsibility. Politicians know this very well. Ursula von der Leyen, who was German defense minister, asked terms like “nuclear weapons” and “deterrence” be removed from her speeches.

Although on paper, all major parties appreciate the importance of Germany’s relations with the US, the Greens and SPD ask for a reset in the relations. The Greens insist on the European way in transatlantic relations and SPD seeks more multilateralism. Therefore, alignment may be harder to maintain in the future. However, If the tensions between the US and China heat up to melting degrees, then external pressure can overrule the internal pressure and Germany may accede to its transatlantic partners, just like when Helmut Schmid let NATO install medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe after the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan and the Cold War heated up.

According to the election results, now three coalitions are possible: grand coalition with CDU/CSU and SPD, traffic lights coalition with SPD, FDP, and Greens, Jamaica coalition with CDU/CSU, FDP, and Greens. Jamaica coalition will more likely form the most favorable government for the US because it has both CDU and FDP, and traffic lights will be the least favorite as it has SPD. The grand coalition can maintain the status quo at best, because contrary to the current government, SPD will dominate CDU.

To understand nuances, we need to go over security issues to see how these coalitions will react to them. As far as Russia is concerned, none of them will recognize the annexation of Crimea and they all support related sanctions. However, if tensions heat up, any coalition government with SPD will be less likely assertive. On the other hand, as the Greens stress the importance of European values like democracy and human rights, they tend to be more assertive if the US formulates its foreign policy by these common values and describe US-China rivalry as a clash between democracy and authoritarianism. Moreover, the Greens disapprove of the Nordstream project, of course not for its geopolitics. FDP has also sided against it for a different reason. So, the US must follow closely the negotiations which have already started between anti-Russian smaller parties versus major parties.

For relations with China, pro-business FDP is less assertive. They are seeking for developing EU-China relations and deepening economic ties and civil society relations. While CDU/CSU and Greens see China as a competitor, partner, and systemic rival, SPD and FDP have still hopes that they can bring change through the exchange. Thus, the US might have bigger problems with the traffic lights coalition than the Jamaica coalition in this regard.

As for NATO and its 2 percent of GDP, the division is wider. CDU/CSU and FDP are the only parties who support it. So, in the next government, it might be harder to persuade them to pay more. Finally, for nuclear participation, the situation is the same. CDU/CSU is the only party that argues for it. This makes it an alarming situation because the next government has to decide on replacing Germany’s tornados until 2024, otherwise Germany will drop out of the NATO nuclear participation.

The below table gives a brief review of these three coalitions. 1 indicates the lowest level of favoritism and 3 indicates the highest level of favoritism. As it shows, the most anti-Russia coalition is Jamaica, while the most anti-China coalition is Trafic light. Meanwhile, Grand Coalition is the most pro-NATO coalition. If the US adopts a more normative foreign policy against China and Russia, then the Greens and FDP will be more assertive in their anti-Russian and anti-Chinese policies and Germany will align more firmly with the US if traffic light or Jamaica coalition rise to power.

Issues CoalitionsTrafic LightGrand CoalitionJamaica
Russia213 
China312 
NATO132 

1 indicates the lowest level of favoritism. 3 indicates the highest level of favoritism.

In conclusion, this election should not make Americans any happier. The US has already been frustrated with the current government led by Angela Merkel who gave Germany’s trade with China the first priority, and now that the left-wing will have more say in any imaginable coalition in the future, the Americans should become less pleased. But, still, there are hopes that Germany can be a partner for the US in great power competition if the US could articulate its foreign policy with common values, like democracy and human rights. More normative foreign policy can make a reliable partner out of Germany. Foreign policy rarely became a topic in this election, but observers should expect many ramifications for it.

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