The “new Turkey” of the president Erdogan
The past year can arguably be considered a turning point in the political history of Turkey. In August, the president Recep Tayyp Erdogan has been elected president of the Republic, after serving three terms as prime minister, the first directly elected by Turkish citizens.
Such an institutional step marked a substantive strengthening of the very president Erdogan and his party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), as the former foreign affairs minister and Erdogan’s right-hand man, Ahmet Davutoglu, has been named as new prime minister. Since the last electoral campaign, “new Turkey” has become an important concept in the political Turkish lexicon. As an editorial in the pro-Erdogan daily Yeni Safak argues, «if the attack [on New Turkey] is coming from within, this is called betrayal. New Turkey is not a slogan. It’s not a party expression or a political show. New Turkey is a project. This is the redesigning and re-establishing of Turkey after a century». The recent restrictive action of the government against the press seems to match some features of this insight of the State. On December 14, the Turkish police have arrested twenty-five members of the daily Zaman’s redaction and TV station, including its editor in chief, Ekrem Dumanli. Admittedly, the raids can be easily interpreted as addressed against Fethullah Gulen, the US-based islamic cleric, to which Zaman is closely tied. The move has been sharply criticized by the European Union. Additionally, the Turkey’s parliament has been discussing an “internal security” reform that is going to strengthen the powers of the police in handling demonstrations. The organization “Reporters Without Borders” points out that: «If the bill is passed as it stands, police officers will be allowed “in emergencies” to conduct searches of places, persons or vehicles on nothing more than a verbal order from a superior that must subsequently be confirmed in writing. Arbitrary searches of news organizations and journalists’ homes, which are already common, would inevitably be facilitated, at the expense of the confidentiality of journalists’ sources.
The socio-economic agenda
One of the most thorny issues the Turkish government has to tackle is constituted by the socio-economic agenda. The question has been strongly raised, among others, on the occasion of the Taksim square’s demonstrations in 2013. The prime minister Davutoglu has recently formulated his economic priorities, as Turkey has been taking the G20’s presidency in 2015. It pivots on inclusiveness, implementation, and investment for growth. Despite of political declarations, growth has lost momentum in 2014. After the high rates registered in 2010 and 2011 (around 10%), in 2012 the economy grew around 2%. In 2014 the target of 4% has been revised by the government. A relevant factor in such a drop is the fall of domestic demands and investments. Turkish economy is highly dependent on foreign capital (the current-account deficit hit 7.9% of GDP in 2013). According to the state statistics agency, Turkey’s unemployment rate stood at 10.9% in December 2014 rising from 10.7% in November. The issues of refugees and its economic and humanitarian implications is worth to be mentioned. Over 1.700.000 million Syrians have taken refugee in Turkey since the war began in March 2011. Nearly 30% of these live in twenty-two camps near the Syrian-Turkish border. In September 2014, attacks by the Islamic State against Kurdish towns and villages close to the Turkish border brought hundreds of thousands of Kurds to flee to Turkey. As the Danish Refugee Council reports: «In Turkey, refugees outside of camps face integration challenges such as language barriers and very few social ties, resulting in higher tensions with local communities and difficulty finding employment. Syrians in Turkey have very few opportunities to access credit with shops, and landlords generally demand rent/utility payments every month without exception or flexibility. Syrian men who do manage to find temporary jobs (daily, weekly, or sometimes monthly) often complain that they are not paid at the end of the work, and they cannot pursue any legal recourse because they have no right to work in Turkey. They say the Turkish employer will just find another Syrian to replace him, and generally not pay him either».
This issue triggers new dynamics in the labour market and in the very Turkish society. The huge increase of labour supply pushes wages down. A sudden upsurge of Turkey’s population by 1 million people has soared rents by 40-50%, especially in the provinces of Gaziantep, Sanliurfa and Hatay. The rising rent and increasing unemployment particularly hit the poorer portions of the local population. The chairman of the Mersin Chamber of Retailers and Artisans, Talat Dincer points out that the «refugees working at wages below the minimum wage and without social insurance cause the increase in unemployment. A solution has to be found soonest».
The next June 2015, the general elections will constitute a significant test in order to assess the real grip of AKP’s power. It will be the occasion to test the institutional Turkish path to a presidential system, with the president Erdogan’s proposal to emend the constitution, and the challenges which the regional panorama presents.
Ankara and Brussels: accession process and common regional challenges
The EU-Turkey relations have recently showed interesting developments after a phase of substantial stalemate mainly registered on the issue of Turkey’s accession to the European Union. Remarkable changes have characterized the political life of the two actors in the last year. While a new Commission installed in Brussels, after Erdogan sworn in as president of the Republic and the new prime Minister Davutoglu took his charge, Ankara published a document containing the new strategy of Ankara toward Europe. It highlighted, among others, that «Turkey and the EU are encountering common challenges that underline the importance of Turkey’s accession process in shaping the EU project». In the last period, EU-Turkish relations have been characterized by a certain diplomatic freeze. The crackdown of the nationwide demonstrations of Gezi Park, domestic scandals of corruption and the issue of press freedom have contributed to hamper a constructive dialogue. Although such elements of contrast, the situation seems to be address toward new scenarios. On December 2014, for instance, the EU High Representative, Federica Mogherini, visited Ankara and held a meeting with Davutoglu. The visit constituted the precious occasion for Mogherini to highlight «the strategic importance EU-Turkish relations and our desire to step up engagement in view of shared interests and common challenges». Then, she added that «we need to improve on the alignment onforeign policy and security policy. It’s never been so low and this is a problem for the European Union, but it is mainly a problem for Turkey». Surely, the essential core of such a renewed European approach toward Ankara has to be found in the increasing threat of the Islamic State. It is a major security concern for the European Union. The reluctance of Turkey in dealing with this issue in a coordinated multilateral effort has prompted the Western leaders to a closer engagement with Ankara. An important in the Turkish-EU relations involves the very perception of Europe by the Turkish public opinion. According to a public opinion survey conducted by the Centre of Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) at the beginning of 2015, Turkey should cooperate with the European Union to have a stronger economy and foreign policy.
Economic and trade ties with EU
With the accession process still alive, some instruments shape the current relations between EU and Turkey. First, they are linked by a Customs Union Agreement, which came in force on 31 December 1995. The agreement covers all the industrial goods and provides for a common external tariff. In the past years, it has been underlined the importance to upgrade the Customs Union into a deeper Union including also the liberalization of services and public procurement. On 9 January, Commissioners Johannes Hahn and Cecilia Malmström met Turkish Minister of Economy Nihat Zeybekçi. During the meetings the functioning and improvement of the Customs Union were discussed. The EU is Turkey’s number one import and export partner while Turkey ranks 7th in the EU’s top import and fifth in export markets. Turkey’s main exports markets are the EU, Iraq, Russia, USA, United Arab Emirates and Iran. Turkey’s exports to the EU are mostly machinery and transport equipment, followed by manufactured goods. In the meantime, with reference to gas supply, Turkey has formally started the construction of the Trans Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which when operational by the end of 2018 will carry Azerbaijani gas to European markets and reduce the bloc’s energy dependence on Russia.
Turkey and Russia: competition and cooperation
The aftermath of the crisis in Ukraine entailed a meaningful change in the very relation between Ankara and Moscow, particularly opening a specific dialogue on gas’ dossier between the two countries. On 1 December 2014, Alexey Miller, chairman of the Gazprom Management Committee, and Mehmet Konuk, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Botas Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, signed in Ankara a memorandum of understanding on constructing an offshore gas pipeline across the Black Sea towards Turkey. The agreement marks the end of the South Stream project, which had to transport natural gas from Russia, through the Black Sea, directly to Bulgaria and Europe. «Turkish Stream is now the only pipeline», Gazprom’s chief executive, Aleksei B. Miller, stated. «There are no other variants possible. Our European partners have been notified of this, and their task now is to establish the necessary gas-transporting infrastructure from the borders of Turkey and Greece». As Alexey Grivach, Deputy General Director of Gas Projects at Russia’s National Energy Security Fund, argues: «This huge project brings the Turkish dream of becoming the huge gas transit hub to Europe closer. But first it was based on the gas from the Middle East and the Caspian, and now it is occurring that this hub will be based on the Russian gas. The first loser is Europe which will not have such a great project for the European economy, and even more importantly for some countries, not very rich countries of the EU, like Bulgaria. And they will lose the investments and transit fees, and this will go to Turkey and enforce the Turkish position in the market, and in the region as well».
In the framework of the December 2014’s last diplomatic meeting in Ankara, Putin and Erdogan agreed on some chapters of the bilateral relations. Despite of disagreements on some foreign policy issues like Syria and Ukraine, the two leaders opted to focus on areas of mutual interests as gas and trade relations. On Syria, for instance, Turkey is critical toward al-Assad regime and pushes for his removal. On the other hand, Putin is convinced that a lasting settlement cannot be achieved without Assad. Also, Turkey raised tough criticisms to Moscow about the annexation of Crimea as well as there are disagreements on border disputes in the Caucasus. Although such contentions, there are sound economic ties between the countries. Turkey is the second trading partner of Russia after Germany. The two governments expect to foster their bilateral trade relations from $33 billion to $100 billion by 2020. Moscow will invest $20 billion in constructing the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, the first project of this kind in Turkey.
Akin, Ezgi, What exactly is “New Turkey”?, Al-Monitor, 26 August 2014.
Reform package would leave police even freer to harass journalists, Reporters without borders, 17 February 2015.
 Turkish G20 Presidency Priorities for 2020, For the whole document see: https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2015-TURKEY-G-20-PRESIDENCY-FINAL.pdf.
 Cetingulet, Mehmet, Syrian refugees aggravate Turkey’s unemployment problem, 9 July 2014, Al-Monitor.
 Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs, “Turkey’s New European Union Strategy,” September 2014.
 Turkey assumed “candidate status” during the Helsinki Summit on 10-11 December 1999. At the Brussels Summit on 16-17 December 2004, the Council affirmed that Turkey fulfilled the political criteria and decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005.
O’Byrne, Davis, EU energy dream made real as Turkey breaks ground on Azeri gas export route to Europe, Business New Europe Intellinews, 17 March 2015.
 Among the obstacles to the realization of the South Stream there was the EU third energy package. It stipulates the separation of companies’ generation and sale operations from their transmission networks.
 Reed, Stanley, Arsu, Sebnem, Russia Presses Ahead With Plan for Gas Pipeline to Turkey, New York Times, January 21, 2015.
 Kudashkina, Ekaterina,Turkey Hopes to become a Gas Market-Maker Expert says, Sputniknews, 2 December 2014.
Ethnic tensions in Montenegro
On Sunday, July 7, the citizens of Montenegro had the opportunity to witness another incident, that is, the open provocation of radical Albanian elements in Montenegro. Traditionally, on the feast of the Nativity of St. John the Baptist, in Svac, near Ulcinj (a town on the southern coast of Montenegro) liturgy is served at the ruins of a 1, 000 year-old medieval church.
The Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral held this year the liturgy in Svac, but at the entrance to the locality, where the ancient church is located. As the Montenegrin police, at the request of Albanian politicians, did not allow the liturgy service in the church. At the gathering, strong police forces were present, especially on the entry to the site.
Priest Slobodan Zekovic, who served the liturgy, stated:
“We are no strangers here, we come here for decades. We come here on the foundations of our statehood and spirituality. With a single goal, not to forget our holy ancestors, aware of the graves that are here. I am sending the blessing of Metropolitan Amfilohije, who was supposed to bring the hand of St. John the Baptist. But, due to tensions, that will be done next yеаr. The President of the municipality said that the access to the site has been banned until December, because archaeological research is being done“.
However, last year also there were tensions in Svac. Then, about ten local Albanians blocked the road, so that Metropolitan of Montenegro and Littoral Amfilohije and the believers of the Serbian Orthodox Church could not come to Svac. The leader of this group was Hadzija Sulejmani, a member of the Ulcinj Assembly and a member of the Democratic Party of Albanians. Sulejmani tried to explain his shameful act by saying that the church has never been an Orthodox holy place, and that he, as a Muslim and a representative of the Ulcinj municipality, does not allow access to the church.
Everything becomes much clearer after seeing a monument that the local Albanian politicians set up in 2005 in the form of a memorial plaque, which says: “In the name of our ancestors Illyrians who founded this ancient town of Svac as the legacy of our Albanian culture …” In other words, then the Albanians marked their territory and now slowly begin with violent means to “defend” it.
History is clear about the Svac. The city of Svac has never been the city of Illyrians, and especially not the city of Albanians. In 2012, the Ministry of Culture of Montenegro started exploring Svac. The research team, led by archaeologist Mladen Zagarcanin, discovered Serbian and Roman pottery in the same layer, which clearly shows the centuries-long presence of Serbs in that area. Stefan Nemanja, the Serbian Grand Prince (Veliki Župan), merged Svac to Serbian Grand Principality (also known as Raška, lat. Rascia) in 1183. When the Mongol hordes in 1242 conquered and demolished the city of Svac, it was restored by the Serbian queen Jelena, the wife of King Uros, who lived in Ulcinj at the time. For architectural decoration, the painters and masters are brought from Serbian Grand Principality Raška (lat. Rascia) . The remains of the Church of St. John are still visible in the city today, where still writes that it was built in 1300. In 1571, the town of Svač was completely destroyed by the Turks. However, what is important to mention is that the Albanians took part in the destruction of the Svac, together with the Turks. So today we have come to a crazy situation that the people who ruined Svac, and that’s the Albanians, want to acquire the historical heritage of that medieval city. In a doctoral dissertation “The influence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire on the creation of the Albanian nation”, Bulgarian historian Teodora Toleva, who studied the Vienna imperial archive, writes:
”After thorough studying of the archives we may claim that at the beginning of the 20th century the Albanian population did not still represent a formed nation. The ethnical groups in Albania live isolated; they do not have connections between themselves, except when fighting. The possibilities for their convergence were practically nonexistent; murders are common, even for the people from the clan. There were two basic dialects in the country that were so different that people could hardly understand each other. There was no unique literary language, but more than twenty different manners of writing in local dialects. The coefficient of literacy did not even exceed 2%. The population belonged to three religious confessions – Muslims, Orthodox and Catholics. The Albanians did not have national awareness, they did not have general interests, they did not express solidarity and they did not develop in the direction of waking the national feeling. Hence, at the beginning of the 20th century there was no Albanian nation.” Toleva also noted that:
“At a time when Vienna decides to implement a new plan for Albania, there are about twenty different transcripts of Albanian dialects. Three are basic: one uses the Arabic letters, the other is Cyrillic, the third is Latin. ” Official Vienna also had a decisive influence on the unification of the Albanian language. A letter that the Albanians still use today was accepted at a congress in Bitola in 1908. The decisive role was played by the Austro-Hungarian consul Karl. Grammar, literary books, history books, all printed in Vienna. The promotion of the Albanian language was carried out at every step. The reason why Austro-Hungary did all this was Serbia, which was then the main enemy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Through the creation of the Albanian nation, the Austro-Hungarian Empire wanted to weaken Serbia. And, they did it.
Today, the Austro-Hungarian Empire policy has been taken over, dominantly by the United States and United Kingdom, but also from some other Western states. The main goal is to create Greater Albania. Recently, the self-proclaimed Kosovo and Albania decided to implement a common foreign policy. Unlike the West, which supports that unlawful act, which raises tensions in the Balkans, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned that act.
“The provocative steps of Tirana and Pristina, which are in line with the realization of the concept of ‘Greater Albania’, cause serious concern. In this context we see the signature on July 2, the Albanian-Kosovo agreement on unification of diplomatic missions in third countries. We note that the US and EU prefer not to respond to such destructive measures and to effectively cover the ‘Greater Albanian events’ that are destructive for the region “, stated Russian Foreign Ministry.
In accordance with the support from the West, political representatives of Albanians in Montenegro every day behave more and more insolently. The current Montenegrin authorities do nothing to make Albanian politicians know that they have to respect the laws of Montenegro. While Serbs in Montenegro are strictly forbidden to display Serbian flags, Albanians in the places where they are majority display Albania’s national flag. Albanians every day show more clearly that Greater Albania is the only thing that would satisfy their national interests. The recent event that happened in Svac is something that previously could be seen in Kosovo and Macedonia. Therefore, now, while the fire is still weak, it is necessary to extinguish it. Otherwise, the Greater Albania’s fire can swallow both Ulcinj and other parts of Montenegro.
From our partner International Affairs
New “executive branch” of EU and Russia: EU hostile, but not united
The recent decision by the European Council to nominate Ursula von der Leyen of Germany for the post of European Commission Chairperson and Christine Lagarde of France for President of the European Central Bank has caused many eyebrows to raise. Nevertheless, since this “feminist” set of candidates will surely receive the approval of the European Parliament, it’s these people that Russia will have to deal with. (Nominees for the posts of European policy chief and president of European Council – Josep Borrell of Spain, and Charles Micheln of Belgium – became less of a surprise: their victory in the European Parliament is a sure thing too.)
Significantly, both the “prime minister” and the “foreign minister” from the European Union’s new team have been spotted making outrageously averse remarks regarding Russia. Ursula von der Leyen, holding the post of Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, said less than a year ago that one ought to speak with Russia from a position of strength. In response, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu advised Ms. von der Leyen and other Germans to ask their grandfathers what happens when Germans try to speak with Russia from a position of strength. Josep Borrell, speaking in an interview with the Spanish El Periodico, described Russia as “an old enemy” of Spain and Europe that is somewhat “posing a threat again,” whereas China, in his words, is but a “rival”.
The Russian Foreign Ministry reacted by demanding that Borrell account for these words, which clearly do not fit into the framework of friendly relations between Russia and Spain. The EU’s foreign policy chief-to-be came out of this situation with an elephantlike grace, chiding the Russian Foreign Ministry for “excessive” reaction and explaining his position by saying the following: “I said that Europe’s old defender – the United States – is no longer defending it, causing the rise of Europe’s former rival – the USSR “. Thus, the European diplomat has managed to strengthen a prejudice-based lie (about Russia as an enemy) with another (about the notorious “attempts by Putin to restore the USSR”). And there is a third lie – a hint at the now dishonored theory of a conspiracy between Trump and Russia. For someone burdened with the responsibilities of the head of European diplomacy, there seem to be too many prejudices and stereotypes. In all likelihood, these new representatives of the EU will not be easy to deal with.
Nevertheless, the near victory of von der Leyen and the removal from the race of the Dutch socialist Frans Timmermans, and representative of the European People’s Party (i.e.”Democratic Christian”) Manfred Weber of Bavaria, speaks of serious differences, bordering on hatred, within the EU. After all, it’s these two nominees (plus Danish liberal Margrethe Vestager, who served as European Commissioner for Competition) that were considered favorites for the post of European Commission chief right up to the G20 summit in Osaka. Chancellor Angela Merkel, who openly supported Weber’s candidacy and wanted the job of European Central Bank chief for the current head of the German Central Bank, Jens Weidmann, appears to be on the losing side, given the current layout of forces. Even such a well-informed player in European affairs as George Soros, predicted on the platform of the globalist Project Syndicate that in the event of Weber’s “failure” to head the European Commission, Merkel’s ambitions would be offset by the appointment of Jens Weidman. But this just didn’t happen: the EU’s top finance position went to Christine Lagarde.
Why did the options planned for so many weeks for the above mentioned candidates, which cannot be seen as 100% losers (Timmermans will remain vice-chairman of the European Commission, and Weber is set to become chairman of the European Parliament) were dropped?
The European Union makes it no secret that countries of the “Visegrad group”, first of all, Poland and Hungary, came out against Timmermans. And this is no wonder: it was Timmermans, as vice-president of the European Commission, who “oversaw” Poland’s punishment for its “sins against democracy” and has called for sanctions against Warsaw if it does not abandon so unwelcome for the EU judicial reform. As for Hungary, Timmermans was as harsh with its Prime Minister Viktor Orban. As a result, even Andrei Babis, the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, which did not have time, unlike Poland and Hungary, to experience the negative rhetoric of Timmermans, said bluntly: “Timmermans is not the person who can unite Europe.”
As it happens, by voting against Timmermans, the current Polish leadership took revenge for their own failure last year, when they made an attempt to remove Donald Tusk, former Polish prime minister considered to be EU-loyal political opponent of the current ruling party in Poland, “Law and Justice”.
Thus, the current choice of candidates has become a sign of ever increasing instability and unpredictability of the European Union, including in its relations with Russia. In my opinion, two trends are gaining strength at the same time. Firstly, the selection of candidates for top jobs in the European “mainstream” is based, among other things, on the principle “who speaks harshiest of Russia will win” ( this guaranteed success of von der Leyen and Borrell). Secondly, as Eastern European countries are slowly gaining weight, their attitude towards Russia ranges from hostile ( Poland and the Baltic States) to neutral and conciliatory ( Hungarian Prime Minister Orban).
The Orban factor, according to a variety of reports, became a key one for “not supporting” Manfred Weber’s candidacy on the part of France, which eventually led Weber to defeat. President Macron did not conceal his discontent with the fact that Weber, as head of the European People’s Party faction in the European Parliament, did not exclude Viktor Orban and his party Fides from this faction.
The French newspaper Le Monde carries detailed reports on the issue. For the French president, who deems Orban, along with Italian Interior Minister Matteo Salvini, his personal enemies over disagreements on migration issues, any means will do to fight against the Hungarian politician. Le Monde carries reports about Macron’s attempts to cut down EU payments to the Hungarian budget due to Hungary’s unwillingness to bear its share of the migration burden on the EU. And although Macron has not succeeded in these attempts, the battle between the “progressists” (Macron) and the “traditionalists” (Orban and the Visegrad Group, which is behind him) is driving the main wedge into the European Union, including its position towards Russia. Both the elections to the European Parliament and the differences over the candidacies for the “executive branch” of the European Union have clearly demonstrated this.
From our partner International Affairs
North Macedonia and Albania not allowed even in EU “waiting room”
The recent decision by an EU summit to postpone until October the solution on welcoming in Albania and Northern Macedonia as new members marks yet another setback for the European Union, which testifies to lack of unity among its members. Both Albania and Northern Macedonia have done all they could in the past few years to prove their loyalty to NATO and the West with a view to secure early admission to the European Union. Albania has joined NATO and supports Kosovo separatists, while the former Yugoslav regional capital Skopje chose to change the name of its country from Macedonia to Northern Macedonia, despite the unconvincing results of the de facto failed referendum on this issue in February this year. All these efforts were not rewarded, not even by a formal announcement on the start of the membership talks.
The matter is that European capitals make no secret of the reasons for such a postponement: the parliaments of Germany and the Netherlands opposed the entry of Macedonia, and Albania in particular. These parliaments have thereby refused to implement the recommendations of the European Commission of May 29 which advised member states to speed up the process of welcoming new members into the Union from countries of Western Balkans.
Instead of information on the beginning of the negotiations, Macedonia and Albania received a humiliating communiqué of the European Council, calling on these “hopefuls” of the EU membership to do more to secure the rule of law, strengthen democratic institutions, etc.
Macedonians and Albanians feel deceived also because the EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement, Johannes Khan, promised last year that membership negotiations would begin in June 2019 if both countries carried out reforms of their judiciaries and security services.
Albanian Prime Minister Edie Rama said that his country has fulfilled the reforms required by Brussels and that Tirana has thus earned the right to enter admission negotiations.
“I want to say that the European Union should proceed from geostrategic and geopolitical considerations, and it also should take into account the achievements of candidate countries,” – Prime Minister Rama was quoted as saying on June 11, 2019. “If candidate countries deserve to be admitted, the European Union should not deny them this right.”
The Prime Minister of Northern Macedonia, Zoran Zaev, went as far as stating that postponement of negotiations on his country’s accession to the EU could lead to the fall of his government and the victory of nationalist forces “hostile to the European Union”.
Behind all these statements lies demonization of Russia and the attempts to present it as a “destabilizer” of the situation in the Balkans, just as it was done by Montenegrin leader Milo Djukanovic, who accused Moscow and so-called “Serbian nationalists” of an attempt to stage a coup in his small country for the purpose of preventing Montenegro from entering NATO.
The version of what happened was provided by a Montenegrin court, which blamed leaders of the opposition Democratic Front for an attempt to seize power in Podgorica with the help of two dozen Serbian militants. The court described the incident as a typical conspiracy and a “high-profile process” in the style of Andrei Vyshinsky. Nevertheless, the Western press has accepted this version, telling its to readers about plans by wicked Russians and Serbs to kill Mr. Djukanovic, who positioned himself as a Serbian-Montenegrin nationalist during the “Yugoslav Wars” of the early 1990s.
Will North Macedonian Prime Minister Zaev succeed in performing the same trick, will the EU accept his version that “forces hostile to the European Union” will take over if his country does not join the European Union in the near future? It seems that the European Union is skeptical about Zaev’s “warnings”. It knows only too well that Zaev himself came to power as a result of a Macedonian “color revolution” that removed the former leader Nikolu Gruevsky, who led the left-wing party VMRO-DPNE. This party is still the largest opposition party in the parliament of Northern Macedonia.
Shortly after coming to power Zaev reoriented the country to NATO, hoisting a NATO flag in front of the Macedonian government building. Taking advantage of people’s hopes for joining the European Union, Zaev ensured the victory in the presidential election of his henchman Stevo Pendarovsky. But now that the prospect of starting negotiations looks remote and indefinite, Zaev and his entourage may indeed face a destabilization. The position of Albanian government of Edi Rama, who is facing powerful protests across the country, is hardly better.
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