Connect with us

Americas

What happened to Brazil’s Foreign Policy during Dilma Rousseff’s first mandate?

Published

on

The end of the Cold War imposed new dynamics to the world. International Relations no longer have the ideological bias from the Cold War times, and have therefore become more flexible in the sense that states begin to establish relationships with key strategic partners taking into account their national interests, which are not guided by the bipolarity of the system. The Brazilian Foreign Policy, after democracy came back, in 1985, has also changed: Brazil is a more active international actor in key issues of the international system’s agenda.

While in the 1980’s Brazil was a country that participated in discussions together with developing countries, deciding to be distant from the established powers and international institutions, in the 1990’s the Brazilian Foreign Policy goes through an “aggiornamento”. The so called “autonomy by distance” becomes “autonomy through participation”. It is during Fernando Collor’s presidency that Brazil hosted the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio 92), at the time when the presidency and the chancellery sought to change the perception of the world in relation to Brazil, especially regarding environmental issues, which were a delicate matter to the country during the military dictatorship. The country seeks therefore to sustain an attitude of openness to dialogue both bilaterally and multilaterally. Gradually, the logic of the Brazilian Foreign Policy shapes itself pari passu to the world, which was also adjusting its modus operandi after the Cold War.

One can note that the mandate of Fernando Henrique Cardoso continued the “autonomy through participation” from his predecessors Fernando Collor and Itamar Franco and expanded its scope, establishing strategic partnerships with established powers such as the United States, the European countries and Japan; moreover he prioritized South America, foreseeing a Common Market of the South (Mercosur), possibly to the molds of the current European Union. The nomenclature “autonomy through participation” is then updated and it becomes “autonomy through integration” in Fernando Henrique’s mandate, which was essential for Brazil ‘s presence in the world in that specific time.

The solidification of the international presence of Brazil came, however, during Lula’s government. The President and his Foreign Minister, Ambassador Celso Amorim, understood the new dynamics of international relations and deepened Brazilian credentials abroad. The presidential transition between relatively antagonistic parties, PSDB (right) and PT (left), did not impair the continuity of the Brazilian Foreign Policy, on the contrary, strengthened its position in the world. The Brazilian Foreign Policy has never been homogeneous, but the continuity of its basis was maintained from the post-dictatorship period, that is 1985, to the second Lula government, that is 2010. One example was the evolution of the term autonomy coined by International Relations analysts. “Autonomy by distance” became “autonomy through participation”, soon after became “autonomy through integration” and finally it consolidated in “autonomy through diversification”, which briefly translates Lula’s Foreign Policy.

The “autonomy through diversification” was a symbol of high Brazilian self-esteem internationally. The President and his Foreign Minister, Ambassador Amorim, privileged the Brazilian Foreign Policy by strengthening bilateral relations and South-South coalitions (BRICS, IBSA, G-20, BASIC), by having cooperative, proactive and purposeful attitudes (Reform of the Security Council), by trusting traditional partners (US and Europe) and by focusing on regional integration (MERCOSUR and UNASUR).

However, it can be said that during Dilma’s mandate Brazil’s Foreign Policy has not evolved in the same way that had evolved over the past years although belonging to the same party as Lula da Silva (PT). For the first time since the 1990s, there was a change of priorities in the continuity of the Brazilian Foreign Policy. There is no evidence that the term “autonomy through diversification”, represented by Lula da Silva’s government, has been cited by analysts to characterize Dilma’s Foreign Policy. The employees from the Ministry of External Relations as well as opinion makers perhaps have implicitly represented President Dilma’s Foreign Policy as “autonomy by the indifference”. The Foreign Ministry, for example, suffered from cuts in both its budget as well as in the number of places offered to access the diplomatic career (from 100 per year during Lula da Silva’s government to 18-30 diplomats passing the public exam per year during Dilma’s mandate).

Contrary to claims about Rousseff’s lack of interest in foreign affairs, the Group of Reflection in International Relations (GR-RI), in an analysis of the presidential speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2014, shows that the Brazilian leader had given an active speech as well as her predecessor, Lula da Silva, in which she mentions important issues to the international agenda, such as solidarity in humanitarian affairs and internet governance — one can note that the latter was never brought forward properly. GR-RI’s article also mentions that new informal alliances, such as the BRICS, which “express an effort and an ability to create new policymaking procedures” — the BRICS are, in fact, the consolidation of multilateralism of reciprocity that Brazil searches in the international arena, the turning point of Dilma’s mandate concerning Foreign Affairs was even the creation of the BRICS Development Bank, which will be based in Shanghai, China, however, statistics and analysis put Brazil as one of the weakest economies of the group.

The change of priorities, although bad for the image of Brazil, can serve as a lesson for future foreign policy makers. Brazil urges to have concrete goals in the international scenario. Foreign Policy thus should be treated as a state and not a government policy. Although international relations are dynamic, Brazil needs to define its objectives to be part of the international system in the most effective way. Foreign Policy is as important to the development of a country as national policies are.

Although the adverse change of priorities has recently occurred in the Brazilian Foreign Policy, the country has always sought – and has been seeking since – to have a prominent place in the international scenario. Integration, diversification and other progressive synonymous must again be adjectives for Brazil’s Foreign Affairs. However, this does not mean lack of priority in urgent internal structural changes such as the creation of social policies and the reduction of economic disparities in the country. Overcoming internal challenges is key to Brazil. The coordination of both internal challenges and external objectives must be achieved so there is a progressive continuity that Brazil’s Foreign Policy surely deserves.

Continue Reading
Comments

Americas

Leftists make a comeback in Latin America

Mohammad Ghaderi

Published

on

In Argentina and Uruguay, leftist candidates won the elections and Evo Morales could maintain his position as the president of Bolivia, but in Chile, people have protested against the U.S.-backed president.

The failure of the U.S.-backed candidate in the Argentinean election in recent days was a sign of the U.S. failure in Latin America. Leftist Alberto Fernandez, an opponent of U.S. interventionist policies, won about 48 percent of the vote in general election and was announced as the new president in the first round.

 This is while countries such as Venezuela and Cuba have maintained their anti-U.S. sentiment. Although the U.S. has made an unceasing effort in the last two years to overthrow the current regime in Venezuela, it has not succeeded. 

The New Left movement in Latin America, which was formed by the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chaves, has put Venezuela in many troubles but reduced U.S. influence in the region to the point that even experts suggested that Washington has lost its backyard.

The New Leftist governments emerged in Latin America in the late 20th century. Leftist leaders have distanced from some of traditional principles, but maintained the fight against American hegemony, just like their predecessors. Latin America, with rich sources of oil, gas, and uranium, as well as great opportunity for investment, has been of particular importance from a geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic perspective. The U.S. has put control over Latin America on its agenda since 1823 when then president James Monroe offered his plan known as the “Monroe Doctrine”.

The Monroe Doctrine emphasized that as long as the U.S. had not achieved real power and growth, it cannot be considered as an active element and main actor in world politics, thus it should obtain necessary economic growth in Western Hemisphere. The doctrine also stated that South America and Caribbean are areas with high security priority whose fate is tied to the U.S. fate, and the U.S. must have a strong influence in the region to provide its own growth and development.

In the late 20th and early present century, Latin America has witnessed new developments, including the New Left movement. The New Left in Latin America was founded and developed as leaders such as Chavez in Venezuela, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in Brazil, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua came to power.

 Opportunities and threats

The U.S. is concerned about the presence of its rivals, especially Russia and China, in Latin America and the cooperation of these two countries with leftist states in the region. To counter China and Russia’s influence, the U.S. has launched various plans to undermine leftist governments through economic crises and put its allied right-wing figures into power.

Washington’s comprehensive effort to topple the Maduro administration in Venezuela is an example. On the other hand, China and Russia’s approach to Latin America and the tendency of New Left countries to ally with Beijing and Moscow can be a major deterrent to the implementation of the U.S. plan in the region.

This is while the Trump administration is trying to redefine U.S. role and position in Latin America. From Trump’s point of view, the wrong policies of previous governments and developments have caused the U.S. to lose its control over Latin America and the Caribbean, and instead increased the influence of U.S. rivals, including China, in the region.

In an interview with Foreign Policy, following his recent visit to Colombia, Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein said that the Trump administration is making a push to strengthen alliances across Latin America as part of an effort to counter rising Chinese and Russian influence in the United States’ backyard.

Goldfein said Colombia and other Latin American countries risked being locked out of U.S. and allied operations if they stopped buying military hardware from the United States and turned to other markets instead.

China has invested heavily in the region to reach Latin America’s oil reserves. Beijing has now become the largest trading partner of some Latin American countries, including Brazil, Chile, Cuba and Uruguay.

Russia also continues to sell billions of dollars in arms to Latin American countries. Unlike China, which seeks to use Latin American natural resources for its economic growth, Russia’s interests in this region are more strategic.

From our partner Tehran Times

Continue Reading

Americas

Democrats take a gamble on Trump’s impeachment

Javad Heirannia

Published

on

Despite all ups and downs, Democrats finally brought impeachment inquiry into President Donald Trump to the House of Representatives, a move which made Trump’s prediction come true.

The House of Representatives passed a resolution on Thursday to launch an impeachment inquiry into Trump, thereby making formal investigations against him possible. The resolution was approved by a vote of 232 to 196.

Accordingly, the House of Intelligence Committee carries out the investigations into the impeachment and reports its findings to the Judiciary Committee that comments on the process of impeachment.

Trump has said that the House will get enough votes to impeach him, but he is certain that the Senate will acquit him of charges.

Investigations into Trump’s impeachment began on September 24 following the official order of Speaker of U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi.

The order came after reports about Trump’s telephone call with Ukrainian president for investigation into his possible rival Joe Biden.

During the conversation Trump asked his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky for a “favor”. He pressured Zelensky to investigate Joe Biden, his possible Democratic rival for the 2020 presidential election, and his son Hunter Biden who was on the board of a Ukrainian oil and gas factory.  At the time, Trump had suspended $400 million military aid to Ukraine as a quid pro quo.

Why Nancy Pelosi risks?

It should be noted that some Democrats have called for Trump’s impeachment since his first months of his presidency. The impeachment inquiry was popular among Democratic voters, with a recent poll showing that %73 of them favoring the impeachment.

But Republicans are strongly opposed to impeachment, and the country generally relies on Republicans. That is why Nancy Pelosi and other leading Democrats were first reluctant to officially begin an impeachment. Their calculations have so far revealed that impeachment against Trump will not have much effect on the opinion of Republicans and his supporters, a situation which will make it more difficult to remove him from the 2020 election.

Trump has described the impeachment as “fake”.  Pelosi said that Trump has affirmed that he had asked the Ukrainian president to take actions in favor of his political position, claiming the measures of Trump’s administration were undermining U.S. national security.

“The release of the notes of the call by the White House confirms that the president engaged in behavior that undermines the integrity of our elections, the dignity of the office he holds and our national security,” Pelosi said in a statement.

House Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam Schiff also said that the president should prioritize national interests rather than his personal interests. Schiff added that they will study whether Trump has exploited military aid to Ukraine to meet his demands. 

Consequences of Trump’s impeachment

Experts argue that Trump’s impeachment and lack of a decisive leader will make the U.S. more vulnerable to other countries’ plots. As Robert W. Merry recently said in The National Interest magazine, “When the president is weakened at home, then America is weakened abroad.”

However, Washington’s friends and enemies consider U.S. foreign policy insignificant due to political infighting at home. Instead, the great power players are seeking to limit the influence of the country rather than cooperating with it.

The recent accusations against Trump can be easily stated as a national security issue, which needs to be reformed immediately. Theoretically, military aid will be provided only if U.S. officials become convinced that they can achieve main security objectives of Washington. Therefore refusing to provide aid because of political reasons is a serious wrongdoing, showing that the personal interests of the president is superior to U.S. national interests. 

Will the impeachment inquiry get the necessary vote?

Now that the House has launched an impeachment inquiry into the president, the Senate will play an important role in the process. In this case, the Senate will act as a court that decides on Trump’s dismissal or survival.

To oust Trump, the votes of 67 members of the Senate is needed, which would be two-thirds of their population. Currently, there are 53 Republicans and 47 Democrats in the Senate. Therefore, Democrats need the support of 20 Republican senators.

Since the Republicans have not supported Trump’s impeachment, it is highly unlikely that Trump’s impeachment leads to his dismissal.

Impact of the impeachment on the 2020 presidential election

The impact of Trump’s impeachment on the presidential election depends on his defense and the credibility of accusations against him. Democrats are well aware that accusing Trump of corruption and incompetence will not affect American voters. Democrats probably knew that those allegations were not strong enough to undermine Trump, but on the contrary they would undermine their positions.

By stating an issue related to U.S. national security, Democrats took the risk of impeachment. To make the impeachment strategy successful, Democrats should prove that the president has endangered U.S. national security and he may do the same in future. This claim can go beyond party politics and put unbearable pressure on Trump, Republicans and uncertain voters.

From our partner Tehran Times

Continue Reading

Americas

Russian Involvement in Venezuela is Troublesome for Western Hemisphere

Todd Royal

Published

on

The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) “projects that natural gas consumption in Asia will continue to outpace supply.” With the future growth of natural gas consumption concentrated in Asia the EIA “expects ‘non-OECD Asia’ to consumer 120 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) by 2050, outpacing regional production by 50 Bcf/d.” China’s natural gas consumption will “triple between 2018-2050.” Most long-term natural gas infrastructure, global liquid natural gas (LNG) terminal(s) import and export, and demand projections are based on Asian growth.

Late October reporting in Russian media confirmed Russian energy conglomerate, Rosneft had plans to consolidate Venezuela’s National Oil Company PDVSA (Petroleos de Venezuela) under Rosneft’s corporate structure in exchange for debt relief. This counters U.S., Canadian and Mexican oil and natural gas firms from satisfying natural gas demand from non-OECD Asia. Additionally, it allows Moscow to use Rosneft acquiring Venezuelan natural gas as a geopolitical, soft power coercion tool by acquiring some of the largest recoverable oil and natural gas reserves in the world.

Venezuelan government sources, Rosneft and the Kremlin all denythe potential for a takeover of PDVSA energy assets to satisfy Russian bank loan requirements to the Madero regime. Russian energy experts have visited PDVSA to analyze the possibility of merging with Rosneft. The Russian energy giant buying out Venezuela’s best source of hard currency and domestic economic driver illustrate the “hard-hitting impact of U.S. sanctions.” The Venezuela regime-based economy predicated on oil and natural gas production is on the verge of collapsing.

Rosneft’s offer is the best way outside of western help for Venezuela to mitigate damaging sanctions, and “debt relief for a country that owes over $156 billion to external parties – and Venezuela’s debt is 740% higher than the value of its exports.” This is four times more than what is typical in emerging markets and economies according to The World Bank.

U.S. Special Envoy for Venezuela Elliot Abrams has pointed to Rosneft having joint projects with PDVSA where it took leading minority stakes, and how these ventures do not “breach” U.S. sanctions. This is positive news for average Venezuelan citizens suffering under economic malaise. Caracas’ debt to Moscow seemingly is being forgiven under the auspices of U.S. blessing. However, the Trump administration has been clear in its maximum pressure “sanctions policy towards Venezuela” that mirrors the sanctions-strategy towards Tehran. Retaliation from the U.S. could be the future of Washington-Moscow-Caracas tri-lateral relations if Rosneft tries to liquidate PDVSA assets, and release thousands of employees to skirt U.S.-led western sanctions.

The Maduro regime will also need to navigate the “$20-$60 billion in debt owed” to China. Will the Chinese have a stake in PDVSA? If so, how does that play into the current U.S.-China trade negotiations? What these geopolitical decisions points towards is a Rosneft-PDVSA merge bringing up more questions than answers.

It makes sense for Russia to be the power broker in Venezuela. This is similar to how Russia is the safe diplomatic choice in the Middle, post-Syrian civil war. According to Foreign Affairs, Russia is now “the Indispensible Nation in the Middle East.” Military troops and hardware were used to save the Assad regime, and now in Venezuela it will be oil, natural gas and petrochemicals that gives Russia a solid foothold in the western hemisphere. PDVSA is one of the “world’s most prolific oil companies” with the largest extractable oil and gas reserves in the world – estimated at 300 billion barrels and PDVSA’s estimated worth is “approximately $186 billion.”

Putting this energy portfolio under Kremlin influence gives Rosneft and other energy firms aligned with Moscow solid footing to control price and supply for global oil and petrochemical markets. The Maduro government wants to stay with previous joint venture contracts between PDVSA and Rosneft, and if the merger takes place, wants to “hand control over to Rosneft without having to go through privatization.” Financial questions arise from this arrangement; who is responsible for terms of debt, how is China able to value the deal, and would equity be defined as a public, private or some form of public-private entity? These are some of the larger issues that would need to be resolved.

Maduro can possibly work around these issues when he took over Venezuela’s Supreme Tribunal of Justice. This allows Maduro to ignore the democratically elected Legislature, the opposition-controlled National Assembly, and its leader, Juan Guaido. Mr. Guaido claims he is the legitimate leader of Venezuela, but likely Rosneft with Moscow’s backing will only negotiate with the Maduro government. The Supreme Tribunal of Justice can overrule the Assembly to assist the merger towards completion. Debt repayment is important to the Maduro regime, and return to financial health.

Citgo, a U.S. based company that is a valued asset for PDVSA is another area of concern for the proposed merger in tandem with U.S. sanctions.

American officials have implemented a freeze on all Venezuelan assets based in the U.S. Washington implemented an executive order coinciding with sanctions protecting “bondholders and other parties” mulling asset sales and seizures for unpaid debts. The international desire among government and financial officials is this move by the Americans facilitate diplomatic solutions over asset seizure. The downside is it strengthens Maduro over the elected Venezuelan legislature and Assembly leader Guaido.

Debt holders who own Citgo then have to negotiate with Venezuela and Rosneft. This will be tough for bondholders to receive repayment, or will it, as this could mean tougher going for international credit markets to lend money for future Rosneft/PDVSA projects. A Moscow-Caracas alliance is something Washington could believe will increase geopolitical tension between all three countries. Debt relief for Caracas, and control over the world’s largest oil reserves are likely to be the final push for Rosneft to acquire PDVSA over escalating tensions between Moscow and Washington with Caracas stuck in the middle.

Continue Reading

Latest

Newsdesk3 hours ago

ADB to Help Improve Rural Water Supply, Sanitation in Kyrgyz Republic

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has approved a $27.4 million financing package to provide safe and reliable water supply and...

South Asia5 hours ago

The efficiency of German contribution in the Afghan peace process

Germany is heavily involved in the afghan affairs since 9.11.2001; the country has brought in to being the modern Afghanistan...

Energy News7 hours ago

IRENA Facilitates Investment and Renewable Projects on Ground in Africa

Boosting renewable energy projects on the ground requires scaling up investment. IRENA’s state-of-the-art analysis of enabling policy frameworks and finance...

East Asia9 hours ago

Implications of French President’s Visit to China on the International Arena

French President Emmanuel Macron pursues a policy of opening up to China and solving problems that may arise peacefully and...

Energy11 hours ago

Is OPEC stuck in a cycle of endless cuts?

In its latest annual World Oil Outlook (WOO) report, published last week, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)...

International Law12 hours ago

Validity of Reservations of Bangladesh against Article 2 of CEDAW

One of the greatest victories for the post-modern feminist movement in the arena of International Law was the Convention on...

EU Politics15 hours ago

Africa-Europe Alliance: Two new financial guarantees under the EU External Investment Plan

Today in the margins of the 2019 Africa Investment Forum in Johannesburg, South Africa, the European Commission signed two guarantee...

Trending

Copyright © 2019 Modern Diplomacy