The Greeks have received all the blame for the crisis, but the bankers in Frankfurt deserve the lion’s share of the culpability for making such ill-advised loans in the first place.
In 1919, the European nations that had prevailed in WWI imposed onerous peace terms on Germany via the Treaty of Versailles. The harsh economic sanctions and reparations imposed on Germany led to economic catastrophe, massive unemployment, hyperinflation and eventual political turmoil, which led to the rise of fascism a little more than a decade later. After only five years of strict enforcement, France finally relented and canceled some of the more onerous terms of the treaty, but by then the economic and political forces in Germany that would see the rise of Adolph Hitler were already in motion. The Second World War was already inevitable.
The insistence of the WWI allies on political humiliation and economic punishment for Germany presents a remarkable parallel to the position taken by German chancellor Angela Merkel over the question of economic austerity and debt repayment for Greece and other heavily indebted nations in Europe. After the human and economic pain of losing two world wars, is it possible that Germany’s leadership has not learned the key lesson of economics, namely that benevolence is always a better course than retribution? Just ask Vladimir Putin of Russia, who has set back his nation’s economy by decades in order to resist the fearsome specter of a Ukrainian free trade agreement with the EU.
As Fred Feldkamp noted, Adam Smith demonstrated more than two centuries ago that benevolence is the driving force by which the invisible hand of economics can produce optimal benefits. The work of Smith in “The Wealth of Nations” supports the approach of Washington with the post-WWII Marshall Plan, whereby the United States rebuilt much of the industrial world using debt forgiveness and copious amounts of new credit. All nations benefitted from America’s generosity. Smith also demonstrates the futility of nations that attempt to punish actual or potential trading partners via reparations and other sanctions, like those applied to Germany via the Versailles Treaty.
By insisting on austerity to enable repayment of debt by nations such as Greece and Spain, to use just two examples, Germany is repeating the very same mistakes that led to disaster for Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. We need to keep in mind that Germany, France and other larger EU nations extended loans to nations like Greece in order to drive exports of goods and services. A lot of short-sighted politicians, corporate executives and bankers enabled this process of lending to a nation that clearly lacked the ability to repay. And now no one in the major capitals of the EU wants to talk about debt restructuring for Greece and other southern European nations.
“There is an odious component in Greece’s sovereign debt,” notes Berlin-based analyst Achim Duebel. “There have also been already two rounds of Greek debt restructuring, but of course the creditors have in the meantime changed.”
The elections in Greece have brought to power Syriza, a left-wing nationalist tendency that bypassed the existing political parties on a platform of rejecting the German-imposed austerity and debt rescue plan, a scheme which essentially requires Greece to follow in the footsteps of 1920s Germany. Greece’s new finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, has denounced German-inspired threats by the European Central Bank (ECB) to cut off funding for Greek banks as “political intimidation,” “warning in fiery language that his country’s democratic revolution will not be crushed into submission,” reports the London Telegraph.
Meanwhile in Spain, a poll showed this week that the anti-austerity Podemos party would come second in an election to the ruling People’s Party, but ahead of the Socialists. “Support for the conservative People’s Party (PP) and the Socialists,” Reuters reports, “the two dominant parties since Spain’s return to democracy in the late 1970s, has fallen to a record low after a series of corruption scandals and tough welfare cuts.”
As with Syriza, Podemos is a relatively new political party—in fact, less than a year old. But this insurgent bloc now threatens to force the ruling Socialist Party into a coalition, if not take the election at the end of 2015 outright. But in both Greece and Spain, the central lesson is that austerity in the name of paying foreign creditors does not sell, either in economic or political terms.
Germany and the other core nations of the EU need to admit that much of the debt incurred by Spain and Greece was unsustainable from the start and was only extended to drive the appearance of economic growth in the EU. Just as the United States used a domestic housing finance boom in the 2000s to fashion the pretense of economic solidity, the loans to Greece were likewise a canard.
Without a change in the stance taken by the ECB and, behind it, the German financial and business establishment, the politics of Europe will continue to radicalize and deteriorate in an almost perfect replay of the 1920s. As Joschka Fischer, German foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998-2005, wrote in Project Syndicate:
“Even before the leftist Syriza party’s overwhelming victory in Greece’s recent general election, it was obvious that, far from being over, the crisis was threatening to worsen. Austerity—the policy of saving your way out of a demand shortfall—simply does not work. In a shrinking economy, a country’s debt-to-GDP ratio rises rather than falls, and Europe’s recession-ridden crisis countries have now saved themselves into a depression, resulting in mass unemployment, alarming levels of poverty, and scant hope.”
Germany’s leadership must somehow come to understand that the real threat today is not the inflation of Weimar Germany, but the political unrest caused by the crushing burden of foreign debt. “There has already been voluntary debt forgiveness by private creditors, banks have already slashed billions from Greece’s debt,” Merkel told the Hamburger Abendblatt. “I do not envisage fresh debt cancellation.” But without additional reductions in Greek debt, the country is likely to default on its remaining obligations and begin a process of financial repudiation and political radicalization that could spell the eventual unwinding of the EU itself.
Germany needs to tone down its rhetoric and admit that the debt forgiveness and bailout loans provided to Athens so far have largely saved banks in Germany and other EU nations via the back door, rather than actually helped Greece itself. The Greeks have received all the blame for the crisis, whereas the bankers in Frankfurt deserve the lion’s share of the culpability for making these ill-advised loans in the first instance. But does Merkel have the courage to make this case to the German public? The fate of Europe hangs in the balance.
First published by the National Interest
Turkey and Trump’s sanctions-based “political economy”
By the end of last year, the Turkish economy had slipped into a technical recession, boosting in 12 months by only 2.6%, despite the fact that a year ago the government expected GDP to grow by 3.8%. The slowdown is particularly striking against the background of sustainable development over the past seven years: in 2010, the country’s GDP grew by 8.5%, in 2011 – by 11.1%, in 2012 – by 4.8%, in 2013 – by 8.5%, in 2014 – by 5.2%, in 2015 – by 6.1%, in 2016 – by 3.2% and in 2017 – by 7.4% This trend has turned Turkey into one of the fastest developing economies, earning it 17th position worldwide in nominal GDP and 13th in the GDP value regarding purchasing power parity.
The situation changed by the middle of 2018, when relations with Washington deteriorated to the point of a trade war. The Trump administration resorted to the much-practiced method of targeting the “dissenters”: it raised drastically customs duties on steel and aluminum imported from Turkey (which, however, did not prevent the United States from becoming the second buyer of Turkish metallurgical produce by the end of the year). On August 1 the US introduced sanctions against Turkish Interior and Justice Ministers. At that time, the main stumbling block (at least on the surface of it) was Turkey’s refusal to release American priest Andrew Brunson who was detained in 2016 on charges of espionage and links to Fethullah Gulen’s movement along with the Kurdistan Workers ’Party. For some time Donald Trump’s propaganda slogans were dominated by the maxim “to save rank-and-file pastor Brunson”.
Turkey responded by slapping import duties on American goods: cars, alcohol, tobacco, cosmetics. And, of course, it put two US ministers on its sanctions list.
But the forces were clearly far from equal. As a result, the Turkish lira collapsed. At the beginning of 2018 one dollar traded for 3.8 liras, whereas by the end of the year it sold for 5.3 liras. Moreover, at the peak of the weakening of the national currency, the dollar cost almost 7 liras. The Central Bank of Turkey was forced to raise the interest rate, even despite opposition from the country’s omnipotent president. Today, the rate has climbed up to the red level of 24%. Consequently, there has been a drop in the sales of real estate, cars, and a number of other industrial goods. Prospects for inflation have materialized too – in October, inflation hit a fifteen-year high, exceeding 25 percent.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan put the blame for the crisis on Turkey’s foreign ill-wishers. This time – with a lion’s share of truth.
In October, the court sentenced Branson to imprisonment for exactly the time he had already served. The pastor returned home, mutual sanctions were lifted, which partly calmed the markets. But only partly.
According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TSI), the country’s GDP increased by 2.6% by the end of the year. At the same time, the service sector grew by 5.6%, agrarian – by 1.3%, industrial – by only 1.1%. Exports, compared to the previous year, increased by 7% – to 168 billion dollars (a record figure in the entire history of the Turkish Republic). Foreign trade deficit, amid a boost of imports prices, decreased by 28.4% to $ 55 billion, while imports proper dropped by 4.6% to 223 billion dollars. Tourism revenues increased by 12.3% to 29.5 billion
At first glance, the situation is far from critical, but, according to the TSI, over the year, per capita GDP dropped from $10,597 to $ 9,632; household expenditures, although going up by 1.1% on the year, went down by 8.9% in the fourth quarter. In December unemployment rate among the able-bodied population reached 13.5% – more than 4.3 million people.
Nevertheless, Berat Albayrak, Minister of Treasury and Finance of Turkey, sounded optimistic: “The worst days for the economy are over. The government is confident that the growth of the Turkish economy in 2019 will match the forecasts laid down in the New Economic Program. ”
In general, the above-mentioned program envisages the implementation of reforms that will protect export-oriented small and medium-sized enterprises, strengthen their competitiveness, stimulate the economy to secure a high level of added value. An important part of the document is a clause that stipulates cutting government spending on expensive infrastructure projects, often designed to foster the image rather than the economy.
Specialists differ in assessing the prospects for the Turkish economy: forecasts vary from a slight increase to a further decline. In particular, according to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Economists expect the cooling to continue. The OECD forecasts a further reduction in the economic growth of (Turkey-author) for 2019 to minus 1.8 percent.” So far, the trend is as follows: industrial production, for example, in January 2019 fell by 7.3% against January last year.
Among the chronic illnesses of the Turkish economy is a deficit of the balance of payments, which the government traditionally tries to compensate with foreign loans and foreign investment – these primarily provided economic growth in previous years. Now this source seems nearly exhausted as investors worldwide are growing increasingly wary of developing markets. The position of Turkey is aggravated by the uncertainty of foreign capital about the independence of the Central Bank, its concerns about the unpredictability of the country’s policy and the adequacy of its economic course (first of all, its adherence to ambitious projects with questionable economic efficiency).
Also, potential investors are deterred by the strained relations between Ankara and Washington. For many, President Trump’s recent treat to “ruin” Turkey for its policy on Syrian Kurds and his recent decision to abolish customs preferences for a number of Turkish goods came as signaling the continuation of a trade war. Significantly, these statements were made after the Turkish leadership confirmed its determination to acquire Russian air defense systems, thereby making it clear that pursued a course towards independence in strategic decision-making.
For Turkey, the United States is a fairly important trading partner, which in 2018 accounted for almost five percent of Turkish exports ($ 8.3 billion) and more than five percent of imports ($ 12.3 billion).
The recession in the Turkish economy has a certain negative impact on Russian-Turkish economic results. Last year, Turkey became Russia’s sixth largest trading partner. In particular, it accounts for a considerable share of Russian exports of metals, grain and, most importantly, energy carriers (the second, after Germany, importer of oil in the world). In February, according to Gazprom, the export of Russian gas to non-CIS countries decreased by 13% in annual terms. The company said the main reasons behind the decrease were the warm weather in Europe and the crisis in Turkey.
The Russian economy has succeeded in adapting to the extensive sanction pressure from Washington and, it looks like the Trump administration has now chosen to “attack from the flank”, targeting one of Moscow’s major foreign economic partners. It would not be a mistake to assume that the ability of the Turkish leadership to resist pressure from its “strategic ally” and NATO partner in the near future will largely determine not only economic, but also political relations between Moscow and Ankara.
First published in our partner International Affairs
Ambiguity in European economic leadership
Europe’s economic situation remains uncertain! The European economic crisis and austerity policies remain in place. On the other hand, there is no sign that the EU is passing through the current situation. Two conservative /Social Democrats in Europe have not been able to effectively counteract the economic crisis over the last few years.
This same issue has led to anger by European citizens from traditional European parties. Subsequently, the trend of European citizens to nationalist and extremist parties has increased in recent years.
The events that have taken place in France in recent months have led to disappointment with the eurozone leaders over the current deadlock.The most important point is that Macron was planned to assume the title of the Europe’s economic leader in the short term, and that was to be after succeeding in creating and sustaining economic reforms in France and the Eurozone.
Meanwhile, European citizens expressed their satisfaction with the election of Macron as French President in 2017. They thought that the French president, while challenging austerity policies, would strengthen the components of economic growth in the European Union. Moreover, EU leaders also hoped that Macron’s success in pursuing economic reforms in France would be a solid step in pushing the entire Eurozone out of the economic crisis.
In other words, in the midst of anti-Euro and extremist and far-right movements in Europe, Macron was the last hope of European authorities to “manage the economic crisis” which was raising inside the Eurozone: the hope that has soon faded away!
The main dilemma in France is quite clear!”Failing to persuade French citizens” on his economic reforms, and Macron’s miscalculations about the support of French citizens for himself, were among the important factors in shaping this process. Macron had to give concessions to protesters to prevent further tensions in France.
After the country’s month-long demonstrations, Macron was forced to retreat from his decision on raising the fuel price. Besides, he had no way but to make promises to the French citizens on issues such as raising the minimum wages and reducing the income tax. This had but one meaning: Macron’s economic reforms came to an end. Right now, European authorities know well that Macron is incapable of regaining his initial power in France and the Eurozone by 2022 (the time for the France general elections).
Therefore, Macron has to forget the dream of EU’s economic leadership until the last moments of his presence at the Elysees Palace. Of course, this is if the young French president isn’t forced to resign before 2022! The European authorities and the Eurozone leaders have no alternative for Macron and his economic reforms in Europe. That’s why they’re so worried about the emergence of anti-EU movements in countries such as France and Germany.
For example, they are well aware that if Marin Le Pen can defeat Macron and come to power in France during the upcoming elections, then the whispers of the collapse of the Eurozone, and even the European Union, will be clearly heard, this time with a loud voice, all over the Europe.
First published in our partner Tehran Times
Economic integration: Asia and the Pacific’s best response to protectionism
Deepening economic integration in Asia and the Pacific is a longstanding regional objective. Not an end in itself but a means of supporting the trade, investment and growth necessary to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It is a priority for all member states of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN ESCAP). China has a valuable contribution to make so I am beginning 2019 with a visit to Beijing. One to discuss with Chinese leaders how we can strengthen our collaboration and accelerate progress.
The case for deeper integration in Asia and the Pacific is becoming increasingly apparent. Recent trade tensions highlight Asia and the Pacific’s vulnerability to protectionism from major export markets. UN ESCAP analysis shows how regional supply chains are being disrupted and investor confidence shaken. Export growth is expected to slow and foreign direct investment to continue its downward trend. Millions of jobs are forecast to be lost, others will be displaced. Unskilled workers, particularly women, are likely to suffer most. Increasing seamless regional connectivity – expanding the infrastructure which underpins cross border commercial exchanges and intraregional trade – must be part of our response.
We should build on the existing Asian transport infrastructure agreements UN ESCAP maintains to further reduce regulatory constraints, costs and delays. For instance, UN ESCAP members are working to improve the efficiency of railway border crossings along the Trans-Asian Railway network. There is great potential to improve electronic information exchange between railways, harmonise customs formalities and improve freight trains’ reliability. The recent international road transport agreement between the governments of China, Mongolia and the Russian Federation grants traffic rights for international road transport operations on the sections of the Asia Highway which connect their borders. We should expand it to other countries. There is also huge opportunity to develop our region’s dry ports, the terminals pivotal to the efficient shipment of sea cargo to inland destinations by road or rail. A regional strategy is in place to build a network of dry ports of major international significance. UN ESCAP is looking forward to working with China to implement it.
Sustainable energy, particularly cross-border power trade, is another key plank UN ESCAP member States’ connectivity agenda. Connecting electricity grids is not only important to meet demand, ensure energy access and security. It is also necessary to support the development of large-scale renewable energy power plants and the transition to cleaner energy across Asia and the Pacific. The fight against climate change in part depends on our ability to better link up our networks. ASEAN’s achievements in strengthening power grids across borders is a leading example of what political commitment and technical cooperation can deliver. At the regional level UN ESCAP has brought together our region’s experts to develop a regional roadmap on sustainable energy connectivity. China is currently chairing this group.
For maximum impact, transport and energy initiatives need to come in tandem with the soft infrastructure which facilitates the expansion of trade. UN ESCAP analysis ranks China among the top trade facilitation and logistics performers in our region. This expertise contributed to a major breakthrough in cross-border e-commerce development and ultimately led to a UN treaty on trade digitalisation. This has been adopted by UN ESCAP members to support the exchange of electronic trade data and documents and signed by China in 2017. Now, UN ESCAP is working to support the accession and ratification of twenty-five more countries who recognise the opportunity to minimise documentary requirements, promote transparency and increase the security of trade operations. Full implementation of cross-border paperless trade in Asia and the Pacific could reduce export costs by up to 30 percent. Regional export gains could be as has high as $250 billion.
As we look to the future and work to accelerate progress towards the
2030 Agenda’s Sustainable Development Goals, economic integration must remain a
priority. A strong UN-China sustainable development partnership is essential to
take this agenda forward and strengthen our resilience to international trade
tensions and economic uncertainty. Working with all the countries in our
region, we have a unique opportunity to place sustainability considerations at
the heart of our efforts and build seamless regional connectivity. That is an
opportunity, which in 2019, UN ESCAP is determined to seize.UNESCAP
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