What is the impact of Kumtor on Kyrgyzstan’s Gold Mining Sector?
Nationalization talks have started again in Kyrgyzstan about the ownership of Kumtor Gold Mine. Kumtor Gold Mine, operated and jointly owned by Canadian Centerra Gold via Kumtor Operating Company (KOC) and the Kyrgyz government, has always been a point of tension in the country. Marred by protests, both anti-Kyrgyz government and anti-Centerra, environmental controversy, and being the center of internal Kyrgyz political and social struggles, Kumtor remains Kyrgyzstan’s largest and the most profitable investment project and the country’s main economic asset.
The Kumtor Gold Mine, the largest gold mine in Kyrgyzstan located in the Issyk Kul Province, is located 350 kilometers southeast from the capital of Bishkek and 80 km south of Issyk-Kul Lake. The mining operation is open-pit which uses surface mining to extract rocks and minerals. The mine has been in operation since 1997; the lifespan of the mine has been extended to 2023.
The mine which is currently 100% owned by Canadian Centerra Gold (operated through Kumtor Operating Company or KOC) is a joint-stock company (JSC) which Kyrgyzstan via Kyrgyzaltyn owns “33% of the common shares or 77,401,766” and “as of March 1, 2012, Kyrgyzstan’s interests are estimated at $1.546 billion.”[i] Kumtor currently employs 2,617 Kyrgyz citizens (95% are full-time) out of 3,190 total employees. Kumtor accounts for 20% of Kyrgyzstan’s industrial sector and output and accounts for 8% of its GDP. With current dividends, Kyrgyzstan receives 11.3 million USD per year and KOC pays 108 million USD in taxes to the Kyrgyz government.[ii]
Ata-Meken has submitted a draft law on the nationalization of Kumtor. The last round of talks/negotiations about Kumtor took place 10 December 2014. Calls for nationalization emerged out of the failure to establish a joint-venture of the mine: “due to populism we have lost the chance to set up a joint venture [for Kumtor],” Kyrgyz President Atambayev said in a 1 December 2014 interview.[iii] The currently discussion would have Kyrgyzaltyn swap 33% of its holdings for 50% ownership of the joint venture company operating Kumtor, making ownership 50/50. Alternatively, the Kyrgyz nationalist political parties (Ata-Meken and Respublika) suggest Kyrgyzaltyn own 67% while Centerra holds 33% or Kyrgyzaltyn control 100% of the mine as advocated by Respublika.[iv]
The assertiveness of the Kyrgyz when negotiating mining contracts is due to the feeling that foreign companies operating the mines are not investing in local communities and are not promoting development in the region. This is partly because of past environmental accidents.
In May 1998, a truck toppled releasing 1700-1800 kg of toxic sodium cyanide into the Barskoon River. After the accident, local villagers reported illness (some deaths were reported by never fully linked to the cyanide spill—this is speculative) as the river is used for drinking and for irrigation. After the accident and the lackluster response by both Centerra and the Kyrgyz government, locals blockaded the roads to Kumtor and demanded that the contract be cancelled. This prompted more environmental safeguards such as immediate notification of a spill was to be implemented. Another incident occurred on January 20, 2000 where a KOC truck “carrying 1,500 kilograms of ammonium nitrate, used as an explosive at the mine, crashed, [and] spilling its contents.”[v] Kyrgyz authorities were not immediately notified of the spill.
Because of these accidents, there is concern about the use of land. The Kyrgyz Republic’s “Law on Subsoil” introduced in 1997 “governs relationships arising between the government and individuals and legal entities, and other states while using subsoil” and regulates mineral recovery (extraction), mineral deposits of economic significance, ownership of the subsoil and there within minerals.[vi] The Law states that subsoil is the exclusive property of the Kyrgyz Republic is under protection by the state. This law has been used to regulate mining activities and has been used to justify violations of environmental regulations including operations at Kumtor.
The “Law on Glaciers”—to prevent the degradation of glaciers that supply drinking water to many local villages—was passed by Parliament in April 2014, but was sent back by the President for revisions. The new law would require companies to pay for damages to the glaciers. The glaciers affected would be Davidov, Lysyi and Sarytor as KOC has put rocks on top of glaciers and removed parts of glacial ice violating environmental provisions of the project; Centerra has adjusted their operations to stop the acceleration of water.[vii] Lake Petrov is also in danger.
It is unclear whether or not the environmental laws on glaciers or subsoil are genuine attempts to preserve the environment or are a way for the Kyrgyz government to extract concessions from foreign companies to increase their profits or holdings in a company.
There are also concerns how the mining and the chemical usages to mine the gold will affect the historic freshwater Issyk-Kul Lake. The Issyk-Kul Development Fund became part of the Kumtor operation and KOC/Centerra is required to provide 1% of its gross revenue to socio-economic development of regional sectors aligned with spending is based on government priorities. The fund was started in 2009 and since then 25 million USD was provided to the fund; 4.638 million USD was provided to the fund in 2012 alone. The fund has helped build schools, kindergartens, sports clubs, and irrigation infrastructure which has been impacted by the mining.
To mitigate any significant economic effects of the nationalization of Kumtor, additional gold mining operations exist at Ishtamberdy, Bozymchak and Taldybulak Levoberezhnyi mines. Ishtamberdy is Chinese operated, protested by Kyrgyz locals, and has experienced some controversy including Full Gold Mining JSC threatening to cease operations in September 2013. The mine was to begin production in the second quarter of 2013 creating 600 permanent jobs.[viii]
Bozymchak mine would produce mainly ore and would produce 0.8 to 0.9 tons of gold. Kazakhstan’s Kazakhmys incurred an impairment charge in 2012 of $162 million USD against Bozymchak which reveals a higher operating risk in Kyrgyzstan as the company had to reduce its goodwill.[ix] The first shipment of the concentrate from Bozymchak to Kazakhstan was expected to occur in November 2014.[x] The mine was said to have completed construction in late 2013 providing 600-700 permanent jobs. Taldybulak Levoberezhnyi, an Open Joint Stock Company, is expected to be in operation until 2026: 60% belongs to Altynken (purchased by Chinese Superb Pacific Limited Company in Sept 2011) and 40% belongs to the Kyrgyz government. At the Taldybulak Levoberezhnyi, production was not expected until June 2014 according to AKIPress. In October 2012, locals picketed the headquarters of the mine in Orlovka, Kyrgyzstan. The protesters disputed the “Chinese company’s illegal sacking of Kyrgyz citizens and polluting of the local environment.”[xi]
There are also gold deposits that could be exploited including Makmal and Togolok but they are not as profitable. The Makmal gold mine was once extremely profitable. Operations at Makmal began in 1986 and excavated until 1996 producing 21.47 tons of gold. The mine is in past producer stage and its life has been extended to 2016. Geological reserves after 1996 were estimated at 20 tons of gold. [xii] Mining operations at Togolok will produce 800 jobs and its probable reserves are estimated at 86 tons in the mine deposit and the surrounding area.[xiii]
There are multiple promising gold deposits/sites are Karator, At-Bashy in the Naryn region, containing 5.5 gold reserves and the “Buchuk” gold reserve of 15-20 tons. Shambasei gold resource, a low-risk high-margin project, in Southern Kyrgyzstan has an estimated defined gold reserve of “2.5 million [tons] at 3.4g/t, or 277,000 ounces of gold.”[xiv] Karakazyk in the Chon-Alay district in the Osh region would produce 200-300 kg per year producing 100-120 jobs for the local workforce. These identified sites combined produce less gold and revenue than Kumtor and would provide fewer jobs.[xv]
The nationalization of Kumtor must be mitigated by the countries’ other mineral sectors such as copper, ore, silver, iron and tungsten. To remain economically competitive within the Eurasian Economic Union, Kyrgyzstan must develop sustainable economic and mining practices as the Kyrgyz economy is susceptible to many supply shocks; reliance on Kumtor is too heavy. By developing other sectors of the economy, Kyrgyzstan is shielding itself from a possible economic meltdown. If nationalization were to occur, would the Kyrgyz government be able to support the projects developed by the Issyk-Kul Development Fund? Poor development in the financial sector has led to poor governance of the situation prompting protests that have shut down or suspended operations.
Kumtor protests were rooted in the need to address environmental concerns, contributions to the community, and perceived unequal revenue distribution and fueled by renewed nationalism and the assertiveness of the new post-Bakiev government. South African investors (Talas Gold Company) and Australian investors (Z-Explorer of Manas Resources) have met the same challenges as Canada’s Centerra. If these issues are not resolved, can cause widespread damage to Kyrgyzstan’s gold mining and damage Kyrgyzstan’s reputation as a reliable foreign business partner. Corruption in Kyrgyzstan is also a concern. According to Transparency International 2014 Corruption Perception Index rankings, Kyrgyzstan has a rank of 27 (0 is the most corrupt to 100 which is the least corrupt).
Kyrgyzstan would most likely be unable to run the mine itself: “[KOC] does not earn money on a daily basis. It receives financial support from Centerra for most of the year until it can sell gold and pay back all of its loans.” [xvi] Pay out would not be immediate and the government would have to put the money upfront to benefit the costs. Most of the workers that Kumtor employs would most likely stay unless the nationalization of the mine were to affect their wages and Kyrgyzstan lacks the workforce to replace Centerra’s sector specialists. If nationalized, there would be higher operating costs decreasing revenue. Other companies (or countries) might be interested in developing the mine, but would most likely face the same issues as Centerra Gold leading Kyrgyzstan to become more of a high political risk country.
[i] Kumtor Gold. 2013. FAQ: Kyrgyzstan and Centerra. http://www.kumtor.kg/en/about/faq/centerragold-and-kyrgyzstan/ (last accessed 29 December 2014).
[ii] Gullette, David and Asel Kalybekova. 2014. Agreement under pressure, Gold mining and protests in the Kyrgyz Republic. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/10927.pdf (last accessed January 3, 2015). Page. 15.
[iii] Kg.24. 2014. Kyrgyz moves towards Kumtor nationalization. The Times of Central Asia. http://www.eng.24.kg/bigtiraj/173638-news24.html (last accessed 29 December 2014).
[iv] Gullette, David and Asel Kalybekova. 2014. Agreement under pressure, Gold mining and protests in the Kyrgyz Republic. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/10927.pdf (last accessed January 3, 2015). Page. 15.
[v] Norlen, Doug. 2000. The Kumtor Gold Mine: Spewing toxics from on high. Pacific Environment and Resouces Center, September 2000. Bankwatch Web site. http://bankwatch.org/documents/kumtor_toxics_09_02.pdf (last accessed January 4, 2015). Page 2.
[vi] United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on Subsoil. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Web site (UNECE). http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/hlm/prgm /cph/experts/kyrgyzstan/documents/law.on.subsoil.pdf (last accessed January 5, 2015)
[vii] Centerra Gold. 2012. Environmental and Sustainability Report 2012. Kumtor Gold. http://www.kumtor.kg/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Eco2012_en.pdf (last accessed January 3, 2015). Page 28-29.
[viii] The State Agency on Geology and Mineral Resources of the Kyrgyz Republic. 2014. The mines of the Kyrgyz Republic. http://www.geology.kg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=200&Itemid=242&lang=en (last accessed Jan 2, 2015).
[ix] Kazakhmys. 2013. KAZAKHMYS PLC HALF-YEARLY REPORT FOR THE PERIOD ENDED 30 JUNE 2013. KAZAKHMYS WEB SITE. http://www.kase.kz/files/emitters/GB_KZMS/gb_kzms_reliz_220813_en.pdf (last accessed January 3, 2015).
[x]The Times of Central Asia. 2014. Kazakhmys to start shipping concentrate from Bozymchak in Kyrgyzstan in November. http://www.timesca.com/news/9961-kazakhmys-to-start-shipping-concentrate-from-bozymchak-in-kyrgyzstan-in-november (last accessed December 30, 2014).
[xi] Trilling, David. 2012. Kyrgyzstan: Chinese Respond to latest mine attack. Eurasianet.org Web Site. http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66121 (last accessed January 2, 2015).
[xii] Kyrgyzaltyn. 2011. Makmal Gold Mining Combinate. Kyrgyzaltyn Web site. http://www.kyrgyzaltyn.kg/en/filialy/63-kombinat-makmalzoloto (last accessed December 29, 2014).
[xiii] The State Agency on Geology and Mineral Resources of the Kyrgyz Republic. 2014. The mines of the Kyrgyz Republic. http://www.geology.kg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=200&Itemid=242&lang=en (last accessed Jan 2, 2015).
[xiv]Proactive Investors. 2014. Manas Resources updates Shambesai gold resource to latest standard
http://www.proactiveinvestors.com/companies/news/58591/manas-resources-updates-shambesai-gold-resource-to-latest-standard-58591.html (last accessed January 3, 2015).
[xv] The State Agency on Geology and Mineral Resources of the Kyrgyz Republic. 2014. The mines of the Kyrgyz Republic. http://www.geology.kg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=200&Itemid=242&lang=en (last accessed Jan 2, 2015).
[xvi] Gullette, David and Asel Kalybekova. 2014. Agreement under pressure, Gold mining and protests in the Kyrgyz Republic. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/10927.pdf (last accessed January 3, 2015). Page. 10.
Chimes from Tashkent
Located at the new center of global attraction for economic activity, Pakistan and Uzbekistan share a long string of relations. After the independence from the soviets, Pakistan was among the first countries to recognize it. In 1992, Pakistan established their first diplomatic sanctuary in Tashkent. Since then delegations from both the countries paid visits to each other.
The bond shared between the two countries, that lie in close proximity, is strengthened by similar eastern culture and fortified by the religious ties. This sharing of cultural and religious values is clearly visible in the national language of Pakistan which borrows thousands of words from Uzbekistani language. This nexus is now getting even stronger with the increase in co-operations in social and economic sectors.
Relations between both the states saw an unprecedented growth in recent times and this social integration is ever growing. During the last year only,
63events such as seminars, presentations and business forums were arranged for general public. Whereas, the Uzbek Embassy had a significant number of bilateral meetings with the top tier of business community including several associations and unions. The same sentiment was reciprocated by Pakistani side when more than 50 companies paid visit to Uzbekistan with the purpose of investment. There were a number of exhibitions, events and investment forums in Tashkent, Jizzakh and Bukhara. Eight different Pakistani companies participated in such events.
Uzbekistan and Pakistan have also been working on 38different joint ventures for launching import/export operations.
In economic sphere, Islamabad and Tashkent hold great trade potential. In just 2018, the mutual trade between both countries crossed USD 98.4 million’s mark, which means a raise of around 170%.Prior to 2018 in 2017 numbers of economic activity between two states were low and accounted for just USD 36.6 million.
In 2018 Pakistani export to Uzbekistan increased for 150% and amounted 66 million USD (in 2017 – 26 million USD).
Last year Ambassador of Uzbekistan to Pakistan Mr. Furqat A. Sidikov while addressing business community at Islamabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry expressed that trade volume between Pakistan and Uzbekistan has the potential to rise up to USD 1billion in next 5-6 years. It clearly signifies that both countries can provide enormous benefit to each other’s socio-economic segment. Pakistan has been exporting edibles like mango, citruses, raw and refined sugar. Furthermore, chemical products, pharmaceutical products, and leather and textile goods are major exports of Pakistan to Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan is also a hub for petrochemical goods, cotton and silk goods. Its exports to Pakistan includes: leather raw materials, petrochemical products and mineral fertilizers, cotton yarn, cotton fiber, raw silk, plastic products, agricultural machinery, clothing, etc. Not only this, dry fruits and vegetables are also exported from Uzbekistan to Pakistan.
In 2018 Uzbekistan-Pakistan Business Council was established in Islamabad in order to facilitate and support the business community in two countries. Apart for this, several forums are also established in main cities of Pakistan to boost up the economic potential.
Accessibility remains a key subject in establishing people to people relations thus recognizing this flight route from Tashkent-Lahore-Tashkent was resumed in April of 2017. Both states also look forward to initiate new routes from Islamabad and Karachi as well. Earlier in May Uzbekistan’s Ambassador to Pakistan had a meeting with Chairman Senate of Pakistan to discuss the inter-parliamentarian cooperation between Pakistan and Uzbekistan. Sideways to expanding parliamentarian relations it was also discussed to further strengthen the cooperation on transport sector to provide uninterrupted route to trade of goods.
Both countries share many economical and regional platform and are member of Organization of Islamic countries (OIC), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Economic Cooperation organization (ECO)and others. Multiple times these platforms were used to freshen up the relations between two countries. Based on mutual trust both countries can have free trade agreements to amplify the relations between them.
Enormous potential lies in social, economic and political sectors on which both countries can work. Both countries can play a key role in bringing peaceful non-military solution to misery in Afghanistan as well as in the region. Pakistan needs to explore new avenues for cooperation with countries like Uzbekistan and extract the maximum benefit for itself.
Uzbekistan understands importance of Pakistan in keeping stability and prosperity of the whole South Asian region. Both countries are interested in continuing bilateral partnership on all key issues of the regional security and stability agenda, including the conflict resolution in Afghanistan and expansion of infrastructure, trade and economic ties between Central Asia and Pakistan.
Uzbekistan initiated logistic project that project will include the construction of the massive railroad transport corridor “Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan”. In details, this corridor will compose the rail line “Uzbekistan-Mazarisharif” which has been already realized between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan as well as construction of new rail road “Mazari-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar”.
In perspective, full realization of this unique transport corridor, will make Pakistan as a Central regional trade hub between South Asian and Central Asian regions.
No More Business as Usual: Improving Water Usage in Central Asia
Central Asia’s future economic development, including its energy and water security, depends to a great extent on how effectively countries manage their natural water supplies, especially under increased pressures from climate variability, economic growth, and population expansion.
The population of Central Asia is expected to grow by around 30% by 2050. As such, demand for water services will also increase significantly.
Central Asia is heavily dependent on agriculture, which provides livelihoods for about 50% of the population in some countries. But its level of water productivity is one of the lowest in the Europe and Central Asia region. More efficient use of water in the economy could significantly contribute to increased agricultural productivity, green energy production and the health of the region’s environmental assets.
According to estimates, the adoption of modern agricultural techniques and methods could increase the region’s crop yields by over 20% by 2030, and by 50% by 2050. On the other hand, if countries continue a “business as usual” approach, Central Asia is among the regions that could experience a significantly negative impact on GDP under climate change. Each year, inadequate water supply and sanitation leads to overall economic costs equivalent to around $2.1 billion, although these costs differ from country to country – ranging from almost 0.5% of GDP in Kazakhstan to around 4.25% in Tajikistan (2017 data).
“The water agenda in Central Asia is always viewed through the lens of the Aral Sea disaster,” said Ato Brown, World Bank Country Manager for Kazakhstan. “Today, it is high time for us to start changing the narrative so that Central Asia is known for being an oasis of production and productivity.”
According to a World Bank report, Central Asia is among the regions that have most to gain from properly managing water resources under climate change.
Most of the major rivers in Central Asia cross borders, therefore countries need to coordinate water management to advance sustainable development and climate resilience.
Water resources in the region are sensitive to climate variability, which poses significant challenges to the agriculture and energy sectors.
Since the 1950s, average annual temperatures have increased by 0.5°C in the mountainous areas of southern Central Asia, and glaciers that feed the region’s main rivers – Amu Darya and Syr Darya – have shrunk by a third. With the melting of glaciers, the expected fall in river flows will have a major impact on agricultural production.
By 2025, hydropower is expected to overtake gas as the main fuel source for energy production in Central Asia. Where hydroelectricity production is based on reservoir storage, there can be flow management benefits for climate change adaptation, including flood and drought prevention and mitigation, as well as timely delivery of irrigation and drinking water.
“Central Asian countries need to start with a joint project, and there are opportunities for working together,” said Ato Brown at the Astana Economic Forum. If the countries of Central Asia invest sufficiently and effectively in better water management, they have the potential to become not just economically prosperous and resilient to climate change – but also to provide new opportunities and hope for all their citizens.
Pakistan and the -Stans
From the coasts of Caspian Sea to the rouged lands touching Afghanistan, there lies a belt of resource opulent countries, the Central Asian States. Comprising of five states, it is now becoming the new hub for social and economic development. As it lies at the heart of ancient silk route, central Asia also holds key importance in the new geo-economics of world as well. With combined population of more than 66 million and alone Uzbekistan accounting for approx. 29 million, Central Asia is an emerging market for investing companies.
Known as the five -STANs since all five states include -STAN at the end of their respective names. When these states got independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Pakistan was among the first and few countries to recognize them and establish diplomatic relations with them. Since then, Pakistan and Central Asian countries enjoy healthy relations. Form visits of high-level delegations to signing of MOUs for establishing Joint Economic Commissions (JECs) Pakistan is fully acknowledging the role and importance of Central Asian states.
Geography plays a key role in the importance of these states located on the crossroads of East and West, Central Asian culture is an amalgam of ancient civilizations and modern era. Pakistan and the other STANs have a lot in common. Deeply connected with the bond of the religion, Pakistan and Central Asia, share many similitudes in culture. For instance, Sufism is enrooted in both societies. The architecture, cuisine, arts and handicrafts and even the dresses are somewhat similar. The languages also contain words and structures that are common. Thus, implying that both have immense potential of bilateral co-operation. For this, cross-cultural integrating policies and measures will boost the relations.
Out of many cross-cultural programs, Students’ exchange programs can be very beneficial. Pakistan in 1992-93 started Special Technical Assistance Programs, under which apart from language courses, diplomacy, banking and accountancy expertise were also exchanged. Programs were fully funded by the government of Pakistan. Presently, Central Asian Faculty Development Program had 7% of its fellows from Pakistan in Phase I. Similar programs can help improve the relationship between Central Asia, at not only state level but also it will be beneficial in context to people to people diplomacy.
Economic diplomacy stands as one of the guiding principles for Pakistan’s foreign policy now, hence the already important trade and commerce now stands even more important between the two societies. Presently, Pakistan’s trade volume is almost 58.4 USD in region with exports comprising of larger numbers, indicating the Central Asia can be very favorable market for Pakistani exporters and investors. Kazakhstan being the largest trade central Asian partner of Pakistan, is followed by Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. This trade and commerce between the two can contribute a lot in economic development of the countries and uplifting the standard of living.
Pakistan now is lying a greater emphasis on tourism industry than ever before. It has also been a driver for development in Central Asia. Travelers from across the globe are now visiting the region because of its unique cultural heritage and landscape. The number of visitors to Central Asia is ever increasing as it increased from 2 million visitors in 2010 to 6 million in 2016. Pakistan has also aims at a single tourist visa for all Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC). The promotion of tourism for strengthening of economic and cultural ties across countries and generation of employment and business opportunities had been the priorities under CARCE 2030.
After Washington’s venture on War on Terror and Pakistan becoming the pivot of it tables got turned. When Pakistan experienced the ricochet of Uncle Sam’s policies in Afghanistan , there seemed a decline in Pakistan’s heed towards the Central Asia. Affected by terrorism and its export from across the border with severe internal security challenges, discourse of Pakistan’s foreign policy took a major shift. Pakistan’s primal objective was to secure its internal and external parameters. After more than a decade, the dark clouds are dispersing from Pakistani skies and it is rising from the dungeon of bloodshed.
Now is the time for Pakistan to revamp its foreign policy framework and extend its diplomatic arms across the regions. Since both societies can benefit and can bring robust advancements to their socio-economic fabric by cooperating with each other. Pakistan should thus align its foreign policies with the overall shift in global politics. Since East now holds much important on international scenario, Pakistan and Central Asian co-operation will stand for a more promising future of region.
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