Connect with us

Terrorism

Wahhabi’s on the Warpath in Paris

Alexander Athos

Published

on

On Orthodox Christmas Wednesday 7 January 2015 10 French journalists and 2 were French policemen were murdered and 11 other innocent people have been wounded, some critically by 3 Wahhabi Salafi terrorists. French President Francois Hollande has labelled this terrorist attack on the offices of French magazine #CharlieHebdoas an exceptional act of barbarity.

France has been on the highest terrorist level alert since Al Qaeda,  and other Wahhabi Salafi extremists called for Muslim’s to commit lone wolf attacks on French people and institutions for their continued opposition to Wahhabi Salafi terrorist insurgencies in Africa and the Middle East.

The world recoils at yet another terrorist attack by Wahhabi’s on the warpath shouting the Takbir (تَكْبِير), ‘God (Allah, nominative Allāhu), is Great (Kabir)’. Whilst it has special non-offensive meanings and uses in everyday Muslim rituals and social intercourse, it has a sinister application when said during violent acts of Wahhabi Salafi terrorism like the beheading of French tourist Hervé Gourdel in Algeria by Wahhabi Salafi militants ‘Soldiers of the Caliphate’. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/world/africa/herve-gourdel-french-hostage-beheaded-algeria.html

Mohammed Merah
Another French Algerian Wahhabi Salafi terrorist Mohammed Merah recorded himself shouting Allahu Akbar as he killed three French paratroopers in the 2012 before going on to murder little children and their father at a Toulouse Jewish kindergarten. Cody, Edward (March 22, 2012). “Mohammed Merah, face of the new terrorism”. The Washington Post.
See my article: “ISLAMO-FASCIST TERRORISM NOW IN FRANCE; WHAT MUST BE DONE TO STOP ITS SPREAD” https://www.moderndiplomacy.eu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=136:islamo-fascist-terrorism-now-in-france-what-must-be-done-to-stop-its-spread&Itemid=487
Interestingly Abdelkader Merah, Mohammed Merah’s brother was also involved with recruiting French Salafis to be fighters for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Iraq long before Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi coined his Salafist Al Qaeda group as ISIS. Both al-Zarqawi and al-Baghdadi loved violent jihad and especially beheading Westerners whilst saying “Allāhu Akbar”.
The 9/11 Salafi terrorists like the French-Moroccan Zacarias Moussaoui said in the preparation plans for their attacks 2001:
“When the confrontation begins, strike like champions who do not want to go back to this world. Shout, ‘Allahu Akbar,’ because this strikes fear in the hearts of the non-believers.”  Barnett, Tracey (May 3, 2006). “Tracey Barnett: Suicide bombers follow a morality of their own”. The New Zealand Herald. Retrieved November 16,2011.

“Also, in the cockpit voice recorders found at the crash site of Flight 93, the hijackers are heard reciting the Takbīr repeatedly as the plane plummets toward the ground and the passengers attempt to retake control of the plane.
Imam Samudra, who was sentenced to death for his role in the 2002 Bali bombings that killed 202 people, chanted the phrase upon hearing his sentence.
During the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, witnesses reported that gunman Nidal Malik Hasan shouted “Allahu Akbar” before opening fire, killing 13 people and wounding 30 others.
Another silent way of gesturing the Takbir (تَكْبِير) is pointing their finger upwards, pointing to heaven
The Wahhabi Salafi vanguard, ISIS from the minarets of its self-styled Caliphate calls for death and terror on the streets of the coalition forces of US, UK, Australia, Canada and Europe and their evil minions take up the carrion call all over the West. ISIS calls for Salafi jihadi’s to run down infidels in cars, randomly behead civilians on the streets, attack the families of military personnel and shoot or knife infidels and their leaders.
In an audio message in September 2014, the ISIS media head Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, put out a call to all Wahhabi Salafi’s around the world to carry out murders of Westerners who opposed ISIS:

“If you can kill a disbelieving American or European — especially the spiteful and filthy French — or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any manner or way, however it may be,”
On Monday 13 October, in St-Jean-sur-Richelieu Canada, a new but zealous convert to Wahhabi Salafi Islam 12 months ago, Canadian Martin Couture-Rouleau murdered Canadian soldier Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent by running him and another soldier down in a car pointing his finger to heaven seeking Allah as his justification for doing so.
On 22 October 2014, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau radicalized by KSA funded Wahhabi Salafi BCMA went on a shooting spree in Ottawa Canada that killed one reservist and wounded another at Canada’s War Memorial and then attacked the Canadian Parliament.

On 23 October 2014 Zaim Farouq Abdul-malik (Zale Thompson) already radicalized at a Wahhabi Salafi mosque in Queens NY (radicalized at the Islamic Center of Queens on 37th Avenue Woodside aka Masjid al-Fatima), grabbed an axe and tried to hack 4 policemen to death in Queens New York.
On 15 December 2014, just before Christmas, Wahhabi Salafi convert Man Haron Monis, “Manteghi Boroujerdi” and “Sheikh Haron” armed with a pump action shot gun went into a busy Sydney café and held 17 innocent Australians hostage demanding an ISIS flag and to talk to the Australian Prime Minister. The siege ended early on the morning of 16 December, when he shot one of the hostages and was then killed by police.
See my article: https://www.moderndiplomacy.eu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=459:wahhabi-s-on-the-warpath-in-sydney-australia&Itemid=487

Now on 7 January 2015 the  Takbir (تَكْبِير) was screamed out by three armed Wahhabi Salafi men with Kalashnikov’s and grenade launchers in Paris as they gunned down 23 innocents.
Among the terrorist murderers were French nationals from Algerian immigrants. The gunmen shouted ‘Allahu Akbar’ and ‘We have avenged the prophet (Mohammed)’ as they went about their murderous rampage. See CNN video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3CIrye0Lz10

The Kouachi Brothers from the predominantly Muslim Parisian enclave of 19th Arrondissement are still on the run after the carnage. They are suspected to be hiding near the town of Crepy in Valois NE Paris.

The #KouachiBrothers like the #TsarnaevBrothers were of immigrant stock who turned on their new Western homelands because of the radicalization by Wahhabi Salafi’s in their local mosques. In the case of the #KouachiBrothers it was the Addawa Mosque located at 39 rue de Tanger (Paris 12th)..

Larbi Kechat is the current Imam of that Mosque and is under a deportation order by the French authorities. http://gotnews.com/breaking-charliehebdo-terrorists-attended-radical-mosque-paris-jesuischarlie/

Cherif Kouachi, 32,

The younger Kouachi brother (aka Abu Issen) born 28 November 1982 was already a petty criminal in Buttes-Chaumont known for thuggery and drugs known terrorist sympathizer when convicted for recruiting French fighters for ISIS. He served 18 months of a three year sentence. He was also suspected of involvement in an attempted prison escape of GIA terrorist Smain Ait Ali Belkacem who is serving life for the attack on the Paris Metro in October 1995 that injured 30 people. His other known associates include Djamel Beghal a terrorist who was plotting to blow up the US embassy in Paris. Beghal is out of jail after serving a 10 year sentence.

The elder Kouachi brother left his passport in the getaway car driven by Mourad.He was born in September 1980, in the 10th arrondissement in Paris.
 

Hamyd Mourad, 18.
Hamid is not a French citizen. His nationality is unknown.
He was formerly a student at a high school in Charleville-Mezieres, close to the city of Reims. Since graduating he had been homeless.
He turned himself into Police.
Apparently he was the driver of the getaway car (Citroen c3). The Kouachi Brothers did the killing with military precision. This latter aspect is evidence perhaps that justifies the fears of security officials that those associated with ISIS are more dangerous than lone wolf Wahhabi’s because they are well trained in military tactics, use of arms and munitions.

Hamyd Mourad: 5 Fast Facts You Need to Know

Here is a video of the events from a French perspective: http://www.linternaute.com/actualite/societe-france/charlie-hebdo-les-terroristes-identifies-recherches-a-reims-et-a-pantin-0115.shtml

See Jihadists who support this terrorist attack include Salafist groups like Forsane Alizza (FA- The Knights of Pride) aka ‘Sharia4France’ , ’Force de Défense Musulmane sur Internet’, and al-Muhajiroun (The Immigrants) .

France has some serious soul searching to do about its tolerance of Wahhabi Salafi radicalization. The ability of hate preachers radicalizing Muslims in the West following this latest #CharlieHebdoas atrocity are likely to be severely curtailed by Counter Terrorism legislation and enforcement. The very liberty of France and the West hangs in the balance because of the   unrestrained ability by the likes of Mohammed Achamlane, and Larbi Kechat’s to recruit disillusioned Muslim youth from Islamic communities in France like Mohammed Merah or the Kouachi Brothers away from the traditional Islamic faith of their parents who immigrated to France from Morocco and Algiers and instead adopt the death cult of the Wahhabi Salafi Takfiri Jihadi such as ISIS. Their cult made everything from their plight to the perceived injustice of Muslims around the world easily understood in a populist way and in the French vernacular.  
“All of these preachers and organisations target second-generation Muslims, explicitly playing on their sense of being victims of racism, exclusion and loneliness in the West, and hence are very successful among Blacks or non-Muslim members of the underclass, as well as gaoled petty criminals. They offer a valorising substitute identity: members of the vanguard of internationalist jihadists who fight the global superpower and the international system.”  http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/etc/roy.html

The converts were shown a way out of their sin and into heaven by taking the express lane of radical militancy to attack all enemies of the Wahhabi-Salafi Jihadi’s (the only true Muslims) whether they be Crusader-Zionists in AF-PAK, Shia Muslims, Sufi Muslims or Moderate Sunni Muslims (all apostates in the cults eyes to be excommunicated (Takfiri) and worthy of death) or non-Sharia democracies in the West. The deaths of the #CharlieHebdoas journalists and cartoonists will not be in vain if the age of political correctness will now yield to a more sensible truthful evaluation of the risk posed by KSA funded Wahhabi Salafi imams and mosques to modern Western democracies.

Alexander Athos is a writer and businessman.He was awarded a Bachelor of Arts (European History) Personal background Alexander was christened Orthodox brought up Catholic and now Evangelical Christian with an acceptance of the best in Christian tradition and a respect for genuine people of faith from other cultures. Political inclinations: Christian intellectual who has an eclectic predisposition to understanding global and national political and social trends and seeking to influence them for good by thoughtful and persuasive discourse.

Continue Reading
Comments

Terrorism

Cross-border links between terrorists, organized crime, underscore need for coherent global response

MD Staff

Published

on

The nexus between terrorism and organized crime took centre stage in the Security Council on Thursday, with experts raising fresh concerns over opportunistic alliances emerging among belligerents who share a hostility towards national authorities, and seek to exploit vulnerabilities created by the COVID-19 crisis.

“Comprehensive and cooperative responses are needed more than ever”, said Ghada Waly, Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).  The COVID-19 crisis is raising a new set of challenges for national authorities, as criminals seek to exploit vulnerabilities created by lockdowns and shifting travel patterns.  Building the capacities to deal with these threats is now a key part of UNODC’s focus, she noted.

Presenting the Secretary-General’s report on actions taken by Member States to address the links between terrorism and organized crime, mandated by resolution 2482 (2019), she said it reflects the contributions of some 50 Member States and 15 Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities, as well as the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team.

Personal connections, mutual interests

She said Member States highlighted a range of links, often in connection with the financing of terrorism.  Some could not confirm the existence of links, due to constraints on their investigative capacities. 

Many reported that terrorists and organized criminals cooperate on the basis of shared territory or mutual interest, often drawing on personal connections forged in prisons. 

She said many States also reported that terrorists benefit from organized criminal activities such as people trafficking, migrant smuggling, kidnapping for ransom and illicit drug trafficking.  As criminal networks are often interested in cooperating with terrorist groups to avoid scrutiny by national authorities, Member States have adopted legislative policies and operational responses identified in resolution 2482 (2019).

Money laundering, strengthening borders

Further, she said Member States emphasized the importance of ratifying legal instruments, such as the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and various international drug control conventions. 

They cited the need to fight money laundering – notably by complying with UN resolutions and building public-private partnerships. 

Strengthening border security – in particular by analyzing flight passenger data – is another priority, she said, along with improving prison management to prevent radicalization and developing whole-of-society approaches to countering violent extremism.

Member States also emphasized need for cross-border cooperation through regional platforms, bilateral agreements, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and mutual legal assistance treaties.

Going forward, she said national legal frameworks could be updated to include precise definitions of terrorism.  More resources could be directed towards criminal justice coordination and establishing specialized units, as well as through a greater focus on intelligence-led policing, and evidence collection. 

A 350 per cent rise in phishing scams: Voronkov

Vladimir Voronkov, head of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), drew attention to Virtual Counter-Terrorism Week, held in July, which gathered more than 1,000 representatives from Member States and civil society, to discuss issues critical to the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

“Our discussions showed there is a shared understanding and concern among Member States that terrorists are generating funds from illicit trafficking in drugs, goods, natural resources and antiquities, as well as kidnapping for ransom, extorting and committing other heinous crimes”, he said.

He said speakers highlighted a significant rise in cybercrime in recent months, with a 350 per cent increase in phishing websites in the first quarter of 2020 – many targeting hospitals and health care systems. 

Speakers also noted the importance of ensuring that efforts to address the nexus between terrorism and organized crime are proportionate to the threat and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Terrorists, crime networks exploiting COVID-19

“Terrorists are exploiting the significant disruption and economic hardships caused by COVID-19 to spread fear, hate and division and radicalize and recruit new followers”, he emphasized.

Noting that the Office of Counter-Terrorism works with UNODC, the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate and INTERPOL to help Member States fight money laundering and terrorism financing, as well as enhance border security, law enforcement and prison management, he said efforts must be made to study how the links between terrorism and organized crime evolve – without automatically conflating both threats.

Joint efforts to address local grievances, poor governance

Member States are rightly focused on tackling the health crisis caused by COVID-19.  “But we must not forget or be complacent about the continuing threat of terrorism”, he warned.  In many parts of the world, terrorists are exploiting local grievances and poor governance to regroup and assert their control.  “Collective action and international cooperation are needed now more than ever.”

Continue Reading

Terrorism

Can an ISIS Terrorist be Rehabilitated and Reintegrated into Society?

Anne Speckhard, Ph.D

Published

on

Authors: Anne Speckhard and Molly Ellenberg

Debates across the world are raging, discussing the issues pertaining to the repatriation of foreign terrorist fighters [FTFs] who left their home countries to fight with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS] or live under their so-called Caliphate. Some died in Syria and some have made their way back home, but nearly 10,000 male FTFs, approximately 2,000 of them from Europe, are currently being held by the Syrian Democratic Forces [SDF] in prisons and camps in Northeast Syria. Likewise, thousands of women who brought or bore children into ISIS are now locked with their children in detention camps as well. It is unlikely that the SDF will be able to hold the FTFs forever, especially with frequent attacks by Turkey that pull guards away from their posts to assist in the fighting or with bombs that even hit the prisons and camps themselves, allowing the detainees to escape. Likewise given international challenges to holding trials in SDF territory these prisoners currently are being held without charges, except for those who were charged or tried in absentia at home. Ergo, it is crucial to determine if the FTFs will make it home, whether by entering stealthily, being extradited after crossing the border into Turkey, or being properly repatriated by their home countries, and then to decide what will happen with them. If they are successfully prosecuted – which is a challenge given that evidence from the battlefields so far away is hard to procure, as are legally acceptable statements from witnesses – they will likely be imprisoned and may take part in some sort of treatment program, begging the question: Can an ISIS terrorist be rehabilitated and reintegrated into society?

After a well-attended ICSVE Zoom panel featuring journalist Anthony Loyd and lawyer Tasnime Akunjee discussing the thorny issues concerning rights concerning citizenship and repatriation, particularly that of British-born Shamima Begum, the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism [ICSVE] hosted another panel moderated by director Dr. Anne Speckhard to discuss and debate the merits of terrorist rehabilitation and reintegration, specifically in Europe.[1] Throughout the discussion, two schools of thought emerged, each linked to the concept of disengagement versus deradicalization, which arose numerous times throughout the comments posted by audience members as well as issues of treatment and evaluation. This paper is an attempt to capture the main points of the discussion hosted by ICSVE of four experts, all of which have been intimately involved with terrorist rehabilitation programs in the UK, Belgium, Austria and Iraq.

In regard to the theme of disengagement versus deradicalization as an end goal of a rehabilitation program it’s important to define the concepts. Terrorist disengagement refers to simply changing one’s behavior, refraining from violence, and removing the terrorist from the community or social network in which they were radicalized, while deradicalization refers to a change in attitude and ideology and a disavowal of one’s previously held beliefs endorsing violent extremism and terrorism and rejecting democratic societal values. All of the panelists held that listening to their clients and taking a holistic approach to treatment is necessary and that disengagement can happen far more quickly than deradicalization, and generally does, simply by virtue of being imprisoned. Some of the panelists argued that successful rehabilitation programs require a theological repudiation of ISIS’s ideology to ensure the individual does not return to terrorist actions upon release, and that deradicalization should be evaluated based on the person’s beliefs about militant jihad and Islamism in general, regardless of whether that person is still willing to act violently based on those beliefs. While they caution that holding extremist beliefs is not a crime in and of itself, those who have disengaged but not been deradicalized are more likely to return to violence given that their extremist beliefs support such behavior. Thus, the panelists aim for their clients to change their extremist beliefs and express acceptance and appreciation of democratic values and tolerance of other religions and behaviors decried as heretical by extremist groups.

Others see ideology as a secondary aspect of radicalization, with many terrorists not having been attracted into the group by its ideology nor being particularly ideologically committed at the point of imprisonment. These panelists therefore viewed addressing ideology as a secondary aspect of rehabilitation. Those in this camp see addressing grievances related to identity, belonging, and significance as paramount and place emphasis on a systems approach which treats the individual, but also takes into account the need to address the individual’s response to a rejecting society. Likewise, this systems approach also locates the problem both within the individual and society and thus calls for broader societal change to also occur to address the racism and discrimination that made these individuals feel marginalized and alienated and thus more vulnerable to radicalization and terrorist recruitment in the first place.

While criminologists like Andrew Silke have argued that ideological deradicalization is not a necessary component of rehabilitation and that many terrorists have been released and successfully reintegrated into society, his research refers to terrorist groups that are not following a militant jihadist ideology.[2]  Likewise, those experts that argue that ideology is not the driving force for joining a terrorist group and that view significance, purpose, belonging, friendship, and material rewards as the far more important reasons for joining also do not place significant value on addressing ideology in rehabilitation. While these are important points, it behooves one to consider how ISIS themselves viewed ideological indoctrination.  After declaring their Caliphate, ISIS required every new male member to attend a two-week shariah training program in which the underpinnings of the ISIS ideology were taught, with no dissent allowed.  ISIS men were then expected to teach their wives and children these lessons at home. All ISIS men were taught that only ISIS were the true believers, that even other Muslims could be takfired – that is, condemned to death for failing to pledge their allegiance to ISIS; that jihad is a mandatory obligation of all Muslims; that suicide terrorism is a honorable type of Islamic martyrdom with rewards for the “martyr” including instant access to Paradise; that punishments of beheading and other brutally gruesome practices carried out by ISIS are legitimate; and that all Muslims are obligated to move to and serve the Caliphate. They were taught that absolute obedience is necessary, and failure to follow ISIS rules would end in worldly punishments in addition to damnation to eternal hellfire. ISIS cadres that have been interviewed by ICSVE often describe the ISIS shariah trainers as extremely charismatic and that the indoctrination was strong and, in many cases long-lasting, taking over a year to shake after an ISIS member defected or left the group. Given this intense and effective indoctrination process, it is likely that ideological evaluation and treatment should at least be considered in the case of ISIS members who lived in Syria and Iraq.

Redouan Safdi, an imam who works in the main terrorism prison in Belgium with Belgians convicted of terrorism offenses, including FTFs who have traveled to Somalia, Libya, and Syria and have chosen to return to Belgium states that when he is designing an individualized rehabilitation program for an individual terrorist returnee, “The first question I always asked was, ‘Why did this person go?’” In this first statement at the outset of his presentation, Safdi invokes an important aspect of working with people who have been radicalized: Recognizing the push and pull factors, wherein the latter refers to the benefits, material, spiritual, psychosocial, or otherwise, that person was promised by the terrorist group while he or she was being recruited, and the former refers to the aspects of the person’s home society, in this case Belgium, that were painful or unacceptable to that person and contributed to his decision to leave. When Safdi asks the people with whom he works why they would leave the safety and security of Belgium to go to a country marked by chaos and death, he says they usually begin by talking about their love for Islam. But when the conversations become deeper and more meaningful, he explains, “I would hardly hear them talk about an Islamic State or the implementation of shariah. All I would hear is the injustices they have experienced in the past: Racism, discrimination, poverty, lack of opportunity.” Many of the people in the prison who left from Belgium to Syria, he says, are very young people who felt “frustrated and alienated by society […] and were searching for an identity […] young people who did not feel at home in the countries where they were born.” ISIS, reflects Safdi, was able to almost perfectly respond to these grievances through their propaganda, especially on social media, and cater to the needs of these “lonely, alienated, frustrated young people.” Spiritually, politically, and socially, ISIS gave them “hope, a new identity […] a sense of belonging. They showed them appreciation.”

Indeed, in an ICSVE study of 220 ISIS recruits in-depth interviewed in prison or after having defected or returned home,[3] we found that nearly a third of the interviewees from Europe were convinced to travel to ISIS by Internet-based propaganda and recruitment alone, without any face-to-face interactions.[4] ISIS’s online recruitment and propaganda alone gave them a sense of purpose, meaning, significance, dignity, identity and hope for their future in Syria. The other two-thirds of the sample were recruited by family members, friends and actual face-to-face recruiters, all promising a better and more Islamic future in Syria. By beginning with these issues, Safdi gets to the heart of the matter, that no one joins a terrorist group except that the group purports to meet some of their needs, materially, spiritually or psychosocially, and that when leaving the terrorist group these needs don’t simply evaporate. They likely still exist, and may be exacerbated upon return, and need to be addressed by redirecting the individual to healthier and more prosocial answers than joining or staying attached to a terrorist group and its virulent ideology. Other researchers have agreed that because many people join terrorist groups in an effort to find an identity, disengagement may cause one to feel a profound loss of identity, meaning, and purpose, all of which were previously provided by and centered around the terrorist group. Thus, replacing the social support once given by the terrorist group is a critical aspect of both deradicalization and disengagement.[5]

Despite the strong draw of groups like ISIS, however, Safdi nevertheless believes rehabilitation and reintegration is possible for most people, under one condition: “We have to be able and we have to be ready to listen to these people.” This is not an easy task, as listening to their grievances requires addressing racism and discrimination that contributed to them feeling alienated enough from Belgian society to go join ISIS in Syria, and which are issues that are ongoing today, despite a great deal of mainstream societal denial. All of the social alienation these convicted terrorists felt before joining ISIS is likely to exist once again when they are released. Issues of racism and discrimination are not easily addressed social problems, so Safdi states that it is important to work with the individual to find ways to live within society while giving them a “feeling that they are wanted […] that they are needed. We have to make sure that these people feel at home.” Unfortunately, Safdi admits that strong societal issues in regard to rejecting many Muslim minorities and converts as well as widespread denial about the reality of this issue still exists in Belgium, stating, “This is the one thing that no one is ready to do: To listen and deal with the needs of their own citizens.” This aspect of Safdi’s assessment is a clear rebuke of those who claim that violent behavior, extremist or otherwise, is a simple choice made by people who are claimed to be not held accountable for their actions. The truth is that the choice to join a terrorist group and believe in an Islamic utopia in Syria came about while living inside a social system that was actively rejecting the individual so the choice occurs within a societal context which also bears some responsibility. As one audience member comments, “Choice also needs to be contextualized. Choices aren’t always clear and opportunities to make choices aren’t always equal across the board.” Indeed, this is why we argue that one cannot see radicalization as a problem solely residing within an individual. It also involves systemic racism, discrimination, marginalization which are frustrating to the individual and which create many cognitive openings to respond to the claims of groups like ISIS.

Beyond listening to grievances, Safdi explains that Belgium’s approach to rehabilitation is holistic, covering not only the ideological symptoms of the person’s radicalization, but the multiple reasons behind radicalization. Indeed, radicalization into terrorism is never univariate. The first author, after studying hundreds of terrorists over many years, identified at least 50 motivations and vulnerabilities operating on the level of the individual that resonate to the terrorist group, its ideology and the level of social support present in society for joining the group.[6] There are always multiple reasons why an individual joins a terrorist group, requiring a holistic approach and often using multiple professionals, most often psychologists as well as religious scholars.

Safdi participates in a program that involves both imams and psychologists and notes that most Belgian FTFs are not knowledgeable enough about Islam to need only a purely theological deradicalization program. That said, even with those who lack strong ideological indoctrination and the ability to defend that indoctrination, he does offer Islamic guidance to address the poorly supported hadiths and cherry-picked Quranic verses that terrorists use to justify and promote terroristic violence. The holistic approach works, Safdi says, because everyone on the team “is there to help. They are not there to judge or punish him.” As for evaluating the success of the deradicalization program, Safdi does not use concrete evaluation tools, but continually watches to see if and how the individual undergoes a process of changing his core identity from rejecting Belgian society and endorsing terrorism to becoming one who embraces living in Belgian society. Safdi looks for how the prisoner slowly begins to disavow his former harsh, judgmental and violence-endorsing self and no longer “wants to be associated with the person he was in the past.” Also, Safdi looks for behaviors demonstrating an openness to new ideas, such as enrolling in courses at a university, which are also good indicators of a change in attitude and embracing finding his place in Belgian society according to Safdi. Moreover, he says, when his clients are released from prison, they are kept under surveillance. Only one person with whom he has worked has recidivated.

Moussa Al-Hassan Diaw, who runs DERAD, a prison deradicalization organization in Austria, also spoke in the panel about rehabilitating and reintegrating militant jihadist terrorists who have been convicted on terrorism charges. His organization also works with far-right and far-left terrorists. Diaw’s program, like Safdi’s, is holistic, focusing on “culture, religion, democracy, pluralism, civic education, and history.” His stated goal, however, is for the person being treated to come to an “acceptance of a pluralistic, democratic society and to avoid polarization.” In contrast with Safdi’s methods of addressing the reasons behind one’s radicalization and helping in the formation of a new identity, Diaw addresses the ideological beliefs that support endorsing violence and as a religious scholar he is well equipped to guide a person out of the ISIS ideology. In keeping with this goal, while Safdi measures success through behavioral change demonstrating a newfound positive identity, Diaw requires a rejection of the extremist ideology and acceptance of democratic values as evidence of deradicalization. Diaw points out that much of his work takes place outside of the prison system. As such he is free to address radicalized belief systems, which are legal to hold as long as the individual does not engage in criminal behavior. He believes that those underlying beliefs that support violent behaviors need to be addressed in order to have confidence that the individual will not return to violence. Of course, the determination of at what point one can be considered “moderate” as opposed to “extreme,” is subject to debate. For example, Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) hold that non-violent, legal political activism should not be a target of deradicalization, even if one’s beliefs are extreme or fundamentalist.[7] Diaw obviously disagrees when it comes to ISIS and we would also point to ICSVE reports on cases of ISIS defectors returning to a commitment to the group when there has been no treatment and also the ideology has not been successfully addressed. Therefore it appears that this is a thorny judgment issue but that addressing ideology within a holistic approach likely makes recidivism less likely.

At the outset of his program, Diaw aims to establish himself to his clients in a positive way and to prove that rather than being “part of a power structure,” he is a sympathetic, understanding community member. After addressing the aspects of rehabilitation, many of which are similar to those discussed by Safdi, though he emphasizes a heavier focus on disputing the ideology of ISIS and other similar groups, Diaw moves on to the challenges of reintegration. First, he says, the people need to find a job, but their reputations are often beyond repair, so they have to change their names or somehow overcome the social barriers to finding employment. It should be noted that in Europe it is normal for employers to require potential hires to show a police certificate demonstrating that one has not been in trouble with the law, an impossibility for former terrorist convicts. Others worry they will not be accepted back into their communities from which they left or that they will not be able to rebuild relationships with their families and regain custody of children who may have been put into the welfare system. Some audience members commented that mainstream Muslim communities may be wary to welcome these people back for fear of being surveilled themselves once the former terrorist lives among them, or even be harassed by law enforcement due to their association with someone convicted on terrorism charges. All of these roadblocks to reintegration can drive the person back to their old radical community, even if they no longer hold radical beliefs, and once finding comfort and belonging with their former community they are at risk for re-radicalizing. Relocation may address many of these concerns in removing the stigma people may feel in the job market after release from prison and also physically distancing them from their old negative influences. However, having to show a clean police record is a significant barrier for many to gain employment. An example of failed reintegration is seen in the case of Younes Delefortrie, an ISIS returnee in Belgium. Younes returned to Antwerp after being convicted on terrorism charges but freed on a stay of sentence to open a bakery and try to reinvent himself. Far-right politician Geert Wilders publicly denounced him, telling the public that his baked goods had blood on them due to his terrorist past. The bakery failed as a result and Younes, who did not receive good treatment and support, never found his way and was later returned to prison.[8]

Omar Shariff, a therapist and former extremist now working in the United Kingdom comments on how powerful ISIS’s brand is; that its marketing strategy seduced so many young people all over the world. For this reason, Shariff states that he regularly uses videos produced through ICSVE’s Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter Narrative Project in his work, using insiders from ISIS to denounce the group on video with those with whom he is working. In his view, people countering ISIS are fighting “a giant,” and therefore young people need far more than just “youth work.” He echoes the previous two speakers in emphasizing a holistic approach that addresses all aspects of radicalization, including but not limited to the theological aspects. For Shariff, evaluation of a deradicalization process should be individualistic and tailor-made and should focus on the individual’s acceptance of Islam as a religion that values life above all else, as well as moderation, as evidenced in the Islamic concept of “the balanced nation.” He actively confronts those who do not hold such views from a scholarly Islamic perspective and also examines the person’s mental health.

All of the speakers emphasized the voluntary aspects of prison-based terrorist rehabilitation and reintegration treatment programs, stating that no one is forced to take part. Each one noted that active listening, visiting, repeatedly inviting and caring for those who refuse to take part often wins them over.  In describing his evaluation process, Omar Shariff emphasizes evaluating his own efficacy to create a strong enough rapport with the client to succeed in beginning and continuing to move them along a deradicalization process. Safdi concurs, explaining that people in Belgium convicted on terrorism charges are not required to undergo treatment, but he nevertheless continues to visit them in prison, allowing them time to think and decide on their own to talk with him. We would also note that prison is a very lonely and can be a harsh place where kindnesses can go a long way in reaching a person who might otherwise be unreachable and that by extending simple acts of care, a prisoner may make a change of heart. The first author recalls a high-value terrorist ideologue in Camp Cropper in Iraq who he refused to confess or talk with any prison interrogator, always pointing out that he had been injured during his capture and needed a doctor. The first series of interrogators ignored his request for a doctor, but a particularly caring one dropped his demands for answers and took the prisoner for medical treatment, an act which completely turned the prisoner to not only cooperating with his interrogator but ultimately becoming an ideologue fighting militant jihadi terrorism in the prisons in Iraq.[9]

While the time to go deep into how treatment of prisoners convicted on terrorism charges actually takes place was limited and not all audience questions could be fielded, the written comments from audience members, many of whom are also experienced in this type of work, made throughout the event were numerous and insightful, many related to the different paths toward rehabilitation and reintegration, focusing on either psychosocial problems or on religious arguments. Many asked for common Islamic arguments against ISIS’s ideology and were pointed to the Quilliam guide entitled, “Tackling Terror: A Response to Takfiri Terrorist Theology.” Others asked whether there were empirically based assessments for deradicalization. Many programs utilize the Violent Extremist Risk Assessment [VERA], which is informed by the operator, although there are many other assessment and evaluation checklists other than the VERA and some prison programs make their own. No matter what assessment measures are used, it is important to assess repeatedly throughout a rehabilitation program, observing both positive changes and falling back into old behaviors and ideological points of view. Likewise, it is important to have a global assessment, from both psychological and religious points of view, and when possible to have feedback from other prisoners and guards as well. All of the panelists stressed the importance of tailoring their assessments to the individual, based on his or her specific risk factors and reasons for having joined a terrorist group initially. They also emphasized the difficulty in ensuring that individuals have truly deradicalized, not simply learned how to say the right things in order to be released.

The diversity of viewpoints among the panelists as well as the comments demonstrate the beginning of an answer to whether an ISIS terrorist can be rehabilitated and reintegrated into society. Yes, rehabilitation is possible, the panelists agree, but programs must be holistic, individually tailored, culturally sensitive, trauma informed and continuously evaluated for positive growth as well as setbacks over time. The consensus appears to be that reintegration is as difficult as rehabilitation with its own challenges and that the difficulties of remaining deradicalized and disengaged after release from prison are many. Reintegration is likely supported by the individual’s acceptance of the benefits of a democratic and pluralistic society in which he or she lives and determination to live as a productive, law-abiding citizen within that society and a reciprocal expectation of societal acceptance of the individual once he or she has served their time. Acceptance of societal benefits is difficult to achieve if the person did not formerly and does not expect to experience these benefits upon release. Thus, broader societal reform surrounding racism and discrimination is also critical in order to work toward truly ensuring that militant jihadi prisoners released after serving under terrorism charges do not revert to their old ways upon finding that the same grievances that drove them to violent extremism initially are still present, alongside the terrorist groups that promised them an alternative form of governance, albeit one that is achieved via terrorist actions.

[1] The ICSVE Zoom Panels are sponsored by grants from the Embassy of Qatar in Washington, D.C., and from the European Commission’s Civil Society Empowerment Programme.

[2] Silke, A. (2011). Disengagement or deradicalization: A look at prison programs for jailed terrorists. CTC Sentinel, 4(1), 18-21.

[3] Speckhard, A., & Ellenberg, M. D. (2020). ISIS in Their Own Words: Recruitment History, Motivations for Joining, Travel, Experiences in ISIS, and Disillusionment over Time–Analysis of 220 In-depth Interviews of ISIS Returnees, Defectors and Prisoners. Journal of Strategic Security, 13(1), 5.

[4] Speckhard, A., & Ellenberg, M. (April 15, 2020). Is Internet Recruitment Enough to Seduce a Vulnerable Individual Into Terrorism?. Homeland Security Today.

[5] Feddes, A. R. (2015). Socio-psychological factors involved in measures of disengagement and deradicalization and evaluation challenges in Western Europe. Электронный ресурс]. Режим доступа: URL: http://www. mei. edu/content/article/understanding-deradicalization-pathways-enhance-transatlantic-common-perceptions-and-practices (дата обращения: 05.09. 2018).

[6] Speckhard, A. (2016). The lethal cocktail of terrorism: the four necessary ingredients that go into making a terrorist & fifty individual vulnerabilities/motivations that may also play a role. International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism: Brief Report.

[7] Moskalenko, S., & McCauley, C. (2009). Measuring political mobilization: The distinction between activism and radicalism. Terrorism and political violence, 21(2), 239-260.

[8] Speckhard, A., & Yayla, A. S. (2016). ISIS defectors: Inside stories of the terrorist caliphate. Advances Press, LLC.

[9] Speckhard, A., & Paz, R. (2012). Talking to Terrorists: Understanding the Psycho-social Motivations of Militant Jihadi Terrorists, Mass Hostage Takers, Suicide Bombers &” martyrs”. McLean, VA: Advances Press.

Author’s note: first published in Homeland Security Today

Continue Reading

Terrorism

Firearms trafficking, ‘enabler and multiplier of violence’ worldwide

Newsroom

Published

on

The Global Study on Firearms Trafficking 2020 focuses on the serious and “too often hidden” problem of firearms trafficking that serves as “an enabler and multiplier of violence and crime in every part of the world”, said Ghada Waly, Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

Making up some 39 per cent of the total number of firearms seized worldwide, pistols are the most seized type of firearm globally.

And almost all flows of arms trafficking between regions, can be traced back to points in Northern America, Europe and Western Asia. 

As they are often involved in violence, particularly homicides, they are also a major security concern.

Vital tool for governments

The report, which provides the most comprehensive data on firearms trafficking to date, said UNODC, is a vital source for law enforcement and policy makers to help reduce the damage and loss of life, stemming from illegal arms flows.

“By shedding light on challenges, and on the origin and trafficking routes of firearms, the study can support Governments in strengthening law enforcement and criminal justice responses to detect and disrupt illicit flows, dismantle the criminal organizations and networks responsible, and bring the perpetrators to justice”, maintained Ms. Waly.

In the shadows

Firearms trafficking remains a largely invisible phenomenon, which only emerges once trafficked weapons are used to commit other crime, according to the study. 

On average, two-thirds of seized firearms were impounded on the legal grounds of illegal possession. 

However, additional information related to the seizures and tracing results, suggest that a considerable portion of these firearms may have been illicitly trafficked into the country, prior to their being confiscated. 

And only around half of the arms suspected to have been trafficked, were taken on the basis of having been trafficked.

Regional breakdowns

Data from cities in 81 countries in the study, reveals that around 550,000 firearms were seized in 2016 and 2017, with pistols the most commonly trafficked. 

This may be explained by the high number of responses received from the Americas, where pistols made up, on average, more than half of all seizures.

Meanwhile, in Africa and Asia, at 38 and 37 per cent respectively, shotguns were the most prominent firearms seized and in Oceania, rifles were top, at 71 per cent. 

At the same time, Europe seems to be the most heterogenous in terms of seizures, with pistols accounting for 35 per cent, rifles 27 per cent, and shotguns, 22 per cent.

Weapon ownership

The study reveals that around the world, 54 per cent of homicides are carried out with a firearm. 

And while handguns play a significant role in gang or organized crime killings, they are far less prominent in murders involving partners or family members.

Countries with higher levels of violent death and homicide – particularly in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean – tend to seize a higher percentage of firearms connected to violent crime, while in Europe, drug trafficking is the most prominent among the other forms of crime linked to illicit weapons.

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

South Asia1 hour ago

The New Axis, the Mapolitics and South Asia: The Indian View

Today, while the pandemic has caused immense economic recession worldwide, South Asia exponentially simmers with territorial disputes, extra-maritime activities, border...

Diplomacy3 hours ago

Blue Gold: An Emerging Source Of Global Conflicts

Depleting potable water resources have sent alarm across the globe pertaining to the emergence of a new spree of future...

East Asia5 hours ago

Changing equations of US-China relations and Taiwan Factor

The relations among the two permanent members of security council have improved since the Nixon surprise visit to China in...

East Asia7 hours ago

Filing of a petition with ICC: Beginning of Uighurs’ legal battle against China

Uighur Muslims, a minority community in Xinjiang province of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter China), has been subjected to...

International Law9 hours ago

Civic and Ethnic Nationalism in a Populist World: Behind the Facade of Dichotomies

The Rise of Anti-System Politics The walk into the twenty-first century is marked by enormous structural shifts. The rise of...

Africa11 hours ago

Russia’s Lukoil Finds A New Home In Senegal

Undoubtedly, a number of Russian companies have largely underperformed in Africa, which experts described as primarily due to multiple reasons....

Eastern Europe21 hours ago

In The Bends And Labyrinths Of Civilizations

What describes a nation, or more importantly who describes a nation? Nations like to tell about heroic, victorious events of...

Trending