Just months after the lone wolf attacks by the shooter in Canada’s capital and the hatchet man in Queens New York, Australia has had its taste of ‘Wahhabi’s on the warpath’.(1)
This time another recent convert to the Wahhabi Salafi Islamic sect, Man Haron Monis, a self-styled Islamic cleric aged 50, decided to mount a lone wolf operation to restore glory and pride to his perceived oppressed Sunni brothers. Before then he was a sadistic sexual predator and hater of the West. He was the “author of “grossly offensive” letters sent to taunt parents and relatives of Australians killed by extremism in Indonesia as well as troops who lost their lives in Afghanistan between 2007 and 2009.(2)
Born “Mohammad Hassan Manteghi,” who came to Australia as a refugee from Iran in 1996. On 15 December 2014, this man of ‘Peace’ aka “Manteghi Boroujerdi” and “Sheikh Haron” armed with a pump action shot gun went into a busy Sydney café and held 17 innocent Australians hostage demanding an ISIS flag and to talk to the Australian Prime Minister. The siege ended early on the morning of 16 December, when he shot one of the hostages and was then killed by police.
Significantly, Haron recently converted from Shia Islam to a radical version of Sunni Islam, Wahhabi Salafism. Most terrorist attacks against the West have been perpetrated by Sunni extremists from the Wahhabi Salafi Takfiri cult which the Australian PM correctly describes as a Death Cult who seek martyrdom in killing Shia’s and Westerners.
On his website he proudly renounces his Iranian Shia heritage and says “I used to be a ‘Rafidi’ ( رافضي an Arabic term for “one who rejects” that is typically used by Sunnis to denigrate Shias as non-Muslim) but not anymore. Now I am a Muslim (Arabic: مسلم), Al-ḥamdu lillāh” (Arabic الحمد لله) phrase meaning “All Praise and Thanks to God”). In other words he stating that he is a Sunni and in the typical Wahhabi Salafi Takfiri narrative, so a true Muslim and by implication, that all Shia are takfiri (Arabic: تكفيري for ‘apostate’).
“In their ongoing campaign to unseat the Shia government of Iraq and the Alawite government Syria, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, aka ISIS) frequently uses “rafida” (sometimes “raafida”) to refer to all Muslims who are not Sunni. This term is also used to refer to citizens of Iran, which is approximately 90% Shia and 8% percent Sunni. ISIL members are known to execute those who they accuse of being “rafida”. In Saudi Arabia today (where the Wahhabi Salafi denomination of Islam predominates), Shiites are referred to as Rafidha. In Iraq, anti-Shi’a material is still surfacing. A discourse was released after improvement by the name of “The Rafida in the Land of Tawhid”, which included orders by a member of the Higher Council, to kill Shi’is. Until 1993, schoolbooks in Saudi Arabia openly denounced the Shi’i and Sufi beliefs and referred to the Shi’i as rafida in the books.” (3)
With his girlfriend, Amirah Droudis, Haron undertook a campaign protesting against the presence of Australian troops in Afghanistan, by writing letters to the families of soldiers killed there, in which he called the soldiers murderers. “Haron was arrested on charges of “using a postal or similar service to menace, harass or cause offence”, all of which he pleaded guilty to in 2013. He was reportedly sentenced to probation and 300 hours of community service.”(4)
Chillingly, his web page said after his conviction for sending grieving relatives of killed Aussie servicemen hate mail was: “From now on when I want to advise people not to kill children, I should do it by hand delivery, not by using the postal service”.(5)
We are told he was a lone wolf but he was a leader in the Sydney Islamic Community also known as Sheik Haron. He has devotees/followers. The police and counter terrorist organizations would be wise to round them up and question each of them and keep an eye on them.
One of his closest associates is his girlfriend ‘sister’ Amirah Droudis who allegedly brutally killed Sheikh Haron’s ex-wife Noleen Hayson Pal, setting her on fire and stabbing her 18 times in a stairwell in March 2014. She was out on bail for that, as was Haron. Haron and his girlfriend were on bail for charges relating to this brutal killing when the siege occurred.(6)
Here is a video(7) of a ‘sister’ devotee of ‘brother’ Haron’s from the website www.sheikhharon.com saying “In the name of God the Merciful…” there is media mafia that reports on behalf of Islam’s enemies. Listen for the machine gun sound effects at the end of the clip with the words: ‘Our Policy: War on Oppression’ (8)
Someone has taken down his website but here is a copy:
On his website, he describes himself as a cleric of ‘Peace’ but that means only peace for the Muslims…all enemies of Muslims as he sees them (“America and its allies including UK and Australia” ) must be confronted for their so called “criminal acts” in oppressing Muslims (and he shoes graphic images of dead, presumably Muslim, children in which it is implied that the West killed)….on the website he says Muslims must fight against these ‘crimes’ and so uphold ‘peace’. This is his perverted message and the narrative of all Wahhabi Salafi’s like Al Qaeda and ISIS. He exhorts his ‘brothers’ (fellow Sunni Muslims) to “obey Allah and His Messenger and the caliph” (i.e. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi ISIS leader who has proclaimed himself Caliph of Sunni Muslims). Also an image on the website shows Haron wearing the same headband he wore during the Martin Place siege, which said: “We are ready to sacrifice for you, O Muhammad” (a motif often used by suicide martyrs) which suggests he was ready to perpetrate horror and then end his life as a Salafi hero /’Shaheed” on a martyrdom operation. If true, it was just as well the siege ended as it did, thanks to the heroism of the Lindt Chocolate Cafe manager, Tori Johnson who grappled with the gunman when Sheikh Haron the cleric of ‘peace’ tried to shoot fleeing hostages with his pump action shotgun. (9)
This horrific act of terror in the middle of downtown Sydney vindicates the Australian government’s strong stand against hate preaching and extremism and the beefing up of their laws and counter terrorism infrastructure.
It also vindicates the large prophylactic raids by Police to thwart beheadings in Martin Place just months prior to this siege from Moran’s fellow travellers.
Interestingly after those raids in September 2014, Hizb ut-Tahrir and many Muslims (approximately 400) including Wassim Doureihi (owner of the infamous Jihadist ‘Al Risalah Islamic Bookstore’ in Bankstown) and Sheikh Haron (pictured third from the left in Salafi dress and fist pumping the air) organized a mass Muslim protest at the Lakemba railway station in Sydney. (10)
Many Counter Terrorism commentators including Muslims like Maajid Nawaz of Quilliam Foundation have said of this siege that what is needed is a counter narrative to the Wahhabi Salafi ideology which says that the West oppresses Sunni Muslims and needs to fight and instil terror in the West to build a theocratic Sharia dominated Salafi Caliphate in the Middle East, the Balkans, North Africa and Spain to be safe from contamination from a decadent and militant West and restore Islamic pride. See Maajid’s earlier interview on CNN as to what makes people (like Sheikh Haron) want to support and identify with extremist Wahhabi Salafi outfits like Al Qaeda, Al Nusra, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Jemaah Islamiyah, Al-Furqan Islamic Heritage Foundation, Hiz ut-Tahrir and ISIS.(11)
After the Sydney Siege, it is hoped that ‘hate preachers’ in Australia and everywhere will be exposed without the retort that to do so is an attack on the Islamic community. It is not.
Here is a list of some of the Australian hate preachers and you will see that they all espouse the ISIS Wahhabi Salafi Takfiri ideology.(12)
Most Muslims do not accept these radical hate preachers. They are normally at the fringes of Islamic society. They gain marginal acceptance in times of conflict but Muslim families fear for their children who could get caught up with the Wahhabi Salafi extremists who glorify death for a false narrative that Muslims and Non-Muslims cannot co-exist and that this justifies suicide martyrdom jihad attacks on the West of the kind Sheikh Haron was on in a chocolate shop at Christmas time. (13)
- See my previous article in Modern Diplomacy: https://www.moderndiplomacy.eu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=427:wahhabi-lone-wolves-on-the-warpath-in-the-west&Itemid=488
A shift in militants’ strategy could shine a more positive light on failed US policy
A paradigm shift in jihadist thinking suggests that the US invasion of Afghanistan may prove to have achieved more than many counterterrorism experts would want policymakers and military strategists to believe.
Similarly, the paradigm shift also hints at the possibility that the presence in a Taliban-governed Afghanistan of various militant Islamist and jihadist groups could turn out to be an advantage in efforts to prevent and contain political violence.
The evolution of tensions and unfolding of differences in the world of Afghan militancy will constitute a litmus test of the shift and how history will ultimately judge the United States’ 20-year forever war in Afghanistan in terms of counterterrorism.
The shift involves a move away from cross-border and transnational acts of violence towards local militancy and the garnering of popular support through good governance based on an ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam. It is a difference in strategy that constitutes one of the ideological and strategic differences between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
“This is not because (the jihadists’) ideology has softened: It is because they have learned that inviting overwhelming reprisals from modern militaries is the fastest way to forfeit their conquests, squander their influence and be forced to start all over again,” said scholar and journalist, Hassan Hassan, in a lengthy piece of rare up-close reporting on jihadist militancy.
“Contrary to how some understand the US withdrawal in Afghanistan, the lesson extremists are taking from the Taliban’s success is not simply that jihad works but that diplomacy and engagement are a necessary part of the process, which includes reassuring the West about external threats emerging from their areas. What can be gained from parlays in Doha is more significant and lasting than any terror attack,” Mr. Hassan went on to say.
The shift amounts to a return to the pattern of Islamic militancy that historically is rooted in local grievances and conflicts. Mr. Hassan also describes the Islamic State’s transnational jihadism that targets the West, long embraced by Al-Qaeda, as an aberration of that history.
Mr. Hassan’s analysis is supported by research published by The Soufan Group, a research organization established by Ali Soufan, a former FBI agent who played an important role in the interrogation of captured Al-Qaeda officials and was involved in related cases in the United States and elsewhere.
Analyst Abdul Sayed noted that Al Qaeda, in an effort to prevent the United States from driving it out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, has “shifted focus from global terrorist attacks and external operations to supporting local jihadist groups throughout South Asia, and fuelling the narratives that underpin their objectives. This shift helped build resilience, allowing Al-Qaeda to survive despite the massive blows inflicted by the United States and its allies.”
The Islamic State’s loss of its proto-state in Syria and Iraq, and the Taliban victory in Afghanistan appear to vindicate this paradigm shift.
CNN correspondent Clarissa Ward said she walked away from an interview in August with Abdu Munir, the name used by a commander of the Islamic State-Khorasan, two days before it attacked Kabul airport, with the impression that “ISIS-Khorasan is very different from ISIS… in Syria and Iraq. Ms. Ward was referring to the Afghan affiliate as well as the Islamic State itself using common Western abbreviations for them.
Ms. Ward said that “the conversation that I had with this commander did not lead me to believe that they had the same level of transnational ambitions… They’re much more focussed on the Taliban, honestly, than they are on trying to blow up a plane…and they’re much more simple, less sophisticated.”
The jihadist strategy shift would be further vindicated if the Taliban victory also reinforces ultraconservative religious trends in neighbouring Pakistan.
Ultraconservatives and jihadists may take heart from recent opposition by Muslim clerics, including Tahir Mehmood Ashrafi, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s special representative for religious harmony, to draft legislation that would ban forced conversions.
As a result, the shift could become one more argument to justify a possible future decision by President Joe Biden to pull US troops out of Iraq and Syria originally dispatched to fight the Islamic State, as part of the emerging contours of a Biden doctrine.
“There is no question that the GWOT has not gone as planned… Yet it would still be wrong – and rash – simply to discard the GWOT as a strategic failure. The fact that consecutive presidents have found it so difficult to extricate the United States from ongoing operations in the greater Middle East reflects the reality of a persistent threat from extremist organisations and their allies… GWOT has been considerably more fruitful than it might first appear,” said analysts Hal Brand and Michael O’Hanlon, referring to President George W. Bush’s global war on terror launched in 2001 in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.
Messrs. Brand and O’Hanlon may be painting an overly optimistic picture. In the best of cases, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan will only partially live up to their criteria of success laid out in a recent journal article. The Taliban’s policing of jihadists may prevent them from targeting the United States and others but will continue to offer them a safe haven, allowing them to recruit.
“Being a safe haven for global jihadists and acting as a launchpad for attacks against the West are not the same thing. Under the Doha Agreement, the Taliban have committed to preventing attacks being launched from Afghanistan, but they have not pledged to cut off relations with foreign jihadist groups altogether, nor to expel them from Afghanistan,” said Afghanistan scholar Antonio Giustozzi.
Even so, on balance that could turn out to be less of a problem provided the Taliban can keep in check the Islamic State, the one jihadist group that refuses to accept its takeover of Afghanistan or make Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban, adopt the shift in strategy. The fata morgana of a Taliban 2.0 could be shattered if large numbers of Taliban fighters defect to the Islamic State in protest against the group’s policing of militants on Afghan soil and/or embracing degrees of social liberalization, particularly regarding women’s rights.
That could prove to be a big if. Question marks about the Taliban’s ability to police those groups that have welcomed its victory and/or pledged allegiance to it have already begun to emerge. Mr. Giustozzi reports that in contrast to Pakistani militants Lashkar-e Taiba and Lashkar-e Jhangvi, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; the TTP and Al-Qaeda have refused to negotiate agreements that would tighten Taliban control by moving them to different parts of the country. Lashkar-e Taiba and Lashkar-e Janghvi are groups seen as having close ties to Pakistani intelligence.
The proposed agreements reportedly stroked with demands put forward by China that the Taliban ensure that militants on Afghan soil are prevented from training, raising funds and recruiting.
Suhail Shaheen, a Taliban spokesperson in Qatar, appeared to acknowledge the demands in an interview with the Global Times, a Chinese Communist Party newspaper. “First, we will not allow any training on our territory. Second, we will not allow any fundraising for those who intend to carry out a foreign agenda. Third, we will not allow the establishment of any recruitment centre in Afghanistan. These are the main things,” Mr. Shaheen said.
Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban’s chief spokesperson in Kabul, however, last month left the door open on the Taliban’s relationship with the TTP.
“The issue of the TTP is one that Pakistan will have to deal with, not Afghanistan. It is up to Pakistan, and Pakistani Islamic scholars and religious figures, not the Taliban, to decide on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of their war and to formulate a strategy in response,” Mr. Mujahid told a Pakistani television program. The spokesman stopped short of saying whether the Taliban would abide by a decision of the scholars.
The TTP is believed to be responsible for a recent spike in attacks on Pakistani security forces, including a suicide attack in Pakistan that killed three paramilitary soldiers and wounded 20 other people. The stepped-up attacks prompted the New Zealand cricket team to last week abandon its first tour of Pakistan in 18 years and abruptly leave the country while England cancelled its visit that had been scheduled for next month.
Similarly, behind the facades, cracks had already emerged between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda before the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, prompting the group, like the TTP, according to Mr. Giustozzi, to refuse to negotiate a deal with the Afghans and build support among factions of the Taliban that are more sympathetic to the jihadists.
Al-Qaeda was wary of what the Taliban’s agreement with the United States would mean for the group and suspected the Afghans of having a hand in the killing of several of its senior members in recent years. Al-Qaeda worries, moreover, that Taliban understandings with China and Russia could put its freedom of movement and/or existence into further jeopardy.
Apparently anticipating a Taliban failure to control all jihadists on Afghan soil and/or adoption of the paradigm strategy shift by some major jihadist groups, US intelligence officials predicted that Al-Qaeda would be able to reconstitute itself in Afghanistan and be capable of orchestrating attacks inside the U.S. in one to two years.
Their predictions were bolstered by the return to Afghanistan of Anwar ul Haq Mujahid, a leader of Osama bin Laden’s former “Black Guard,” who allegedly helped plan and orchestrate the jihadist leader’s escape in 2001 as the United States bombed his Tora Bora hideout. Mr. Mujahid, no family of the Taliban spokesman, reportedly returned to Jalalabad to command Taliban forces and foreign fighters in eastern Afghanistan. Several of his associates are said to also be back.
However, Mr. Mujahid’s return does not by definition deny the potential shift in Al-Qaeda strategy that is supported by the Taliban. It could be the Taliban’s way of placating the group as well as the more militant within its own ranks.
“Despite the persistence of the relationship…the Taliban have a strong interest in holding Al-Qaeda in check… It is not hard to imagine a scenario in which the Taliban provide space and financial support for Al-Qaeda to operate while also restricting the activities of the group to plot and stage attacks,” said scholar Cole Bunzel.
Islamic State threat moves online, expands across Africa
Two decades after the 11 September terrorist attacks in New York, terror networks Al-Qaida and Islamic State – also known as Da’esh – continue to pose a grave threat to peace and security, adapting to new technologies and moving into some of the world’s most fragile regions, the top UN counter-terrorism official told the Security Council on Thursday.
UN counter-terrorism chief Vladimir Voronkov presented the Secretary-General’s latest report on the threats posed by terrorist groups, saying that Da’esh continues to exploit the disruption, grievances and development setbacks caused by the pandemic to regroup, recruit new followers and intensify its activities – both online and on the ground.
“Today, we face transnational terrorist threats like Da’esh and Al-Qaida that are enduring and able to adapt to new technologies, but also expanding to include individuals and groups that commit terrorist attacks connected to xenophobia, racism and other forms of intolerance”, said Mr. Voronkov.
The UN counter-terrorism architecture, largely set up in the wake of the 9/11 attack, helps Member States implement effective frameworks to prevent, address, investigate and prosecute acts of terrorism.
It is also ramping up efforts to help countries adapt to the rapidly changing nature of the threat, which has become more digital and de-centralized in recent years.
Noting that the world is currently witnessing a rapidly evolving situation in Afghanistan “which could have far-reaching implications” around the globe, he cited Da’esh’s expanded presence in that country and pointed out that several members of the Taliban have been designated as terrorists by the Security Council.
“We will need to ensure that Afghanistan is never again used as launching pad for global terrorism“, stressed the UN official.
He briefed the Council on the eve of the fourth commemoration of the International Day of Remembrance of and Tribute to the Victims of Terrorism, observed annually on 21 August.
Islamic State in Africa
While Da’esh remains focused on reconstituting its capabilities in Iraq and Syria, Mr. Vornkov said the most alarming development in recent months is the group’s relentless spread across the African continent.
The so-called “Islamic State in the Greater Sahara” has killed several hundred civilians since the start of 2021 in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, while the group’s “West Africa Province” will likely gain from the weakening of Boko Haram, with additional spillover of terrorists and foreign fighters from Libya.
Meanwhile, the expansion of Da’esh in Central Africa – and especially in northern Mozambique – could have far-reaching implications for peace and security in the region.
“A global response is urgently needed to support the efforts of African countries and regional organizations to counter terrorism and address its interplay with conflict, organized crime, governance and development gaps”, said Mr. Voronkov.
Repatriating women and children
Alongside Da’esh’s expansion in Africa and its rapid shift online, Mr. Voronkov also cited the continued detention of thousands of individuals with alleged links to terrorist groups as another factor exacerbating the threat.
Deteriorating conditions in detention facilities and displacement camps in northeast Syria, in particular, are serving as a rallying cry for terrorist activities. They have already fuelled instances of terrorist radicalization, fund-raising, arms smuggling, training and incitement to terror.
Against that backdrop, he echoed calls from officials across the UN for Member States to voluntarily repatriate all concerned individuals, with a particular focus on children.
In September, the Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) will jointly launch a global framework to support countries requesting assistance with protection, voluntary repatriation, prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration of individuals with suspected links to designated terrorist groups returning from Iraq and Syria.
The framework has already been deployed in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
Taliban and Al Qaeda: Putting a fox in charge of the chicken coop?
Abu Omar Khorasani was taken from Kabul’s Pul-i-Charkhi prison and unceremoniously shot.
The first and only person to have been executed since the Taliban gained full control of Afghanistan, Mr. Khorasani was the head of the Islamic State in South Asia until he was arrested by government forces last year.
The precise circumstances of his execution are not known. His killing was, however, at least in part designed to send a message to the international community, and particularly Afghanistan’s neighbours, including China and Iran, as well as Russia, Central Asia’s security overlord.
The message was that the Taliban were cracking down on foreign jihadists and militants in Afghanistan.
Mr. Khorasani was an easy symbol. The Taliban and the Islamic State, whose ranks of foreigners are primarily populated by Pakistanis and a sprinkling of Central Asians, Uighurs, Russians, Turks, Iranians, Indonesians, Indians, and Frenchmen, have long been adversarial. The Islamic State recently accused the Taliban of being more nationalist than pious in their negotiations with the United States.
The Taliban message is a partial truth at best. What is true for the Islamic State is not true for Al–Qaeda and others such as the Uighur Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
The Taliban appear to believe that they can get away with the differentiation because they perceived the United States as more focused in the withdrawal negotiations on ensuring that the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and other militants will not be allowed to use Afghanistan as a base for international operations rather than on getting them expelled from the country.
The perceived US focus may have been rooted in a concern that if Taliban’s hands were forced, they would let militants slip out of the country and not hand them over to authorities. That would make it difficult to control their movements or ensure that they are either entered into deradicalization programs or, if warranted, brought to justice.
“It’s a Catch-22. The Taliban ensuring that Al Qaeda sticks to rule risks putting a fox in charge of the chicken coop. How much better that is than having foxes run wild remains to be seen,” said a retired counter-terrorism official.
Officials of the Trump administration that negotiated the agreement suggest that the continued presence of Al-Qaeda and other militants in Afghanistan would violate the accord with the Taliban.
Former Vice President Mike Pence as well as Trump era State Department counterterrorism coordinator Nathan Sales argued that the deal “required the Taliban…to refuse terrorists safe harbour.”
Russia and China, while publicly more measured in their statements, are likely to share western concerns. Russia held military drills earlier this month with Tajik and Uzbek troops in Tajikistan, 20 kilometres from the border with Afghanistan.
Al-Qaeda may have been boosted in recent weeks by multiple prison breaks in which the Taliban freed operatives of Al-Qaeda and other militant groups. It remains unclear however to what degree the breaks will help the group strengthen its presence in Afghanistan.
General Mark Milley, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned this week that al Qaeda and the Islamic State could quickly rebuild their networks in Afghanistan.
The United Nations recently reported that Al-Qaeda “is present in at least 15 Afghan provinces”, and that its affiliate in the Indian subcontinent, “operates under Taliban protection from Kandahar, Helmand and Nimruz provinces.”
“Without information on who exactly escaped, it is difficult to determine whether historically significant figures remain within AQ’s AfPak network, or if it is mainly composed of newer figures these days, whether local or regional foreign fighters,” cautioned political violence scholar Aaron Y. Zelin. Mr. Zelin was referring to Al-Qaeda’s Afghanistan-Pakistan network.
Also unclear is whether Al-Qaeda operatives in Iran will be allowed to relocate to Afghanistan.
The prison breaks further go to concerns about relying on the Taliban to police jihadists and other militants with aspirations beyond Afghanistan’s borders. Of particular concern is the fact that the balance of power has yet to be determined between Taliban leaders who in recent days have been eager to put a more moderate, accommodating foot forward with security guarantees for their opponents, minorities and women and the group’s far-flung less polished rank and file.
The concern about the Taliban’s ability and willingness to control militant activity on Afghan soil is magnified by worry regarding the continued existence of warlords with the power to organise violence, provide jobs and public services, and forge or strengthen ties with militants.
“Warlords will play an active role in the future of Afghanistan. They will remain businessmen and political leaders, connected to global economic processes and networks. They will develop the military power that they need to control territory and wage war. They will, finally, continue to fight for more autonomy and, in some cases, might even manage to partially form their old regional polities once again,” said Romain Malejacq, author of a book on Afghan warlords.
“Afghanistan’s availability as a sanctuary for terrorists is, to say the least, related to its status as a warlord-ridden wasteland,” said journalist and author Graeme Wood.
The Taliban’s refusal to expel militants not only complicates the group’s efforts to garner legitimacy in the international community and particularly its neighbours, even if Al-Qaeda has been significantly weakened since 9/11 and is less focussed on attacking the United States and more on the Muslim world.
It also strengthens those who fear that Afghanistan will again emerge as a launching pad for trans-national political violence. “We are going to go back to a pre-9/11 state—a breeding ground for terrorism,” warned Michael McCaul, the ranking Republican member of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee. “They (the Taliban) will not restrict terrorist groups, just ask them to operate low-key,” added Douglas London, a former head of CIA counterterrorism operations for South and Southwest Asia.
The Taliban proved already 20 years ago that they valued loyalty when they rejected US and Saudi pressure to hand over Osama bin Laden no matter the cost. The Taliban have since come to appreciate Al Qaeda’s fighting skills and contributions to the Afghan militants’ cause.
Taliban fighters this week, in a violation of their pledge to inclusiveness, demonstrated their ideological anti-Shiite affinity with Al-Qaeda by blowing up a statue of Abdul Ali Mazari, a Shiite Hazara militia leader killed by the Taliban when they first took power in 1996.
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