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Vietnamese Australians’ Community: Realities and Prospects

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A Vietnamese Australian is an Australian, either born in Vietnam or having Vietnamese ancestors. These people make up the community of Vietnamese Australians and contribute significantly to both the Australian and Vietnamese economies as well as the comprehensive partnership relationship between the two countries. The circumstance behind the establishment of this community, however, was anything but without incidents.

In 1975 Vietnam was liberated from the US-backed Saigon regime. The new united Vietnam, christened the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was then established. Since then, particularly between 1975 and 1990, many people who worked for the South Vietnam government left Vietnam to reside abroad, including in Australia. According to the 1991 National Census, there were 124,800 people born in Vietnam residing in Australia and in 2001 there were 154,000. In 2011 this figure rose to 185,000. In the same year there were 219,000 people who spoke Vietnamese at home. (1)

The greatest proportion of Vietnamese Australians lives in Sydney (with strong vibrant communities in Sydney’s west and south west) and Melbourne although many of the second generation now live throughout Australia. The social mix of the refugees included people from all professions and walks of life in Vietnam which is reflected in today’s Vietnamese Australian communities. Mahayana Buddhism is the main religion of the community, followed by Christianity both Catholic and Protestant. The main festivals observed by Vietnamese Australians include Tet Nguyen Dan, the Lunar (or Chinese) New Year, and Tet Trung Thu (the Mid-Autumn Festival).

The article will analyze the Vietnamese Australians’ contribution to the Commonwealth of Australia and Vietnam in terms of economic development, the forging of a multiracial and multicultural society as well as the promotion of the comprehensive partnership relationship between Vietnam and Australia. The article will analyze the current problems of the Vietnamese Australian Community and suggest measures to overcome these problems. The article will also forecast the prospect of Vietnamese Australian Community in Australia in the future and propose some suggestions to improve the role and status of Vietnamese Australians in both Australia and Vietnam.

1. Australia and Her Immigration Policy Towards Asian Refugees
Being a unique country created in a unique historical background, the nature of Australian nationalism and nation building has been considerably debated.
Australia was a colonial society generated in the period of the great imperialist competitions of the nineteenth century, having then accepted modern nationhood while still responding to the imperial imperatives of Great Britain. This colonial past has resulted in two unresolved consequences: The first of these imperatives remains the effective subjugation of the original nations, and their incorporation into each of the three subsystems. Much of contemporary debate about Indigenous issues reflects the “unfinished business” – both for the empire project and the people subject to it. The second imperative is the defence of the original imperial peoples against competing external empires (understood as cultural systems rather than militarily driven state invasions). They are both different faces of the Australian empire project: (i) the successful imposition in a new land of a cultural, political and economic system; (ii) and that system privileges and secures the interests of the colonizing peoples. The strategy has been presented as multiculturalism (since about 1975) and has sought to suppress the racial nature of Australian nationhood, through assertions of commitments to modern values of equality in cultural relations, and capacity to contribute to economic development in immigration policies.(2)

By 1966 under the Prime Minister Holt Edward (Liberal), Australia had signed the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Educated, English-speaking Asians were being accepted – reflecting the idea of orientation to modernity as the organizing principle around which race could be reduced as a criterion of population selection. A modernizing nation would accept modernized populations, as they were expected to share values of democracy and economic productivity, and be bearers of significant stores of human capital (created by the investment by their states of origin). The new ALP government in 1973 withdrew all racial references in the Immigration Act, expecting that the modernity model of non-White immigration would continue as the norm. Indeed, a central ideological tenet of global modernity was created for this purpose, the concept of multiculturalism and its programmatic implementation.

Initially the Australian government under Prime Minister Gough Whitlam (3) was reluctant to get involved with the inflow of Asian refugees in spite of the aforementioned convention. Yet the arrival of the fishing boat KG4435 at a wharf in Darwin in April 1976 during the next government led by Malcolm Fraser meant that there had to be actions to take. The boat was the first sign of what had been happening throughout Southeast Asia, and soon it became a problem faced by every Australian government thereafter.

Fraser’s government’s solution was to broker a deal with the Asian countries of first refuge. The goal was twofold: To take the refugee problem off public attention, yet at the same time manage their arrival so as not to interfere with the Australian national interest and integrity. The government proposed that if the countries would no longer refuel the boats and send them towards the undefended north Australian coast, then Australia would take 15,000 refugees a year from the camps. However, the Australian government would choose those refugees it wanted in relation to their ‘fit’ with Australian priorities – thus attempting to sustain the modernity framework for population intake (and, in the process, minimize those with disabilities etc. who might be a long term cost to Australia).  This became, more or less, a framework for later governments in dealing with refugee issues that persists until today (4).

Once the first wave of refugees had been contained and a system found to process them, Australia sought ways to manage the continuing pressures. This period is marked by two contradicting views of the two Prime Ministers Bob Hawke and John Howard. Prime Minister Bob Hawke argued that if the outsiders (refugees) are seen as strengthening the depth of the cultural resources of the community, the level of perceived threat to Australia is reduced. Criminal deviance can then be seen as a minority activity, requiring normal social control strategies, rather than reflecting the essential differences between communities, or defining the core of the culture of the “Others”. On the contrary, in the late 1980s, John Howard as an opposition leader considered the outsiders as a threat to social cohesion.(5)

This duality, at its root, represents the real issue with white (or previously settled) Australian’s view on Vietnamese refugees and the subsequent community. Given the insecurities and prejudice deeply rooted in history, how the “existing population” views the “newcomers” will play an important role in defining how well they would fit into the new society and their social roles in the years thereafter.

As social cohesion and the formation of a modern, internally consistent and stable Australia began to be called into question, the position of the Vietnamese community once again was the target of much debate. The gist of the modern Australian Empire Project is the creation of an Australia that can compete with nations in the world on equal footing while maintaining an advanced, progressive, democratic and developed society at home. To this goal, social cohesion is key element. Previously, ever since the arrival of the Vietnamese refugee community as a full-fledged ethnic group, there have been many arguments to and for multiculturalism and their role in promoting or undermining the Australian internal solidarity and social cohesion. At that time, these arguments were based more on cultural and social grounds than economic.

The argument involving social cohesion was extended to economic grounds in the wake of the proposal from Monash University’s Centre for Population and Urban Research. It stated that the Vietnamese were forming part of an emerging structural underclass.(6) As it happened, the Vietnamese community in Sydney, whose composition consisted of a large portion of ‘recent migrants who lack the skills to compete in the contemporary labour market’ (7) was found to be contributing to the sedimentation of poverty. The polarization of income groups had accelerated from 1976 to 1991, and intensified over the next five years. This period paralleled the rise in Vietnamese immigration; the impact of this polarization was most evident amongst the Vietnamese, and by implication may indeed have been a consequence of their presence.(8)
In sum, in that quarter century, a generation, a social revolution had occurred in Australia: from a society with White Australia as a recent and avowedly racist population selection policy, to an egalitarian policy now avowedly non-racist; from a society in which Asian faces were still extraordinary, to one where visible diversity is everywhere; and from a society with little sense of non-European cultures and traditions, to one where every Buddha’s birthday has senior politicians lining up to be seen at Vietnamese temples.

2. Immigration Reality from Vietnam to Australia
The community of Vietnamese Australians was established by refugees from the war in Vietnam and was the first large group of Asian immigrants to settle in Australia after the end of the White Australia policy in 1973. The migration of Vietnamese to Australia, which has occurred mostly during the last 40 years, has two distinct phases: (i) before Vietnam’s renovation policy with assisting orphans pre-1975 and refugee resettlement during 1975–1985; (ii) and after renovation policy with purpose of family reunions, since the late 80s.

2.1. Immigration from Vietnam to Australia Before Renovation Policy
From 1958, Vietnamese students started to arrive in Australia to study at universities under the Colombo Plan. Almost all of these students returned to Vietnam after finishing their courses. Meanwhile, Australia committed combat troops to the Vietnam War in 1965. Later, many of these troops and other Australians married Vietnamese people and brought them back to Australia. Additionally, as a result of war there were over 800,000 orphans in South Vietnam alone. Australian families adopted 537 Vietnamese orphaned babies and infants between 1972 and 1975. This was the beginning of the first wave of permanent Vietnamese migration to Australia. In 1975 there were only about 1,000 people born in Vietnam living in Australia consisting of 335 Colombo Plan students; 130 private Vietnamese students; and over 500 orphans adopted by Australian families.(9) 

After the fall of Saigon Regime in 1975, Australia, being a signatory to the “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees” agreed to resettle its share of Vietnam-born refugees under a refugee resettlement plan between 1975 and 1985. In reality, Australia accepted Vietnam War refugees and arrivals of Vietnamese people increased rapidly. Once Prime Minister Fraser (from 11 November 1975 to 11 March 1983) had committed to taking the Vietnamese refugees, he was able to call on a shared liberal value set among his supporters in the Coalition, and the various spokespeople for the ALP Opposition, to fuse a solid wall of commitment to multiculturalism as the state ideology of inter-communal relations. Under this approach there was little argument about the Vietnamese policy at the level of parliamentary debate – other than to stress the need for services and the pressures to which government should respond.(10)

The resettlement of Vietnamese refugees did not happen without incidents. As refugees supported by the Australian government of the time, they were largely resettled in localities around the large migration centers. This is to say places like Cabramatta and Fairfield (Sydney), where already a relatively large population of previous immigrants – Yugoslavs, Italians, Russians, among others – existed. Unlike other postwar refugee communities, however, the Vietnamese community tended not to disperse from their initial place of settlement. As a result, they became a significant, condensed ethnic group in these localities, a fact that would fuel contention and public fallout for years to come.

Of these Vietnamese refugees, who arrived in the immediate post-war period, four main groups can be identified with different but in some cases overlapping arrival times: (i) the first group, arriving in 1975 was mostly elite Vietnamese, Chinese businessmen and Catholics. This group happened right before and after the liberation of South Vietnam; (ii) the second group arriving in 1976–78 was a gradually increasing outflow of refugees from camps outside Vietnam. In 1976 the first boat KG4435 arrived in Australia carrying refugees who had by-passed formal immigration procedures (11). Desperate to find a new home, they were accepted as immigrants on humanitarian grounds (see Table 1). Within three years a further 53 refugee boats had arrived; (iii) the third group, arriving in 1978, were mostly owners of private businesses, especially Chinese. Many of the boats that began to arrive in Australia had been refueled in Malaysia and then sent on their way. In addition, many of these refugees were not in fact boat people – but rather people being processed through refugee camps; (iv) The fourth group were so called ‘economic refugees’, mostly small traders, rural and urban workers and the unemployed. These left Vietnam during the socio-economic turmoil of the 1980s searching for a better life elsewhere and for the most parts weren’t fueled by political reasons.

Table 1: Vietnamese Population in Australia, 1976-2001

 

Census Year

Born in Vietnam

% change

The second generation

Speak Vietnamese

% change

% Australia- born speaking Vietnamese

1976

2,427

         

1981

41,096

   

n/a

   

1986

83,028

100

 

n/a

   

1991

121,813

50

25,151

110,817

 

16

1996

150,941

25

46,756

146,265

30

26

2001

154,831

3

n/a

174,236

20

n/a

Source:Andrew Jakubowicz, A Quintessential Collision:  Vietnamese in Australia after a generation of settlement

and adaptation, University of Technology Sydney, May 2004.

After the initial intake of refugees in the late 1970s, there was a second immigration peak in 1983-84, most likely a result of the 1982 agreement between the Australian and Vietnamese governments on the Orderly Departure Program (ODP), which allowed relatives of Vietnamese Australians to leave Vietnam and migrate to Australia. This means that ODP emphasized family reunion, and two-thirds of arrivals over the next few years were women. Then the first immigrants from Vietnam under this program arrived in Australia in 1982. Within a few years the Vietnam-born population of Australia would again double. A third immigration peak in the late 1980s seems to have been mainly due to Australia’s family reunion scheme. At the 1981 census, there were 41,096 people born in Vietnamese in Australia, a very large increase from the 1976 level (see Table 1). (12)

2.2 Vietnamese Immigration to Australia Since Renovation Policy (1986)
In 1986 the Vietnamese government committed to the Doi Moi (renovation) Policy, liberalizing the market and undertaking structural reforms needed to modernize the economy and produce more competitive, export-driven industries. The July 1989 International Conference adopted a Comprehensive Plan of Action that would have the effect of reducing the acceptance rate, increasing delays, and leaving about 40,000 rejected applicants in camps who refused to go back to Vietnam. In the wake of this situation the boats began to arrive again, with about 2,000 Indochinese arriving between 1989 and 1995, though the Vietnamese were few in numbers. The situation they faced had changed dramatically from what was before. These arrivals were now detained in camps in remote parts of Australia, facing arduous checks on their bona fides. When a couple walked out of one camp in 1992, security was intensified, based on a supposition that all unauthorized arrivals might seek to escape from lawful custody. All unauthorized arrivals, therefore and thereon, had to be interned under high security.

However, from the late 1980s Australia’s family reunion program was officially applied, called the ‘Vietnamese Family Migration Program’ (VFMP). Over 90,000 refugees were processed and entered Australia during this time. By the 1990s, the number of Vietnam-born migrating to Australia had surpassed the number entering as refugees. Between 1991 and 1993, the percentage of Vietnam-born migrants had reached 77% of the total intake of Vietnam-born arriving in Australia. By 1996 Vietnamese immigration had effectively ceased – tough new rules on family reunion made by the Howard government (from 11 March 1996) meant that there was a net increases of less than 4,000 over the 1996-2001 census period. Meanwhile the community was reflecting many of the characteristics of a mature group: for instance, by 2001 over one in four Vietnamese speakers was Australian born, while in 1996, 86% of Vietnamese had adopted Australian citizenship; and by 2000, the percentage of Vietnam-born migrants had climbed to 98%. In 2001-2002, 1,919 Vietnam-born migrants and 44 humanitarian entrants settled in Australia (see Figure 1). (13)

In the 2001 census, the 155,000 people of Vietnamese ancestry were first or second generation Australians; first generation Australians of Vietnamese ancestry outnumbered second generation Australians with Vietnamese ancestry (74%: 26%). Relatively few people of Vietnamese ancestry stated another ancestry (6%). Among the leading ancestries, the proportion of people who spoke a language other than English at home was highest for those of Vietnamese (96%). (14) At the 2006 census, 173,663 Australian residents declared themselves to be of Vietnamese ancestry.

fig02

In more recent years the vast majority of Vietnamese migrants have come to Australia through the Family Stream although there are growing numbers of skilled migrants. Permanent migration refers to the number of visas granted in any given year, without taking into account whether the visa recipient actually arrived and settled in Australia. In 2012-13, 30% of permanent visas granted to Vietnamese nationals were skilled visas, up from 17 per cent in 2009–10. A total of 5,339 Vietnamese nationals were granted a permanent visa through Australia’s Migration Programme in 2012–13, with the Family Stream accounting for 70% of visas granted. Of permanent migration, skilled migration focuses on facilitating the permanent entry of those who can make a positive contribution to Australia through their skills, qualifications, entrepreneurial spirit and employment potential. In 2012–13: (i) among the 128 & 973 skilled visas were granted, Vietnamese nationals accounted for 1.2% (1,592 grants) of the total. Compared to 2011–12, skilled visas granted to Vietnamese nationals rose by 49%. This represented an overall rise of 136% since 2009−10 and the highest on the record.  Much of this recent growth can be explained by a large increase in Employer Sponsorship, from 392 grants in 2011–12 to 898 grants in 2012−13, a 129% increase; (ii) Skilled visas granted to Vietnamese nationals accounted for nearly one-third (30%) of all permanent visas granted. While this share is low compared to most other countries it has increased from a share of 17% in 2009−10. Vietnam moved back to 15th position as source of skilled migrants in 2012–13 after falling to 19th in 2011−12; (iii) Points Tested Skilled Migration accounted for 34% of all skilled visas issued to Vietnamese nationals. Accountants, cooks and software and applications programmers were among the main occupations for new Points Tested Skilled Migration visa holders.

In addition, family migration facilitates the entry of close family members of Australian citizens, permanent residents and eligible New Zealand citizens. The programme is currently dominated by partners and dependent children, but also provides options for other family members, such as Carers, Parents and Aged Dependent Relatives. In 2012–13: (i) 60 cases of 185 family visas were granted, with grants to Vietnamese nationals accounting for 6.2% (3,716 grants) of the total. This made Vietnam the fifth largest provider of Family migrants to Australia; (ii) permanent family visas granted through the Migration Programme were 2.7% higher, but for Vietnamese nationals they were only increased by 0.8%: (iii) the Family Stream accounted for 7 in 10 permanent visas granted to Vietnamese Nationals – 73% of visas granted in this stream were to partners of an Australian resident.

Permanent additions are the sum of those granted a permanent residency visa while in Australia and those granted a visa through an Australian mission abroad, who has entered Australia during the respective reporting period. In 2012–13, there were 5,940 Vietnam-born permanent additions to the Australian resident population. Among these new additions there are: (i) Skill Stream comprising 750 skilled migrants and 784 accompanying family members and accounted for 26% of all permanent additions; (ii) Family Stream, made up of 4087 migrants and accounted for 69% of all permanent additions; (iii) Non-programme Vietnamese-born New Zealand citizens account for 2.9% of all permanent additions (se Figure 1). (15)

Apart form that, the subclass 457 visa programme allows Australian employers to sponsor foreign workers for employment in management, professional, technical and skilled trades’ positions. The programme is demand-driven and highly responsive to Australian labour market conditions. In 2012–13 demand for this visa remained high and increased from 125,070 in 2011–12 to 126,350 – an 86% rise since 2009–10: (i) In 2012–13, 1310 subclass 457 visas were granted to Vietnamese nationals – 115% higher than 2011–12 and 245% higher than the number granted in 2009–10; (ii) Among the Vietnamese workers sponsored under this programme, café and restaurant managers, accountants and cooks were the main occupation for which Australian employers recruited from abroad.(16)

By the end of 2013, there were 215,000 people born in Vietnam were resident in Australia and over 250,000 people speaking Vietnamese at home. This is equivalent to 3.5% of Australia’s overseas-born population (17). There may additionally be persons of Vietnamese descent born in Australia, or of arguably non-Vietnamese ancestries (such as Cantonese) born in Vietnam.(18) About 0.9% of the Australian resident population was born in Vietnam. Today the Vietnam-born represent the fifth largest migrant community in Australia behind the United Kingdom (mainly from England and Scotland), New Zealand, China, and Italy, and after the United States of America, Australia is the second most common destination for Vietnamese migrants.(19)

2.3 The Advantages and Disadvantages of Vietnamese Australian Community
Vietnamese Australians vary in income and social class levels. Vietnam-born Australians are highly represented in Australian universities and many professions (particularly as information technology workers, engineers, doctors and pharmacists), while other members in the community are subject to high unemployment rates. As the Vietnamese presence continued to grow (no longer primarily refugees but ODP immigrants), the normalizing of the population change process intensified local antagonisms. The popular press made much of what was seen as an emerging crime problem, though in 1987, it was found that the situation was much less fearsome than the public discourse might suggest. For instance, Vietnamese minors were 50% less likely to offend than the community norm; unaccompanied minors were even less likely to offend; while the rate was rising it was still very much lower than the community norm. Vietnamese had a much lower violent crime rate: drug offences in 1987 were 75% of the norm; and the suburbs in which the Vietnamese were concentrated had less crime than before their arrival. (20) Even so, youth crime became the trope through which the fears about social cohesion were voiced. However, since 2000, the vast majority of Vietnamese migrants to Australia came through the Family Stream (although there have been growing numbers of skilled migrants). The income of this group is more than the average rate of the Vietnamese Australian community.

Over three-quarters of people born in Vietnam live in New South Wales (39%) and Victoria (37%) (21)(see Table 2). In Melbourne the suburbs of Richmond, Footscray, Springvale, Sunshine and St Albans have a significant proportion of Vietnamese-Australians, while in Sydney they are concentrated in Bankstown, Cabramatta, Canley Vale and Fairfield. Other places of significant Vietnamese presence include Brisbane, where many have settled in suburbs like Darra and Inala. For most of the decade after 1986, the focus was on the Vietnamese communities of Sydney and Melbourne.

Table 2: National geographical distribution, by Vietnamese-born and Vietnamese nationals (%)

National geographic distribution

NSW

Vic.

Qld

SA

WA

Tas

NT

ACT

Proportion of all persons counted in the Census, 2011

30

25

20

7

10

2

1

2

Proportion of all Vietnamese-born counted in the Census, 2011

39

37

9

6

7

0

0

2

Geographical distribution, permanent additions, 2012−13

 

Skill Stream (primary)

23

27

27

10

10

0

1

2

Skill Stream (dependent)

17

19

42

11

8

0

1

1

Geographical distribution, temporary entrants, 2012−13

 

International students

30

45

10

5

6

0

0

2

Temporary Work (Skilled) (subclass 457) visa (primary)

39

20

18

4

16

0

1

3

Permanent departure

 

All Vietnamese-born permanent resident

57

21

8

2

9

0

1

2

Source: Information on migrants has come from internal data collected by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.

Information on the geographical distribution of the total population was sourced from the 2011 Census of Population and Housing

Of particular note, Vietnamese Australians have an exceptionally low rate of return migration to Vietnam. In December 2001, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) estimated that there were 3,950 Australian citizens resident in Vietnam. It is not clear what proportion of this number are returned emigrants with Australian citizenship or their Vietnamese Australian children, and what number are simply other Australians in Vietnam for business or other reasons. The greater proportion (3,000) was recorded in the south of the country. (22) What this means, among others, is that the community of Vietnamese Australians is relatively stable – they have come to stay for the rest of their lives.

3. Vietnamese Australian Community’s Contribution to Commonwealth of Australia and Vietnam
3.1. Role of the Vietnamese Australians to Economic Development and Multiracial Society of Australia
Today over 250.000 Australians are Vietnam-born, a mix of Viet and Chinese ethnicities, of which 25% are white collar professionals, whilst 28% work in transport, production and laboring. They enjoy strong community networks, and make a distinctive cultural contribution to Australian life and commerce. Features of Australia’s Vietnamese-born migrants are as follows: (i) The median age of 42.8 years was 5.5 years above that of the general Australian population; (ii) Females slightly outnumbered males – 53% compared with 47%; (iii) In August 2013, their labour force participation rate of 61% was slightly below the national average of around 65%; (iv) The unemployment rate at August 2013 was 7.8% – this is higher than average and above the national rate of 5.8%; (v) In August 2013, 107 000 Vietnam-born people were working in Australia. Their main occupations were labourers (19%), technicians and trade workers (15%) and professionals (14%).(23)

The arrival of the Vietnamese refugees and the culture clash and social paranoia that ensued as a result thereof was an unfortunate, yet natural, course when two wildly differing peoples made contact so suddenly, as has been examined in the above section. Yet more fascinating still is the growth of said community between the first arrival and present day. From 1975 until now, the Vietnamese community in Australia grew from near-nonexistence to a 250 thousand-strong ethnic minority. With this growth came an accompanying identity, which, in and of itself, contributed in many ways to the socio-political scene of the host country.

As a result, by 2012 the second generation was a significant part of Australian political, economic and cultural life. (24) Today there are Vietnamese newspapers, a community literary and cultural website as well as radio stations and regular SBS television programs. Vietnamese community organizations thrive and are involved in community development, advocacy and social work. Community members play an increasing role in local government as well as representation in the Upper Houses of Australian states. Vietnamese Australians are also well represented in the arts and the professions.

A far larger portion of Vietnamese are less successful, but do contribute to Australian society in their own ways. Many Vietnamese set up their own businesses, often working hard to put their children through school and university. Vietnamese small businesses gradually transformed streetscapes in suburbs like Richmond and Springvale into vibrant, restaurant and retail centers. Those who participate in these works do so mostly for survival. They have a long history of being overworked and underpaid until the Australian social activist community began to take action supporting their interest. (25) The result of these social movements is doubtful at best: The report found large numbers of Vietnamese workers still working for low pay, often being defrauded and suffering from exhaustion. (26)

For whatever motives, the contribution was made: their income was vital to the family, and the work often involved all the family. Thus, Vietnamese workers and their families have played a crucial part in the survival of many industries, particularly the Australian clothing one, literally sacrificing themselves in the work (suffering repetition and other injuries) so that their children can stay at high school, and successfully go on to university. The mentality behind this act of apparent sacrifice will be discussed in the following section.  
All these achievements stand testimony to the fact that the Vietnamese Australian community has gone a long way by any standards. There are a number of factors affecting this interaction process as follows:  

First, there is the political climate of the time. It was a stormy ride for the fledgling community since day one: They have constantly been used, positively or otherwise, in such political movements and upheavals as  the real end of White Australia in the late 1970s. In the early 1980s  their presence was again used as evidence in support of the abandonment of bi-partisanship on multiculturalism. In the following decade the community was centrally embroiled in the emergence of a politics of race in the 1990s, providing case studies for the vehement demagoguery of the One Nation party and their allies, while also providing widespread support for Australia’s first significant antiracist political party, Unity.
To this end, the Vietnamese Community in Australia has contributed to and revealed the deep instability of the Australian empire project, yet has also highlighted its resilience and capacity to adapt to and incorporate potential threats (27). Whether or not these incidents were for the better or worse of the Vietnamese Australian community, they have found themselves unwittingly at the eye of the storm of change in the Australian political thoughts of the era.

Second, it is the coincidental affinity of the Vietnamese culture with the pro-education, meritocratic environment of modern Australia. The Vietnamese culture considers education and successes in studies, one of the greatest values to be had. Within both Buddhist and Catholic Vietnamese communities, there is an assertion of the value of education, and a belief in the potential for individuals to realize their aspirations through education. Such a belief was rooted deeply in the history of the country, since the time of the Vietnamese Imperial exams, the last of which was still held towards the end of the Nguyen Dynasty. In an Australian environment that encourages educational participation, in which a globally focused modernity permeates elite and middle class cultures, meritocratic rules of selection compete with racist structures of exclusion. The Vietnamese dedication to academic excellence, hence, has found an excellent thriving ground. It was no surprising that a significant part of the Vietnamese community makes it through these hurdles – although a marginalized minority fails to do so. This also explains the degree of sacrifice Vietnamese Australian parents have been undertaking for the education of their children, as touched upon above.

Third, globalization of intellectual elites, proliferation of modern ideas of self-actualization brought into existence by the aforementioned high levels of education and meritocracy. This seems to manifest in the drive for self-actualization and the search for a new identity for themselves among Vietnamese Australian of the second-generation and beyond. Nowhere is this seen more clearly than during the Viet Pop exhibition (mobilized by community arts worker Cuong Le) – the text panel concludes with the words “the search for identity” is what young Vietnamese Australians are.

 Fourth (and the least fortunate) is the marginalization and failure to cope with the new environment seen in a significant part of the Vietnamese Australian population. Statistics are harrowing: Drawing on Victorian police reports, Vietnamese-born offenders processed for all crimes increased by nearly 40% from 1993 to 1997 – compared with a state rise of about 2%. Violent crime fell from about 350 offenders to 200, while drug offences rose from 220 to 1000. (28) Apart from that, a Commonwealth Parliamentary inquiry in 1995 into Asian Organized Crime made particular reference to the Vietnamese involvement in crime. In a detailed summary they identified a range of claims by police and law enforcement bodies across Australia, indicating that Vietnamese gangs were involved in heroin importation, sales and distribution, extortion, and home invasions. The concerns about the gangs in the Vietnamese community were widely held, and fuelled the growing antipathy to the community. (29)

This factor cannot and should not be taken out of context of the political difficulties mentioned above. The political turmoil and rejections as well as the failure to cope with the Australian environment has played a vital part in impoverizing and driving to crime a part of the Vietnamese Australian youth (30). They experience the strains too dramatically, and in their anomic reactions find alternative pathways to seeking (usually not successfully) economic success – often through crime as has typically occurred in other societies for newer immigrant groups, and in the past in Australia.(31)

Therefore, it is not surprising that the Vietnamese have drawn a fair amount of attention from social scientists and scholars interested in the ways in which cultural interaction, adaptation and change occur. (32) They were refugees from a colonial society escaping the aftermath of civil war, and entered a society that had been a protagonist on one side of that war. Many in the host society had hoped the war had been fought so that the population of Vietnam would stay in their own country, while others had supported the forces that won the war and triggered the exodus.

3.2 Role of the Vietnamese Australians to Economic Development of Vietnam and Promotion of Comprehensive Partnership Relationship between Vietnam and Australia

Economic opportunity is a huge driver for emigration (particularly among the educated). For this reason some 27.1% of Vietnam’s tertiary-educated population live abroad. Despite solid and continuing growth in Vietnam, economic development throughout the country is uneven and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is comparatively very low. This provides high incentives for Vietnamese nationals to leave in the hope of better economic prospects in countries like Australia, where on a purchasing power parity basis GDP per capita is more than 10 times higher (see Table 3).

Table 3: Economic and Human Development Indicators of Australia and Vietnam, 2013

Indicator

Australia

Vietnam

Adult literacy (%)

99.0

93.2

Fertility rates (children per female)

1.9

1.8

GDP per capita PPP (US$)

44,074

3,750

Life expectancy at birth (years)

82.0

75.4

Mean years of schooling

12.0

5.5

Human Development Index (HDI) (33)

0.938

0.617

Median age (years)

36.9

28.2

Population (millions)

22.9

89.7

Population growth (%)

1.8

1.1

Source: Most data in this table comes from the UNDP Human Development Report 2013, the CIA World Fact book and, the International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database April 2013. Data on the size, growth and median age of Australia’s population was sourced from the Australian Bureau of Statistics.

The Vietnamese Australian community, in that backdrop, is in a unique position to impact on the economic development in Vietnam. Equally uniquely are they qualified in aiding the comprehensive partnership relationship between Vietnam and Australia. They have many means at their disposal to these ends:

Firstly, they are a significant economic driver, expressed through such channels as remittances, business and investment. There are many commercial centres of Vietnamese throughout Australia. Most notable is the contribution of the Vietnamese Australian Community’s Entrepreneur Association, established with the support of Vietnam’s Embassy in Australia. This Association with more than 200 members was inaugurated on 3rd July 2010 to support and assist the Vietnamese Australian community’s entrepreneurs in undertaking business opportunities in Australia and Vietnam as well as other countries in the world. They have been making a positive contribution to the promotion of trade between the two countries as well as the supporting of the Vietnamese Australian business community.

With their economic capacity, the Vietnamese Australian business people have been increasingly investing into Vietnam. This has proven to be a growing source of remittances. According to World Bank data, remittances into Vietnam were US$9 billion in 2011, around seven times greater than in 2000 and equivalent to eight per cent of Vietnam’s GDP, making Vietnam one of the top ten remittance recipients. Remittances of the Vietnamese Australian community accounted for about 25% of total remittances of overseas Vietnamese all over the world. (34) On average, remittances from Australia increase by 10 – 15% per year, contributing to stabilizing Vietnam’s international balance of payment as well as socio-economic development. In previous period, remittances were mainly for helping families and relatives, but now this money is also used for business and/or macroeconomic purposes: investments in industries, contributions to poverty reduction and elimination, job creation and local welfare guarantee.

Secondly, the Vietnamese Australian community possesses many young, dynamic intellectuals with a lot of financial potentials, business and management experiences as well as high educated knowledge who have integrated into Australian societies. Through their skills and integrity they have acquired and held many political and economic positions in Australia and highly respected by many. Mr. Hieu Van Le, Governor of South Australia State, Chairman of the South Australian Multicultural and Ethnic Affairs Commission is one exemplary person.  
The third and second generation who have been working in various crucial sectors of Australian economy such as information technology, electronics, composite materials, ecology, commerce, law, accounting and so on, have gradually replaced the first in Community operations. In recent years, every year there are many Vietnamese Australian experts, specialists, scientists, professors returning to Vietnam to take part effectively in teaching, textbook writing, consultation, knowledge, technological transfers and so on. They are cooperating with domestic experts, scientists, specialists and scholars to carry out research programs, to implement R&D projects, to bridge Australian universities and institutes with Vietnamese ones. Besides, thanks to their access to Australia’s advanced technologies and the understanding of the world development trends, the Vietnamese Australians may suggest and comment on the building of Vietnamese legislation and the making of policies for better socio-economic development and international integration.

Thirdly, the Vietnamese Australians have become the important bridge to help Vietnam expand bilateral relationship between Vietnam and Australia. With their influences to various Australian authorities, the Vietnamese Australians can promote economic, trade and political relations between Vietnam and Australia, and mobilize Australian support in international forums. This can be considered a crucial factor contributing to the Vietnamese implementation of her expanded foreign policies: diversified and multilateral foreign relations policies, so as to contributing to national building and defence. Moreover, the Vietnamese Australians have the unique advantage of living and working in Australia and tend to have close ties with other countries and peoples as a result of this. Therefore, they are a real force to diffuse, popularize and broadcast Vietnam’s culture, image of country and people to Australia and the world through cultural festival, food and tourism promotion, exhibition and trade fairs.

Fourthly, the Vietnamese Australian Community is also instrumental in protect the country from hostile activities of the enemies. Nowadays, there are more than 100 hostile organizations and groups including many in Australia (such as Viet Tan) who used to be soldiers and officers of the South Vietnam regime. They have ever been trying to contact reactionaries inside the country to obstruct and sabotage Vietnam’s socio-economic development efforts, particularly in the remote and mountainous areas. They have illegally carried out missionary works in the areas to provoke ethnic minorities into protesting against Communist Party and government of Vietnam. In recent years, they have been taking advantage of such issues as democracy, human right, and freedom of religion to organize meetings to slander and distort the policies of Vietnam government.

It should be made clear that the base of power of these subversive elements lie within a small portion of the Vietnamese Australian Community. As long as they can sway the overseas Vietnamese’s opinion to their way of thinking, the Vietnamese people and government’s goal of upholding national unity and integrity will be severely challenged. On the other hand, if they should fail to rally overseas Vietnamese to their cause, it will be very difficult for them to do any real and lasting damage. The cooperation of the Vietnamese Australian community, hence, plays a role that cannot be overstated in maintaining national unity. In that context, the Vietnamese Australian community has correctly explained the policies and guidelines of Government and CPV, as well as disclosed their plots and hostile activities to Australian Government and people (for example, Lawyer Tran Ba Phuc in Melbourne).    

        
3.3. Solutions and Suggestions to Improve the Role of the Vietnamese Australians in Australia and Vietnam
The Vietnamese Australian Community has continuously been growing both in number and quality. In recent years, apart from the vast majority of Vietnamese migrants through the Family Stream, there have been a growing number of skilled migrants. The Vietnamese Australian community has grown to almost 250,000 people at the end of 2013, excluding the 24,000 Vietnamese students at Australian schools and universities.  Of this number there have been more and more successful Vietnamese Australians in political, economic and artistic fields.
Although deeply and widely integration into the Australian economy and society, there are many issues involving the Vietnamese Australian community that needs to be addressed in order to enhance their role in both Australia and Vietnam. There are such issues as the loss of the Vietnamese cultural root among the later generations of Vietnamese Australian Community, the rate of crime – especially drug-related crimes – among the poorer Vietnamese Australians, the loss of faith in the government of Vietnam and the Communist Party of Vietnam (or worse, the development of dissident thoughts and movements). From the Vietnamese side, there are a number of solutions the Vietnamese government can undertake: (i) stimulate the second and third generations to keep learning Vietnamese as well as maintain the Vietnamese cultural traditions and identity by providing textbooks and cultural products; (ii) promote their investment in Vietnam by means of such concessions as visa exemption, residence, investment incentives, tax holidays… as much as is within reasons; (iii) mobilize and incentivize Vietnamese Australian scientists, scholars and professors to work in Vietnam by provisions of  material incentives and preferential treatments; (iv) maintain the community’s ties with the homeland by providing them with information of current situation in Vietnam as well as achievement in political and economic affairs, supporting them to organize food and cultural promotion of Vietnam in Australia; (v) closely cooperate with the Australian authorities to counter Vietnamese Australian criminal activities, especially in drugs and human trafficking; (vi) Strengthen diplomatic information service to inform Vietnamese Australian of the true picture in Vietnam and counter slanders and misinformation spread by subversive elements hostile to the Vietnamese national unity.

At the same time, with diligence, skill and brain, the Vietnamese Australians treated fairly, supported and facilitated by Australian government to study at the universities and vocational colleges, will contribute a lot to Australia. In addition, with the dynamic development of East Asia, the Vietnamese Australians can be used by Australian Government as a cultural and economic bridge between Australia and the East Asian countries in general and between Australia and Vietnam in particular. Apart from that, with the support of both Vietnamese and Australian authorities, the establishment of Vietnamese center (town) will give rise to even greater multiculturalism of Australia.  

4. Conclusion
For Vietnamese Australians, the strive for integration and assimilation into the greater Australian society was defining in many ways. In this long journey of more than forty years that have seen both the best and the worst in the Australian mindset, their efforts have in general paid off. In 2013 there are almost 250,000 thousand Vietnamese Australians in a community that has largely melded with the Australian society. Throughout this journey, they have made many contributions, both good and bad, for or against their own interest, to the Australian process of building a modern, democratic, non-discriminatory and civilized society.

However, this does not mean the role of policymakers should henceforth end. The contribution of Vietnamese Australians to both countries and to their relationship with each other is so significant that the community needs constant nurturing, promotion and accommodation. A strong, mature, civilized and modern Vietnamese Australian community will play a pivotal role in strengthening both Australia and Vietnam, as well as bridging the two countries whose culture and politics do not always see eye-to-eye. This paper seeks, then, to provide some assessment and suggestion for policymaking to pursue those ends. This is an endeavor that will require not only the close coordination and participation of the Vietnamese government, but also cooperation between Vietnam and Australia and the political will to commit to comprehensive joint actions.

 

(1)As many as a quarter of Vietnamese speakers in Australia are of Chinese ancestry but there is no real divide between ethnic Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese Vietnamese communities.

(2)Andrew Jakubowicz, A Quintessential Collision: Vietnamese in Australia after a generation of settlement and adaptation, University of Technology Sydney, May 2004.

(3)He used to be Army minister during the Vietnam War.

(4)For example, in conjunction with the Vietnamese government’s orderly departure program. See more in: Viviani, N., 1980, Australian government policy on the entry of Vietnamese refugees in 1975, Centre for the Study of Australian-Asian Relations Griffith University.

(5)Social cohesion’ was after all a central concern of the empire project – what sort of deal needed to be struck with incomers to ensure that the social order was not destabilized? The original strategies of assimilation had faltered as they did not address the realities of communal processes of survival and the critical role of culture in human identity and social engagement.

(6)Birrell B. and Seol B.-S., 1998, ‘Sydney’s ethnic underclass’, People and Place, Vol. (6) 3.

(7)Healy E., 1997, “1996 Census Update – Residential Concentrations of Vietnam-Born people in Melbourne and Sydney”, People and Place, Vol. 5(3).

(8)Tran, M.V., Holton, R. J., 1991, Sadness is losing our country, happiness is knowing peace: Vietnamese social mobility in Australia, 1975-1990, Canberra: Office of Multicultural Affairs.

(9)However, that before 1975 Vietnam was not separately recorded as a country of birth for settlers so the Australian Bureau of Statistics is unable to provide an exact picture of settler intake prior to this time.

(10) Lewins F. W. and Ly J., 1985, The first wave: the settlement of Australia’s first Vietnamese refugees, Sydney: Allen & Unwin; Viviani N., 1984, The long journey: Vietnamese migration and settlement in Australia, Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press.

(11) People sailing out of Vietnam to wherever would take them; if they survived from pirates, storms and unsafe boats. Many of the boats that began to arrive in Australia had been re-fuelled in Malaysia and then sent on their way.

(12)Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Social Trends, 1994 : Population Growth: Birthplaces of Australia’s settlers, Canberra 1995.

(13)In the 2001 census almost all people of Vietnamese ancestry were first or second generation Australians, consistent with the timing of Vietnamese immigration, which essentially began in the mid-1970s and increased over the 1980s (Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Social Trends, 2003: Population characteristics: Ancestry of Australia’s population, Canberra 2004).

(14)In 2001, the Vietnamese language was spoken at home by 174,236 people in Australia. Vietnamese is the sixth most widely spoken language in the country after English, the Chinese languages, Italian, Greek and Arabic. See: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Social Trends, 2003: Population characteristics: Ancestry of Australia’s population, Canberra 2004.

(15) Australia Government, Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Country Profile – Vietnam, Canberra 2013.

(16) Australia Government, Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Ibid.

(17)Between 1975 and 1986, almost all of the Vietnamese arrivals were refugees. This decreased to around 45 per cent between 1986 and 1991 and only 22% between 1991 and 1993. By 2000 the Vietnamese humanitarian arrivals were less than 2% of the total Vietnamese settler arrivals.

(18)Australian Bureau of Statistics, Country of Birth of Person by Sex – Australia, Canberra 2007.

(19)Australia Government, Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Country Profile – Vietnam, Canberra 2013.

(20)This is partly thanks to almost Vietnamese Australians follow one of the religions. According to census data released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in 2012, Vietnamese Australians are, by religion, 30.3% Catholic, 0.4% Anglican, 3.1 other Christian, 55.2% other religions (mainly Buddhist with Taoism and Ancestor Worship   as one), and only 11.0% no religion.

(21)Australian Bureau of Statistics, Ibid.

(22)Australia Government, Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Country Profile – Vietnam, Canberra 2012.

(23)Australia Government, Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Country Profile – Vietnam, Canberra 2013

(24)Indeed, in June 2002 in the outer Sydney suburb of Liverpool a group of twenty-something Vietnamese Australians created ‘Viet Pop’, a celebration of their experience as ‘Generation 2’. Through music, performance, art and photography they sought to capture the multiplicity of identities, challenges and creative engagements that characterized their lives in this metropolis to which their parents had fled a generation before. In addition, in the 2003 Centenary Awards identified eight Vietnamese Australians for recognition – from SBS radio’s Quang Luu to Fairfield Unity Party councillor Thang Ngo.

(25)Alcorso C., 1991, Non-English Speaking Background Immigrant Women in the Workforce, Centre for Multicultural Studies, University of Wollongong.

(26)Cregan C., 2001, Home sweat home: Preliminary findings of the first stage of a two-part study of outworkers in the textile industry in Melbourne, Melbourne: Department of Management, Melbourne University.

(27)Hage G., 2002, White nation: fantasies of white supremacy in a multicultural society, 2nd Edition, Sydney: Pluto Press.

(28)The figures were provided by Mukherjee of the Australian Institute of Criminology in 1999 (Melbourne).

(29)Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority, 1995.

(30)Robert Merton first theorised such situations in his studies in the 1940s of anomie and alienation in ethnic neighbourhoods of Chicago, and reflected on a sociological modelling of dis/organised crime. Merton proposed models of adaptation by immigrant communities facing existing hierarchies of status and privilege that produced dysfunctional outcomes he labelled as ‘alienation’ and ‘anomie’, drawing on but going beyond Durkheim’s theoretical conclusions about the dynamics of suicide. Merton argued for a model that linked personal values and aspirations to social structure and mobility pathways. He suggested that the critical link was between aspiration and opportunity. ‘Anomie’ occurred where individuals had internalised wider societal values and aspirations but found that the legitimate pathways to achieve those goals were blocked – thus leading to the development of alternative pathways and structures. ‘Alienation’ referred to a process when the very values of the wider society were rejected, and alternative values with little chance of their realisation, emerged.

(31)See more in: (i) Featherstone, R. and Deflem, M., 2003, ‘Anomie and Strain: Context and Consequences of Merton’s Two Theories’, Sociological Inquiry 73(4): 471-489; (ii) Merton, R. K., 1938, ‘Social Structure and Anomie’, American Sociological Review, No 3(October): 672-682.

(32)Kawakami, I. 2003 ‘Resettlement and Border Crossing: A Comparative Study on the Life and Ethnicity of Vietnamese in Australia and Japan’, International Journal of Japanese Sociology 12(1): 48-67.

(33)The HDI produced by the UN is a composite measure of three dimensions of human development – health, education and income. Australia ranks very high on this measure, with a 2012 score of 0.94, second only to Norway. Comparatively, Vietnam’s HDI in 2012 was 0.62, ranking the country 127 out of 186 countries. The HDI of East Asia and the Pacific in 2012 was 0.68.

(34) In term of remittance, Vietnam was the number 2 in South East Asia and the number 9 in the world in 2012.

C. Main Reference
1. Andrew Jakubowicz, Vietnamese in Australia: A Quintessential  Collision, University of Technology Sydney, 2004
2. Ashley Carruthers, Vietnamese Dictionary of Sydney, 2008 http://dictionaryofsydney.org/entry/vietnamese.
3. Australia Government, Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Country Profile – Vietnam, Canberra 2013
4. Australian Social Trends, 1994, Population Growth: Birthplaces of Australia’s settlers. Australian Bureau of Statistics. Retrieved 2008-03-14.
5. Australian Social Trends, 2003, Population  characteristics: Ancestry of Australia’s population. Australian Bureau of Statistics. Retrieved 2008-03-14.
6. Department of Immigration and Citizenship, http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/statistics/federation/body2.pdf.
7. Haslinda Abullah (2009), “Major Challenges to the Effective Management of Human Resource Training and Development Activities”, The Journal of International Social Research, Volume 2/8 Summer 2009.
8. Gibbs, Stephen (2 December 2003). “Crunch time for SBS over Vietnamese news bulletin”. Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 2008-03-14.
9. International Organization of Migration (IOM), Rural Development and Migration, Hanoi 2014.
10. International Organization of Migration (IOM), IOM Viet Nam joins together with National Government to host workshop on grievance redress mechanism for migrant workers, Hanoi 17th December 2013.
11. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, Washington April 2013.
12. James Jupp (ed.), 2001 The Australian People: An Encyclopedia of the Nation, Its People and Their Origins Edited by, Cambridge University Press 2001
13. Nguyen Anh Tuan (ed), 2006, Chapter 7: Migration of Labor Forces in International Economic Relations (Textbook), National Political Publisher, Hanoi.
14. Tim Lambert, a Brief History of Vietnam, http://www.localhistories.org/viethist.html,
15. Philip L. Martin, 2003, Highly Skilled Labor Migration: Sharing the Benefits, Geneva: The International Institute for Labour Studies.
16. Philip Martin, 2004, Inter-economics: Policy Responses to Unauthorized or Irregular Workers, Geneva: ILO, January/February
17. Viviani, N. and Griffith University. Centre for the Study of Australian-Asian Relations.  1980  Australian government policy on the entry of Vietnamese refugees in 1975, Centre for the Study of Australian-Asian Relations Griffith University.
18. Viviani, N., Lawe-Davies, J. and Griffith University. Centre for the Study of Australian-Asian Relations.  1980  Australian government policy on the entry of Vietnamese refugees, 1976 to 1978, Centre for the Study of Australian-Asian Relations Griffith University.
19. Viet Ventures,  http://www.vietventures.com/vietnam/history_vietnam.asp     
20. The World Fact book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html   
21. UNDP, UNDP Human Development Report 2013, the CIA World Fact book 2014.
22. Williams, J. R. and Morris, J.  1991,  Homecoming: images of Vietnam, Nambour, Qld: Homecoming Publications.

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Southeast Asia

Jokowi’s Spin-Off: Becoming International Statesman

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Image source: Kumparan

Entering 2023 just going as equally as “The End of the Jokowi’s Era”. It could be seen by the fact that Indonesia has been gluttoned up by the hands of politicians who are seeking power and hot seats in the government in 2024. However, surprisingly those phenomena are not completely causing a turbulence towards Jokowi and his cabinet line during their remaining terms in office.

Instead, Indonesia still can thrive with more legacies, right before a few months to campaign period this June, such as proudly presenting as a rightful ASEAN Chairmanship in 2023. But unfortunately, this could be the last monumental journey he took on a ride during his presidency. Therefore, these last months are considered as a perfect timing to reflect on Jokowi’s foreign affairs and policy under his decade of leadership.

Beginner Player

Throwback to Jokowi’s very own departure as a President Republic of Indonesia, the international public took a distinguished appraiseation on him. Starting from his humble background who was borned and viscous with a bunch of Javanese tradition, until the world dub him as a “Face of the Village”. This call was well written in a journal titled Indonesian Foreign Policy Under President Jokowi by Aaron L. Connelly in 2014.

This ‘profiling’ thing then herding other countries’ leaders was expecting a unique touch from him on responding to a bunch foreign issues later on. However, not all were quite big fans of him. Some of them were might even explicitly condescending to him that he was not and would not be an ideal type of an international statesman.

Turns out, after Jokowi had finally heard those ‘gossips’, he quickly tackled all of those sentiments by giving the statement that even though he came from a village, he is still nourishingly international-minded. But in anyways, these two contrary expressions–internationalist type of man or not–could be only answered by run-through Jokowi’s track record since early.

As far as we all know, the most distinctive Presidential candidacy than the rest of others, for instance as a mayor/regent and governor, lies in their capabilities in handling foreign affairs. So back then in 2014, that moment could be totally Jokowi’s first movement deepening not only local politics, but also broadening cross’ countries.

In the meantime to prepare for running as a President, he studied with Rizal Sukma, the executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), about international relations outlook. He spent a lot of time drilling numerous Indonesia’s former Presidents in carrying out foreign history.

Worse than that, Jokowi even dragged Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, one of the biggest mining business owners, to work side by side with him as part of his foreign policy advisers. His inclination towards his advisers secretly implied that he was just “a new kid on the block” in international affairs who was driven by the seniors. Unlike the previous President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), who was more tendentiously too dominating all foreign affairs policies decisions.

Those assistance were exaggerated by the fact that Jokowi was slow in confirming which foreign issues became his top priority. He and his team were a little bit late in presenting the “visi-misi Indonesia statement”. That time Indonesia lacked anything in the way of grand strategy or a vision of Indonesia’s role amidst great power rivalry.

During that vacuum, nay Jokowi did give more affection to domestic issues rather than international affairs. It was also written a few times ago by The Jakarta Post senior editor, Kornelius Purba, that Jokowi indeed took a while in achieving ambitious goals after he only got the last three years tenure left.

Embracing the Maturity Flank

Behind the desk, Jokowi also has his strategic movement to flip out of the situation. Jokowi moved so fast and piecemeal “split movement” where he divided a game into domestic and international stages. He repaired the local or national system damages first before he went playing internationally. In that way, then it is a very reasonable assessment by David Singer in his popular journal titled The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations that Jokowi did redress local or domestic issues in order to staging-up Indonesia’s position on an international level.

Hence, it was not surprising if Singer named Jokowi as a pro-player for packaging a nationalist style for a more-called hidden international purpose and so vice versa. According to one of the political science lecturers in Indonesia, Muhammad Tri Andika, this flow of thought is identified as a “pro-people diplomacy” (diplomasi pro-rakyat). It is simply placing people’s interest as  a  centre  of  Indonesia’s  foreign  diplomacy  to  secure  the  needs of Indonesian people first and foremost.

This strategy is virtually fulfilled one from five recommendations which was conveyed in The Washington Quarterly journal by Prashanth Parameswaran titled Between Aspiration and Reality: Indonesian Foreign Policy After the 2014 Elections, that Jokowi should fixing even improving Indonesia’s own ‘game system’ variables, such as the bureaucracy, democracy index, and human rights indicator, as powerful instrument to enhance its soft power approach.

Furthermore, he is also remembered for his fearless attitude. Seemed by how Jokowi ordered all raw material companies, especially nickel ore, to terminate the exportation in terms of increasing investment scale. He pushed that ambitious plan through pressing the newest regulations where a country or company who wants to purchase the nickel product, should share holdings in Indonesia advance. Even Jokowi did not stand down when the European Union (EU) sued Indonesia for it. Yet he accepted the dare and proceeded with the whole lawsuit process fairly at the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

Nowadays, Jokowi has been rumoured that he could be leaning to continue his career path right to the United Nations as a Secretary General. This gaslighting appeared precisely eversince Jokowi utilised Indonesia’s opportunity as a President of G20 to mediate Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky during their Russian-Ukraine open war. World leaders saw that as a legitimately bold move.

Not to mention, recently, Jokowi was appointed as a member of the Champion Group of the United Nations’ Global Crisis Response Group (GCRG). This was delivered by Antonio Guterres, the Secretary General of the United Nations, itself. This establishment was expected as a noble force for Jokowi to formulate and advocate resolutions towards global food, energy, and financial crises.

After retracing Jokowi’s leadership, it could be noted that Jokowi has become a decent international statesman material. He may have stuttered a little bit at the beginning, but eventually he managed it well-steady. Therefore, his progressive performance can be assessed that being a president has successfully shaped Jokowi from a national to international statesman once and for all.

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Myanmar Crisis Presents Major Challenge for Indonesia’s 2023 ASEAN Chairmanship

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Photo by ASEAN2022 Phnom Penh Media Center/Khem Sovannara & Yim Sovathana - AKP

At the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits closing ceremony in November 2022, Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen handed over a gavel to Indonesian president Joko Widodo. This symbolic move signifies the humble end of Cambodia’s chairmanship of ASEAN and marks the beginning of Indonesia’s turn to lead Southeast Asia’s premier regional organisation.

ASEAN’s chairmanship rotates annually between its 10 member states by alphabetical order. Coincidentally, Indonesia’s turn came exactly after it had finished holding the presidency of G20 in 2022. Indonesia’s presidency could be considered a mild success, managing to initiate productive talks on common global issues, namely digital transformation, climate change, and religious tolerance. However, it was mired with challenges along the way. Western countries persisted to exploit the supposedly economic forum to raise concern on security issues instead, reasonably due the critical state of global geopolitics at that moment.

Unfortunately however, there’s noticeably an uneasy parallel to be drawn here: Indonesia’s G20 presidency and ASEAN chairmanship will both be held with ongoing (and armed conflicts stealing all the attention. If the G20 has to face the Russia-Ukraine war, ASEAN has to face Myanmar’s domestic crisis. Even worse, ASEAN members have different stances on how to respond and properly resolve the situation, which could hamper concrete solutions. Understandably, high expectations will be placed upon Indonesia as ASEAN’s new chair. Could it possibly bring about orderly, peaceful cooperation in the midst of regional discord?

Indonesia’s ASEAN chairmanship came at a time where the crisis in Myanmar has intensified to an all-out civil war. When the military overthrew the democratically-elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in February 2021, it had only been a political issue. Now, the crisis has transformed into a much more complex problem, affecting not just political-security aspects, but also the socio-economic dimension of everyday life. The military junta routinely clashed with resistance forces coordinated by the civilian National Unity Government (NUG). Dozens of ethnic-based armed groups are also present. Junta forces misuse their firepower to burn down villages and take hundreds of innocent lives.

According to recent UN OCHA reports, over 1,4 million people in Myanmar are displaced due to the crisis. Prices of commodities such as food and fuel have risen due to inflation, deepening the socio-economic stress on ordinary civilians. As such, the international community and civil society organisations scramble to deliver humanitarian assistance. However, operations are often hampered by armed clashes between junta forces and civilian resistance groups as well as threats to aid workers in the field. Living conditions are getting incredibly more concerning day by day.

Though there is one noteworthy recent development regarding this crisis. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 2669 in December 2022. It demanded an end to violence and release of political prisoners—including Aung San Suu Kyi—by the Myanmar junta. This was the first UNSC resolution on Myanmar in 74 years since it became a UN member in 1948. However, the resolution did have three abstentions, which were from China, India, and Russia. Both China and Russia are somewhat supportive of the military junta, becoming its main supplier of weapons, armoured vehicles, and combat aircraft. China’s UN representative argued that a solution to Myanmar’s crisis depends on efforts by Myanmar itself. Russia believed the situation “did not present a significant threat to international security”, thus not warranting a UNSC resolution. Meanwhile, India called for “quiet, patient, and constructive diplomacy” with the junta; otherwise enduring peace and stability would not be achieved.

None of the 10 ASEAN states presently serve as non-permanent members of the UNSC, thus ASEAN did not officially contribute to the resolution. But Kyaw Moe Tun, permanent representative of Myanmar’s (former) civilian government to the UN, stated that it was “pressure from ASEAN” that made the UN Security Council finally adopt the resolution. UNSC members also consulted ASEAN throughout the resolution drafting process, eventually including demand for the junta to adhere to ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus (5PC). Furthermore, the resolution itself acknowledges ASEAN’s progress so far, encouraging the international community to support ASEAN-led mechanisms and processes.

Because the resolution came from the UNSC, it is legally-binding, and directly strikes at the military junta. After it was announced, Indonesia’s permanent UN representative—alongside Malaysia and Singapore’s foreign ministries—immediately issued statements welcoming the resolution to support ASEAN’s ongoing efforts. While doable in the UN, such a resolution would be near-impossible to replicate through ASEAN mechanisms.

ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making has operated under the principle of non-interference since the organisation’s founding. Any important decision made by the grouping must be subject to unanimous approval from all member states. The decision also needs to stay clear of interfering in any member’s domestic affairs, especially regarding how they run their internal politics. Nevertheless, ASEAN needs to pick up its pace quickly. The more protracted Myanmar’s crisis becomes, the more likely the world’s major powers will intervene. From an outsider’s perspective, ASEAN credibility would be questioned. The group would seem weak and incapable of solving its own issues.

Currently it has entrusted a Special Envoy to Myanmar who is responsible for observing and ensuring the implementation of 5PC by Myanmar’s junta. However, little progress has been made. ASEAN’s envoy is still barred from meeting Aung San Suu Kyi and other groups that are most opposed to the junta, even though their participation in the peace process is envisioned in 5PC. Cessation of violence and safe delivery of humanitarian assistance that the envoy called for are also unlikely to be fully accommodated by the junta in the field.

The crisis will likely steal most—if not all—of the spotlight throughout ASEAN’s 2023 political-security agenda. Thus, ASEAN under Indonesia’s chairmanship should direct its focus to achieve a more realistic goal, which is maintaining regional stability and cohesiveness, rather than meekly attempting to rescue Myanmar’s democracy. Of course, the latter must still be considered as a long-term objective. But considering the current climate, it is unfortunately still unfeasible.

Furthermore, ASEAN should also concretely show that it listens closely to the voices of Myanmar’s ordinary people. Being the ones most directly impacted by the crisis, Myanmar’s civil society has high expectations for ASEAN to resolve it. If ASEAN decides to continue playing it safe with Myanmar’s junta, the people may be disheartened and distrust the grouping. They may perhaps even be pushed to take on a more “extreme” approach to ensure their livelihood and well-being.

So far, Indonesia has clearly shown its disapproval of Myanmar’s junta, especially its refusal to fully comply with ASEAN’s 5PC. As chairman, Indonesia must be able to demonstrate its determination to bring the crisis to an end—and unite all ASEAN members for the cause.

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The Irony of Indonesian Media Disaster Communication

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Photo: OCHA/Anthony Burke

Indonesia occupies the fourth position as the most populous country in the world, with a projected population that will continue to increase every year, according to data from the  Central Statistics  Agency  (BPS). Indonesia’s population in 2021 will reach 272.68 million people, and in 2022 it will reach 275.77 million. This figure increased by 1.13%. Of course, an increasing population requires the government to carry out more effective policies in social processes in Indonesia; according to BPS data for 2021 in the 2021 Susenas Survey, almost 62.10% of Indonesian people can access the internet. The high use of the internet in Indonesia reflects the rate of information and communication that is so fast in Indonesia. In the book Communication Clutter by Wahyuni in 2020,  the openness of information and the fast acceptance of the public towards this information is turning Indonesian society towards a modern information society. Indonesia’s high  number  of internet users is inseparable from the rapid development of both technology and technology. Such as cell phones, laptops, or media devices such as  social media, websites, or other news applications.

In addition to its population and extensive internet usage, Indonesia is also blessed to be in a geographical area that is included in the trajectory Pacific Ring of Fire (Pacific Ring of Fire), in which there are many rows of volcanoes, as a result of which earthquakes, both tectonic and volcanic, frequently occur in Indonesia. So Indonesia was referred to as a country rich in earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions by Prasetya in 2006.

Then looking at Indonesia’s backward state, Indonesia is a country that is prone to natural disasters. On the other hand, Indonesia also has extensive internet access, making information and  communication  channels happen quickly. Of course, disaster mitigation efforts will be carried out more quickly both before the disaster, during the disaster, and after the disaster, but neither the government nor the Indonesian media have been able to provide good disaster communication. This has been proven by several recent disaster events in Indonesia, such as the Cianjur Earthquake and Heavy Rain in Jakarta; neither government agencies nor the media have been able to provide examples true in disaster mitigation efforts, then what is the role of the media in disaster?

Disaster Communication

In the study of global humanitarian action, the role of the media plays an important role in the process of disaster mitigation; the media plays a good role for the international community, the government, and society itself, then here are the three roles of the media in humanitarian action:

1.  The media is a communication channel between the public and policymakers (Authority). Making news must be based on truth and the interests of all without being concerned with  just  one  party,  especially  information  when  in  an important situation or crisis (Scanlon, 2007)

2.  The media acts as an educator before, during, and after a disaster occurs, such as providing disaster warnings, how to deal with disasters, and also as an actor monitoring disaster situations (Rattien. 1990)

3.  The media also plays a role in the process of social control in disaster mitigation efforts. Emergencies are also in the process of post-disaster recovery (Vasterman, 2005)

From the three points above, let us compare it with the state of the Indonesian media regarding a disaster, especially the Cianjur earthquake disaster. The Cianjur earthquake was an earthquake  that  occurred  on  November  21,  2022,  with  an  earthquake  strength  of  5.6 magnitudes and with a total of 600 victims; of course, the number of victims was very large from an earthquake with a magnitude of 5.6 M. It is an irony how disaster mitigation cannot work.

According to the theory developed by Scanlon, the media is a channel of communication between the public and the government that is independent of partiality. The media is often only concerned with the needs of government actors. Some of the news narratives that are used as framing are the arrival of government agencies. Of course very ironic, bearing in mind that the media’s interest is to make it a communication tool between the public and the government, the media has very little contribution in narrating the needs of refugees and the post-disaster community life, which is highlighted only by assistance from actor A and actor B.

The media also acts like an educator, according to Rattien, who provides education before, during, and after a disaster. In reality, only a few Indonesian media provide information about disaster prevention, even from government agency media, launching from the bnpb.go.id page, Indonesia’s official agency for natural disaster management. There needs to be more government effort in educating its people; education usually comes from parties -private parties. Of  course,  this  is  very  ironic,  considering  that  institutions  that  are  supposed  to  provide knowledge and education have very little contribution. Furthermore, in the “During a Disaster” space, the Indonesian media is filled with intrigue and politics. The media is more focused on framing government officials than covering the adequacy of the needs of the victims, after making comparisons betweenbnpb.go.id withmem.gov.cn (Media of China’s ministry of disaster management) andbousai.go.jp (Japanese government media on disaster mitigation) there is a very big difference, the two foreign media are more inclined to provide data on recent disaster events, be it donations, needs and there are also illustrations of disaster mitigation, in contrast to Indonesian media, Indonesian media are inclined to depict politicians very large, this is what makes the Indonesian media very concerned in mitigating a disaster, especially in the matter of education.

Furthermore, finally, the media acts as social control; the lack of education about a disaster results in a lack of public knowledge about the impact of a disaster, Cianjur which is located on the Indo-Australian and Eurasian plates, which results in an uneven ground position. The media is often indifferent to this matter, more concerned with aspects of tourism and politics. With education and an understanding of the situation in Cianjur, of course, the public will understand and understand the existing conditions; relocating housing and filling places will certainly be easily directed if there is such education, but it is a shame the Indonesian media does not show that in the framing or the agenda setting.

Solutions and Hope

Of course, there is great hope that the media can carry out its role as a disaster communication actor.  Media  Indonesia must be more precise in determining the agenda setting and framing during a disaster. Media presence in disaster mitigation is a humanitarian task  devoted to alleviating crises and sorrows that occur, not only for the political interests of just one actor; this is the basis for disaster communication in the Indonesian media, which is still very concerning.

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