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A Solution for an Unsolvable Problem? Recognition of the State of Palestine – by Israel, now!

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The new Swedish government officially recognized on October 30, 2014 the State of Palestine (1) . British Parliament voted two weeks earlier on a resolution in favour of backing the recognition of the Palestinian State (2) . And even the high representative of the European Union for foreign affairs Federica Mogherini spoke during her first official visit to Israel and Palestine in November 2014 in favour of the recognition of the Palestinian State (3).

Already on November 29, 2012 United Nations General Assembly, voting by an overwhelming majority, accorded Palestine “Non-Member-State” observer status in the UN. Did these important acts change anything on the ground? Certainly not. The only recognition which would count would be the one expressed by the State of Israel – in its own interest. Officially the government of Israel is in favour of the so-called two-states-resolution. So, what has been going wrong, why the world is waiting since the Oslo and Washington Peace Accord for the decisive step?

As a matter of fact the Oslo and Washington Peace Accord was too vague for the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the right to exist in recognized and secure borders for Israel, and the creation of an independent Palestinian state on the territories occupied by the Israelis in 1967.  

While the PLO “recognized the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security” and “accepted United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338” , Israel “in response, decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process” (5).

In a retrospective view for the PLO the recognition of Israel was obviously connected with the withdrawal from all occupied territories according to UNSC Res.242 und 338. (4) Careful reading of Chairman Arafat’s letter does not allow another interpretation of, while for Israel the recognition of the PLO did not mean the same, neither the total withdrawal from occupied territories, in particular not from in the meantime annexed areas like East Jerusalem or from the settlements, nor in any way a recognition of a sovereign Palestinian state. To some extent this is also the continuity of different interpretations in the past, in particular of UNSC Resolution 242. While Israel reads from the formulation “Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” (6), that this does not request the withdrawal from “the” territories and therefore not from all occupied areas, the Arab and in particular the Palestinian side has a complete different view, based on the preamble of 242:  “Emphasising the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war…” (7).

So the future failure of the peace process was built in from the very beginning.

In the Israeli view not only the negotiations of the most difficult questions in the relations between Israel and the Palestinians were postponed but the solutions were in no way anticipated, for the Palestinians the solution was already fixed by the implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338 and only the implementation was postponed and subject to further negotiations.

This may explain also some (past) patience of the Palestinian side with delays regarding timetables for Israeli withdrawals from territories, because one day they would have withdrawn from the whole West Bank and Gaza, including East Jerusalem and would have given up the settlements. Taking into account how difficult it was for them to accept even 242 and the principle right of Israel to exist and the opposition to this recognition by radical forces in the own camp, it seems that Arafat for a long time thought that the Israeli also need to overcome a strong opposition on their side to the recognition of a Palestinian state on the whole of the occupied territories, but at the end he expected the compromise, that would combine the Arab and the Israeli reading of 242, namely full withdrawal of Israel behind the borders of 67 (Arab view) and recognition of the State of Israel within these borders (Israeli view). Why would that mean already a compromise in the Arab view? Because first of all they never accepted the creation of the state of Israel by the UN in 48, and secondly, the borders Israel before 67 were only cease fire lines and include also a large area dedicated by the UN in 48 to the Arab state in Palestine.

Indeed there has been strong opposition on both sides against the implementation of the Oslo accord, even to the particular interpretation of the “own” side. Gush Emunim (the religious settlers movement) and the parties of the far right have fought against the abandonment of the occupied territories and even a broad majority of the moderate Israelis has been against compromises on Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and the total abandonment of all settlements (of the latter because of the rejection of the claim that any territory should be “judenrein” (8). Hamas, because of religious arguments, and other radical groups because of their political opposition to Arafat and Al Fatah insisted on the right to establish the own state on the whole territory of Palestine, that includes all of Israel. Despite a series of incidents, including the shooting in the Mosque of Hebron and the assassination of Rabin and continuous attacks in Israel by Hamas and Jihad, Israel and the Palestinian side stuck for a long time to the Oslo process.

It seems that the crucial point was reached in Camp David (9), although this may look paradoxically.  Not only in the Israeli view Barak offered to Arafat a maximum, “more than the majority of Israelis would agree, much more than Arafat could reach in the future”. But it was also a conditional offer – it must be the final solution. Arafat would have had to give up any more claims. No real share of Jerusalem, to accept an archipelago of Israeli settlements, or to say it in a more drastic language, more than 200 stings in the flesh of a Palestinian state, divided by countless Israeli corridors to the settlements. This “offer” was the offence to Arafat, not the visit of Sharon to the Al Aksa, which was of course helpful to mobilize the Palestinian public.

Arafat came to the conclusion that further negotiations are senseless (and that was exactly the message he got from Barak –“You will never get more…”). The consequence was the 2nd Intifada, to which Israel reacted in a way, which strengthened day by day the radical Palestinians. In particular Israelis demands of periods of total non-violence before resuming talks with the Palestinian side made Hamas, Jihad and the Al Aksa Brigades the masters of the game. Being totally opposed to the resumption of talks it was easy for them to achieve their immediate goal. Arafat, afraid of loosing his leadership, at least had to tolerate, and within his own Al Fatah camp may be even to authorize or to facilitate some actions.

Israel reacted not only with a definite refusal of talks with Arafat, but in the end with the well-known military action including the siege and humiliation of Arafat. Although stressing that the IDF does not want to stay in the Autonomous Area and he will find “somebody” to negotiate, it seems obvious that Sharon did not have any exit strategy nor do his successors.

The situation far away from peace culminated once again in more and more sophisticated missile attacks of Gaza based Hamas on Israel and the well-known Israeli retaliation on Gaza in 2014. Both sides did not care about heavy criticism from many sides.   

Indeed, a solution cannot be imposed from outside. The parties of the conflict must find it.  While Fatah has shown in the past flexibility (certainly not always for the better, but still), Hamas does not or cannot because of its fundamentalist ideology. Sharon although not of the calibre of Begin, who made peace with Egypt, and his successors showed at the end some flexibility. It is obvious that Israel as a democracy cannot remain forever or even survive as an occupying force. One the one hand this was recognized by the withdrawal from Gaza, on the other hand the Israeli forces are still in the West Bank and claim to return to Gaza whenever they want. Hamas seems not to be ready to recognize Israel under what conditions ever and not to accept the agreements of PLO with Israel. So for the moment the crisis seems to be unsolvable. Is there any solution?

The solution would have to start at that point, where the Oslo Agreement was too vague and gave space to quite different interpretations.

What Israel needs most desperately, is the right to exist in peace and security within the borders of 1967. Everything else should be subject to future negotiations, although it would be clear that there are some emotional issues like the Western Wall and the Jewish Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem, which go beyond. But it would be an illusion that all open questions could be solved by the peace agreement. For the moment both sides are not able to accept the (necessary) compromise in a long list of sensitive questions as there are e.g. not only Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, but the settlements (and here in particular those in the area of Jerusalem), the return and/or compensation of refugees, the exact borders, future share of resources (water!) etc..

What the Palestinian side needs most desperately is the recognition of an independent, sovereign state with the opportunity to exist in peace and security, but also in dignity. As Israel should be recognized at least within the borders of 1967 that means the recognition of a Palestinian state on the territories of the West Bank and Gaza, occupied by Israel in 1967 (except the Golan Heights) (10). Again, everything else should be subject to future negotiations (between the two states!), including the exact borders. The agreed principle, however, should be, that this Palestinian state will include the vast majority of these territories and sovereign rights in the Arab part of Jerusalem, which will be the capital (not automatically the seat of all authorities). If the Palestinian side can reach this, it would certainly also strengthen Fatah and force Hamas to accept the reality.

Therefore any new agreement should start with:

A mutual recognition of the State of Israel and the Palestinian State, for both with the right to exist in peace, security and dignity; i.e. for Israel within the borders before 1967, for the Palestinian State on the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 (except the Golan Heights) and sovereign rights of this state in (East) Jerusalem, which will be also recognized as its official capital. (11)

Israeli territorial claims beyond and the exact borders of the Palestinian State, with the understanding that it will contain in any way the vast majority of the territories in question, as well as the details of sovereign rights in (the Arab part of) Jerusalem will be subject to negotiations between the two states.

Not depending on these negotiations free access to the believers of all religions concerned to there sanctuaries (list should be established by the parties) will be granted and guaranteed by both states. Real estate property of religious institutions and communities will be respected by both states.

A mutual recognition that due to the history and demography there is no space for “ethnically clean” states; therefore there is in principle the right of Arabs to live with equal rights in the State of Israel as well as the right of Jews to live with equal rights in the Palestinian State. The same applies to all ethnic and religious minorities in both states. The right to return for refugees will be subject to negotiations due to principles to be already agreed.

The State of Israel and the Palestinian State will establish a close co-operation in many fields, in particular in
•    the protection of ethnic and religious minorities (12)
•    the protection of and to access to religious sanctuaries (including cemeteries)
•    the economic area with a view to a free trade area and a customs union
•    the use of natural resources, in particular water
•    border and air space control
•    internal security, in particular prevention of and fight against terrorism
•    general for the implementation of all current and future agreements

The State of Israel and the Palestinian State will negotiate as equal partners in the spirit of good neighbourhood the following subjects:
•    the concrete co-operation in the fields mentioned above
•    the exact borders of both states on the basis of the mutual recognition
•    a time-table for the hand-over of areas within those borders and for the time being still occupied by Israeli armed forces
•    the establishment of joint security check points between Israeli and Palestinian controlled areas
•    the sovereign rights of the Palestinian State in the Arab part of the City of Jerusalem and the status of that as the official capital; from the very beginning Israel will recognize e.g. the “Orient House” as a place where only the Palestinian State will exercise sovereign rights;
•    the use of a corridor between the two parts of the Palestinian State (West Bank and Gaza Strip)
•    military defence and military assistance
•    the future of Israeli settlements with various options
•    the compensation for lost property of Palestinian refugees and the right to return for certain groups of refugees
•    the right of residents of both states to opt for the citizenship of the other state
•    the setting-up of joint bodies or authorities, in particular for common administration of natural resources, air control, border control, combat terrorism
•    creation of a joint parliamentary delegation or assembly
•    common human rights standards, probably based on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (13)
•    joint co-operation with neighbouring countries, in particular in economic matters (14)
•    …..

Such an agreement should be guaranteed by the UN, USA, the EU and Russia and recognized by the Council of Europe, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. (15)

Furthermore it should be accompanied by financial assistance from the USA and the EU and others (e.g. Norway or Switzerland) in the areas of
•    a fund for compensation of lost property of Palestinian refugees
•    a Palestinian Recovery Programme (PRP)
•    establishing common authorities
•    institution building of the Palestinian State

Other organisations (in particular the Council of Europe) could assist in various areas, like review of history textbooks, human rights education, education for democratic citizenship, institution building, training of young leaders, youth exchange, protection of ethnic and religious minorities, multicultural and inter-religious dialogue etc..

The founding father of Israel, Theodor Herzl, told his fellow Jews “If you will it, it is not a dream”. If both sides will peace, it will not be a dream. But they have to will it now!

(1) www.government.se/sb/d/19375/a/249204
(2) 67th UN General Assembly, 44th meeting
(3)  Jerusalem Post, November 10, 2014
(4)  Chairman Arafat’s letter to Prime Minister Rabin from September 9, 1993
(5) Prime Minister Rabin’s letter to Chairman Arafat from September 9, 1993
(6)  UN Security Council Resolution 242(1967) par.1 (i)
(7)  UN Security Council Resolution 242(1967) 2nd paragraph of the preamble
(8)  « cleansed of Jews », Nazi terminology for areas where all Jews have been either deported or murdered.
(9)  2000 Camp David Summit in July 2000, with US President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat
(10)  The Golan Heights have been annexed by Israel and are a question between Israel and Syria, now overshadowed also by the civil war in Syria.
(11)  The late famous mayor of Jerusalem Teddy Kollek had already the vision that the city could be shared as their capital by the two states.
(12)  e.g. Armenians, Bahaï, Bedouins, Druse, Samaritarians, etc.
(13)  A possible European contribution could be to accept both states as observer states or even as associated members to the Council of Europe with a view to open the ECHR to them.
(14)  Several personalities such as former Jordan Crown Prince Hassan, Chairman Arafat and others and institutions such as the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs saw the Benelux as a model for regional cooperation of Israel, Jordan and Palestine.
(15)  Taking into account the large number of Arab citizens of Israel the Arab League could consider a special relation with Israel, e.g. observer status for certain areas

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Middle East

The Saudi Export of Ultra-conservatism in the Era of MbS – an Update

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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There has long been debate about the longevity of the Saudi ruling family. One major reason for doubts about the Al Sauds’ viability was the Faustian bargain they made with the Wahhabis, proponents of a puritan, intolerant, discriminatory, anti-pluralistic interpretation of Islam.

It was a bargain that has produced the single largest dedicated public diplomacy campaign in history. Estimates of Saudi spending on the funding of ultra-conservative Muslim cultural institutions across the globe and the forging of close ties to non-Wahhabi Muslim leaders and intelligence agencies in various Muslim nations that have bought into significant, geopolitical elements of the Wahhabi worldview are ballpark. With no accurate date available, they range from $75 to $100 billion.

It was a campaign that frequently tallied nicely with the kingdom’s deep-seated anti-communism, its hostility to post-1979 Iran, and the West’s Cold War view of Islam as a useful tool against Arab nationalism and the left – a perception that at times was shared by Arab autocrats other than the Saudis.

The campaign was not simply a product of the marriage between the Al Sauds and the Wahhabis. It was long central to Saudi soft power policy and the Al Saud’s survival strategy. One reason, certainly not the only one, that the longevity of the Al Sauds was a matter of debate was the fact that the propagation of Wahhabism was having a backlash at home and in countries across the globe. More than ever before theological or ideological similarities between Wahhabism or for that matter Salafism and jihadism were since 9/11 under the spotlight.

The problem for the Al Sauds was not just that their legitimacy seemed to be wholly dependent on their identification with Wahhabism. It was that the Al Sauds since the launch of the campaign were often only nominally in control of it. They had let a genie out of the bottle that now leads an independent life and that can’t be put back into the bottle.

That is one major reason why some have argued in the past decade that the Al Sauds and the Wahhabis were nearing a crunch point. One that would not necessarily offer solutions but could make things worse by sparking ever more militant splits that would make themselves felt across the Muslim world and in minority Muslim communities elsewhere in multiple ways including increasing sectarian and intolerant attitudes in countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

The rise of Mohammed bin Salman clearly challenges these assumptions. For one, it raises the question to what degree the rule of the Al Sauds remains dependent on religious legitimization as Mohammed moves de facto from consensual family to one-man rule in which he anchors his legitimacy in his role as a reformer.

It also begs the question of what would ideologically replace ultra-conservative Sunni Muslim Islam as Saudi Arabia’s answer to perceived Iranian revolutionary zeal. The jury on all of this is out. They key lies in the degree to which Mohammed is successful in implementing social and economic reform, his yet to be clarified definition of what he envisions as moderate Islam, and what resistance to his religious redefinition and social reforms will emerge among members of the religious establishment and segments of the population.

Mohammed has so far dropped tantalizing clues, but neither said nor done anything that could be considered conclusive. In fact, what he has not done or said may be more telling, even if it would be premature to draw from that conclusions of the potential limits of change that he envisions. On the plus side, he introduced social reforms that enhance women’s opportunities and relaxed restrictions on cultural expression.

At the same time, he has whipped the religious establishment into subservience and positioned them, including key vehicles like the World Muslim League that the government used to fund and propagate ultra-conservatism, as forces against extremism and militancy and in favour of religious tolerance and dialogue. In February, Saudi Arabia agreed to surrender control of the Great Mosque in Brussels after its efforts to install a more moderate administration failed to counter mounting Belgian criticism of alleged intolerance and supremacism propagated by mosque executives.

Saudi officials have spoken of a possible halt to the funding internationally of religious institutions although an apparent agreement to pump $1 billion into the building of hundreds of mosques and religious centres in Bangladesh would suggest otherwise. The failure in Brussels and the fact that there is little reason to believe that the religious establishment has experienced a true change of heart or that Saudi Arabia has satisfactorily completed a revision of its text and religious books suggests that the kingdom is ill-prepared to propagate a truly moderate form of Islam in Bangladesh or anywhere else.

In some ways, the question is whether this matters as much outside the kingdom as it does domestically. The parameters have changed with Mohammed’s grip on power but the fact that the religious establishment was willing to ultimately compromise on its theological principles to accommodate the political and geopolitical needs of the Al Sauds has been a long-standing fixture of Saudi policy making.

For the Wahhabi and Salafi ulema, the public diplomacy campaign was about proselytization, the spreading of their specific interpretation of the faith. For the government, it was about soft power. At times the interests of the government and the ulema coincided, and at times they diverged.

Yet, more often than not the requirements of the government and the family took precedence. While contacts between Wahhabi and Deobandi scholars from the Indian sub-continent go back to the 1930s, if not earlier, Saudi scholars were willing to put their differences aside as Deobandis emerged as a powerful force among the anti-Soviet mujahedeen in the 1980s and subsequent anti-Shiite strife in Pakistan.

The problem in mapping the financial flows of the campaign is that the sources were multiple and the lines between the funding streams often blurred. No doubt, the government was the major funding source but even than the picture is messy. For one, who constitutes the government? Were senior princes who occupied powerful government positions officials or private persons when they donated from their personal accounts in a country in which it was long difficult to distinguish between the budget of the government and of the family?

On top of that, the government had multiple funding streams that included the foreign ministry using its network of diplomatic missions abroad, the multiple well-endowed governmental non-governmental organizations such as the Muslim World League that often were run with little if any oversight by groups like the Muslim Brotherhood with their own agenda, institutions in the kingdom like the Islamic University of Medina and its counterparts in Pakistan and Malaysia, as well as funds distributed by Islamic scholars and wealthy individuals.

Adding to the complexity was the fact that there was no overview of what private donors were doing and who was a private donor and who wasn’t. This pertains not only to the blurred lines between the government and the ruling family but also to Saudis of specific ethnic heritage, for example Pakistanis or Baloch, as well as Saudi intelligence. At times members of ethnic communities potentially served as government proxies for relationships with militant anti-Shiite groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Taiba and their successors and offshoots in Pakistan.

Further complicating a financial assessment is the lack of transparency on the receiver’s end. In some cases, like Malaysia the flow of funds was controlled by authorities and/or a political party in government. In others like Indonesia, money often came in suitcases. Customs officials at airports were instructed to take their cut and allow the money in with no registration.

In other words, while the Saudis donated they seldom prior to 9/11 and the 2003/2004 Al Qaeda attacks in the kingdom exercised control over what was done with the funds. The National Commercial Bank when it was Saudi Arabia’s largest financial institution had a department of numbered accounts. These were largely accounts belonging to members of the ruling family. Only three people had access to those accounts, one of them was the majority owner of the bank, Khaled Bin Mahfouz. Khaled would get a phone call from a senior member of the family who would instruct him to transfer money to a specific country, leaving it up to Khaled where precisely that money would go.

In one instance, Khaled was instructed by Prince Sultan, the then defense minister, to wire $5 million to Bosnia. Sultan did not indicate the beneficiary. Khaled sent the money to a charity in Sarajevo that in the wake of 9/11 was raided by US law enforcement and Bosnian security agents. The hard disks of the foundation revealed the degree to which the institution was controlled by jihadists.

At one point, the Saudis suspected one of the foundation’s operatives of being a member of Egypt’s Islamic Jihad. They sent someone to Sarajevo to investigate. The investigator confronted the man saying: ‘We hear that you have these connections and if that is true we need to part ways.’ The man put his hand on his heart and denied the allegation. As far as the Saudis were concerned the issue was settled until the man later in court testimony described how easy it had been to fool the Saudis.

The measure of success of the Saudi campaign is not exclusively the degree to which it was able to embed religious ultra-conservatism in communities across the globe. From the perspective of the government and the family, far more important was ultra-conservatism’s geopolitical component, its anti-Shiite and resulting anti-Iranian attitude.

The man who was until a couple of years ago deputy head of Indonesian intelligence and deputy head of Nahdlatul Ulema, one of the world’s largest Islamic movements that professes to be anti-Wahhabi, symbolizes the campaign’s success in those terms. He is a fluent Arabic speaker. He spent 12 years in the Middle East representing Indonesian intelligence, eight of those in Saudi Arabia. He professes in the same breath his dislike of the Wahhabis and at the same time warns that Shiites, who constitute 1.2 percent of the Indonesian population and that includes the estimated 2 million Sunni converts over the last 40 years, are one of the foremost domestic threats to Indonesian national security. This man is not instinctively anti-Shiite but sees Shiites as an Iranian fifth wheel.

The result of all of this is that four decades of funding has created an ultra-conservative world that lives its own life, in many ways is independent of Saudi Arabia, and parts of which have turned on its original benefactor. A study of Pakistani madrassas published earlier this year concluded that foreign funding accounted for only seven percent of the finances of the country’s thousands of religious seminaries.

The fact that ultra-conservatives are no longer wholly dependent on Saudi funding is a testimony to the campaign’s success. This realization comes at a crucial moment. Post 9/11 and even more so in the wake of Al Qaeda attacks on targets in Saudi Arabia in 2003/2004, Saudi Arabia has introduced strict controls on charitable donations to ensure that funds do not flow to jihadist groups.

There is moreover no doubt that Saudi funding in the era of Mohammed bin Salman is unlikely to revert to what it once was. The Saudi-funded Bangladeshi plan to build moderate mosques, the relinquishing of control of the Grand Mosque in Brussels, and the World Muslim League’s newly found propagation of tolerance and inter-faith dialogue as well as its effort to reach out to Jewish communities would suggest that Saudi money may be invested in attempting to curb the impact of the kingdom’s decades-long funding of ultra-conservatism.

Yet, there are also indications that Mohammed bin Salman is not averse to funding militants when it suits his geopolitical purpose. The US Treasury last year designated Maulana Ali Muhammad Abu Turab as a specially designated terrorist on the very day that he was in the kingdom to raise funds. Abu Turab is a prominent Pakistani Islamic scholar of Afghan descent who serves on a government-appointed religious board, maintains close ties to Saudi Arabia, runs a string of madrassas attended by thousands of students along Balochistan’s border with Iran and Afghanistan and is a major fund raiser for militant groups.

Abu Turab’s visit to the kingdom came at a time that Saudi and UAE nationals of Baloch heritage were funnelling large amounts to militant anti-Shiite and anti-Iranian Islamic scholars in Balochistan. It is unclear whether the funds were being donated with Mohammed bin Salman’s tacit blessing.

What is clear, however, is that the funding and Abu Turab’s visit coincided with the drafting of plans to destabilize Iran by exploiting grievances and stirring unrest among Iran’s ethnic minorities, including the Baloch. Those plans have not left the drawing board and may never do so. The funding nevertheless raises the question how clean a break with support of ultra-conservatism Mohammed bin Salman is contemplating.

Edited remarks at The Middle East and the Geopolitics of Religious Soft Power, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University and the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC 18-19 April 2018

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Where will the proxy war in the Middle East last?

Sajad Abedi

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A direct US strike on one of the Syrian Army bases is a new development in the terrorist war that began six years ago against Syria. The attack, which took place after accusing the Syrian government of using chemical weapons in the region of Khan Sheikhon in the Syrian Arab Republic, raised several questions, among which are the most prominent:

What are the realities and purposes of using chemical weapons in the current situation? Why did the Western countries accuse the Syrian government of using chemical weapons without any documents and opposed the Russian request to form a neutral truth-clarifying committee to clarify the facts? Why the US government headed by Donald Trump did does not pay attention to Russia’s request for unilateral action to ignore international law and interference in other domestic affairs? What does it mean to handle this attack? What are the likely outcomes and consequences of this attack?

1- Syria after the use of chemical weapons in arid groups in the East Hemisphere region in 2013 and tensions in the area after the threat of a massive attack on Syria by former US President Barack Obama by mediating Russia he agreed to destroy his chemical weapons in order to prevent any excuse and accusations from the United States and Western countries. As a result, the United Nations Monitoring Committee (UNSC) announced that it was carrying out its mission in full cooperation with the Syrian government, under the supervision of the United Nations, the Syrian Chemical Weapons Depot.

The purpose of the Syrian disarmament was to prevent Syria from attacking bases of armed groups in the eastern submersion. The goal was also to create space for Syria, and to intervene in the United States to shift the balance of power in favor of armed groups. The Zionist regime, the Zionist lobby in the United States, the warlords and anti-Syrian states, were pushing for such an approach to force Obama to engage in a frantic war in Syria.

Now under the conditions of the Jabhat al-Nusra in Khan Sheikhon region, a chemical strike has taken place that the Syrian army has managed to defeat the attacking armed groups in the suburbs of Hamma and remove the areas under the control of this group. The army also plans to continue fighting in other areas of armed groups and to launch attacks on Jabhat al-Nusra bases in the province of Idlib. With the support of the allied army on all fronts and the achievements of many, as well as the removal by the White House, the Department of State and the United States Mission to the United Nations, that the US government’s priority is the defeat of ISIS, Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian people should determine the fate of Assad. These issues have led to the outrage of the terrorist armed groups and their supporting countries and the American warlords. Hence, they have taken measures to use chemical weapons in Khan Sheikhon and have accused the Syrian army of using this type of weapon to achieve the following objectives.

They are struggling against the Syrian government by accusing the Syrian government of using chemical weapons that were sacrificed by a number of citizens. They demanded that they undermine the status of the Syrian government in international circles and any negotiation.

They are also pushing for the Syrian government to squeeze on the military front to force the army to attack terrorists at various fronts to prevent the terrorists from defeating and collapsing. The goal is to give the terrorists fresh breath and to rebuild their queues once again.

The warlords have called on Trump’s positions to change their position on Assad and the fight against terrorism to attack Syrian military bases, especially military airports. This is a topic that the Washington Research Center has been reporting on. French Foreign Minister Marc Ayro said the chemical test was a testament to the new US administration after its position on Assad’s fate.

2- Accordingly, Western countries quickly accused Assad of using chemical weapons and opposed Russia’s request for a neutral truth-clarification committee to determine the facts. They tried to achieve the stated goals and mislead public opinion and cover the realities and exonerate the Nusra Front. They also demanded that chemical weapons remain in the hands of the terrorist groups if they continue to use it and continue their erosion wars in Syria.

3- The US government’s move to launch a missile attack on the Syrian airspace appears to be in contrast to the Tramp position. He has surrendered to warlords. He wants to align with the warlords, in order to reduce the opposition that the supporters of the supporters of the terrorist groups inside Syria have taken to take action. He also wants to show off with Obama, who hesitated to attack Syria in 2013.

But the US invasion showed that Washington is attacking the government, the Syrian people and the Syrian army with the help of the terrorists, and that the terrorists are instrumental in serving US plans to occupy Syria. America is the largest terrorist country in the world and a terrorist organization. It does not fail to ignore international law and the sovereignty of other countries, and always plays the role of police in the implementation of forest law. It has a right to charge, convict and enforce justice.

4.Consequences of probability

Indeed, the US invasion of Syria has shown that America is directly involved in the terrorist war against Syria. The move came after the West realized that the terrorists were on the brink of destruction, and that the victory of the Syrian national government and the axis of resistance were decisive. The role of the United States will prove this to the people of Syria, the Arab countries and the world’s public opinion that what is happening in Syria is the plan of America, the West, Zionism and the reactionary Arab state aimed at destroying Syria and destroying its national system.  This has led the Syrian people to support more than their leader, and his legitimacy and his unique role in confronting colonial forces, terrorism and Western-affiliated institutions are strengthened.

The US attack on Syria has led Russia to end its air coordination with the United States in the Syrian heavens. This is a practical measure against the ignorance of international law by the United States and its neglect of Russia’s position. Russia emphasized that the Syrian army did not carry out a chemical attack, and the army had no chemical weapons, and these were terrorist groups that possessed chemical weapons. Hence, it is better not to accuse the Syrian government of any reason and evidence. There is no doubt that Russia’s reaction to the developments in Syria will be great. This does not allow US fighters to cover the Russian missile defense coverage. In addition, it is likely that Moscow will provide advanced weapons to the Syrian army to defend against any attack on missiles and fighter jets. It is not possible for Russia to neglect this attack that ignores Russian red lines in the Syrian territories. This is particularly the case when US attacks on Syria and its attempt to rid the terrorists of failure to Russia’s strategic goals of sending its troops to Syria.

US action on the Syrian army’s attack will not only lead to a conflict with the Syrian army and its allies. But there is also the possibility of a conflict with Russia. This is the issue Moscow and Washington are trying to avoid. Because of this will lead to a world-wide destruction of devastation.

Hence, it is likely that the US invasion would be to reduce domestic opposition that Tramp has faced since coming to power in the United States. He has called for this attack to strengthen his position against his enemies without rejecting his opposition to a new and more costly war than the Iraq war.

Trump has said he wants to get the US economy out of recession and solve the US unemployment crisis, and to repair US infrastructure that needs a trillion dollars.

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Forcing Peace: New vs. Old Pathways in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

James J. Rooney, Jr.

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Someone once said that, “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results is the mark of insanity.” I would posit that U.S. policy in the Middle East, specifically that relating to the Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement falls squarely into that category. For the last forty plus years, try as it may, the policy of the U.S. has failed, and failed miserably, to produce the desired results. The policy of the U.S. towards this issue must change radically if positive results are expected in the near-term.

Anyone contemplating creating an alternative policy that might change the performance dynamic of the principle parties borders on hubris. The literature on this subject is literally overwhelming. It is difficult to conceive that new ideas and alternative thinking on the subject is even possible; after all, the experts have spoken. But in the growing shadow of failure, something different must be tried. Peace between Israel and Palestine is possible. There are two potential paths forward: one with its roots in the past; and the other with its trajectory dependent on a radical new policy that will act as a non-voluntary force function on both sides.

Path 1:President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demonstrate that they are the right men at the right time in history and can successfully negotiate a lasting peace agreement between Palestine and Israel. History is not in their favor. Both leaders in the past have exhibited heightened levels of nationalism which could cognitively bias their ability to put aside political differences and focus on legitimate compromise that could benefit both sides and create a lasting peace. Of the two, Abbas actually seems the more pliable.

Path 2:The implementation of a U.S.-sponsored, United Nations-implemented policy that essentially removes the Palestinians and the Israelis from the decision-making process. Such a policy has never been successfully attempted on the international level and will require significant support from the U.N. Security Council and the general membership. Given the current state of affairs in the Middle East and the contempt that much of the Arab community feels towards Israel, this might not be as tough a sell as it sounds. After fifty years of intransigence, the world is ready to see this problem solved and therefore might be willing to consider strategies never before considered.

Israel, in an attempt to stay solvent and secure, has been seriously brokering deals with its neighbors since at least 1967 following its success on the battlefield against a formidable Arab alliance that included Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Some of these deals were successful, including the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty signed at Camp David in 1978 and the Israeli- Jordanian peace Treaty signed in the Arava valley of Israel in 1994.Unfortunately, dozens of other deals simply fell into the dustbin of history. Interestingly enough, the successful ones were a byproduct of the interaction between powerful and aggressive leaders on both sides that had the right combination of leadership attributes and communication skills to pull it off, namely Sadat and Begin (1978) and Rabin and King Hussein (1994). Personal chemistry between the parties didn’t hurt and often helped to get through the rough spots; minimal trust between individuals was essential to create a joint vision of a peaceful future that both sides could live with. They might not love each other, but at least they were able to see the advantage of respecting each other for a greater objective.

Key issues on the table:

Though there is a plethora of reasons for these two Semitic cultures to hate each other, there are just as many reasons why a negotiated settlement would benefit both sides. Figure 2 lists just some of the more important issues that need to get hammered out before any settlement agreement is possible. Many of these issues have been on the negotiating table before with little progress. There are two “hot button” issues in particular that can and usually have blown out any possible deal: namely, the status of Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Any final settlement will have to solve this particular conflictual Rubik’s cube.

Over the years, the negotiating teams from both sides were stacked with “big guns” like Begin, Rabin, Peres, and Barak from Israel and Arafat and Abbas from Palestine. Certain personality combinations seemed to work better than others and it was often the case that failure to close the deal was caused by external forces as when Rabin was assassinated in ’95.  His death stopped the forward progress. The ’96 election of the ultra-right-wing Netanyahu ultimately lobotomized that potential deal. Discussions between the two sides dried up for at least the next four years. But once again, in the case of Rabin, we can observe the impact that a strong leader, willing to take on the established and entrenched policies of their own government bureaucracy, can have on the dynamics of supposedly entrenched conflict.

Critique of current policy options:

Since the days of the Carter Administration, the policy of the United States towards the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been one of engagement from a safe distance. The policy constructs of every President from Carter to Obama has had a central tendency to allow, if not to outright push, the two parties to seek a mutually beneficial solution, i.e. “work this out on your own and we’ll be there to help out with the paperwork and take the credit.” When attacks by terrorists in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv happened, as they often did, or additional Israeli settlements were built on the West Bank, as they often were, the U.S. would cajole the offending side to alter its behavior and return to the negotiating table. U.S. dollars were often spread around the table as enticement.

On May 19, 2011 Obama gave a Middle East policy speech in which he described a “new approach” to the age-old issues plaguing the region. This new policy trajectory would focus on “promoting democratic reform, economic development, and peace and security across the region” (Cordesman, 2011, 3). This policy lacks specificity, a method for execution, and a fundamental understanding of the key issues. It also ignores the history of the conflict and the complex nature of relations in the region. This is a pie-in-the-sky policy statement with no teeth: very much the same old platitudes that have defined U.S. policy for the last fifty years toward the conflict.

Trump has seemingly broken with the policies of the last five administrations. He does not embrace the two-state solution, but he does have his favorite team. “Since taking office, US President Donald Trump has shown unfailing support for Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians, distancing himself from the two-state solution and recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital” (AFP, 2018, 3). Mahmoud Abbas wasted little time in responding and “accused the United States of ‘deplorable and unacceptable measures’ that ‘deliberately undermined all peace efforts” (AFP, 2018, 5). As of this writing, Trump’s regional policies, like his credibility, is crumbling fast throughout the Middle East. “Trump’s apparent intention to abandon the two-state framework, explicitly or implicitly by failing to exert pressure on both parties to accept it, will greatly increase the probability of conflict among Israel, Iran, and the US” (Buonomo, 2017, 2). A byproduct of these actions could involve a serious uptick in the levels of violence directed at both the U.S. and Israel. Thus, Trump’s attempt at new and innovative policies are not helping the situation and may be exacerbating the regional raw feelings that have always been there. With a politically wounded Donald Trump and U.S. involvement possibly marginalized in the process, it becomes even more paramount to understand the nature, character, and psychology of the two key figures at the center of the storm, Mahmoud Abbas and Benjamin Netanyahu.

A Leadership Profile Model was constructed using qualitative information provided in open sources. Based on the narratives and appraisals offered in the literature, qualitative judgments were made on a scale of 1 to 5 concerning Abbas’ and Netanyahu’s leadership profile. Such a model provides a very high-level view into the characteristics and abilities of both leaders to successfully meet and carry through on a negotiated settlement. From this high-level view, a limited perspective can be formulated.

The most striking differences between Netanyahu and Abbas is in the psychological profile. Netanyahu is clearly more egocentric, does not work that well with others, is somewhat Machiavellian in his approach to politics, is not very transparent, does not easily trust others, can be very aggressive when pursuing a goal, and, in fact, uses others to achieve his goals and then takes the credit for it.At first glance, when comparing the two leaders, this is not a marriage made in heaven. Further psychological studies are required in order to truly assess whether these two men can overcome their obvious differences and work together for the common good.

New policy resolutions or proposals for consideration:

If the overall results of the psychological study above is supremely negative, then the aforementioned extraordinary policy must be executed by the United Nations and supported materially, financially, and operationally by the United States. Such a policy must, by definition, include the fifteen points outlined in Figure 4below. This policy is designed to be equitable: neither side is going to get exactly what it wants, but both sides are going to get exactly what each needs to be sovereign, safe, and free.

It is recognized up front that this policy is extraordinarily harsh and gives the two parties very little wiggle room. But these same parties have had almost fifty years to work out their differences and have essentially achieved nothing in all that time. Some countries are using the dispute for their own leverage and own strategic agendas. This temptation must be permanently removed. Continuing to trust Israel and Palestine to get this done on their own is problematic unless Netanyahu and Abbas can figure a way out of this morass and passed their own negative psychological leadership proclivities. Sticking to old pathways will not achieve this. The need for radical new pathways must be recognized.

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