Of all the states of the Maghreb and Mashreq of the Middle East and North Africa that have experienced the phenomenon of the “Arab Spring” resulting, in some of them, with removing the gerontocratic dictatorships, Libya is a country that has known one of the most striking forms of post-revolutionary development: from the internationally supported banishment of the dictator Muammar al-Gaddhafi in 2011, to a democracy sabotaged from its very first stage of germination, by identity conflicts and tribal and caste contradictions. In the period which followed, up to the present stage where, from the first half of 2014, the former Jamahiriya presents itself to the observer as a state of armed militias, of ambitions for power, of anarchy and rapid slippage towards social dissolution and, apparently, by towards misidentification and national fragmentation.
The fratricidal struggles between the Libyans are not recent, they arose when the TV in print media presented the bloodied and death disfigured face of the one who was the “the great leader of the revolution of September 1, an image in which all Libyans saw a sign of victory, but which each understood ac- cording to ambitions, interests, adventurism and aspirations of power and influence groups, families, tribes and clans of the most diverse, in a society whose demography is perhaps more acutely than in the case of the other Arab states, marked by a complicated ethnic and centrifugal plurimorfism which, in addition to Arabs, is composed of other ethnicities: Imazighen (Berbers), Greeks, Maltese, Italians, Pakistanis, Turks, Indians. In the well-known tradition of faith in predestination and shifting responsibility for what is going on to anyone else but themselves, the Libyans do not cease to accuse the West, unanimously and regardless of the divisions that separate them, for the state in which Libya is today, nearly four years after the removal and trial less murder of Colonel Gaddhafi, in an advanced state of dissolution.
There is no doubt that the Western community and the influential Arab powers have their share of responsibility the “Libyan spring” – which was and certainly will still be examined in the minutest details – but it is equally doubtless that the Libyans themselves have their own and overwhelming responsibility at least to have too easily forgotten their national identity, the values for which they fought with gun in hand and the free future they are entitled to, and this social, mercantile, customary, territorial ideological and confessional frag- mentation is most clearly expressed in the realities of the multitude of “patriots” and “nationalists” who, on behalf of outdated vocal slogans, defend their own fortifications of concepts and interests. This study aims to present, to the extent allowed by the printing space, a picture of Libya today, viewed from several perspectives – political, security and military – to facilitate a deeper understanding of contemporary Libya and the chaos in which it is struggling.
A land of independent ”revolutionaries” Today, the “private” armed militias are making the law in Libya. Their emergence, which coincided with the overthrow in August 2011, of the Gaddhafi regime, has at least two causal reasons: massive and brutal use of the former regime from, the early moments of social unrest, of military repression against the demonstrators, which determined their reaction to retaliate by using weapons, and secondly, limiting the actions taken by NATO regarding the air bombardment of the positions held by the military or by supporters of the former dictator, in parallel with the arming and the financial and logistical support of the protesters, in order to tilt the balance of forces in their favor. Well armed, both the revolutionaries and the military, the police and security forces defeated with the help of the Western military intervention, were organized in militia divided into two hostile camps, so that, in the next three years, amid the chronic political in- stability and the inability of the installed authorities (by the Western coalition leading the “democratic” Libya) to dissolve the extra-institutional and military formations and end the “militia phenomenon”, they grew numerically and from the point of view of the manpower, becoming, in their whole, a political, military and security force even stronger and more active than the governments that have succeeded and even than the national army.
According to former Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, if in the first days after the fall of Gaddhafi, the number of the “armed” rebels was around 30,000 people, today we speak of the active existence of more than 200,000 “militia” members of various colorations and ideological affiliations. Moreover, with time, the extra-governmental armed formations mosaic managed to impose itself and to substitute the very military institution in the execution of the state security and defense missions normally assigned to the army and police, such as the security and pro- tection of the major importance objectives (port facilities, oil fields, ports, airports, borders etc.).
We are currently experiencing the dramatic situation in which the government itself uses the services of the militia in this sense, as the same procedure is applied to the political parties or alliances engaged in the power struggle or in the liquidation of their political opponents. It is understood that, for their services, the militias require proper rewards which refer not only that the “beneficiaries” satisfy their pragmatic and group claims (of economic-financial nature), but also issues related to the sphere of politics or the interest of national and social unity, as in the case of the request for the establishment of the independent administrative region Brega – the most important reservoir of oil resources of the country – or the monopolization of oil exports out of the control of any governmental control the requests being supported even by forceful action – the taking over of government and legislative offices, including the parliament building (which was forced, at gunpoint, to adopt the famous law of “political isolation (lustration) of the uncomfortable politicians”, especially those with a Ghaddafist past. In the same category is included the use of the militias, by the political factors, either to repress peaceful demonstrations calling for reforms and improving the living standards, or for attacking foreign commercial consular or diplomatic representative offices, resulting in hostage taking and even fatalities.
With the appearance of the retired General Khalifa Haftar on the political-military scene, leader of the inter-militia alliance self-entitled “Karamat Libya” (Dignity of Libya), fierce conflicts and political disputes appeared both within the government coalition and in the parliament, em- bodied, inter alia, by recourse to the support of the “private militias” to resolve political disputes and to organize, in early August, new anticipated elections, which resulted in the establishment of a new parliament and of a new executive disputed by the opponents, so that Libya offers the novelty of a country that has two simultaneous governments and two parliaments which repel each other, not hesitating to support their positions by appealing to strong arguments of the “party and clan militias”.
The morphology of the military scene the current picture of the Libyan military spectrum dominated by militias is divided be- tween two large groups of armed formations, whose membership we will present in the following lines: It is the alliance that acts as the “Libya Dawn” (Fajr Libya) and its self-entitled adversary “Libya’s Dignity” (Karamat Libya) led by (ret.) General Khalifa Haftar.
I. The alliance “Libya Dawn” (Fajr Libya) is organized as the oldest structure, consisting of formations encountered in the context of the revolution and the most heterogeneous in what regards the ideological orientations and programmatic objectives. The “alliance” is com- posed of the following main militant currents: 1) The “Shield of Libya” militias (Dar’u Libya) consisting of three regional divisions (central, eastern and western). Having its operational pivot in the Missurata region and city it is, in its great majority, composed of militant-Islamist elements whose ideology and doctrine are inspired and close to those of the “Muslim Brotherhood” movement. 2) “The Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Center”, an Islamist armed militia which acts mainly in the eastern areas of the national territory, fulfilling police specific missions. The formation was constituted in mid-August 2013, in Tripoli, through the merger of several “revolutionary” armed groups.
3) “The Revolutionary Phalanx of Tripoli ” (Katibat Thwwar Tarablus), a rebel formation of Islamist ideological doctrine affiliation, close to Abdel Hakim Belhajj, former leader of the Libyan Is- lamic opposition party “Al-Gama Al- Libiya Al-Muqatila” (the Libyan combat group). “The Phalanx” was founded by a former member of this group, Al-Mahdi Al-Harati (also founder of a Jihadist faction fighting in Syria) and who became after the Revolution … mayor of the capital Tripoli. 4) “The Shoura Council of the Revolutionaries of Benghazi”, appeared on June 20, 2014 as a partnership between several tiny Salafist-Jihadist groups, with the objective of fighting against forces led by (ret.) General Khalifa Haftar and the so-called “Al-Saika Battalion”, made up of former soldiers and officers of the Libyan army. 5) “February 17 Brigade”, considered to be the largest and best equipped formation, created as an “armed arm” of the Libyan “Muslim Brotherhood” movement. It works in the port city of Benghazi in the east. 6) “Al-Sahat Ra’fatallah Detachments” that is also present in the perimeter of Benghazi. Although it has announced its willingness to be integrated into the national army, the group has kept two training camps and its entire armament. It was the first militia which engaged fights with General Haftar’s troops in May this year.
7) The “Group of the Shari’a Partisans” militias (Gama’at Ansar Al-Shari’a). The main and most active Jihadist-Salafist party in Libya constituted, in addition to local Libyans, of thousands of foreign fighters coming, especially from Algeria, Tunisia and the sub-Saharan Sa- hel African countries. The group is on the list of terrorist organizations drawn up by the US Sta- te Department. 8) The group “The First Shield of Libya”, of Jihadist orientation, was established and operates in the city of Tripoli. More recently it has merged with the group “Gama’at Ansar Al- Shari’a”, alongside which it is engaged in confrontations with the armed formations led by General Khalifa Haftar.
II. The Alliance “Libya’s Dignity” (Karamat Libya) is, in turn, a combination of armed military formations constituted by former Libyan soldiers and national army officers which is present in several conflict regions of the country. Accused by the alliance groups “Libya Dawn” of having “anti-revolutionary” objectives and character, the alliance is created and commanded by (r) Lieutenant General Khalifa Haftar and is composed by the following main entities: 1) “Libyan National Army” Forces, which include about a third of the soldiers and officers of the Libyan military. It is under the direct command of General Khaif Haftar. 2) “Al-Sai’ka” Forces (Thunderbolt), coming from the elite units of the national army and ordered by Colonel Younes Abu Hamadeh. 3) “Al-Sawaiq” Brigade (Lightning), belonging to the family of Al-Zintan – the largest as- sociation of Libyan tribes – well equipped and trained, and similar, in what regards the specific tasks and structure, with the Western private security firms. It is commanded by General- Colonel Mustafa Trabulsi, who is in close relations with the monarchy of the United Arab Emir- ates, from which he receives substantial financial and logistical aid. 4) “Qa’qaa” Brigade (translatable, approximately, by “thunder”, “noise” or “weapon noise”), established in 2011 as an armed militia of revolutionaries who fought against the armed forces loyal to Colonel Gaddhafi. It is commanded by Osman Mleiqta
5) “Warshafana” Battalion, a militia calling itself after the name of the tribal clan Warshfana from the ranks of which come most combatants. 6) “Libyan Tribes Council” Battalion, composed of Warshafana clan warriors and several close and ally tribes, in kinship with it. 7) “Tibou” tribal union forces, in the extreme south of the Libyan territory.
The polarization of the political scene In July 2012, were held the first free general election that Libya has experienced in the last half century and which provided a first look at the guidelines and beliefs of the Libyan electorate under the new conditions after the overthrow of Colonel Muammar Al-Ghaddafi and his “Jamahiriyan” regime. At that time, 80 of the 200 members of the new parliament in Tripoli – People’s General Congress – were elected on party lists, while the rest, the majority of 120 MPs awarded a nominal victory on the vote. Unlike other countries that have experienced the phenomenon of the “Arab Spring”, the poll revealed the landscape of the predominant orientation of the citizens towards the political liberal mainstream led by Mahmud Jibril who, with a total of 39 seats in parliament, was invested as the first head of post-revolutionary Libyan government.
At the other extreme, another party which entered the election race, the National Front, member of the political coalition self-named National Rescue Front, succeeded to win only three parliamentary seats. Instead, the Justice and Edification Party, derived from the Muslim Brotherhood movement received 17 seats, while two other Islamist parties – Nation’s Party, a center party led by Sami Saadi and the Center National Party, led by Ali Tarhouni, each obtained only two seats in the parliament. However, the Libyan political life was to focus, quickly, in a different direction than the one crystallized in the first democratic election ballot, that of a strong centrifugal and multipolar movement, generated, in particular, by party, tribal and personal interests of the Libyan political class, so that, at the moment, the Libyan political map has the following plurimorphous configu- ration: 1. National Forces Alliance formed in the wake of the removal from power of the Gaddafi regime and consisting of a mosaic of the first forces and political trends that Libya knew after decades of dictatorship.
The alliance includes a small number of 41 political parties, hun- dred of independent members and civil society organizations and it is headed by Mahmoud Ji- bril, a former member of the Transitional National Council, formed after the regime change in the country. Proclaiming democracy, national identity and human rights as guiding principles of its program, the Alliance is ideologically characterized as liberal and secular, even though its leader, Mahmoud Jibril, said in July 2012, that the Shari’a Islamic law is the main principle of the Alliance’s actions which, besides the already mentioned guidelines, stands for accepting and encouraging the so-called “mid-moderate Islam”. At the legislative elections of July 2012, the Alliance won 39 seats out of the 200 seats of the Libyan parliamentary forum.
2. “National Front” Party (Al-Djabha Al-Wataniya) set up in Tripoli, on the remains of the former National Rescue Front (created as a clandestine opposition movement in 1981, au- thor of a failed attempt to overthrow the regime Muammar Al-Ghaddafi by force, in 1984). Be- tween 1987 and 1990, the Salvation Front continued to organize military structures, using for this purpose the territory of the neighboring African country Chad, where they were set up as the “Libyan Patriotic Army”, which was subsequently to be actively involved in armed anti- Gaddhafi confrontations until his removal from power. The National Front, formed after this moment, in 2011, enrolled in its political platform approx. 16 principles and action objectives, including the adherence to the values of democracy, civilian and human freedoms, ensuring the establishment of political plural- ism as an expression of the freedom of opinion, etc. At present, the party is led by Mohammed Mugrif, who was, between 2012 and 2013, the president of the new Libyan parliament (the General National Congress).
3. The “Muslim Brotherhood” Movement in Libya, which appeared in 1949, but, unlike the Egyptian and Tunisian branches of the “Muslim Brotherhood”, has failed to achieve a significant dissemination in its ideology among the masses, trade unions, and civic organizations, due, mainly, to the draconian repressive measures applied by the Ghaddafi regime. Only on March 3, 2012, did the Movement announce the establishment of a political party of its own, under the name of the “Justice and Edification Party” led by Mohammed Sawwan. Freedoms and human rights, participation of all citizens, without discrimination, to the edification of the society, decentralization and economic liberalization, balanced development of all provinces and regions of the country, reducing unemployment, increasing chances at a job and a life of dignity for all citizens, achieving social harmony and concord, are just some of the objectives of the political program of this party which during the elections in June 2014, won 14 seats in the Legislative forum of Libya.
4. The federalist political current formed during the revolutionary events of 2011 from the representatives of the Libyan historical provinces Brega and Fezzan, wishing for the cessa- tion of the state of marginalization and underdevelopment that they had experienced during the former regime, claims from the new post-revolutionary authorities to be reintroduced in the na- tional circuit of resources and social and economic values of development. More than one year after the revolution and in response to the indifference with which the authorities in Tripoli have treated these claims, a group of officers led by Ahmed Senoussi Zubeir and several tribal leaders from eastern regions of the country, declared the establishment of a “Council of the Federal Province Brega”, headed by Ahmed Senoussi and having as programmatic objective the “protection and promotion of the province in a federal liberal state”. Simultaneously, another entity led by Ibrahim Jazran, organized as an armed militia, self-proclaimed independent as the “Political Bureau of the Province Brega”, taking control by force, of the oil terminals destined for the Libyan oil exports, as a means of pressure on the central authority to satisfy their grievances, among which the first was the demand for the establishment of the autonomous province Brega within the borders it had during the monarchy period of the Libyan history (from the city of Sirte to Tobruk, near the state border with Egypt). The current is known, in terms of the crises it has caused, and as the “Armed Liberal Current”.
5. Tibou Movement is the ethnic and tribal groups settled in northern and western part of Chad, in the Tibesti mountain range in the south-eastern oases of Libya, in the far western part of Sudan and northern Nigeria. These are nomadic Bedouin tribes with a total population of approx. 5 million people (of which approx. 400,000 are Libyans), divided into 38 tribes and having as main occupation agriculture and sheep breeding. The Libyan ethnicity of the Tibou group was, starting in 2007, involved in protest and resistance actions against the Gaddafi regime, establishing, in this sense, its own political party the “Tibou Front for the Salvation of Libya”. According to the Tibou leader, Abdel Magid Mansour, the number of the Tibou combat- ants amounts to 1,200.
The evolution of the internal crisis – main stages The tensions on the Libyan political and social scene have entered into a process of rapid degradation and violent confrontation with taking control, by the armed militias, of the “field” initiative, which led to continuous pressure put on the policy makers and on the legislative and executive leadership, which progressively amplified the armed confrontations and the regional and international interference in the internal affairs of this country. – In May 2013, the Parliament adopted the so-called “Law of Political Isolation” aimed at removing the former regime officials and supporters of Gaddafi from the political life. The adoption of the law occurred as a result of the pressure of the armed groups, after they took over government offices, including those of the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs and threatening to extend such actions. – On August 3, 2013, armed separatist groups occupied major oil fields by force, claiming the autonomy of the province Brega.
The action, also continued this year, has brought huge losses to the national budget by stopping royalties and income from oil exports. – In the same month, a new actor in the person of General Khalifa Haftar appeared on the political-military fringes along with his military coalition “Libya’s Dignity”, which marked the entrance of the internal situation in a stage of chaos, violent clashes and of personal and group vengeances, all resulting in loss of life and in significant losses and damage to the national economy of the country. – On 10 March 2014, the then Prime Minister of the Libyan government, Ali Zeidan chose to resign, taking refuge in Germany after a loaded tanker managed to escape unhindered off- shore in the direction North Korea being, however, stopped by US ships patrol and brought back to the Benghazi port. In Zeidan’s place, the parliament invested Defense Minister Abdallah Al Thaniy to lead the Executive, but he also resigned after a few days, due to his inability to form a new national unity government. – In early May 2014, the General National Congress (the Parliament) appointed Ahmad Moaytiq as Prime Minister, but the appointment was annulled by the Constitutional Court; – In mid-May this year, Gen. Khalifa Haftar ordered the beginning of the “Libya’s Dignity” national scale operation against the Islamist rebel groups and formations. – June 25: gathered in Cairo, the representatives of Libya’s neighboring states called all groups, forces and militias involved in the confrontation to accept the initiation and execution of an extensive dialogue of national reconciliation, promising, at the same time, to refrain from any intervention in the internal Libyan problem. In its turn, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution to that effect, warning the imposition of international sanctions if the players on the Libyan fringes do not accept a general cease-fire. – On July 21, the Libyans elected a new parliament dominated by liberals and Islamists.
The United States decided to close its embassy in Tripoli and evacuate the personnel. – As of mid-July, the Libyan conflict takes on the dimensions and characteristics of a genuine civil war, particularly carried out in Tripoli and Benghazi. – August 4, 2014: the elected Libyan Parliament held its first meeting at Tobruk, in the absence of the Islamist MPs. At the request of Tunisia, a new meeting of the representatives of the neighboring countries is held in Algiers, to analyze the possibilities of achieving a cessation of hostilities between Libyans. Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Mali, Niger and Chad are participating. – August 18 2014: Foreign bombardment devices of unknown identity perform bombing raids on the positions held by Islamist militias and on the international airport in Tripoli. Egypt and the UAE are charged with these actions. Both Cairo and Abu Dhabi reject the accusations. – August 23: the “Libya Dawn” coalition militias (Fajr Libya) take control on the international airport in the Libyan capital. The Parliament in Tobruk declares the Jihadist groups “Ansar Al-Shari’a” and “Fajr Libya” terrorist organizations. Libya is a country with two governments and two parliaments (Tripoli and Tobruk) who deny each other’s legitimacy. – On August 25, the National General Council (whose mandate had expired since March) appoints Omar Al-Hassi as prime minister. The appointment is challenged by the Coun- cil (parliament) in Tobruk. – September 4: According to a press release from the UN Human Rights Office in Geneva, about. 250,000 Libyans had fled their homes, finding shelter or in other areas of the country or in the neighboring countries.
– September 7, 2014: A military transport plane loaded with weapons for the militia coalition “Libya Dawn” is intercepted and forced to land. Sudan’s military attaché is declared persona non grata and expelled in connection with this incident. – September 22, 2014: the Libyan Parliament elected (in Tripoli) approved the composition of a second government led by Abdallah Al-Thaniy. 13 states (including the US and France) and the UN and the European Union address, in New York, a collective call for “an immediate ceasefire in the Libya immersed in political and security chaos” and the two parallel governments and parliaments each claims their legitimacy. – October 2, 2014: The violent fighting continued in Benghazi, 50% under the control of the Islamist rebels, between the “Shoura Council of the Revolutionaries of Benghazi” militia and units of the Alliance “Libya’s Dignity”, commanded by General Khalifa Al-Haftar, who sought help from the aviation and armor. Five attacks with explosives carried out by Islamist fighters caused the death of more than 50 soldiers from the units of General Haftar. The 15 members of the Security Council addressed a new call to the cessation of the armed confrontation, warning with the imposition of new international sanctions against Libya. – On October 6, the self-entitled Jihadist movement “The Shoura Council of the Revolutionaries of Benghazi”, member of the “Libya Dawn” proclaimed the city and oil district Derna in the east of the country as “Islamic emirate”, pledging, at the same time, the oath of allegiance and loyalty to the leader of the Islamic State, “Caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It was the first significant penetration of the Da’ish Jihadist offensive in Libya which, in the absence of an urgent national reconciliation dialogue between all parties involved in the Libyan war, “threatens to expand rapidly and make the Libyan territory the third part of the “Islamic caliphate” in Syria and Iraq”, according to Bernardino Leon, the representative in Libya of the UN Secretary General. – 15 to 16 October: the Libyan army and the forces led by General Khalifa Haftar triggered a strong ground offensive, supported by aircraft and armored vehicles, on the positions held by the Islamist militias in the northeast and in the city of Benghazi. News releases, formally belied both by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Cairo and by the spokesman of the US State Department referred to the Egyptian involvement in the bombing raids on Islamist parties. The attacking units took control of the quarries in the south and west of the city Benghazi, as well as on the sites and logistics of the militia and self-entitled “February 17 Brigade” – the armed arm of the Libyan movement “Muslim Brotherhood”.
Libya, which, after the dictatorship of Muammar Al-Gaddafi, went through a “bloody spring” just to come under the dictatorship of gangs, militias and armed tribes, seems to move rapidly towards social dissolution and national and territorial dismantling despite the regional and international community attempts to determine, through dialogue or through penalties and economic pressures, a ceasefire and transition to a national reconciliation process. Such prospects still remain remote, as long as, in addition to the ambitions and interests of the political class, of the “professional revolutionaries” and tribal influences, this situation is maintained by the regional actors, including by funding and support of a political orientation or of one or the other of the armed militias. Will the new multinational anti-terrorist campaign have a positive influence – be it only as a warning – on this complicated and dramatic situation? Only short-term developments will allow an answer to this question.
First published in “Geostrategic Pulse
Saudi Arabia, UAE footprint in Eritrea- Ethiopia rapprochement
In a landmark visit, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed landed in the Eritrean capital, Asmara, on Sunday, for a bilateral summit, aimed at repairing relations between the two countries. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki warmly greeted Abiy at the airport, Eritrea’s state television showed.
The visit comes a month after Abiy surprised people by fully accepting a peace deal that ended a two-year border war between the two countries. The meeting sparkled hope for the halt of one of the most difficult African crises.
Eritrea became independent in 1993 after three years of war, but again the conflict between Asmara and Ethiopia in 1998 arose over disagreement on border delineation, primarily at Badme, and that was the end of diplomatic relations between the two states. However, Eritrea has a permanent delegation in Addis Ababa, representing the African Union.
Then the conflict flared into armed clashes. Although Badme was being administered by Ethiopia, with an MP and an administration, Eritrea said maps clearly showed the territory to be Eritrean and in May sent in troops to occupy the area.
From 1998 to 2000, the border wars claimed some 80,000 lives from both sides, but the Algiers Agreement ended the conflict. However, the president of Eritrea broke international law and triggered the war by invading Ethiopia, abusing the Ethiopian opposition to the verdict on the borders, taking repressive measures such as imprisoning dissidents and refraining from implementing law and adopting strict military rules.
Eritrea, Ethiopia economic interests in resolving the conflicts
Some analysts have argued that, the border conflicts had halted Eritrean affairs over the past 20 years, and all the issues were overshadowed by these clashes. The Ethiopian prime minister took the first step in resolving the conflict in June, announcing that his troops would withdraw from the Badme region and other border areas.
A high-level Eritrean delegation led by Foreign Minister Osman Saleh had earlier visited the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, last month for peace talks, a meeting that was followed by a news conference.
Eritrea and Ethiopia are among the least developed countries in the Horn of Africa. Although the Ethiopian economy has grown significantly in recent years, the Eritrean economy was suffering and had dropped to a record low. Analysts believe that although realization of peace between the two states is in the interest of both, Eritrea’s economy will enjoy a greater benefit of the rapprochement.
In addition, the peace talks can attract foreign investors to Eritrea. The end of “state of war” will help Ethiopia solve its problem of not having a sea passage, because after the independence of Eritrea overlooking the Red Sea in 1993, the issue aroused for Ethiopia.
The war between the two countries has caused much difficulty for Ethiopian trade through the ports of Eritrea and the Red Sea, and this peace will help rebuild economic activities to the time prior to conflicts.
At first glance, it seems as if the two countries realized the necessity of bilateral relations, but the fact is there was involvement of foreign countries in the peace talks. Some believe that Washington, an ally of Ethiopia, does not require the country to adhere to the border agreement.
Perhaps the U.S. has come to the conclusion that it is time to make a new alliance as Djibouti, located in the vicinity of Ethiopia and Eritrea, has allowed China to build a military base on its territory. So, given the geopolitical developments in the Red Sea and the Chinese military presence in the United Arab Emirates, America sees its interest in improving relations with Eritrea.
Saudis and Emiratis footprint in African conflicts
In general, the African continent is of great importance to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and these two countries have set their strategic interests on the continent. In many cases, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have benefited from the support of their African allies in regional conflicts. For example, they have called on African countries, to cut off relations with Iran and Qatar or to engage in military aggression in Yemen in their support.
The poor African states, relying highly on Saudi and Emirati donations, bow down to the two Arab states’ demands. Out of fear of losing alliance and leaving a positive image on the world, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi acted as a mediators in the built up tensions among African states, namely Eritrea and Ethiopia. That would also fulfill their objective of preventing the African states side with Iran or Qatar.
In recent years, Eritrea has improved relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE has too set up a military base in southern harbor of Eritrea.
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, both Ethiopia’s allies, played an active role in Ethiopian prime minister’s decision to negotiate with Eritrea with their financial sponsorship.
The unprecedented and controversial trip of Abu Dhabi’s crown prince to Ethiopia last month, in the light of the agreement between the two African states, as they poured in $3 billion was a proof of the UAE push in the two states peace talks.
In any case, it appears that the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and, above all, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are making attempts to establish a new regional system based on which the security of the Persian Gulf region is tied to the security of the Horn of Africa region, and for the same reason strengthening their foothold on the African continent and, in appearance, pursuing peace and reconciliation among its political and economic allies.
First published in our partner MNA
African development relies on education and literacy
Key to a successful education, literacy remains one of sub-Saharan Africa’s top public priorities, now more than ever. Thanks to the progress achieved in recent years, book publishing is gaining more and more traction in African economies and cultures.
To underestimate the role of books, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, would be to disregard the many issues surrounding this commonplace yet valuable item. Literacy not only allows children and adults to develop their imagination, but also facilitates learning in other areas of the educational system. By extension, literacy plays a role in expanding education, in training youth, in reducing inequality, and ultimately, in developing a nation.
These aspects sit at the heart of the Children of Africa Foundation, which I created in 1998 and preside over to this day. The foundation has worked tirelessly for 20 years to promote literacy and reading among our children. Today more than ever, amidst a rapidly growing population, it is crucial that we rely on books and all they offer to craft a better future. Towards this end, our ivorian and international partners provide an essential and valuable service. On May 2nd of this year, at the Embassy of the United States in Côte d’Ivoire, I received 1,500 books destined to expand the Foundation’s Bibliobus collection. Several months earlier, the village of Smallburgh in Great Britain presented the Foundation with a new bus as part of a humanitarian project, baptized “Smallburgh 2 Abidjan”. This new, very typically English bus is a great attraction for young and old alike, and a unique library resource centre for introducing our youth to the English language. I look forward to the benefits it will provide, as the english language has become an essential part of the professional world in this day and age.
The Foundation’s Bibliobuses, today numbering nine, will serve to advance both reading and computer literacy even further throughout the Ivory Coast. To this end, we can also count on the support of players in the publishing industry, who came together for an international conference in Abidjan on January 25th of this year. This unprecedented event was held for the purpose of identifying solutions to promote a love of literacy among students, improve the quality of books, and ensure their availability to students.
In this way, going forward, the African publishing industry will be able to adapt to the different languages, cultures, and educational tools used throughout the continent. I commend the initiative of this gathering put together by the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Over twenty African countries were in attendance to rethink the role books can play in order to support education.
Quality education, a profitable investment
Education through reading is a challenge I’ve personally adopted. According to the most recent report by the French Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement, AFD) on sub-Saharan education, the number of students facing severe difficulties has significantly decreased over the last ten years in French-speaking African countries. From 1999 to 2016, the rate of literacy among 15-24-year-olds has actually increased from 67.6% to 75.5%, and that of adults from 54% to 60%. But there is much work still to be done for the majority of students to achieve a mastery of the basic reading and math skills crucial to pursuing a quality education.
Make no mistake; education has positive impacts on health, employment, social involvement and well being. The return on investment of higher literacy rates can also be seen in the social and economic development of countries through technical progress and innovation, corporate investment, health and safety, trust in public policies and institutions, and civil engagement. Numerous studies have shown that improved education goes hand-in-hand with economic growth.
But the impact literacy rates can have on economic growth relies more on a quality education than on the number of years spent receiving it. Guaranteeing the development of students’ basic skills is one of the indisputable benefits of literacy, key to a successful education and starting life on the right foot. The Children of Africa Foundation endeavours to make this ambition possible through its educational programs. The more our children read, the more they will benefit from their studies, enabling them to become economically, socially and culturally well-rounded adults. And with them, in the long run, so will society at large.
How China and Europe Can Set a New Model for International Cooperation in Africa
This past Tuesday, the first China-Africa Defense and Security Forum, attended by high-ranking officials from 50 African countries, concluded in Beijing. On that same day in Cascais, Portugal, former European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, Portuguese President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, 20 African ministers, and more than 400 African and European leaders kicked off the first EurAfrican Forum.
While the two summits took place more than 6,000 miles apart, their purpose and goals could not be more similar: global powers like China and Europe, as well as India, Turkey, and Russia, see an opportunity to help accelerate the economic advancement of Africa while exerting greater global influence, especially as the United States withdraws from engagement in the continent and pursues its America First foreign policy agenda.
Make no mistake, Africa is on the verge of a major transformation. The continent today is home to 226 million youths between the ages of 15-24, or 19 percent of the global youth population. By 2035, the number of young Africans of working age will exceed that of the rest of the world combined. Around that same time, nearly 45 percent of all Africans are expected to join the middle or upper class.
This critical moment, however, offers both great promise and great risk, not just for Africa, but for the global powers that seek to play a larger role in the region. If China, Europe, and other nations hope to co-create with Africa a shared, sustainable, and prosperous future, it is critical that they learn from the mistakes of the past by collaborating with Africa instead of exploiting it. By building partnerships based on mutual trust, respect, and transparency, Africa, China, and Europe can create a new model for 21st-century international cooperation.
Much has been made of how China has vastly expanded its footprint in Africa over the past two decades while avoiding the pitfalls of past imperial powers. It has largely been a “win-win” partnership, with China gaining access to Africa’s natural resources and African nations getting help to build much-needed infrastructure. China is now the continent’s largest trading partner. More than 10,000 Chinese firms are operating on the continent. China’s massive infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative, will eventually connect China by land and sea to critical points around the world – from Southeast Asia to the Middle East to Africa.
As China continues to make capital investments in the continent, it is critical that African nations not become burdened with huge debts, which can make them susceptible to outside influence on their economies and politics. China can become a trusted lender by adhering to international standards that ensure the transparency and viability of its loans, and by implementing tried-and-true programs established by The Paris Club with the IMF that return borrowers to sustainability.
This type of trust-building and accountability will also be essential if Europe is to take advantage of the vacuum left by the United States and play a greater role in shaping Africa’s future. In order to succeed, Europe must deal head-on with the role it played in dividing, occupying, and colonizing the continent in the 19th century.
One way to build respect between regions and trust between leaders is for Europe to act collectively as the European Union rather than as individual states. Priority should be placed on building a more coordinated approach between the EU and the African Union, as this will also help address the African migration challenge currently facing Europe.
With the UK consumed by Brexit, Italy implementing a populist agenda, and Spain still reeling from corruption scandals, the EU must look to leadership from France and Portugal in building a modern-day partnership with Africa.
France has a complicated and fraught history with Africa, whose last former French colonies achieved independence in the 1960s. But French President Emmanuel Macron has made it a priority of his presidency to reimagine a collaborative relationship between France and Africa. This year, France has committed 200 million euros for schools in African countries and 65 million euros to promote digital startups throughout the continent. At the same time, Portugal is also stepping up its efforts with a range of initiatives, from Portugal and Morocco setting up an undersea power connection, which would be the second Europe-Africa lin, .to Portuguese construction company Mota-Engil announcing this week that it is looking at $1.8 billion in projects in Nigeria, in what would mark its entry into Africa’s largest economy and the continent’s biggest oil producer.
In a rapidly changing global landscape, Europe, China, and Africa have an opportunity to create a new world order that will benefit all three regions. By cooperating on not just economic and infrastructure project, but also pressing issues like migration, climate change, and globalization, leaders from all regions can build a collaborative and sustainable relationship that will improve the quality of life of all of their people in the 21st century.
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