Mesmerizing Foreign Policy issues
On October 26th a new president will be elected in Brazil. The dispute is between Dilma Rousseff (left-wing) and Aécio Neves (center-right opposition), both originally from the state of Minas Gerais. This state plays an important role in Brazilian political history: it is the birthplace of the national hero, Joaquim José da Silva Xavier (Tiradentes), who was the leading member of the Brazilian independence from Portuguese colonial rule. Tiradentes’ aim was to create a Brazilian Republic, in the 18th century.
However, when his revolutionary plan was discovered, he was hanged in public square, becoming an icon of how to fight for independence. Minas Gerais is also the state that is most represented in the Brazilian presidency: since it has become a Republic, in 1889, eight presidents, including Dilma Rouseff, were originally from the southeastern Brazilian state. This next election will decide whether the number of presidents from Minas Gerais will grow or remain the same.
Dilma and Aécio have different backgrounds, although both candidates were born in the same city, Belo Horizonte, and have degree in Economics. Dilma, in her youth, fought against the Brazilian military dictatorship (1964-1985), in the 1970’s, was arrested and tortured by the military corps. After her release, she helped found a party (PDT), became the Secretary of Treasury of the city of Porto Alegre, and later the Secretary of Mines and Energy of the State of Rio Grande do Sul. It’s only in the 2000’s that she leaves the party she helped to found, PDT, due to internal disputes, and joins the Worker’s Party (PT). In the federal government, she was Minister of Mines and Energy (2003-2005), and Chief of Staff of the Presidency (2005-2010). In 2010 she was elected the 36th president of Brazil, but the 1st female to take office.
On the other hand, Aécio is the grandson of Tancredo Neves, who was an influential politician: Tancredo was Minister of Justice and Interior Minister (1953-1954), Prime Minister (1961-1962), Finance Minister (1962), and Governor of the State of Minas Gerais (1983-1984). In 1985, he was appointed by the military, in an indirect election, to become the president of the Brazil. Tancredo Neves, however, died before he took office. Aécio Neves was born in a strong political environment and has always pursued a political career. He started as his grandfather personal secretary (1985), served four terms as an elected deputy in the Federal Chamber of the Deputies (1987-2002), he became the President of the Chamber of Deputies (2001-2002), governor of the State of Minas Gerais (2003-2010), and Senator of the Republic (2011-2013).
Regarding governance they are divergent, but do not differ completely from each other. Although ideologically they are in different extremes, being the Workers’ Party (PT) the left wing, and Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) the right-center wing, they both intend to continue the Social Programs developed until now. In the second term of the elections, Dilma and Aécio claim “paternity” of Social Programs’ creation, such as the “Family Stipend” (Bolsa Família), which started during Lula da Silva’s (PT/2002-2010) government but could also have started during Fernando Henrique’s government (PSDB/1995-2002), whose financial aid to the less fortunate was given in the form of several stipends (Education, Gas, etc.). The Social Programs should be one of the most important topics in both candidates’ agenda, as Brazil still struggles in the fight against social and economic inequality.
In terms of Foreign Policy, which is a less debatable subject in Brazil, whoever wins the elections will face some challenges ahead. During Lula da Silva’s government, Brazil was a very active player, broadening its horizons through the creation of strategic partnerships with countries all over the world. Foreign Affairs thinkers and policy-makers gave Lula’s Foreign Policy the name of “autonomy by diversification” due to the dynamism of Brazil towards foreign matters. Before him, Fernando Henrique Cardoso also played an important role for Brazilian Foreign Policy, his Foreign Policy was known by “autonomy by integration”, in which his government established dialogues with both great powers and regional countries, by strengthening Mercosur, foreseeing an economic bloc that would improve commercial relations among its members.
From 2010 to 2014, however, there was a “changing of paths” in the Brazilian External Relations. Therefore, the future candidate will have to develop specific objectives for the Foreign Policy. The challenges lie in 3 subjects: Mercosur, United Nations Security Council Reform and BRICS. These three subjects are important because they belong to areas in which Brazil should focus if it wants to become a more active emerging power. Mercosur represents the regional surroundings that Brazil must be more attentive to, the UNSC reforms represent the global demands Brazil has and should continue to pursue as long as it does in accordance to internal changes, and lastly the BRICS that represents the multilateral way for Brazil to change world’s unipolar paradigm.
At the moment, Mercosur has some priorities, although it is not advancing. According to the Brazilian analyst Matias Spektor, the future of Mercosur is to remain as is. Ending Mercosur would mean high political and financial cost to Brazil, the best option therefore would be to strengthen what has already been established. The pragmatic option would be to look at the Pacific Alliance and to be inspired by their goals, particularly by the economic integration with Asia through a more active free trade agreeement. Mercosur should begin by establishing agreements with both the Pacific Alliance, and then with Asian countries, so that members’ economies are able to develop. Up to now, bilateral agreements with major economies and economic blocs are blocked.
It is indeed inconceivable that Mercosur members were the last countries in the World Bank ranking, which analyzes the business environment in Latin America: while the countries of the Pacific Alliance are among the top five, Mercosur are among the latter. The statism of the member countries of Mercosur needs to be modified because it is hampering economic relations with world. A more efficient free trade agreement should be considered in order to increase competitive advantage. The reformulation of Mercosur needs to be done, starting with a pragmatic reading of the current situation, in which outdated ideologies should be replaced by the dynamism of free trade.
United Nations Security Council Reform
The Brazil must insist on the reform of the Security Council, but before that, the discourse must be coherent and consistent with the Brazilian goals. If Brazil wants to be part of the political condominium, it needs a priori coordinate their strategies to maintain the uniformity of its narrative. It makes no sense pleading reforms without having the certainty that it will be able to hold their shares in the future. Moreover, beyond the idea to reform, Brazil has also to overcome the problems related to its Armed Forces, its performance in Peace Missions, its aid for the UN budget, and last but not least its lack of empathy and support in Latin America.
To want to be part of the new configuration of world power is an admirable demand, and should be part of the list of long-term external goals and challenges. In order to transform the global unipolarity into multipolarity is essential for the discussions of important global topics in a more balanced way. To demand for a reform, particularly in the highest body of the UN, which is clearly an outdated body that represents the world in a post-Second World War era, it represents something very worthwhile.
The BRICS are the main arena of dialogue to Brazil. Besides this group, the G-20 (commercial and financial) and BASIC (environment) are also considered stages in which the emerging countries can discuss, analyze and facilitate its national interests. Both BRICS and IBSA are focused on issues of paramount importance to the development of each member country, as well as of countries in need of financial assistance and sectoral cooperation. Although it lacks institutionalization, it seems valid performance that countries have created to address global challenges (whether in groups or strengthening bilateral relations).
Currently, the BRICS have created a Development Bank, whose initial capital is 100 billion dollars. The Bank of BRICS creates a new multilateral paradigm, since it represents an alternative for the supply of infrastructure needs in developing countries. The challenge, however, is not to leave this arena collapse. Brazil should reinstate its foreign policy and its economy (according to The Economist, Brazil is among the weakest economies of the BRICS) in order to become a more active actor in the group, so to continue fighting in order to change global paradigms.
Biden Revises US Sanctions Policy
In the United States, a revision of the sanctions policy is in full swing. Joe Biden’s administration strives to make sanctions instruments more effective in achieving his political goals and, at the same time, reducing political and economic costs. The coordination of restrictive measures with allies is also seen as an important task. Biden is cautiously but consistently abandoning the sanctions paradigm that emerged during Donald Trump’s presidency.
The US sanctions policy under Trump was characterised by several elements. First, Washington applied them quite harshly. In all key areas (China, Iran, Russia, Venezuela, etc.), the United States used economic and financial restrictions without hesitation, and sometimes in unprecedented volumes. Of course, the Trump administration acted rationally and rigidity was not an end in itself. In a number of episodes, the American authorities acted prudently (for example, regarding sanctions on Russian sovereign debt in 2019). The Trump-led executives stifled excess Congressional enthusiasm for “draconian sanctions” against Russia and even some initiatives against China. However, the harshness of other measures sometimes shocked allies and opponents alike. These include the 6 April 2014 sanctions against a group of Russian businessmen and their assets, or bans on some Chinese telecommunications services in the United States, or sanctions blocking the International Criminal Court.
Second, Trump clearly ignored the views of US allies. The unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran in 2018 forced European businesses to leave Iran, resulting in losses. Even some of the nation’s closest allies were annoyed. Another irritant was the tenacity with which Trump (with Congressional backing) threw a wrench in the wheels of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project. Despite the complicated relations between Moscow and the European Union, the latter defended the right to independently determine what was in its interests and what was not.
Third, concerns about sanctions have emerged among American business as well. Fears have grown in financial circles that the excessive use of sanctions will provoke the unnecessary politicisation of the global financial system. In the short term, a radical decline in the global role of the dollar is hardly possible. But political risks are forcing many governments to seriously consider it. Both rivals (Moscow and Beijing) and allies (Brussels) have begun to implement corresponding plans. Trade sanctions against China have affected a number of US companies in the telecommunications and high-tech sectors.
Finally, on some issues, the Trump administration has been inconsistent or simply made mistakes. For example, Trump enthusiastically criticised China for human rights violations, supporting relevant legislative initiatives. But at the same time, it almost closed its eyes to the events in Belarus in 2020. Congress was also extremely unhappy with the delay in the reaction on the “Navalny case” in Russia. As for mistakes, the past administration missed the moment for humanitarian exemptions for sanctions regimes in connection with the COVID-19 epidemic. Even cosmetic indulgences could have won points for US “soft power”. Instead, the US Treasury has published a list of pre-existing exceptions.
The preconditions for a revision of the sanctions policy arose even before Joe Biden came to power. First of all, a lot of analytical work was done by American think tanks—nongovernmental research centers. They provided a completely sober and unbiased analysis of bothха! achievements and mistakes. In addition, the US Government Accountability Office has done serious work; in 2019 it prepared two reports for Congress on the institutions of the American sanctions policy. However, Joe Biden’s victory in the presidential election significantly accelerated the revision of the sanctions instruments. Both the ideological preferences of the Democrats (for example, the emphasis on human rights) and the political experience of Biden himself played a role.
The new guidelines for the US sanctions policy can be summarised as follows. First, the development of targeted sanctions and a more serious analysis of their economic costs for American business, as well as business from allied and partner countries. Second, closer coordination with allies. Here, Biden has already sent a number of encouraging signals by introducing temporary sanctions exemptions on Nord Stream 2. Although a number of Russian organisations and ships were included in the US sanctions lists, Nord Stream 2 itself and its leadership were not affected. Third, we are talking about closer attention to the subject of human rights. Biden has already reacted with sanctions both to the “Navalny case” and to the situation in Belarus. Human rights will be an irritant in relations with China. Fourth, the administration is working towards overturning Trump’s most controversial decisions. The 2020 decrees on Chinese telecoms were cancelled, the decree on sanctions against the International Criminal Court was cancelled, the decree on Chinese military-industrial companies was modified; negotiations are also underway with Iran.
The US Treasury, one of the key US sanctions agencies, will also undergo personnel updates. Elisabeth Rosenberg, a prominent sanctions expert who previously worked at the Center for a New American Security, may take the post of Assistant Treasury Secretary. She will oversee the subject of sanctions. Thus, the principle of “revolving doors”, which is familiar to Americans, is being implemented, when the civil service is replenished with personnel from the expert community and business, and then “returns” them back.
At the same time, the revision of the sanctions policy by the new administration cannot be called a revolution. The institutional arrangement will remain unchanged. It is a combination of the functions of various departments—the Treasury, the Department of Trade, the Department of Justice, the State Department, etc. The experience of their interagency coordination has accumulated over the years. The system worked flawlessly both under Trump and under his predecessors. Rather, it will be about changing the political directives.
For Russia, the revision is unlikely to bring radical changes. A withdrawal from the carpet bombing of Russian business, such as the incident on 6 April 2018 hint that good news can be considered a possibility. However, the legal mechanisms of sanctions against Russia will continue to operate. The emphasis on human rights will lead to an increase in sanctions against government structures. Against this background, regular political crises are possible in relations between the two countries.
From our partner RIAC
Sea Breeze 2021: U.S. is worryingly heading closer to conflict with Russia in the Black Sea
On July 10th, the 2021 iteration of the joint military exercise, Sea Breeze, concluded in the Black Sea. This exercise, which began on June 28th was co-hosted by the Ukrainian Navy and the United States Navy’s Sixth Fleet. According to the U.S. Navy, the annual Exercise Sea Breeze consists of joint naval, land, and air trainings and operations centered around building increased shared capabilities in the Black Sea.
This year’s Sea Breeze included participation from 32 countries, including NATO members and other countries that border the Black Sea, making it the largest Sea Breeze exercise since its inception in 1997. All other countries bordering the Black Sea were included in participating in the joint drills, except Russia.
Russia’s exclusion from these exercises is not unsurprising, due to its current tensions with Ukraine and its historical relationship with NATO. However, it signals to Moscow and the rest of the world that the NATO views Russia as an opponent in a future conflict. At the opening ceremony of Sea Breeze 2021 in Odessa, it was made clear that the intention of the exercise was to prepare for future conflict in the region when the Defense Minister of Ukraine, reported that the drills “contain a powerful message – support of stability and peace in our region.”
These exercises and provocations do anything but bring peace and stability to the region. In fact, they draw the United States and NATO dangerously close to the brink of conflict with Russia.
Even though Sea Breeze 2021 has only recently concluded, it has already had a marked impact on tensions between NATO countries and Moscow. U.S. Navy Commander Daniel Marzluff recently explained that the Sea Breeze drills in the Black Sea are essential deterrents to Russian assertions in region. However, these drills have consisted of increasingly provocative maneuvers that ultimately provoke conflict in the region.
These drills have done anything but act as a deterrent for conflict in the Black Sea. In response to the Sea Breeze drills, Russia conducted its own drills in the Black Sea, including the simulation of firing advanced missile systems against enemy aircraft. As the Black Sea is of utmost importance to Russia’s trade and military stature, it follows that Russia would signal its displacement if it perceives its claims are being threatened.
Sea Breeze followed another rise in tensions in the Black Sea, when just a week prior to the beginning of the exercise, a clash occurred between Russia and Britain. In response to the British destroyer ship, the HMS Defender, patrolling inside Crimean territorial waters, Russia claimed it fired warning shots and ordered two bombers to drop bombs in the path of the ship. When asked about the HMS Defender, Russian President Vladimir Putin described the ship’s actions as a “provocation” that was a “blatant violation” of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Putin also went on to claim that Moscow believes U.S. reconnaissance aircraft were a part of the operation as well. Despite this, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson responded with a denial of any wrongdoing.
Russia’s actions to provocations by the United States-led Sea Breeze and interaction with the HMS Defender in the Black Sea signal its resolve to retaliate if it feels as its sovereignty and its territorial claim on Crimea is being impeded on. Despite Russia signaling its commitment to defending its territorial claims in the Black Sea, the United States still willingly took actions during Sea Breeze that would bring the United States closer to a clash with Russia.
Provoking conflict in the Black Sea does not align with the national security interests of the United States. In fact, it only puts the United States in the position to be involved in a costly clash that only would harm its diplomatic relationships.
As Russia has signaled its commitment to its resolve and scope of its military response in a possible conflict, any potential conflict in the Black Sea would be costly for the United States. Over the past few years, Russia has increased the size and capabilities of its fleet in the Black Sea. Two of these improvements would especially pose a challenging threat to the U.S. and NATO – Russia’s drastically improved anti-access/area-denial capabilities and its new Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile. This would mean any conflict in the Black Sea would not be a quick and decisive victory for U.S. and NATO forces, and would instead likely become costly and extensive.
A conflict with Russia in the Black Sea would not only be costly for the U.S. and its allies in the region, but could irreparably damage its fragile, but strategically valuable relationship with Russia. If the United States continues to escalate tensions in the Black Sea, it risks closing the limited window for bilateral cooperation with Russia that was opened through increased willingness to collaborate on areas of common interests, as evidenced by the recent summit that took place in Geneva. After a period of the highest levels of tension between the U.S. and Russia since the Cold War, this progress made towards improving bilateral relations must not be taken for granted. Even if the U.S. and NATO’s maneuvers in the Black Sea do not ultimately materialize into a full-scale conflict with Russia, they will most likely damage not just recent diplomatic momentum, but future opportunities for a relationship between the two powers.
In such a critical time for the relationship between the United States and Russia, it is counterproductive for the United States to take actions that it can predict will drive Russia even further away. Entering into a conflict with Russia in the Black Sea would not only engage the U.S. in a costly conflict but would damage its security and diplomatic interests.
Maximizing Biden’s Plan to Combat Corruption and Promote Good Governance in Central America
Authors: Lauren Mooney and Eguiar Lizundia*
To tackle enduring political, economic and security challenges in the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, the Biden administration is attempting to revitalize its commitment to the region, including through a four-year, $4 billion plan submitted in a bill to Congress.
In its plan, the White House has rightly identified the root causes of migration, including limited economic opportunity, climate change, inequality, and violence. Systemic corruption resulting from the weak rule of law connects and entrenches the root causes of migration, while the increased devastation brought about by climate change exacerbates economic hardship and citizen insecurity.
The renewed investment holds promise: previous foreign assistance in the Northern Triangle has shown results, including by contributing to a reduction in the expected level of violence. As the Biden Administration finalizes and begins implementing its Central America strategy, it should include three pillars—rooted in lessons learned from within and outside the region—to maximize the probability that the proposed spending in U.S. taxpayer funds has its intended impact.
First, the Biden administration should deliver on its promise to make the fight against corruption its number one priority in Central America by supporting local anti-graft actors. The sanctions against officials which the United States is considering are a step in the right direction, but lasting reform is best accomplished through a partnership involving regional or multilateral organizations. Guatemala’s international commission against impunity (CICIG) model was relatively successful until internal pushback and dwindling U.S. advocacy resulted in its dismantlement in 2019. Though Honduras’ equivalent was largely ineffective, and El Salvador’s recently launched version is marred by President Bukele’s campaign against judicial independence, there is room for learning from past mistakes and propose a more robust and mutually beneficial arrangement. The experience of Ukraine shows that while external engagement is no silver bullet in eliminating corruption, the role of foreign actors can lead to tangible improvements in the anti-corruption ecosystem, including more transparent public procurement and increased accountability for corrupt politicians.
In tandem with direct diplomatic pressure and helping stand up CICIG-like structures, the U.S. can harness lessons from prior anticorruption efforts to fund programs that address other aspects of graft in each country. This should involve empowering civil society in each country to monitor government compliance with anti-corruption laws and putting pressure on elected officials to uphold their commitments. While reducing impunity and improving transparency might not automatically persuade Central Americans to stay, better democratic governance will allow the three Northern Triangle nations to pursue policies that will end up expanding economic opportunities for residents. As Vice President Harris recently noted, any progress on addressing violence or food insecurity would be undermined if the environment for enabling corruption remains unchanged.
Second, the United States should support local initiatives to help reverse the deterioration of the social fabric in the region by expanding access to community decision-making. Given the high levels of mistrust of government institutions, any efforts to support reform-minded actors and stamp out corruption at the national level must be paired with efforts to promote social cohesion and revitalize confidence in subnational leaders and opportunities. In the Northern Triangle countries, violence and economic deprivation erode social cohesion and undermine trust in democratic institutions. The U.S. government and practitioners should support civic efforts to build trust among community members and open opportunities for collective action, particularly in marginalized areas. A key component of this is expanding sociopolitical reintegration opportunities for returning migrants. In so doing, it is possible to help improve perceptions of quality of life, sense of belonging, and vision for the future. While evidence should underpin all elements of a U.S. Strategy for Central America, it is particularly important to ensure social cohesion initiatives are locally-owned, respond to the most salient issues, and are systematically evaluated in order to understand their effects on migration.
Lastly, the U.S. should take a human-rights based approach to managing migration and learn from the pitfalls associated with hardline approaches to stem migration. Policies rooted in a securitized vision have a demonstrable bad record. For example, since 2015, the European Union undertook significant measures to prevent irregular migration from Niger, including by criminalizing many previously legitimate businesses associated with migration and enforced the imposition of legal restrictions to dissuade open and legal migration. Not only did this violate freedom of movement and create adverse economic consequences, but it also pushed migration underground, with individuals still making the journey and encountering significant threats to their lives, security and human rights.
A welcome realignment
Acknowledging the role of push factors is key to responding to migration effectively. Most importantly, putting political inclusion and responsive governance at the center is critical for ensuring vulnerable populations feel rooted in their community. A more secure, prosperous, and democratic Central America will pay dividends to the United States not only in terms of border security, but also in the form of improved cooperation to tackle global challenges, from climate change to the rise of China.
*Eguiar Lizundia is the Deputy Director for Technical Advancement and Governance Advisor at IRI
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