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The Islamic State in the new geostrategic context of the Middle East

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The Salafi-Jihadist movement of al-Qaeda ideology self-entitled “The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (Dawlat Al-Islam Fi Al-Iraq wa-l- Sham – Da’ish, Islamic State of Iraq and Levant – ISIL, ISIS, Etat Islamique de l’Irak et Levant – EIIL) appeared on the contemporary terrorist setting in 2012 and asserted itself surprisingly fast as one of the most important play- ers in the context of contemporary radical Islamism as well as in the Middle East conflict arena with its political and geopolitical changes brought about by the twisted “Arab spring”.

On 29 July 2014, after having gained control of important parts from the north and west of Iraq almost as far as Baghdad, the leader of the organization, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, proclaimed the institution of the “Islamic caliphate” under the name of the “Islamic State”, self-proclaiming itself “caliph” and reintroducing this title for the first time after 1924, when the ottoman Muslim caliph- ate and caliph were abolished in Istanbul by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and replaced with the re- publican regime. Rhetorically, the final objective of the 3rd millennium caliph is to create the new Islamic caliphate whose capital would be Mecca, Saudi Arabia and which would include the Levant, Maghreb and the Arabian Peninsula.

The current structure was created as an extension of the former Iraqi al-Qaeda organization “Al-Qaeda in the Country of the Two Rivers”1 after the death – at the end of June 2006 – of its founder and leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. The new organization was created on 13 October 2006 and it was named the Islamic State of Iraq (Dawlat Al-Iraq Al-Islamiy), being led by “emir” Abu Abdullah Al-Rashid Al-Baghdadi and the Egyptian Abu Ayyad Al-Massri. Both leaders were killed during an Iraqi-American operation in April 2013, so that the leadership of the organization  passed  to  Abu  Bakr  Al-Baghdadi,  whose  real  name  is  Ibrahim  Awwad  Al- Samarrai, an experienced Iraqi jihadist fighter that activated under the leadership of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi as well as a the leader of a provincial Salafi group. A former imam of a mosque and having graduated religious studies at the Islamic University of Baghdad, he was detained by the Iraqi security forces in 2004 for several months, so that after being released his reputation extended and he was presented as a ferocious, violent and brutal figure. Extending operations on the Syrian territory, the organization adopted the name “the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant”, attempting an unsuccessful unification with the Syrian al-Qaeda organization Al-Nusra Front, a union that has been rejected by the “central leader” of al-Qaeda, Ayman Al-Zawahiri. This was the moment that marked the beginning of extended dissensions and dreadful armed conflicts between the Iraqi and Syrian Salafi organizations, Al-Baghdadi himself having issued a  statement  in which he  announced the separation  and  complete  independence from  Al- Zawahiri’s leadership.
On 29 June 2014, after a series of rapid and spectacular terrain gaining operations that allowed taking control of six administrative districts in Iraq and the northern Syrian gover- norates, “emir” Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi proclaimed himself “caliph”, a follower of the Prophet in the leadership of the Islamic nation. The name Da’ish becomes “caliphate” known as the “Islamic State”.

Troops, financing, equipment
Da’ish can be considered an exclusively “Iraqi” movement when analyzed from the point of view of the Iraqi jihadist troops’ superiority, at an estimation of 7,000-8,000 people in June 2014 when Mosul was gained over and it reached at approximately 20,000 people in August 2014. There are also – as it happens with al-Nusra in Syria – selected jihadist mercenaries; Islamic and Arabian people originating from the countries that traditionally provided fighters (Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia) as well as western citizens originating from France, Belgium, Great Britain, the United States and the Netherlands.

On the other hand, as compared with other active organizations of this type, this organization is different in terms of the original manner in which it managed to get financing and equipment. We are dealing here first of all with the depreciation of the Iraqi national banks from the cities it gained control of, the money thus obtained being evaluated (in mid- 2014) at approximately 7 billion dollars, an amount that turned Da’ish into the richest extremist-jihadist movement worldwide. A similar method has been used for the procurement of military equipment from the Iraqi army and security forces which left the battlefield and withdrew from al- Qaeda’s attack, giving up its armament, ammunition and even uniforms. Another source of procurement in this sector is, at it happened with banks, the plunder of the barracks and armament and equipment storages of the Iraqi army. The “Islamic State” possesses various and large quantities of military equipment, including of American origin, turning the structure into a real army. Its active arsenal includes M16 machine guns and assault rifles with night vision, howitzers, machine-guns, Grad multiple rocket launching systems, Stinger surface-to-air missiles, filed artillery, BM-21 and Humvee armored carriers, military trucks, T-55 and T-72 tanks, 122 and 152 caliber mortars, ZU-23 Soviet anti-aircraft gun, at least one Scud missile and the list could continue. According to the Iraqi and Amercan intelligence services, while occupying Mosul (July 2014), Da’ish fighters captured nuclear materials from the Mosul university. According to the remarks made by the Iraqi UN Ambassador, the materials that had been taken from the university “can be used in manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, even though they would not present a significant destruction risk”.

Less than a month after the occupation of Mosul, “caliph” Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi began implementing one of the first practices used in his time by Prophet Mohammad against non- Muslims in Medina and Mecca (Christians, Jewish and people of other religions). Mosul and the surrounding area host a Christian community comprising approximately 3,000 people (out of  which one third have left their homes and left). As it happened 1,400 years ago, the “new caliph” presented these people four possible options: convert to Islam, pay jizzya – a negotiated tax allowing them to maintain their religious identity,  leave  the  town or be killed. The personal belongings of those who have left were confiscated for the benefit of Da’ish. The UN support mission in Iraq  condemned this decision; moreover they assessed it as being “crime against humanity”.
“Da’ish” can no longer be considered a national or domestic problem, approached by means of diplomatic  debates or  office agreements in accordance with the methods largely used after the killing of al-Qaeda’s leaders. The failure of this course emerged in the approach of  the  conflicts  in  Syria and Iraq and in the passivity of the Arab and international community as regards the establishment and the rise of the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” as well as the proclamation of the …caliphate in Syria and Iraq. The “Da’ish” must be considered a new face of the global war against terrorism, re- questing a new thinking and reevaluation of this Islamic anti-radical campaign, whose results are more and more overshadowed by the extension of fundamentalist neo-terrorism with an ascent that seems to be out of any kind of control.

From this point of view, we can say that the establishment and the rise of the “Da’ish situation” is greatly due to the great fiasco that ended the trajectory of the contemporary political Islam, from secrecy to leadership, questioning whether the political Islam – in view of the Egyptian, Tunisian, Syrian or Yemenite experiences – still has perspectives in the political equation of the Arab-Islamic world. The Islamism preaching slogans and alternatives inspired by the medieval age of Islam’s beginnings was substituted by a Salafist militant Islamism that built a holistic image of Islam, applied individually, according to circumstances and without spreading Allah’s words, but replacing Allah himself and imposing its rhetoric in the most prag- matic and brutal manners.

Under these circumstances, we question if the “encirclement” of the command, operational and logistic structure of the “Da’ish situation” can lead to its liquidation, as it happened, to various extents, with the structure led by Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban, Al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula and other Salafist factions that had activated in the terrorist-antiterrorist environment since 2011?

In  this  case  the  answer  is  without  a  doubt  negative.  The  “encirclement”  and “harassment” of the new terrorist-Islamist “situation” can no longer be considered a synonym with intelligence and operational actions meant to impede the multiplication and appearance of new terrorist factions and structures, covert by names inspired by the golden legends of the medieval past. It must focus on an idea frequently evoked in rhetoric, but very little applied in practice: the emptiness of the unique ideological fountain from which the radical-extremist Islamism feeds its components. Further discussions on the failed “civil state” as a supplier of terrorism would rhetorically support with different means the same objective as the “Da’ish situation”. Those people who, from one reason or another, are convinced to sacrifice them- selves or kill in deserts and cast terror in a forgotten village in the name of the “victory of the black pendant” over the “heretics” cannot be included in principles and criteria issued two dec- ades ago by the western intelligence services and governmental alliances that fight against an abstract terrorism which is the same all over the world.

There is no difference between the Shiite, Sunni, anarchist or nihilist terrorism when their common objective is to serve a certain religion or despotic ideology. Deeper issues occur when these trends interact with states or with the states’ intelligence services. The Sunni al- Qaeda is illustrative as an example: ever since it appeared until it split into numerous small groups that still operate, al-Qaeda has had a lot of independence, being overpowered only by the abstract concept of “Islamic nation” and the global Muslim caliphate.

Nowadays, terrorism preserved its Islamic ideological independence and is associated to more or less structured groups of interest, including in terms of financing, ordered objectives and targets or temporary alliances that serve to the achievement of the objectives they fight for. Beyond the organizational and command structure, the “culture” of this type of terrorism is characterized by a long quiet period dedicated to preparation, during which the affiliated or selected elements that are to become jihadists deal with social inclusion in the surrounding society, either in the outskirts of the cities or in tribal peripheral regions from the “failed” states, as it is the case in the south of Yemen, in countries from the Horn of Africa or in Caucasus, and generally in the areas selected to be turned into areas appropriate for expansion in order to be turned into   Islamic “territories” or “emirates”. This is a time when social insertion takes place and local alliances are created based on the religious discourse and on social support or the provision of services for the poor, where the terrorist groupings are rooted in order to be further trained and pre- pared. This “foundation” largely explains the rapidity with which the fighters of Djabhat Al- Nussra from Syria or the fighters of the “Islamic State” of Iraq and Syria were able to advance and consolidate themselves in the field, being supported by the Sunni organizations from the occupied regions in the north-east of Syria and in most of the Iraqi territory until the border with Syria and Jordan. To this factor we must add the voluntary insertion of Sunni jihadist factions into the Da’ish, factions that possessed a large experience in the “battlefield”, like “Ansar al- Islam” in the north of Iraq or “Ansar Al-Shari’a” and “Beit Al-Maqdes” in the north and north-east of Syria, as well as the efficient exploitation of hostility that the Sunnis in both countries mani- fest in relation with the authorities that hold power, namely the Shiite government from Bagh- dad in Iraq and the Baath Alawi government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.

The Islamic State: the end of Iraq?
The dramatic developments in Iraq generated, as it was normal, numerous questions to which analysts tried to answer: how was it possible that the Iraqi army and the security forces, with more than 1 million troops (many of which were trained by American allies at costs of bil- lions of dollars) fell so quickly and without any significant fight against the jihadist attackers? How was it possible for the al-Qaeda organization Da’ish/ISIS to turn, into a short period of time, into an entity of rebels – many of whom are foreign mercenaries that were trained and practiced guerilla fights – into a real army organized and equipped for extension and occupation and capable in the same short period of time of humiliating the “prestige” of the Iraqi national armed forces and the “firm political determination” of the central government in Baghdad? Ultimately, which is the impact and what kind of consequences can these domestic and regional developments generate and which are the influences that they could have on the positions of the main players in their immediate vicinity and in the international community?
Western and eastern observers have been trying to explain the fall of the military in Mosul, where at the advice of their commanders, thousands of soldiers and leading officers have given up when hearing the simple rumor that the “black jihadists” of the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” were getting near.

The first observation here would be that the Iraqi army presents itself – in its functional, operational and behavioral dimensions as a group of armed militias, and not as it should be an organized national army. It is mostly made up of fighters from the former Shiite and Sunni militias that appeared during the 2003 invasion, of unemployed people eager to have a “job” and of people that joined in lacking national feelings or military believes, but who wanted to become heroes and get financial and social gains. After Paul Bremer, a former American civilian governor, brutally dissolved the Iraqi “Baath” army – an ideological army, well trained and experienced – the US focused on building the new “democratic” army on criteria not related primarily to the quality of people, but to the number of them, their fast and superficial training, inappropriate to  the  religious, ethical and  tribal  conditions.

Basically, the victory of  the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” is not likely on the long term and ultimately it will not be allowed by the main regional and international players. In Syria the Da’ish militias from the north of the country have already been bombed by the Syrian aviation beginning with the first half of July 2014, during an operation coordinated by the authorities in Baghdad and supported by the Russian Federation and the government in Tehran.
Under these circumstances, any settlement of the situation in Iraq that does not originate from a large consensus and national dialog between all the segments of the political arena will remain a simple situational temporary resolution of a problem that continues to exist for a long time.

 “Global caliphate” or Iraqi enclave?

Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s self-entitlement as “caliph” of the Muslim “empire” in the territories controlled by the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (Ad-Dawla Al-Islamiya fi Al-Iraq wa Suriya – Da’ish, the short Arab form, ISIS and EIIL abbreviations in English and French) and the continued territorial expansion of the “caliphate” (completed with the takeover of Sinjar city and the dam from Mosul in northern Iraq) have brought into light the cross-border and universal Islamic aspirations of this Salafist-jihadist group. Either well-founded or elusory, these territorial-expansionist and ideological ambitions brought into the attention of analysts and observers an interesting aspect related to the transnational attractiveness of the Islamist-terrorist organization: there is an increasing number of Iraqis and Syrians that can no longer take the endless political conflicts between the numerous partisan militias that have been damaging the Iraqi society and decide to join the Da’ish, considered to be a possible savior of Iraq, a solution to es- cape the slough brought in by the western invasion and by a government incapable to reestablish stability and social understanding in the country. The transnationalism of the Da’ish is equally supported by the increasing number of fighters – mercenaries or not mercenaries – that come from outside the country, including the western non-Islamic world, that decide to join the “caliph” Al-Baghdadi. In spite of these characteristics, facts indicate that we are dealing with an Islamist entity that employs old tactics and methods in order to gain and consolidate authority and control in a geographic area of a state in which its real social and identity coordinates and roots can be found – Iraq and the Iraqi tribal extensions from the north of Syria – without which Da’ish cannot provide strategic geographic depth that allows it to support its claims of being – as said by Al-Baghdadi – “a representative of the global Muslim nation”. Its rapid geographic advance that has occurred since June must be realistically regarded from the point of view of at least two factors: the deficiencies of the Iraqi military forces, with a cohesion strongly influenced and weakened by the regional, tribal and family feelings of belonging or interests of the soldiers and commanders, on the one hand, and the fact that terrain gains of the Da’ish mujahidin forces occurred “at home”, in the Iraqi social, traditional and religious environment, where the former Iraqi al-Qaeda faction that currently became “Da’ish” managed to survive after the over- whelming defeat of the Sunni revolts in 2006-2008. At the same time, the “native” Iraq has al- ways been the place where the fate of the “caliphate” and of the Salafi organization led by the fanatic adventurer Al-Baghdadi will be decided.

There is a series of possible analogies that could facilitate a better understanding of the extent at which Da’ish could extend, of what it could do and of what it would not be able to do under the effect of its global euphoria. First of all, al-Qaeda’s experience in Afghanistan proved that no matter how strong its transnational ideological motivation would be, those adopting and promoting it require, primarily, that its roots be deeply anchored in the local social environment. It is true that during its Afghan period, when al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden attracted numerous isolated, alienated or unfulfilled individuals in their societies, it would have not survived without the solidarity and loyalty connections to an armed faction that was created by the society, in this case the Taliban rebels that are indivisibly a part of the Pashtun society of Afghanistan. This can greatly explain the ease of the 2001 American invasion in casting out the Mujahedin, but not the Taliban rebels. Da’ish cannot be placed in an analogical relation with the Taliban as long as it exists and operates inside Iraq, but if we think about Syria, it is in a similar situation with the “old” al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Da’ish may consolidate its positions in Syria – and it proved to possess the necessary potential to do so – just like the Taliban were able to implement themselves firmly in the northern districts of Pakistan, near the border with the neighboring Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani “comrades” were unable to seriously and stably extend beyond their social, religious and traditional environment. From this point of view, we can say that the future – more or less predictable – of the “Islamic State” will largely depend on the manner in which it manages to maintain “the cord to its origin”, which keeps it connected to the origin named Iraq and Iraqi society.

Even the attractiveness that the organization has for Sunni jihadists remains limited to the socio-religious environments. From this point of view, an illustrative example is given by Lebanon, whose multi-religious morphology and marginalization of the Sunnis led to the situa- tion in which the only source of candidates for the jihadist adventure of Da’ish to be these Sunni enclaves, while the recruitment possibilities for the future jihadists depend only on the option of the people belonging to other Salafist groups in Lebanon, a situation similar to what happened in Syria.

In Jordan, Da’ish can attract jihadists coming from the isolated elements of the society, from the demographically rich areas – to be found around Amman and Zarqa suburbs (Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi came from this environment). Their desire to fight in Iraq reached its peak after 2001 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, so that it would be difficult to say that the Jordanian Mujahedin would show the same enthusiasm to enroll in large numbers under the black flag of “caliph” Al-Baghdadi.

Even in Syria, where Da’ish managed for the first time to overtake vast regions in the north of the country in 2001, “The Islamic State” is considered to be a foreign entity whose leaders and commanders are of other nationalities than the Syrian one – Arabs, non-Arabs, Iraqis. The victories of Da’ish in Syria are first of all due to the dissentions, conflicts and weak- nesses of the other rebel factions, be them Syrian or Islamic multinational, which allowed the Islamic State to take them under its control or extend its own authority on the areas that they controlled. The social “matrix” of Da’ish is rather limited to the north-eastern extremity of the Syrian national territory, where its authority has been imposed by constraint, thus creating powerful and latent tensions between the local tribes and associations of clans, on the one hand, and  the  Iraqi “invaders” on  the  other hand.  By rapidly  exploiting  the  weaknesses  of  the “competitors” and by establishing temporary alliances that were cancelled once they were no longer useful, Da’ish offers the second analogy in concept and tactics, this type with the former leader Saddam Hussein, who, in 1968, along with a small group of people originating from Tikrit, established alliances with other officers from the military so that later he could disembarrass himself of these people by means of his famous “purification”. At present, Da’ish is committed  to  eliminate  all  rebel  structures and factions in Syria by “purifying” regions in the north-east of the country – governorates Raqqa, Hassakeh and Deir-Ezzor and to ex- tend offensives towards districts Alep and Homs for the same purpose. All that al- Baghdadi  can offer to his comrades is  an Iraqi-Syrian enclave, isolated on land and landlocked,   without   any   secure   access routes to the oil fields and the energy market, no recognition and mostly, with no experience in social administration and management.

No matter how much hostility the Iraqi Sunnis would have towards the central govern- ment in Baghdad, they do not want the “Da’ish” option for the creation of their expected and desired “free future”. At the same time, as long as the Iraqi political class does not reach a consensus on the crisis, which would include all the social and religious categories and layers in the decision-making and leadership process, as announced by the new Iraqi Prime-Minister Heydar Abbadi, “Da’ish” will not hesitate in using the crisis and chaos to consolidate its “mini- Islamic state” with the same methods that had been used by Saddam Hussein in order to impose his absolute authority on the Iraqi society. As for the “universal caliphate” that  Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi and his idealists are dreaming about, it remains, at the most, a future subject to be included in the memoirs of the “caliph”.

“Da’ish” in the geostrategic context

NATO’s “historical” summit held in Great Britain, 3-4 September, was dominated by the shadows of two “participants” whose positions and actions cause great concern to the entire political and public international community: “tsar” Vladimir Putin and “caliph” Abu Bakr Al- Baghdadi. They independently managed – by what happens at Europe’s and at NATO’s east- ern border on the one hand, and by what happens in the Arab Middle East Mashreq, on the other hand – an unprecedented performance in all the time span after the end of the Second World War and the fall of the former communist bloc: they opened the way for a new cold war with the potential of escalating at any moment; a war in which the participants are no longer two military and ideological opponents, but three parties: the laic West with its armed branch called the North Atlantic Alliance, the Russian Federation that Moscow aims at promoting in all its previous splendor and greatness and the Arab-Islamic East that faces the treat (along with the entire international community) of dealing with the revival of the brutal medieval Islamic rule and Allah’s globalized leadership at global levels.

The leaders attending the Wales summit agreed on two fundamental issues out of a se- ries of issues that were included in the summit’s agenda: to create a new surrounding wall of the Russian Federation by installing a belt of several NATO military bases from the north to the south of the eastern border of Europe and create a military alliance that would include, at the beginning, 10 NATO members, an alliance that would be enlarged with other Arab states hav- ing the mission of fighting against the “green danger” represented by the jihadist terrorist organization named “the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant”. This alliance, characterized by editorialist and commenters and a “sweet and sour coalition”, proves at least several things that raise suspicion in the Arab world: first of all the lack of imagination of the western decision- makers who only repeated the model used by the United States in Afghanistan, Iraq and against Gaddafi’s regime, but not against the Baath regime of Bashar al-Assad; “a sweet and sour alliance” meaning that the western participants with their air forces and navy stationed in territorial waters, far from the battlefield could assume the role of warriors without troops in the field, while  the proper confrontation (and loss of lives) could be arrogated to the allies whose central role will have to be given to the Iraqi government (and not the Syrian one!) led by the newly appointed Prime-Minister Abbadi – a government whose army is equal to that that gave up the fight when faced with the fighters of “caliph” Al-Baghdadi. The decision to hastily create a coalition also proved the perpetuation of this incoherence as well as the same old hesitations and indecision that characterize the western community.

Was it really necessary so much time to achieve a serious and objective evaluation of the danger represented by the expansion of Salafist Islamism, and particularly for the achievement of a fast consensus on the counteracting measures that need to be implemented? It is difficult to guess something like this, since when the Iraqi city of Mosul and the northern part of Syria were taken over, there were many people who rhetorically signaled the seriousness of the situation. Prime-Minister David Cameron and the American President were two of the most fervent supporters of this idea. At the end of June, during an interview for the press, Barack Obama said: “I believe that we are facing a seri- ous threat that cannot be eliminated before the end of my current presidential term”. When the American president ordered the first air attacks against the “Islamic State”, Obama did not set the objective of stopping the expansion of Islamism, but of protecting the Iraqi Kurdistan, ethni- cal and religious minorities and the American people from this expansion. This initial sub- evaluation of the jihadist ampleness, intentions and potential is caused, according to all prob- abilities, to the Obama doctrine called light footprint, materialized in the wide use of air attacks and the avoidance of ground operations – a possible effect of the concern towards the “saturation” of the Americans when it comes to the American military’s commitments in costly wars outside the national borders. The “sweet and sour” touch that the Arab journalists attrib- uted to the haste in making the decision at the NATO summit was not considered to be a resul- tant of the immediate commitment to stop the jihadist wave, but rather an emotional reaction (including meant to calm the American spirit) to Da’ish/ISIS’s dramatic decapitations of journalists  Foley  and  Sotloff  and  to  the threats of repeating these acts of cruelty against other American or British citizens that could have the same dramatic fate.
In this con- text, we are dealing with at least three questions whose answer exceeds the limited framework of the anti-Islamist campaign in Iraq:

1. Which will be  the   position  of the US and NATO and in general of the western community as related to Syria and the jihadist Salafism that activates in this country? On 21 August, the reserved General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, rhetorically said at the Pentagon: “Is it possible for the ISIS to be defeated without taking into consideration the presence and the actions of this organization in Syria? The answer is definitely no! In order to complete things, we must take action in Syria”. This uncompromising evaluation was later on confirmed by President Obama who told the press that: “We will do what we have to do to protect the American people and to make justice after the barbarian assassination of James Foley. We will carefully examine what needs to be done and we will not be impeded in this respect by any border” (hinting here at the border of Syria – our note). Afterwards, the statement was nuanced both by President Obama and by the American Secretary of State John Kerry: the coalition will operate in Syria without requiring the approval of the Security Council as long as the Damascus regime has lost its legitimacy and the Salafist danger is more urgent than any other diplomatic consideration or international law. The alternative was assessed by the Syrian authorities as “aggression” if it takes place without the consent of the Syrian government, while the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov said that an intervention in Syria without the approval of the Security Council would be a serious violation of the principles of international law. Under such circum- stances, the US would be facing a particular difficulty: unlike Iraq, which they are very familiar with considering their 9-year occupation and the data offered by the intelligence services in order to prepare operations against Da’ish, Syria is terra incognita due to the lack of contact with the authorities in Damascus, which, ironically, are currently offering their cooperation for the fight against terrorism. (On 25 August, the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Walid Al-Moallem said that his country was “prepared to cooperate with the international community, including the United States of America and Great Britain, in the fight against terrorism”. The Syrian minister added that “any possible attack on objectives from the Syrian territory must be carried out in cooperation with the leadership in Damascus.”)

Barack Obama’s cooperation with the Syrian regime is problematic, even if the American leader authorized American drone raids on Da’ish objectives in the north of Syria without the acceptance of Damascus. There is also another sensitive issue: what will happen with the Syrian regions freed from the Islamic State and Salafism that fight in this country? Will the Syrian opposition be sufficiently united and strong to provide and support their functionality, even against the possible attempts of the regime to regain them by using force in order to “ensure the territorial integrity and unity of the country?”

Beyond disappointment and denial to cooperate, be it limited and temporary, between the western community and the Baath regime, what does not change is the fact that on the one hand, the desire exists and its achievement depends only on the accounts of each party, thus remaining in incertitude (until proven otherwise, if Washington makes the decision that “since Bashar al-Assad’s regime lacks legitimacy, a military intervention in Syria would not require his approval”). On the other hand, if Syria is not included in the future plans of the coalition, the campaign against the “Islamic State” might show the world – unfortunately – only the empty half of the glass.

2. The second question is the following: to what extent is the jihadist Islamism of Da’ish/ ISIS a danger for the stability and security of the Arab monarchies in the Golf since, as we al- ready know, the presence and potential threats of the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” have turned into an obsessive psychosis? There is no secret in the fact that as long as the Salafism of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was highly important in the monarchic interests of Saudi Arabia primarily so that it imposed its own approaches in relation with the Damascus regime, the former Iraqi Shiite religious government of Nouri Al-Maliki and the conflict between the Sunnis from these states and the Shia expansionism of Iran, jihadism was financially and logistically supported by generous “sponsors” from the western part of the Golf (a formula rhetorically used so that it avoided the explicit nominalization of direct governmental implications). Such generosity risks at becoming currently too costly: according to an Arab proverb “the spell reflects upon the sorcerer”, because the Islamic State turned into a type of evil spirit freed from the lamp in which it has been locked for many years, which openly declared its ambition to extend control over a large part and possibly the entire Arab-Islamic East and remove the Arab regimes that it considers to be “corrupt” and deviated from  the  “real  faith”. The rhetoric pattern of the new Salafist ji- hadism places the ab- solute hereditary monarchies  from  the  Golf on top of this list.

According to Osama bin Laden’s recipe, if the “western crusaders” cannot be attacked on their own territories, they will have to be made to come willingly to the Middle East by attacking Islamic locations that would spontaneously lead to the creation of another Afghanistan or another Iraq, in other words, new fronts in which the “great war” against the “unfaithful” could take place. This is the thinking that made “caliph” Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi to threaten with the invasion of Kuwait in August and afterwards with the invasion of Saudi Arabia, where the Kaaba temple would have been destroyed as a symbol of “pagan worship of rocks” (an allusion to the famous Black Rock from the walls of the temple, venerated by all the Islamic people of the planet). The other oil monarchies are dealing with similar problems, since approximately 4,000 Saudi jihadists and other 1,500 originating from the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Qatar are currently activating in the service of the “Islamic State”.

3. Finally, the third question that concerns politicians, analysts and the media refers to the role and position that the United States and the Islamic Republic could have in the context of the “Da’ish phenomenon”. If – excepting situational and strongly opportunistic options – a real cooperation between the West and Damascus in the fight against jihadist terrorism remains an uncertainty, things are different in the case of the Tehran regime, since it is one of the main supporters of President Bashar al-Assad and the government in Baghdad, having a powerful predilection for the Shiites and Iranians, being at the same time a target of immediate perspective for the American Administration’s regional relations. In mid-June, the “reforming” President Hassan Rohani was giving America “the hand of cooperation” – a gesture obviously opportunistic in the context of the Iranian-American negotiations that were in progress. The head of the Iranian state said: “If we see that the US is decided to take firm action against terrorist groups, then we could consider cooperation with the United States”. The offer gave rise to reactions in the US. Two days later, when questioned about a possible coordination and military cooperation or any other kind of cooperation with the Islamic Republic in order to support Iraq which was half- controlled by the jihadists of the “Islamic State”, Secretary of State John Kerry: “we do not exclude anything that could be constructive”. In fact, confidential discussions on this theme have already taken place in Wien between the Americans and the experienced negotiator Richard Burns, in the context of recommencing the final round of negotiations with reference to the Iranian nuclear programs (cf. Jay Solomon, 15 July, www.http//online.wsj.com). Despite the reciprocal suspicions, a relatively rhythmical coordination between the US and the Islamic Republic of Iran seems to be taking place together with the first air raids carried out by the American troops at the beginning of August against some locations and installations of the Islamic State.

If President Barack Obama maintains his decision of not using land forces in anti-Islamist operations, the Iranians are not to follow the same pattern, despite the repeated denials about the military Iranian presence in the neighboring of Iraq. What is illustrative for Tehran’s availability is that it appointed at the end of June General Qassem Soleymani, the commander of the elite Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to mobilize, organize, restructure and consolidate the regular Iraqi army and the Shiite militias from this country, on considerations that it would protect the sacred Shiite locations from Najaf and Samarra, threatened with the invasion and occupation by the Da’ish fighters (cf. “The Guardian. 14 June, http// www.theguardian.com). The presence of the Iranian forces on the ground against the Islamic State would be welcome in terms of facilitating the air operations by establishing, pinpointing and communicating coordinates of the Da’ish targets to be attacked and destroyed during airborne operations. The American- Iranian cooperation in the anti-Islamist campaign cannot be surprising if we consider the developments in the relations between Washington and Tehran, which have already been materialized at the end of 2013 when an Interim Agreement for Multilateral Negotiations had been signed, supposed to become a final agreement by the end of this year. The fight against Islamist radicalism and Sunni extremism embodied in the “Islamic State” can stand as a convergent point between the American and the Iranian interests.

Possible perspectives

In the general context of the geostrategic implications of the western commitment in the Middle East, there is one thing that should be carefully be given thought by the Arab governments before turning to the help and rescuing intervention of the foreigners: the fact that the “Islamic State” did not came from the void or the prehistoric caves, but that it is the product of the Arab-Islamic society, created from its structures, realities and contemporaneity and developed in an Arab environment with Arab-Islamic moral, financial and logistic support. Consequently, according to logics, the “Islamic nation” (Umma) should be the first to be involved in the correction of errors made intentionally by giving up fatalism and the old tradition of blaming others for all the consequences of their own acts and deeds.

After September 11 and more recently after the developments of extremism embodies by the “Islamic State”, the Arab governments and media generally blamed the United States and the West for “not taking action”, for “hesitating to intervene” and save the world from al- Qaeda. After the NATO summit in Great Britain which established the creation of a 10-state- coalition, there were mentions of a “sweet and sour” coalition, of a “new western invasion” in the Arab-Islamic world and the doubt, criticism and blames remained at a constant level in this respect. When the number of countries joining the alliance got to 40, turning thus the community of the Middle East into an isolated isle, in less than a week, until September 11 (a memorable day due to the attacks that happened 13 years ago), 10 Arab states (the 6 Arab monarchies from the Gulf, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon) plus Turkey decided to join the international coalition as well.

Under the new strategic conditions that are being created in the Middle East and in view of the reactions that the western world and NATO are trying to unify in order to be afterwards applied, it becomes more and more evident that the United States of America finds itself at a turning point in which it needs to reevaluate its policies towards the Middle East, in terms of evaluating the efficiency and justify the maintenance of Barack Obama’s policy of avoiding a military commitment in this part of the world. From this perspective, we can easily understand that the regional presence and expansion of “Da’ish” and its increasing danger is the factor that finally decided the return of the US and of the West to the direct intervention policy in the region. This was the real reason, not – as some may have superficially believed – the decapitation of the two American journalists. It is interesting to notice that until the barbarian killing of the two journalists, President Barack Obama constantly sustained that the US does not have an elaborated strategy to fight the Islamic State, even though several days later the American President started to speak about that same strategy. It is even more surprising that the leading power in the global war against terrorism considers that it takes a “global war” to destroy a band of fanatics! The statement made about the lack of a strategy can be considered more like an emotional expression of a situational context created by an emotional event – the decapitation of the two journalists.

The United States do have strategies. The American superpower has always had a strategy whose general coordinates worked during all the major events of history when intervention was required. The strategy was not invented overnight. The coordinates of the strategies have always been focused on maintaining the balance of power between the involved countries in a specific part of the world, so that it does not allow the rise and consolidation of a certain power at the cost of another one and ultimately, to the detriment of the United States’ strategy. In the Middle East there are at least three such powers that aspire to a local privileged regime that could affect the controllable balance of power and influence: Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Da’ish/ISIS does not stand as an existential threat to America’s national security interests and it can be annihilated even without the alliance made up of more than 40 countries and armies of the world. Nevertheless, its disappearance would not mean that radical jihadism will also disappear, since it is able to find new fertile locations where it could grow and enhance, perpetuating the general threat of the world. The direct involvement of the three regional powers mentioned above does not mean that they are “tied” and committed – willingly or not – to a common “global objective” that forces them to use or moderate their desire to disrupt the regional balance.
Barack Obama did not delay the announcement of the strategy for the “new long war” against Islamist terrorism. The main coordinates of this strategy consist of a US and probably British airborne war against the presence of the Islamic State and Salafism in general in Syria and Iraq, while ground operations were being deployed in Iraq by other regional states whose role is to be later established; the military and logistic support provided to the Iraqi government led by Heydar Abbadi; the consistent arming of the “moderate” Syrian opposition; the training of the Syrian rebels from the neighboring countries (Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia); coordination of intelligence aimed to identify and annihilate financing and procurement channels of the Islamic State; the support and protection of the civilians and ethnic and religious minorities from the countries affected by the jihadist-Salafist groups and other tactical measures that are characteristic to war, which will probably never be revealed to the public. One of these measures – in case they have already been established – refers to the post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq and in Syria – an objective that numerous analysts consider to be “colossal”. If Iraq, with its oil reserves and incomes of approximately 100 billion dollars obtained from oil, manages to sup- port more substantially the reconstruction efforts, things are quite different in the case of Syria because its economy, including the oil one, is practically destroyed. In this case, after annihilating the jihadist-Salafist problem, someone will have to contribute to the Syrian reconstruction.

The United States will definitely commit to some of the reconstruction effort, but it would not cover the entire financial and logistic support required. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates which supported the Syrian uprising and the “revolutionary Salafism” will probably be the countries that will significantly participate in this post-conflict reconstruction effort. This is one of the problems included on the agenda of discussions that John Kerry had in Jeddah. The results will be known at an ulterior moment. The other problems and difficulties that the anti-jihadist coalition will be probably facing originate from the situations and crises that characterize the Arab-Islamic societies and whose explanation can be found in the issues that erode the government system, the concept of power and the functions of the Arab countries’ institutions, as well as the relationship between them and the various ethnic, religious, tribal, cultural and traditional components of the societies existing in the Arab world. In the recent years, after the beginning of the “Arab spring”, many of these cultural, political and social vices have been brought to light and we notice that their defining coordinates are similar, whether it is about Iraq, Syria, Libya, or Palestine, Egypt of the Arab Maghreb.

With reference to the revival of the radical Islam, put across by the rise of Da’ish, the international community and the Arab-Islamic world have finally shown an almost unanimous desire to fight and annihilate the radical Islamism and violent terrorism in general. This perspective is not a new one; it had appeared after the September 2001 attacks and grew in view of the “Arab spring”. Which was the result of the “global war” against religious radicalism and terrorism 13 years after it commenced? More terrorism, more violence! More militias and armed groups and organizations! In 2001 there was practically one “fashionable” terrorist group – al- Qaeda. At present there is no credible inventory of the violent Islamic – Sunni or Shiite – entities or structures. Al-Qaeda turned into a simple Islamic faction that is strongly competing in the mosaic of terrorist-jihadist groups that activate in the Arab-Islamic world and which is in full process of expansion in the region and at an international level, asserting themselves as new and threatening elements in the global geopolitical and geostrategic equations and possessing overstate and cross-border potential. Da’ish proved – even though it happened at a lower scale for the time being – that the growing Islamism is able to ease political boundaries and impose new “Sykes-Picot” agreements, this time built on the criteria of implementing Allah’s governance on earth. Prior to the Islamic State, in 2012, “The Party of Allah” (Hezbollah) assumed the same right of ignoring frontiers and sent its militias to Syria in order to protect the dictatorial regime of Bashar al-Assad. Hezbollah was acting in this manner as a political party, with representation in the legislative and executive institutions of the Lebanese state, but Da’ish is not part of any state, it is not recognized by any states and is at war with all the countries that op- pose its utopia to transform the Arab-Islamic world and the non-Islamic world into a universal caliphate. These two examples are enough to show the two faces of Janus, the double image of religious radicalism and extremism: the one offered by Da’ish, above any law and strongly opposed to the traditional concept of nation-state, embodied in the Sunni radicalism, on the one hand, and the Shiite radicalism encouraged and supported by the regional and international centers of Shiite religious influence, created according to the principles of the Islamic revolution.

For the time being, the new episode in the war against terrorism seems to continue to ignore the strongly religious and political nature and specificity of the Islamist terrorism, considering it from the point of view of an exclusive military confrontation. The United States and its allies are still conceptually avoiding giving an extended redefinition of terrorism in the frame- work of which it would consider not only the American security interests and anti-terrorist legislation, but also the ideological, doctrinal and political nature of terrorism. The reason that stands beyond this position can be found in the fear of facing a new reality. Under the present circumstances, if the definition of terrorism would be extended, it would practically mean that the West and the North Atlantic Alliance would have to face an alternative that nobody desires at this time: either support the Syrian Baath regime led by Bashar al-Assad in his supposed fight against the Islamic State and Salafist Islamism in general, or to declare a total war to this regime and the terrorist groups that infest the Arab-Islamic Mashreq, which would mean in fact, entering a latent belligerent stage with the main sponsors of the regime and of the terrorist franchises: Iran, the Russian Federation, China, Hezbollah, on the one hand, and the Arab monarchies on the other hand, since they were the ones that openly or covert have always supported the ultra-radical Islamism.

The anti-terrorist coalition can be a positive development only if it were given a “road map” that took into consideration the “post-conflict” options and the possibility of a complete or partial failure, as well as the roles that each member will have within the alliance.
On 12 September, American General John Allen was appointed the military coordinator of the “global” alliance against Da’ish. General Allen possesses a lot of experience in the fight against terrorism: in 2006-2008 he led the American troops in Iraq in the famous “Sunni trian- gle” from the west of the country and, together with the Sunni local tribes, he built the famous Sahawat militias that played a very important role in the removal of the al-Qaeda Mujahedin from the west of Iraq. In 2011-2013, in Afghanistan, he led the international coalition (ISAF), after having been nominated in 2012 for the supreme military commander of NATO.

At the same time and almost simultaneously, the spokesperson of the Department of State and of Pentagon said that “starting now, the United States is at war with the terrorist organization the Islamic State – a war that America will carry just as it fought against the terrorist network al-Qaeda”. The statement, in Iraq’s case, seems to be either too optimistic, or it is meant to prove America’s determination to annihilate the Islamist terrorism. While being in Florida on 17 September for a meeting with his generals, Barack Obama reaffirmed his decision of not sending American ground troops in the war against Da’ish. At the same time, the new Iraqi Prime-Minister Heydar Abbadi officially stated that Iraq would not accept foreign military troops on its territory. From this perspective, the strategy of war seems rather simple: Da’ish will be attacked by the aviation and by the Iraqi forces, possibly supported by the American military “advisors”. The question that appears here is: in this case, why was it necessary to mobilize 40 states? Was it necessary for logistic, informational, civilian protection reasons, for missions that are not directly connected to the active campaign? Analysts consider that there are too many countries for such a “small” war. This unprecedented mobilization has already created numerous questions and doubts about America’ long-term objectives when it created the anti-terrorist coalition. “Is it only anti-terrorist?”

The coalition can practically take action at any time in a war that is estimated to be a very long one, as the American officials assessed. There is one question to be discussed here, though the issue never came up in the media and probably not even during the summit in Wales or at Jeddah or in other governments from the Arab world: will the “new war” be a punctual one, with the objective of destroying the Islamic State and the active fundamentalism in its area of operations (Iraq, Syria and probably Lebanon) or is it a war planned to change or create the premises for a positive reformatory change in the entire Arab world of the Middle East? Will it release energies that draw about the general reevaluation of the eternal crises that have been characterizing this part of the world for a very long time – corruption, authoritarianism, religion as a political weapon, religious weariness, selfish interests and traditional approaches, the revival of “Arab solidarity” and of the “common Arab action”, the reestablishment of relations between power and the society, between the state and religion and between tradition and the imperatives of contemporaneity?
Without such thinking coordinates that could be brought as close as possible to implementation, we could speak about another useless war in the Middle East, that would open the way for new conflicts and inferences in the region, as well as for new reconfigurations of geo- strategy and geopolitics in the framework of a new cold war already introduced to the world.

 

*First published in “Geostrategic Pulse”

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Middle East

Shifting Middle Eastern sands spotlight diverging US-Saudi interests

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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A series of Gulf and Middle East-related developments suggest that resolving some of the Middle East’s most debilitating and devastating crises while ensuring that efforts to pressure Iran do not perpetuate the mayhem may be easier said than done. They also suggest that the same is true for keeping US and Saudi interests aligned.

Optimists garner hope from the fact that the US Senate may censor Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman for the October 2 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul; the positive start of Yemeni peace talks in Sweden with an agreement to exchange prisoners, Saudi Arabia’s invitation to Qatar to attend an October 9 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit in Riyadh, and a decision by the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) to cut production.

That optimism, however, may not be borne out by facts on the ground and analysis of developments that are likely to produce at best motion rather than movement. In fact, more fundamentally, what many of the developments suggest is an unacknowledged progressive shift in the region’s alliances stemming in part from the fact that the bandwidth of shared US-Saudi interests is narrowing.

There is no indication that, even if Qatari emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani decides to accept an invitation by Saudi king Salman to attend the GCC summit rather than send a lower level delegation or not attend at all, either the kingdom or the United Arab Emirates, the main drivers behind the 17-month old economic and diplomatic boycott of the Gulf state, are open to a face-saving solution despite US pressure to end to the rift.

Signalling that the invitation and an earlier comment by Prince Mohammed that “despite the differences we have, (Qatar) has a great economy and will be doing a lot in the next five years” do not indicate a potential policy shift, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash insisted that the GCC remained strong despite the rift. “The political crisis will end when the cause behind it ends and that is Qatar’s support of extremism and its interference in the stability of the region.,” Mr. Gargash said, reiterating long-standing Saudi-UAE allegations.

Similarly, United Nations-sponsored peace talks in Sweden convened with the help of the United States may at best result in alleviating the suffering of millions as a result of the almost four-year old Saudi-UAE military intervention in Yemen but are unlikely to ensure that a stable resolution of the conflict is achievable without a lowering of tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Even humanitarian relief remains in question with the parties in Sweden unable to agree on a reopening of Sana’a airport to facilitate the flow of aid.

More realistically, with the Trump administration, backed by Saudi Arabia and Israel, determined to cripple Iran economically in a bid to force it to alter its regional policies, if not change the regime in Tehran, chances are the Yemeni conflict will be perpetuated rather than resolved.

To Yemen’s detriment, Iran is emerging as one of the foremost remaining shared US-Saudi interests as the two countries struggle to manage their relationship in the wake of Mr. Khashoggi’s killing. That struggle is evident with the kingdom’s Washington backers divided between erstwhile backers-turned-vehement critics like Republican senator Graham Lindsey and hardline supporters such as national security advisor John Bolton. The jury is out on who will emerge on top in the Washington debate.

The risks of the Saud-Iranian rivalry spinning out of control possibly with the support of hardliners like Mr. Bolton were evident in this week’s suicide bombing in the Iranian port of Chabahar, an Indian-backed project granted a waiver from US sanctions against the Islamic republic to counter influence of China that support the nearby Pakistani port of Gwadar.

Iranian officials, including Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and Revolutionary Guards spokesman Brigadier General Ramadan Sharif suggested without providing evidence that Saudi Arabia was complicit in the attack that targeted the city’s police headquarters, killing two people and wounding 40 others.

Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency, believed to be close to the Guards, said the attack was the work of Ansar al-Furqan, an Iranian Sunni jihadi group that Iran claims enjoys Saudi backing.

Iran’s allegation of Saudi complicity is partly grounded in the fact that a Saudi thinktank linked to Prince Mohammed last year advocated fuelling an insurgency in the Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan that incudes Chabahar in a bid to thwart the port development while Mr. Bolton before becoming US President Donald J. Trump’s advisor called for US support of ethnic minorities in Iran.

In a bid to create building blocks for the fuelling of ethnic insurgencies in Iran, Pakistani militants have said that Saudi Arabia had in recent years poured money into militant anti-Iranian, anti-Shiite madrassas or religious seminaries in the Pakistani province of Balochistan that borders on Sistan and Baluchistan.

The divergence of US-Saudi interests, agreement on Iran notwithstanding, was on display in this week’s defeat of a US effort to get the UN General Assembly to condemn Hamas, the Islamist group that controls the Gaza Strip. Saudi Arabia, despite the kingdom’s denunciation of Hamas as a terrorist organization and its demand that Qatar halt support of it, voted against the resolution.

The vote suggested that Mr. Trump may be hoping in vain for Saudi backing of his as yet undisclosed plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute that is believed to be slanted towards Israel’s position.

Saudi ambassador to the UN Abdallah Al-Mouallimi said the defeated UN resolution would “undermine the two-state solution which we aspire to” and divert attention from Israel’s occupation, settlement activities and “blockade” of territories occupied during the 1967 Middle East war.

Saudi Arabia’s changing status and the divergence of longer-term US-Saudi interests was also evident in this week’s OPEC meeting in Vienna.

To get an OPEC deal on production levels, the kingdom, once the oil market’s dominant swing producer, needed an agreement with non-OPEC member Russia on production levels as well as Russian assistance in managing Iranian resistance, suggesting

The agreement, moreover, had to balance Mr. Trump’s frequently tweeted demand for lower prices, and the kingdom’s need for higher ones to fund its budgetary requirements and Prince Mohammed’s ambitious economic reforms and demonstrate that the Khashoggi affair had not made it more vulnerable to US pressure.

The emerging divergence of US-Saudi interests in part reflects a wider debate within America’s foreign policy community about what values the United States and US diplomats should be promoting.

With some of Mr. Trump’s ambassadorial political appointees expressing support for populist, nationalist and authoritarian leaders and political groups, the fact that some of the president’s closest Congressional allies back the anti-Saudi resolution illustrates that there are red lines that a significant number of the president’s supporters are not willing to cross.

All told, recent developments in the Middle East put a spotlight on the changing nature of a key US relationship in the Middle East that could have far-reaching consequences over the middle and long-term. It is a change that is part of a larger, global shift in US priorities and alliances that is likely to outlive Mr. Trump’s term(s) in office.

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Qatar’s decision to leave OPEC

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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The Emirate of Qatar will leave OPEC as from January 1, 2019.

The primary reason for this choice is the Emirate’s project to become the world leader in the natural gas market, raising its production from 77 million tons per year to 110 million tons. However, there is obviously also a geopolitical and energy decision underlying Qatar’s current choice.

This is the Emirate’s final response to the boycott and blockade imposed by Saudi Arabia on Qatar in June 2017, with the support of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Yemen, Maldives, the Libyan GNA, Egypt and Jordan – based on Saudi Arabia’s generic accusation whereby Qatar was supposed to sponsor and support “terrorism” on its own.

The blockade was imposed two days after President Trump had met as many as 55 Heads of Arab and Muslim countries to build a sort of NATO equivalent, always against “terrorism” – an alliance to be set up immediately to counteract, above all, the Shiite and Iranian danger.

Let us leave aside the twenty-eight pages taken from the report of the US Senate on September 11, which would definitively prove the connection between those Al-Qaeda operatives and the Saudi regime – as well as the many multiannual reports of private and public funding to the jihadists and finally the lines of credit opened again by eminent citizens of the Wahhabi Kingdom in favour of Al Baghdadi’s Syrian-Iraqi Caliphate.

The Saudis, however, are too rich not to be believed, especially by the USA – hence the great blockade on Qatar succeeded also with the support of some Western countries.

For the whole Middle East, their troops, like the US ones, reported to CENTCOM, at the Al Udeid base  having its headquarters precisely in Qatar.

The strategic characteristics of Qatar, which today wants to build its autonomous natural gas organization –  independent of the oil one of OPEC, which does not deal with gasand is, however, dominated by Saudi Arabia –  are many and particularly interesting: firstly, the Qatari people are probably the richest citizens in the world.

If we assume that the Americans’ average income is 100, that of Qatari citizens is 187.4.

Just about the size of the Falkland Islands, the Emirate has 1.9 million residents, with a very high and growing share of immigrants.

From 2000 to 2010 the Emirate’s economy grew by a 12.9% average per year.

Its future growth up to 2022 is expected to be 18% higher than the current one.

There is also an interesting geopolitical sign: Qatar  participated – with great commitment – in the Western operations against Gaddafi by supporting, in particular, the black market of Cyrenaica’s oil, together with the Turkish intelligence services.

Nevertheless Qatar supports also some “rebel” jihadist Syrian groups against Assad, thus doing half a favour to US allies – while hosting, since 2013, a political office of the Afghan Taliban, which is well known and also frequented by the US intelligence service operatives.

Qatar’s global industrial and financial investments, however, are manifold.

Through its sovereign fund, the Emirate owns significant shareholdings of the Agricultural Bank of China – and certainly the Qatari decision to leave OPEC has been blessed by China. It also has shareholding in the Airbus Group; the London Stock Exchange (15.1%); Volkswagen (17%); Lagardère, a large and diversified media and publishing company; the Paris St.Germain football club; the Virgin megastore;  the HBSC, one of the largest banking groups in the world; Credit Suisse (5.2%) and Veolia, a French water and gas utility and service company.

Not to mention the countless real estate operations: Porta Nuova in Milan; Westin Excelsior in Rome; Gallia in Milan; Costa Smeralda in Sardinia;  Deutsche Bank; Barclay’s; Royal Dutch Shell; Tiffany; Siemens; the Heathrow airport; Walt Disney and the Empire State Building.

In addition to many other shareholdings not mentioned in this paper.

However, it has also a 3% shareholding of Total, which for Italy is an extremely important sign; a majority shareholding of the Miramax entertainment and movie company, as well as shareholdings in Rosneft, the Russian giant of natural gas and raw materials, and in the big five-year project for liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) in Germany and in the EU – a 30 billion US dollar project, of which 10 invested for Germany alone.

Therefore, between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, in the fight  between oil producers and natural gas extractors, there is a real war for the hegemonic conquest of technologically advanced areas and of Europe, in particular, with a view to definitely acquiring markets and using their diversification opportunities.

Moreover, Qatar is at least as rich in natural gas as Iran (and, together with the Shiite Republic, it participates in the exploitation of the South Pars II marine field), but also as the Russian Federation.

The new  Qatar-centred “gas OPEC” means, therefore, that there is no longer the US-friendly Sunni oil OPEC,  precisely the one that organized the great petrodollar recycling started after Egypt and Syria’s Yom Kippur war against Israel in 1973.

Oil recycling at a “high” price against the US dollars which, after the end of the Bretton Woods agreements, led to the new hegemony of the US currency and its inappropriate exchange rate, despite its internal fundamentals.

“The dollar is our currency, but it is your problem”, FED Governor Paul Volcker said to his fellow Governors of the European Central Banks.

At that time, there was not yet the weak and irresolute timidity of the Euro to make the picture more complex.

The European currency is not a lender of last resort, but it plays the game of the global currency as an alternative to the US dollar, with the operational results we can imagine.

It is therefore no mere coincidence that the only strategic uses of the Euro were the minimum Iranian ones, in the oil Stock Exchanges of the islands in the Persian Gulf, or the more paraded than real ones by Saddam Hussein.

In essence, reverting to the geopolitical sense of the very recent Qatari decision to leave OPEC, this means that the 600,000 barrels/day of oil extracted from Qatar are considered fully marginal by it and certainly can never compete with Saudi Arabia’s 11 million barrels/day of Saudi Arabia.

Qatar plays the game with its natural gas – it does not play its oil cards.

The current Qatari operation, however, implies a strategic choice in the near future, which could be the creation of a “gas OPEC” with Russia and Iran, in view of a doubling of the LPG prices in 2019, with China becoming the world’s LPG top consumer and the USA the world’s top oil extractor, albeit with the new and expensive shale techniques, which generate profits only with high oil barrel prices.

Or an economic and financial alliance between Qatar, China, Japan and Russia, which could marginalize the dollar area by reducing it to oil.

At geopolitical level, this will certainly mean greater instability – not necessarily fully peaceful – between the Emirate and the Saudi Kingdom, while the former will invest – also within the EU – in the industrial processing  of LPG, which mainly regards plastics, resins and all synthetic products from hydrocarbons.

If Russia – which also plays on the Saudi table – will be able to control its oil production, in line with the Sunni OPEC, the Qatari operation will be successful, but only for the creation of the new LPG market, and Qatar will not affect the positions already reached by Saudi Arabia and its  allies.

Conversely, if Russia and Iran increase oil production, the pro-Saudi OPEC will definitely collapse and the African, Indonesian and South American production areas shall  look for other regional cartels and, hence, for other geopolitical axes.

Furthermore, the bilateral relationship between the USA and Saudi Arabia will be put to an end, given the new US production and oil power, its global exporting capacity and, finally, its autonomy from the Middle East political and financial cycles.

Moreover, according to the Emir’s policy lines, the Qatari economy  is focused on attracting and accumulating foreign investments, especially after the 2017 blockade, which has attracted much capital from Asia and the Middle East itself,  in addition to the opening of new ports and the creation of  new Special Economic Zones.

Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar have used the so-called Arab “springs” to broaden their personal power and create strong competition among the Gulf countries.

Moreover, Qatar has used the phase following the Arab “springs” to redefine its traditional expansion axes: the special relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood and its traditional link with Iran.

The Emirate, in fact, believes that the Muslim Brotherhood is the central axis of Arab politics and, hence, intends to support it.

While all the others repress it, in line with Saudi Arabia.

Even after the fall of the “Muslim Brotherhood” regime in Egypt – with the coup organized by Al Sisi in 2013 against Mohammed Morsi – Qatar keeps on supporting the fraternal Ikhwan or also Hamas and all the other organizations that have integrated into the global network of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Saudi tension with Qatar also results from the Qatari geo-economic link with Iran and, above all, from Iran’s  economic growth after the 2014 JCPOA agreements on the Iranian nuclear capacity. Saudi Arabia wants to avoid said agreements leading to the economic, oil and military recovery of the Shiite Iran.

Furthermore it cannot be ruled out that, in the near future, Saudi Arabia – possibly supported by the USA, which now believes in every “counterterrorist” storytelling – even organizes a coup against Al-Thani and the current Qatari ruling elite.

The sequence of attempted and failed coups is already long.

It would be a geopolitical suicide, but it may happen.

Pakistan, Bangladesh and other countries are now dependent on the remittances sent from Qatar by their fellow citizens to their homeland, even if, as countries, they sided with Saudi Arabia during the blockade imposed on Qatar in 2017.

Since the beginning, however, Tunisia refused to condemn Qatar (and Italy should be more careful to these infra-Islamic shifts), while Turkey – which operated with Qatar  during the Libyan jihadist uprising – does not accept the Saudi diktat. The same obviously holds true for Iran and – probably less intuitively – for Oman.

After an ambiguous phase, even the Russian Federation  – which had not well foreseen the internal conflict on Qatar within the Gulf Security Council in 2017 – has gradually  linked itself to the Emirate, even without questioning its ties with Saudi Arabia.

Moreover, the United States has even discovered it still has a large military base in Qatar and hence cannot afford a worsening of the infra-Arab conflict and, above all, of the infra-Wahhabi conflict between Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Obviously the issue of relations between Qatar and “terrorism”, or the link between Qatar and Iran, is a completely uncertain and widely manipulated issue.

The Emir’s speech that expressed support for Iran and Hamas and criticized the other governments of the region – a speech that allegedly was to be held on May 23, 2017 – was never delivered. There had been announcements widely publicized by the Saudi and Emirates’ news agencies, but the Emir’ speech had never been delivered.

In this regard, the official Qatar’s news agency in Doha talked about the hacking of Qatari websites, but not even this is certain.

There is also the issue of the one billion US dollars paid  as a ransom to “bandits” in Iraq by some members of the Emir’s family.

It is ascertained that part of that money arrived at the Syrian Al-Qaeda “section”, Jabhat Tahrir al Sham, with a share of funds that – not too strangely – later reached the Iranian government.

Certainly there is also the already-mentioned support for the Muslim Brotherhood and there are now ascertained links between the Ikhwan and some Iranian financial and political-military networks.

Everything is possible in the Middle East.

In Doha there is also a “historical” office of the Palestinians and also one of Hamas, which has always been an integral part of the Muslim Brotherhood, while it is certain that large amounts of money were sent by Qatar to the Egyptian Brotherhood during Morsi’s government and that the Ikhwan militias from every part of the Middle East were trained in Qatar.

Obviously, at least initially, the guerrilla warfare in Libya after Gaddafi’s fall was a clash between the forces supported by the Qatari intelligence services and those organized by the other Emirates, with a specific role played by Turkey – a loyal ally of Qatar – above all at economic level.

Westerners’ stupidity did the rest.

Moreover, Qatar also sent its troops so that the Sunnis could regain control in Bahrain during the 2011 Shiite uprising.

Nor should we forget that, apart from the Al Udeid US base in Qatar, Turkey itself is building its base in Qatar for as many as 5,000 soldiers – a base located in Tariq bin Ziyad, south of the capital city.

However, how does the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – the instrument of confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Qatar – work?

Is it not affected – like OPEC – by an internal weakness that blocks it for any relevant decision?

The GCC was founded in 1981. However, the monetary union, which has been gradually abandoned by Oman and the Emirates, has never been reached.

And the GCC still regards Iran as an “imperialist” factor of radical destabilization of the Arabian peninsula, especially with the organization of Shiites in Saudi Arabia and in other areas of the Emirates.

The Shiites within the Saudi regime account for 15-20%, especially in the major oil extraction areas. Obviously the Saudi regime does not want to destabilize these areas and, above all, it does not want to break the link between the USA and the Sunni world of the Arabian Peninsula – a break that, in the near future, would lead to the victory of the Iranian  Shiites.

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Middle East

Iran: Which way to go?

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The US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), seriously hampered the chances for keeping the landmark accord in place.

The accord, signed in 2015 by the P5+1 group of countries — China, Germany, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States — with Iran, requires Tehran to maintain a peaceful nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.

According to the IAEA, Iran strictly abides by the terms of the JCPOA, while the international community is unable to do the same, no matter how much politicians in the EU and other countries would like to stick to its provisions – all because of US pressure.

Sadly, the United States has financial and economic levers to punish not only Iran, but also foreign companies doing business with the Islamic Republic. Given the choice of either maintaining business relations with the US and the rest of the world or with Iran alone, there is little wonder which of the two options they will go for. This doesn’t necessarily mean that they will do this under US pressure. Business always goes where the money is and sticking with the US looks a more profitable way to go. This is exactly what business-savvy Donald Trump is staking on.

In 2018, some 100 foreign companies, including big ones as Shell, Volkswagen, Daimler, Peugeot, Airbus, Total, PSA, Siemens, and Russia’s LUKOIL and Zarubezhneft, started pulling out of Iran even before the US sanctions, announced by President Trump in May, actually took effect. However, although bending under Washington’s pressure, the authors of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany) as well as the European Union as a whole and many other countries around the world are still interested in keeping the nuclear accord alive. Why?

First, the JCPOA is a truly historic document which, possibly for the first time ever (not mentioning, of course, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – NPT) has curbed the nuclear ambitions of a particular country and put its nuclear program strictly in line with international laws and IAEA requirements. This is a vivid example of the world countries’ effective diplomatic work, which created a precedent of genuine confidence of the parties for the sake of preserving the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Secondly, Iran a leading player in the volatile region of Western Asia, which incorporates the Middle and Near East, the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea zone, and Central Asia.

Thirdly, it should be borne in mind that Iran is a powerful source of hydrocarbons, and that its territory is an important transit route for oil, natural gas and other products to the world market. A well-educated population and a relatively developed industry and agriculture attract the attention of world business. In addition, the 70-million-strong Iran, which boasts one of the world’s biggest militaries, is an important factor in West Asian and world politics.

What needs to be done to resist US sanctions and, thereby, save the JCPOA?

To solve this complex task, Iran and all countries willing to preserve the accord, above all Britain, France, Germany and the EU as a whole, should work together. This is already being done now with the direct and active participation of Russia and China.

Today, the main priorities are:

Providing legal assistance to companies doing business with Iran. The practical implementation of the EU-declared blocking statute, which declares null and void US sanctions against Iran on its territory, prohibits European companies from observing them, as well as implementing any decisions by foreign stemming from these sanctions. The blocking statute also allows European organizations to take legal action to make up for the losses incurred as a result of the implementation of sanctions at the expense of persons who caused these losses (meaning the US government).

It is also necessary to establish an independent payment system that would safeguard European businesses against US sanctions on Tehran (a special purpose vehicle, SPV, to facilitate financial transactions with Iran) with the possible involvement, among others, of the French and German central banks.

The EU is creating a special legal entity to carry out transactions with Iran. Other participants will be able to join in, which will allow European companies to work with Iran in keeping with European legislation – something like the SWIFT banking system, only on a European scale and based on the euro.

This will be an extremely difficult task for Europeans, both from “political” (a real challenge to the US) and technical standpoints. EU foreign policy chief, Frederica Mogherini, said: “The involvement of the Finance Ministers of the E3 [France, Germany, UK] is of key importance at this stage. They are working hard to finalize it. I cannot tell you a date, but I can tell you that work is continuing and is progressing in a positive manner.”

In his turn, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said that this was fraught with problems.

“We need to redouble our efforts here and this is what we are doing now with both Europeans and Iranians.”

Meanwhile, the Iranians, who have so far been strictly implementing the terms of the 2015 nuclear accord, are losing faith in the EU’s ability to resolve the problem. Therefore, it may take several months to see whether this plan is really working.

Speeding up the process of shifting to the use of national currency in trade with Iran (primarily by Russia, China, India, Turkey, which have done this before) would be of much help to Tehran.

In order to move around the financial and banking hurdles erected by the United States, it would be advisable to enlist the help, whenever possible, of Islamic banks in Muslim countries for cash transactions to and from Iran. The Islamic banking system has its specific features that are hard to destroy from the outside, even by a financial superpower like the United States.

The same is true about small and medium-sized companies in Muslim countries used as intermediaries in financial transactions with Tehran. Moreover, it is small and medium businesses, and not necessarily in Muslim countries alone, that can play the main role in maintaining trade and other economic relations with Iran.

Therefore, it would be equally desirable for the EU to provide legal and financial assistance to small and medium-sized companies in Europe, which are willing to do business with Iran, and to shift the main load from big companies to medium and small firms for financial transactions with Iran in Euros. Even though they will hardly be able to completely replace the giant companies, small and medium-sized firms have all they need to offset at least part of the losses. According to Iranian estimates, Tehran hopes to establish business relations with many of the 23 million or so small and medium-scale enterprises in Europe in order to circumvent US sanctions. Moreover, Iran has good experience in getting around tough sanctions between 2012 and 2016.

What can Tehran do under these circumstances?  First and foremost, it should establish a business triangle of Iran-EU, Islamic banks and Islamic small and medium-sized businesses, build close trade and economic partnership with European and other small and medium-sized businesses. This is quite feasible because the Americans will find it hard to keep an eye on a huge number of enterprises, much less trace their transactions in Euros, especially if the European Union contributes to such cooperation with Iran.

Iran’s Supreme Economic Coordination Council recently allowed the country’s private sector to sell crude oil abroad as a way of circumventing US sanctions. This is the first time the Iranian private companies have been granted permission to trade in oil. Tehran should avail itself of this opportunity as soon as possible.

As for Iran’s time-tested methods of tackling sanctions like, for example,  the use of “ghost” oil tankers, which switch off their automatic identification system (AIS) transmitters not to disclose their route and destination, as well as selling “unrecorded” oil at reduced prices, I can assume that these methods have been used before and are being used today.

It seems that, in view of the situation at hand, Tehran should also recall its oil-for-goods project with Russia, prepared back in 2014, whereby Iran supplies oil to Russia (at least 100,000 barrels per day – about 5 million tons a year) in exchange for industrial equipment and machinery. Four years ago, the plan was never implemented in full because Iran, already withdrawing from the sanctions regime in keeping with the JCPOA, was no longer interested in it.

There was only one shipment made in November 2017, to the tune of 1 million tons. The project could be revived now. Russia’s Promsyryeimport, which is part of the Russian Energy Ministry and was created expressly with this project in mind, will implement the Russian side of the deal.

A program of developing two Iranian oil fields, Aban and Peydar, by Promsyryeimport (which replaced Zarubezhneft) and Iran’s Dana Energy Company, could also be considered.

Overall, the across-the-board cooperation between Russia and Iran against US sanctions could contribute very significantly to minimizing their impact.

Tehran will certainly put to maximum use the great potential of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which proved so effective during the period of hard-hitting sanctions of 2012-2016 and which controls between 25% and 35% of the country’s economy and 25% of all its capital.

In 2012-2016, the IRGC set up a large-scale system of circumventing the sanctions by controlling considerable “gray” financial flows to, through and out of Iran. IRGC intelligence was gathering information abroad about the “weak” spots in the sanctions system, about the most effective ways of circumventing sanctions, and was also obtaining data on new technologies Iran was not allowed to buy.

Iran and countries opposed to US sanctions against it are looking for ways to ease their impact. Even though completely neutralizing the negative effect of these sanctions will hardly be possible, a certain let-up is quite possible.

Well, the Iranian response to the US sanctions could at times be controversial, but Washington’s exit from the JCPOA and the US sanctions themselves are by no means legal either.

In October, President Hassan Rouhani warned that the previous four months had been a difficult time for the Iranians and that the coming few months would be equally hard. He said that the government would make every effort possible to tackle the situation. Meanwhile, Tehran says it will stick to the terms of the JCPOA as long as its other signatories (save for the US, of course) do the same. Can they do this?

The situation is complex and unpredictable. For Iran, much will depend on whether the JCPOA is kept alive without the US, if Tehran is able to maintain, albeit limited, financial and economic cooperation with foreign countries, primarily with small and medium-sized businesses, and whether it is satisfied with the results of this cooperation.

How will the sanctions, and especially the fall in oil production and exports, affect the national economy and the life of ordinary Iranians? A good question, given the impact the internal political situation can have on the alignment of political forces in the country.

The outcome of this struggle may not take too long coming. Maybe six months, when a European mechanism against Washington’s unlawful withdrawal from the JCPOA and the resumption of its sanctions on Iran is already in place and the deadline set by President Trump for the eight importers of Iranian oil has expired.

First published in our partner International Affairs

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