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Why we need to be patient with Russia

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Twenty years ago, Russia was a mess – no longer an enemy, not even an adversary and certainly not a partner. What was feared most was a collapse that might turn Russia into something resembling the former Yugoslavia, all pire. “I don’t like it when the U.S. flaunts its superiority,” complained Russia’s then president Boris Yeltsin, who insisted, “Russia isn’t Haiti…Russia will rise again.”

Events now confirm that; Russia is back. And it’s back as a bully to former Soviet holdings in Europe, as a challenge to the United States, and as one of the self-proclaimed leaders of what is allegedly a post-Western world.

This isn’t just a burst of imperial nostalgia akin to that of some European states a few decades ago. Nor is it a moment of post-bipolarity funk – a rebellion against an all-powerful America that didn’t make time for Russia when it was the time to do so, and a revolt against a uniting Europe that didn’t make room for its larger neighbour when it had been hoping for an invitation. As always, ghosts linger on. Seven decades of Soviet governance failed to bury centuries of Russian imperial history. La grande Russie doesn’t stay passively silent for long: her vocation is to be heard and expand, not to withdraw and shrink. The “soul” attributed by former U.S. President George W. Bush to Vladimir Putin after their first meeting in June 2001 mourned two decades of disrespect. Shorn of nearly a quarter of the Soviet Union’s post-1945 territories, Russia was still too big, too near and too nuclear for such treatment – not yet a true European power, but still a leading power in Europe. Russia thus longs for its imperial past, and the vexing question is how to impress upon its government in Moscow that there are limits to self-image that the Russian state can no longer sustain and which the West need not tolerate any longer.

“When Russia was weak in the 1990s,” remembers former U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates, a self-described hardliner on the Soviet Union, “we did a poor job…managing the relationship for the long-term.” The mistake, then, was to pay insufficient attention to Russia’s legitimate interests and concerns. Now that Russia looks stronger, the mistake would be to exaggerate the significance and relevance of those interests. America’s unfinished business with Russia is part of Europe’s own unfinished business, one half of which consists of an ever closer Union while the other half is being undone by national identities that challenge the EU member states’ sovereignty.

The end of the Cold War came abruptly. There was no cease-fire, no peace conference, no formal treaty and no settlement. As the Soviet Union held an unprecedented real estate sale, the West helped itself. What was in Europe was the Russian state of 1917. It might have seemed dead – “Mort à jamais?” as Marcel Proust had asked – but not forever or even for long. It was not wise to dismiss centuries of history that had seen Russia’s territories expand by one Belgium a year for 300 years, that had brutally imposed the Russification of ethnic minorities, and had relied on authoritarian and even totalitarian rule to subjugate its people.

Now it’s Vladimir Putin’s turn to dismiss his country’s most recent defeat and ride at the head of an anti-Western posse against what he calls the world’s “one centre of authority, one centre of force, and one centre of decision-making.” But that moment, too, will pass. As Russia’s economy runs out of gas, so to speak, it also finds itself short of energy – meaning; people and even security space. Over time, an under-developed, de-populated, and encircled Russia has no credible alternative to closer co-operation with the West. Too much history and too little geography separates Moscow from a dangerously ascending China, reportedly Moscow’s alternative of choice.

Boris Yeltsin had whimpered that if there was no clear winner, at least the Cold War had produced no loser. “We’re not talking about a relationship between superiors and inferiors, but between equals,” he wanted his “friend” Bill Clinton to know. There were echoes of Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 who insisted that defeated France should be treated as a co-equal. “If there are still allied powers,” Talleyrand told his victorious interlocutors, “then I do not belong here.” Of course, the legendary French diplomat was one of a kind, but in October 1991, on the eve of its collapse, the Soviet Union was also invited by the United States as the triumphant state to co-chair the Madrid Conference which then-Secretary of State James Baker viewed as “the end game for peace” in the Middle East. A decade later, Putin attacked his country’s implicit surrender and its dismemberment as a geopolitical catastrophe, “impossible to imagine” even while it was taking place.

In autumn 2008, the violence and intensity of the war in Georgia were, according to Robert Gates, “eye openers” that demanded “a different set of lenses.” “Russia’s behaviour,” he announced, “has called into question the entire premise of our [strategic] dialogue and has profound implications for our security relationship going forward – both bilaterally and with NATO.” On the whole, though, he ignored his own warnings, which were not heeded by either by the two presidents he served as Secretary of Defence. On the contrary, a newly-elected Barack Obama soon sought a reappraisal, or reset, of U.S.-Russian relations, as if to make amends. Now however, Putin’s will to re-adjudicate the verdict of History restores a sense of conflict that can no longer be ignored by those he charges with having “not simply robbed” but altogether “plundered” his country.

The confrontation between the West and Russia in the spring of 2014 is no more about Ukraine than the 2008 war in Georgia was just about Georgia. Neither of these countries is a core American interest, and the EU states have shown little interest in bringing either into their Union any time soon. Ukraine and Georgia before have been crises for Russia more than for the West, and what has made of “their” crisis “our” problem is Russian behaviour that in each case has threatened the European institutional and territorial order built up over the past 60 years. From the start, though, Putin was not discreet about his intentions – how he viewed Russia and what he thought of the West. “A proud man who loves his country,” nevertheless felt George W. Bush, deceptively moved by a “sense of Putin’s soul.” In his first major speech after Putin returned to the presidency which he had for a while loaned to Dmitri Medvedev, Putin urged the Russians “not to lose themselves as a nation” and to reject the “standards imposed on us from outside” at the expense of “our traditions.” In a dubious replica of Ronald Reagan 20 years earlier, the Russian president unveiled an “evil empire” – a U.S.-led, post-Christian Western world said to be exporting godlessness, permissiveness, and moral depravity. Unlike Mikhail Gorbachev, Putin does not want a common home with Europe, but hopes instead to build one of his own: No longer Russia in Europe or even Europe with Russia, but Europe to Russia and even, at least for the post-Soviet space, Europe in Russia.

Why Nikita Khrushchev chose in 1954 to return Crimea to the Soviet Republic of Ukraine is more puzzling than Putin’s decision to return it to Russia. A proletarian intellectual who goes to the geopolitical barricades to fight for what he believes more than for what he knows, Putin echoes Nikolai Danilovsky, whose brand of Russian nationalism nurtured Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s belief in a “Great Russian hegemony” dedicated to “a great renewal … for the whole world” which, wrote Dostoyevsky, was endangered by a Western civilisation whose invasion “begins with luxury, fashions, scholarship, and art – and inevitably ends in sodomy and universal corruption.” That same conviction makes of Putin a gambler prepared to bet heavily on a doctrine of imposed self-determination for what he claims is, “the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders.”

Nor is the renewed confrontation between Russia and the West about more recent but no less spurious analogies. Comparing Putin to Hitler, and interpreting his discourse as a translated rendition of Mein Kampf, is no more constructive than comparing Nazi Germany to post-Soviet Russia. Tantamount to assimilating spring 2014 with autumn 1938, the analogy is hardly relevant when the Western democracies today show so little interest in waging the war against Russia that they should arguably have favoured in the 1930s over appeasement. History does not grant time outs for the replay of bad calls. Similarly, evoking a new Cold War with Russia is to return to March 1948, and call for the rollback that the United Sates might have favoured over the containment that the influential commentator Walter Lippmann at first dismissed as a “strategic monstrosity.” Get real: conditions with Ukraine are not comparable to those that prevailed in Munich, or on the eve of the coup in Czechoslovakia; Putin is no more a menacing reminder of Hitler or Stalin than Obama is a reincarnation of Neville Chamberlain or Franklin D. Roosevelt.

“There will be costs for any military intervention,” warned President Obama in February 2014, on the eve of the Russian annexation of Crimea. But pray tell: what was there for Putin to fear after he had witnessed a year earlier Obama’s reluctance to enforce his own “red lines” in Syria with John Kerry himself calling their threatened strike “unbelievably small”? There has been little Obama could do relative to how much Putin can take, in Ukraine and even some of the non-NATO territorial space in Europe. After the military option has been taken off the table, what’s left is pontification – about being on the wrong side of history, as Obama put it – to deter an adversary whose sense of history goes the opposite way.

“Not to rush to judgment,” advised veteran American diplomat George Kennan after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, and “not to write off the Russians and their leaders. Patience, patience – that’s what we need.” That may well be sound advice, but for how long and how far? There is a long game to be played: don’t provoke Russia and its leaders with empty threats, to be sure, but don’t indulge Russia and its people with too much “understanding” either. Let it be stated once and for all: History does not owe Russia the apologies it owes Ukraine and other territorial pieces of Europe’s tragic geography of pain. That is the area where can still be heard the silenced sounds of war, and where can best be smelled the worst odours of death. As historian Timothy Snyder has noted, more Ukrainians were killed fighting Nazi Germany than American, British, and French soldiers combined – not to mention the millions who had been starved to death by Stalin before the war. The history of Russia has been written by what it did to its people and in the lands of its neighbours rather than the other way around.

In short, the Russian government does what it does because Russia is what it is: a country unable to imagine life without empire, and unprepared to populate its new democracy with truly democratic leaders. The annexation of Crimea was not just Putin’s way of showing Obama his manhood, rather it is a renewed bid to fulfill the idea the Russians have of themselves and of Europe. Russians may not like all that their president does, but over 80% of them approve his action. Meanwhile, Obama satisfies the broad preference of Americans who wish to do less in the world, but his foreign policy approval rating shows support from fewer than one person in three. It is as if there was public embarrassment and even some shame relative to the way in which Americans as a nation like to think of themselves.

You know where to begin, noted Kennan on more than one occasion, but often ignore where you’re going to end. So it was after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, and with the division of Germany in 1949, and since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. First Georgia, and since then with Crimea and Ukraine, Putin started “something” – but what? Does he know where he is going? In the same vein, Obama has shown he knows how to stand up to the so-called swaggerers – but will he also know where to stand up, and for what? This is Kennan turned inside out: knowing how it will end because of the limits of Russian power may actually be easier than knowing where to begin. War is no longer the way of history, but how do you bring along those whose own history takes them another way?

Over 40 years ago, President Richard M. Nixon hoped to put in place a strategy that would calibrate interests and capabilities. Knowing “when it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest” was not easy then, with a surge of Soviet power and the rise of “new influentials” which Nixon viewed as the introduction of a new multipolar order. America, he pledged, “cannot – and will not – conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defence of the free nations of the world.” Now as then, Obama’s foreign policy reticence is shared by a majority of Americans who want “to come home.” But also like them, it is a source of concern for a large number of America’s closest allies in need of strategic reassurance. The irony is plain for all to see. Ten years after the fiasco in Iraq, the global demand for American power has never been higher, but its credibility rarely lower and its reliability more in doubt.

To convince its friends, a preponderant power must be right; to tame its enemies it must be strong; to do both, it must inspire trust. All too often Obama has appeared to do the reverse – at best, right for what he said but weak for what he did and ineffective in the way he did it. By his own account, comfortable with complexity – “the big things” as Bill Clinton noted – Obama can easily win an argument, but a lack of attention to what follows often leaves his exchanges with adversaries unheard, his reassurances not implemented, and his likeable personality not trusted. In any case, this, too, is not just about Obama but, more broadly, about a post-American world. Long past the Cold War, and possibly past America’s prime too, this is not a world an emerging post-Western America understands well: every power a potential ally but every partner a possible adversary, depending on needs and urgency; every judge a penitent and every penitent a judge, depending on the case and the moment – Kosovo and Crimea, Iraq and Syria, Moscow’s Afghanistan and Washington’s Afghanistan, and so forth.

Obama did not originate this world – one in which the dwindling U.S. supply of security for growing world demand since the Cold War, comes together with a reduced world supply of security for rising American demand since 9/11. Nor did Obama “lose” Putin or “betray” Crimea any more than Roosevelt betrayed Eastern Europe at Yalta and Truman lost to Stalin at Potsdam. Still, there has been too much loose talk in the United States about rebalancing, to Asia or elsewhere; too much ill-timed talk of a reset, with Russia or others; too much vacuous talk, about leadership from behind and too much dismissive talk about the EU and its leaders or about Putin and his leadership. Words can impress momentarily for their elegance, but they matter more durably for their substance. Admittedly, Putin is not in Obama’s intellectual league, but more plainly, he can nonetheless hammer home his points the old fashioned way – with the domineering Slavic idea of a strong and united Russia.

After World War II, the strategy of containment was embraced as a third way between appeasement and war, the two options that had been pursued by the Western democracies during the interwar years – the former to avoid the latter until the latter grew irresistibly out of the former. Fears that containment was too passive and could not rollback Soviet advances were proved wrong, and whether a different strategy would have achieved rollback faster seems unlikely. What is now known is that after some initial geopolitical confusion, the Soviets were stopped until they ran out of time, and the United States was careful to look elsewhere whenever the Soviets used force to control their half of Europe, in Hungary and elsewhere. With war on behalf of any non-NATO or non-EU country now largely ruled out in the West, Russia’s renewed passion for empire must be denied with a firm yet prudent narrative similar to that of President Truman in March 1947.

How best to assist Ukraine begins with the plaintive recognition that little can now be done to keep the country entirely whole, or even free. Twenty years of Western neglect stand in the way of the former goal, and centuries of territorial and cultural intimacy with Russia constrain the latter. The echoes of past calls for the early “liberation” of Eastern Europe during the Cold War still resonate. “What are you proposing to do,” John Foster Dulles was asked when Secretary of State. And President Eisenhower answered at the start of the 1956 crisis in Hungary when he announced that “the day of liberation may be postponed where armed forces for a time make protest suicidal.”

What followed – a “holocaust,” wrote Eisenhower – should not be forgotten. But we must face the fact that Russia’s annexation of Crimea will not be reversed any time soon, if ever, and preventing further amputation is the best that can be expected. History still shapes Ukraine’s destiny – two peoples in a single country that urgently needs a new constitutional formula to if it is to maintain its unity. But geography, with borders shared by seven neighbours, also gives Ukraine pivotal significance for Russia and the West. Attempts by either to build Ukraine up as an outpost against the other will not go unanswered and would deepen a dangerous geopolitical fracture in the heart of Europe.

The 1955 neutralisation of Austria, concluded at a time when Moscow could have imposed partition, is an adaptable precedent. For 40 years after that, Austria was left out of the Western institutions, but the West was not kept far away from Austria. That time-out was well used, for Austria gradually became a non-member member of the European Community, thereby easing its transition to full EU membership shortly the end of the Cold War. By comparison, a quarter of a century of bad governments has made of Ukraine a failed state which the EU is unwilling to adopt and which Russia looks unable to rehabilitate. We should also consider Russia’s own condition – the state of its economy, the health of its society, and the efficacy of its own governance. Russia is back, admittedly, but not as Yeltsin had hoped: however influential it wants to be, this is a demandeur state whose staying power suffers from a lack of capabilities, including people; dwindling market power, including oil; and shrinking security space, with an expanding NATO in the West, while China grows ever stronger and more intrusive in the East and Islam more unsettled and even threatening in the South. These are the facts of geographic and economic vulnerability which Gorbachev understood when trade, mostly with Eastern Europe, amounted to less than 4% of the total Soviet economy. Now, Russia’s foreign trade represents 30% of GDP, with more than half of its exports going to the West, mostly to Europe and mainly consisting of oil and gas sales that contribute the major share of Moscow’s revenues. Add to this Russia’s need for Western capital for technology purchases and the question of who needs whom is clear. Even as the West lacks the military will to deter Putin in the short term, it has the economic power to alter Russia’s behavior before long.

When asked what he thought of Western civilisation, Gandhi reportedly answered that “it would be a good idea.” At 65 years of age, the transatlantic alliance, too, still looks as if it would be a good idea. The obstacle to putting the idea into practice is not a matter of capabilities or even commitment. Rather, what is lacking is the confidence that the capabilities will be used effectively and the commitment assumed evenly; absent such confidence, the will to act is lacking. For the European allies who have become used to relying on the United States for waging, winning, and ending their wars, the recent display of inefficacy in Iraq and Afghanistan is squarely un-American. But if not the United States, who? For Americans who have repeatedly urged Europe to do more, the institutional standstill since the 2008 financial crisis is increasingly exasperating. If Europe cannot be rendered capable as a Union, how can it be responsible for its own security?

These questions, and the expectations they raise, have surfaced many times before. Now, however, their resonance is being heightened not only by Russia’s resurgence in the East but also by Germany’s influence in the EU and America’s drift to Asia and other influential newcomers. In other words, the Western alliance is once again troubled by a Russian problem which the United States can no longer ignore, a German problem which the EU can no longer hide, and an American problem which NATO can no longer dilute. The balance of military forces appears to favour Russia more than ever before; rarely, too, has the balance of economic influence been as favourable to Germany as it is now and never has America sounded less European.
In all these cases, the dilemma is daunting. This is a surprising end to a century of total wars that were fought mostly around these two European superpowers and where there was decisive American leadership. Yet as the United States “pivots” to Asia, which it knows to be inevitable, it hopes for a Russia that is strong enough to not be tempted by China, but weak enough to not concern the EU. And it expects a Europe that is united enough to bury the past century with a fully completed union, but divided enough to depend on an American leadership that is still learning how to consult with, rather than merely inform its allies. Meanwhile, as Europe struggles with institutional questions that it knows to be indispensable, it awaits a Germany assertive enough to lead, but compliant enough to be overruled.

Back to Kennan, then: patience, patience – don’t provoke but indulge. What else? This is how the Cold War was won and half of Europe redone; this is how the other half of Europe will make the continent whole after it has been kept free. The strategic recipe hasn’t really changed much: To borrow from the quip of Lord Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General, America is still very much “in”, and while Germany should no longer be kept “down” (now that the EU is up), Russia must be kept “out” until such time as it’s prepared to come in.

First published by the Europe’s World, article re-posted per author’s permission

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Global protests: Russia and China risk ending up on the wrong side of history

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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Widespread perceptions see Russia together with China as the rising powers in the Middle East as a result of America’s flip flops in Syria and US president Donald J. Trump’s transactional approach towards foreign policy as well as Russian and Chinese support for regimes irrespective of how non-performing and/or repressive they may be.

Russia has sought to capitalize in other parts of the world, particularly Africa, on its newly found credibility in the Middle East as part of its projection of itself as a world power on par with the United States and China.

African leaders gathered in late October in the Black Sea resort of Sochi for the first ever Russian African summit chaired by president Vladimir Putin. China has hosted similar regional summits.

Mr. Putin has proven adept at playing a weak hand well and for now, Russia alongside China, that has the financial and trading muscle that Moscow lacks, are basking in their glory.

Yet, Russia and China could find themselves in tricky situations with protests across the globe from Latin America to Hong Kong threatening to put the two powers on the wrong side of history.

Iran, Russia’s partner in supporting Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and a strategic node in China’s Belt and Road initiative, is already struggling to come to grips with being in the bull’s eye of protesters.

Protesters in Iraq have denounced Iranian influence in the country while Iran’s Lebanese Shiite ally, Hezbollah, is part of the elite that protesters hold responsible for their country’s economic malaise.

Russia and China are well aware of the risk. Not only because of the resilience of protest in Hong Kong but also because of past popular revolts in former Soviet republics that constitute Russia’s soft underbelly and in some cases border on the strategically important but troubled Chinese north-western province of Xinjiang.

Recent protests in Kazakhstan were as much about domestic governance issues as they were about Chinese influence in the country and the crackdown on Turkic Muslims, including ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang.

Central Asia, moreover, is potentially for China a black swan. It is together with Southeast Asian nations Laos and Cambodia, home to countries most indebted to China.

A recent study by scholars at Harvard University’s Kennedy School, the University of Munich and the Kiel Institute for the World Economy concluded that about half of Chinese overseas lending remained unrecorded leaving Central Asian and other nations with no precise oversight of their debt.

“These hidden overseas debts pose serious challenges for country risk analysis and bond pricing,” the study warned.

The risk of ending up on the wrong side of history looms even larger with Russia seeing prevention and/or countering of popular revolts as one of its goals in attempting to stabilize the Middle East, a region wracked by conflict and wars.

Russia, as part of its stabilization effort in the wake of its intervention in Syria, has proposed replacing the US defense umbrella in the Gulf with a multilateral security arrangement.

“Russia is seeking stability which includes preventing colour revolutions,” said Maxim Grigoryev, director of the Moscow-based Foundation for the Study of Democracy, using the term employed to describe popular revolts in countries that once were part of the Soviet Union.

Echoing Kremlin policy, Mr. Grigoryev said Syria was “a model of stabilizing a regime and countering terrorism.”

Russian military intervention in Syria has helped president Bashar al-Assad gain the upper hand in a more than eight-year long brutal war in which the Syrian government has been accused of committing crimes against humanity.

Russia has denied allegations that its air force has repeatedly targeted hospitals and other civil institutions.

Russia’s definition of stability with Syria as its model is unlikely to go down well with youth-driven protests that have already affected twelve of the Arab League’s 22 members.

In some of the most dramatic incidents, this year’s popular revolts forced the leaders of Algeria, Sudan and Lebanon to resign. Iraqi prime minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi is next in line.

Latin America and Africa, like the Middle East and Central Asia, home to often poorly governed, resource-rich countries with youthful populations, are in many ways not that different.

Some Latin American leaders, including Argentine Foreign Minister Jorge Faurie and Luis Almagro, the secretary-general of the Organization of American States, have denounced what they see as interference in protests in Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia and Haiti by two Russia and China-backed countries, Venezuela and Cuba.

Ecuador’s interior minister, María Paula Romo, said last month that authorities had arrested 17 people at an airport,  “most of them Venezuelans . . . carrying information about the protests.”

Policy analysts Moisés Naím and Brian Winter argued that irrespective of whether Venezuela and Cuba have sought to exploit continental discontent, “Latin America was already primed to combust.”

Messrs. Naim and Winter attribute popular anger to disappointing economic growth, stagnating wages, rising costs of living, mounting inequality, and corruption on the back of a commodity boom that significantly raised expectations.

Russian and Chinese support for embattled regimes at the risk of alienating protesters, who have proven in among others Chile, Iraq and Hong Kong undeterred by repressive efforts to squash their protests, will have paid off if it helps engineer the kind of stability Mr. Grigoryev is advocating.

Russian and Chinese leaders may be banking on a development akin to what Messrs. Moses and Winter describe as the emergence of repressive Latin American regimes in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of leaders’ failure to tackle slowing economic growth. The failure fuelled a decline of faith in democracy and the rise of populists.

“The same gears may churn toward mayhem and division, sown from within Latin American countries and without. Venezuela and Cuba may not be the main reason for the current protests. But if the region continues down its current path, it will be vulnerable to the next conspiracy, whether from Havana, Caracas, or somewhere else,” Messrs. Moses and Winter warned.

Events elsewhere in the world may well unfold differently. Yet, Russia and China could ultimately find themselves on the wrong side of history in an era of global breakdown of popular confidence in political systems and incumbent leadership and increasingly uncompromising, determined and resourceful protests.

Said Timothy Kaldas, a senior fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, commenting on the protests in the Middle East: “This isn’t a revolution against a prime minister or a president. It’s an uprising demanding the departure of the entire ruling class,” the very people Russia and China would like to see remain in place.

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Russia-Africa Summit: walking hand in hand through history

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The first-ever Russia-Africa summit held from 23-24 October in Sochi, Russia, marking the culminating point of the return of Russia to Africa, with more than 50 African leaders and over 3,000 delegates invited. This convening is only another illustration of the recent increase in economic, security, and political engagements to foster Russia-Africa relations.

The summit is expected to deepen relations between the Russian Federation and countries of the African continent at both bilateral and multilateral levels; forge closer collaboration on regional and international issues of common interest, raise strategic dialogue between Russia and African countries to a qualitatively higher level, and contribute to peace, security and sustainable development on the African continent.  The Russia-Africa Summit will also contribute towards the overall objective of addressing the aspirations of African countries as encapsulated in Agenda 2063. As the continental development blueprint, Agenda 2063 calls for a people-centered developmental process that ensures, inter alia, economic diversification and growth in order to eradicate poverty, unemployment and inequality

On 16th of October, a seminar under the theme “Discussion in the Run-Up to the Russia-Africa Summit” was held in South Africa, unique strategic partner of Russia in BRICS organization, at the University of Pretoria. The main speaker at the event was the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to South Africa Ilya Rogachev, who delivered a comprehensive speech, which described in detail the essence of the upcoming historical event.

Following is his presentation:

This will be the first event of such scale and magnitude marking an important milestone in the history of relations between Russia and the African continent. All eyes are on us now. I would like to remind that Russia, in all of its incarnations, and the peoples of Africa have always walked hand in hand through history.

We share a common and eventful past, where as allies we strived together for a better world. The Soviet Union was the only global power that has never pursued colonial policies and had never had a detrimental presence in Africa. The very idea of colonialism has always been an alien concept to us, one that to our mind should be abolished from the face of the Earth in all its forms.

The Soviet Union was most heavily involved in the rise of the African continent to independency. Among the most important cornerstones of the Soviet foreign policy was bringing an end to the colonial era, supporting national liberation movements, providing all kinds of assistance to young African nations: economic, infrastructural, military, humanitarian and educational. These pages of history cannot and shall not be rewritten, this friendship will forever be embedded in the history of relations between Russia and Africa.

USSR’s involvement and interest in Africa were guided by the imperative to «protect the interests of the oppressed nations and their right for self-determination and creation of sovereign states». Next year marks the 60th anniversary of the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960. This historical document was drafted on the initiative of the USSR, who had been championing the cause of a free and independent Africa on the global arena for many years.

Needless to say that this enormous and, I would like to stress – selfless – support that the Soviet Union rendered the people of Africa throughout the XX century won over many hearts on this continent.

Sadly, the collapse of the Soviet Union put our partnership on halt. The 1990s were a time of hardship for my country and its people. Even after the resurgence of the 2000s it took us some time to gather and re-establish ourselves as a global leader on the international arena and a prominent economic and technological power. I would not necessarily call these years a time of neglect towards Africa, as some try to put it, but admittedly, to a certain extent we lost the pace and intensity in our cooperation. Speaking in plain terms, now we have some catching up to do.

This is what the upcoming Russia-Africa Summit is meant to achieve: to put our partnership back on track, giving it new dimensions, pertinent to the XXI century, and providing dynamics for further growth. It is designed to set ambitious goals and look for areas of fruitful and practical cooperation. Intergovernmental and business opportunities clearly attract attention from both sides, our mutual interest in deepening cooperation is evidently high. This is why if you look at the expanded programme outlines you would fine nearly every possible topic on the agenda: from the role of media on the African continent to the importance of peaceful conflict resolution.

We envisage both the Summit and the Forum as a prospective platform for regular contacts, governmental and business. It is supposed to be a mechanism, which will allow us to give the much needed impulse to our cooperation, keep track of the progress already made and explore new opportunities. We consider it a platform where equals meet and where every voice is heard.

It is no coincidence that the Summit is hosted jointly by the Russian Federation and the African Union. There is great significance to this fact: unlike some other powers, which are used to looking down at Africa from their high horse, we do not consider Africa and African nations as junior partners. In fact, Russia strives for an equal cooperation based on mutual respect for the interests of all the involved parties.

I would like to draw your attention to this particular aspect, as it is purposefully misrepresented in some of the clearly biased publications and articles that appeared recently in South African press and elsewhere. These experts keep describing Russia’s return to the continent as a premise for a struggle for influence and resources among the global powers.

I would like to discourage that line of thought and tell the analysts, that they are wide off the mark. Some might still be looking at Africa through the lens of a colonial eye. Frankly speaking, this is an outdated and historically void way to behave on the global arena and in international relations. This is not our way. We do not develop and conduct foreign policy and international cooperation from such assessments. Our Western partners keep returning to the concept of a zero-sum game, where one’s gain means another one’s loss – imprinting this crooked assumption on the minds of experts and journalists.

Our mindset is different, we say: let’s cooperate and grow together. Africa is the most dynamically developing continent with rapidly growing economies that shouldn’t be regarded as a mere resource base. It is time to build long-lasting partnerships rooted in the principles of trust and equality. This stance resonates with our African partners. No wonder that our positions on the global arena are largely aligned. We share similar values defined by respect for national sovereignty and international law, as well as similar approaches to tackling current global challenges and threats. The world and the African continent need to find sustainable solutions for pressing issues. It should be done not through a dictate of a group of ‘elite’ countries and the rules that they impose on everyone else, but through the balance of interests and respect for all viewpoints. International law, based on the UN Charter and the existing legal framework, not some new «rules-based order» concepts, should serve as the basis for building relations.

We have always been adamant supporters of the formula «African solutions to African problems», including in the United Nations. It is our firm believe that nations and peoples themselves should resolve their problems, with the expertise and advice of the international community if required. In the past decade we have seen all too well what blatant interference in other countries affairs leads to, the results of the attempts to push for regime change is evident as well – North Africa and the Middle East are still dealing with the fallout from the so-called Arab Spring.

Today Russia enjoys strong bilateral relations with many African countries, South Africa included. The cooperation encompasses many spheres including infrastructure projects, space industry, telecommunication, healthcare, education, tourism, mining and others. The total volume of Russia’s investment in Africa has exceeded 20 billion dollars. The overall trade volume of has increased by many times since the 1990s.

One of the key issues that the African continent faces and that Russia has the expertise to assist with is the energy crisis, a growing shortage of generating capacity that holds back economic development. In 2008, Russian diamond company “Alrosa” finished the construction of Chicapa hydroelectric power plant in Angola; in 2010, Tanzania and Russia signed a deal to build the Rumakali hydropower plant. There are ongoing negotiations on the cooperation in the energy sector with such countries as Sudan, Ethiopia and the DRC.

Russia is helping more than 20 countries in Africa to develop their nuclear industries for energy and medical purposes. In 2014, Russia and Egypt signed an agreement on the construction of El Dabaa nuclear power plant – Russia will provide a $25 bln loan to Egypt for the construction that will create 50’000 job opportunities and add 4,8 GW generation capacity to the grid. In 2017, an agreement on the development of atom energy projects was concluded with Nigeria. A nuclear research centre is to be built in Zambia.

One of the most promising projects in infrastructure development is the establishment of Russian industrial free trade zone in Egypt, which will focus on manufacturing agricultural machinery and hardware. We are also considering participating in the ambitious project of the Trans-African railway connecting Dakar and Djibouti, spanning across the continent.

Russia, and the Soviet Union previously, have always assisted African nations in skill development and education: millions have received highest quality degrees in the past decades, over 15’000 students from African nations are currently studying in Russia. A decision has already been made to substantially increase the number of scholarships in the next few years.

Russia continues to provide humanitarian assistance to those who request it in Africa. In 2017 alone, Russian aid exceeded 1 billion $. Russian Federation is the 5th biggest sponsor of the UNIDO Industrial Development Fund, a top-tier contributor to the UN World Food Programme and the World Health Organisation.

Another important area of cooperation is the assistance in fighting epidemics and diseases that scourge the African continent. For example, the recent outbreak of Ebola virus in the Western African countries prompted Russian doctors to develop not one but two groundbreaking vaccines. The Russian-made vaccines were the first to be tested and to have reach the patients. The vaccines are now being shipped to the Republic of Guinea, the DRC and other countries.

The issues of peace and security are also in the focus of attention. Fighting terrorism, drug- and human-trafficking and other criminal activities are among Russia’s priorities in the international security area. Making certain that conflict resolution in Africa is carried out without the use of violence and within the framework of political dialogue is another keystone of our approach. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has repeatedly extended the country’s full-fledged support to the African Union’s initiative ‘Silencing the guns by 2020’. Last September the Russian Federation as the Chair of the UN Security Council convened a UNSC Meeting on ‘Peace and Security in Africa Partnership to Strengthen Regional Peace and Security’ to give Africa an additional platform.

And this is just the tip of the iceberg whereas Russia-Africa interaction is concerned. So to round it up, the summit has high hopes, but it can already be said with confidence that the event will go down in history as an important milestone in cooperation between Russia and the countries of the continent.

From our partner International Affairs

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Russia

Reminiscence of Soviet soft power and the way it influenced the “Global South”

Punsara Amarasinghe

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The exact meaning carved by Joseph Nye in coining his notable concept “Soft Power” referred to a strong influence over states whereas governments cannot totally get rid of its influence. Because, unlike the hard power which pushes states to the edge, the influence of soft power brings more sentimental effects to targeted states as their national consciousness is solidly smitten by its approach. In a changing world where many state actors arise from military and economic dimensions, the gravity arises from soft power plays a bigger role in shaping the preferences of others through appeal and attraction. In fact, such a smart use of power inevitably brings more constructive results than triggering the fire arms. Today emerging super powers like India and China have been much driven by the idea of using soft power as an indispensable strategy in the realm of their regional and international geo political space. However, the soft power strategy used by Soviet Union during Cold War as a decisive factor in its ideological and political expansion towards the Global South has left an interesting legacy as it could successfully accomplish its mission in Third World countries. In particular, the countries gained their independence from Western powers began to woo the ideological whims propagated by Moscow in early 50’s and 60’s. The anti-colonial sentiments spread across newly independent states boosted their rapport with Soviet Union and this was much strengthen when Moscow provided ample funds to Third World countries in order to galvanize their national economies which was perceived by Soviet Union as an action of necessity. Stalin’s successor Nikitha Khrushchev showed a great zeal in influencing Third World states against the struggle against imperialism.

Nevertheless, the growth of Soviet soft power towards the Global South was mainly an offshoot from its grand cultural and intellectual heritage and the apt way it was used by Soviet Union to twist the arms of those Third World states. As an example the indomitable expansion of Russian literature among the young university students and intellectuals in post-colonial countries became prevalent as a counter narrative against much dominated Anglo American literature. For instance, the growth appeared to bloom in South Asia towards Russian literature was much notable as its attracted and aspired the young generation in Indian sub-continent in a time when the nation emerged after long colonial movement. The characters portrayed by prerevolutionary Russia authors like Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky and Gogol invoked Asian sentiments to think about their own conditions under social inequality. It was such an incredible phenomenon how and why citizens from far distant countries like India and Sri Lanka in South Asia were fascinated with Russian literary ideals. From 60’s till the dissolution of USSR in 1991 Soviet Union spent a heavy amount of money on translating their great literary classics into local languages in South Asia, Africa and Latin America as a great cultural tool, which resulted in producing a class of citizens obsessed with Russian ethos in those regions.

The higher education assistance was another feature of Soviet soft power over third world countries. In African and Asian contexts, most of the ruling elites were products of either British or French higher educational institutes. Yet, most of the masses in rural areas with many economic deprivations had no access to privileged western universities, that went on to hinder their aspirations of pursuing higher studies beyond their states.  Since the dawn of Cold War the factor regarding higher education as a strategic tool was considered by both Soviets and Americans with greater importance. When the necessity of higher education was emphasized by African leaders at Addis Ababa Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa in 1961, Soviet leader Khrushchev declared the foundation of the People’s Friendship University in Moscow, especially for students from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Addressing 3,000 students at Jogjakarta University, Khrushchev affirmed that the Soviet government ‘wished to help the [developing] countries to train their national workforce, engineers, agronomists, doctors, teachers, economists’ and at the same time give a chance to ‘many talented young people coming from poor families’, who otherwise were ‘deprived of the possibility of realizing their wish to study in the Soviet Union.

As a matter of fact, the establishment of People’s Friendship University in Moscow was a greater achievement in Soviet soft power over the Third World States as it’s much promised ideals of the awakening of the East attracted many young students coming from decolonized states. Nourishing the socio cultural ties with non-Communist countries on the basis of idealizing the anti-imperial values intended to intensify the waves of communism in those countries with the eventual expectations of seizing the state power by workers. Another assumption held by Soviets of establishing a higher academic institute for the students from developing world was focused on two goals. Firstly, Soviet Union believed that the knowledge transfer to backward Asian African societies would accelerate their progress and secondly Moscow considered the graduates hailing from Soviet education would have a paternal gratitude towards their authority. The Soviet soft power alliance with the Third World reached its symbolic culmination, when People’s Friendship University was named after nationalist leader in Congo Patrice Lumumba, which was an indication of Moscow for their solidarity with non-Communist states in their struggle against imperialism.

The aftermath of the establishment of People’s Friendship University crated a much conspicuous platform for Soviet Union to execute their soft power and its outcomes became much effective as most of the students studied in People’s Friendship University excelled themselves fields like academia and diplomacy in their own countries. Nevertheless, it is true to admit that Soviet soft power strategy was not always successful, particularly the degrees awarded by People’s Friendship University were discriminated when pro-Western governments came into power in non –Communist states in Asian and African countries. For instance, the pro-Western government in Sri Lanka from 1965 to 1970 marginalized Soviet graduates from employment opportunities, labeling them as leftists. On the other hand, there were situations Moscow expelled Asian and African students, when they professed their dissenting opinions about Soviet system.

The soft power strategy adopted by Soviet Union to approach Third World countries was predominantly confined to higher education, yet the outcomes emerged from such investments brought long term results to Soviet Union. Especially, increase of alacrity to learn Russian among students in the Global South saw a great Slavic cultural infiltration into those Russian speaking countries and its influences continued to grow in many ways. The in 60’s Jawaharlal Nehru University in India, New Delhi established a center for Soviet and Central Asian studies which attracted many Indian scholars and with its growing political influence Russian language became quite a popular. However, the chaotic economic stagnation of Soviet Union in late 80 and its immediate effect resulted in the disintegration of Soviet Union brought the very end to Third World’s romanticism with Soviet culture. The idealistic slogans on world communist society and dictatorship of proletarians were faded into oblivion at the ebb of Soviet decline and the emergence of Russian federation had no time and space to persist their soft power in the Third World as a result of the wave of economic and social instabilities they faced in the 90’s.

Today, more than 25 years after the collapse of Soviet Union, Russia again stands as a strong nation and its recent geo political expeditions have given a palpable sign the Russia yearns to restore its lost glory in the global arena. In fact, Moscow is well aware of the great importance of using soft power in 21st century power politics. Yet, the pivotal question appearing from post-Soviet era is how would modern Russia locates her soft power before growing expansion of Indo-Sino soft power contest in Global South. The steeping increase of Confucius centers and Indian cultural hegemony through its most colorful culture would always mar the idea of restoring Russian soft power beyond Ruski Mir. But, we should not easily forget still there is a nostalgia been pervaded in the memories of the old generation bureaucrats, diplomats, statesmen and academics in the third world countries, which always would pave the path to restore its soft power in diplomacy at least to a certain extend.

*Prof. Sanjay Rajhans is the deputy chair at Department of Public Policy at Faculty of Social Sciences in Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia.

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