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Why we need to be patient with Russia

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Twenty years ago, Russia was a mess – no longer an enemy, not even an adversary and certainly not a partner. What was feared most was a collapse that might turn Russia into something resembling the former Yugoslavia, all pire. “I don’t like it when the U.S. flaunts its superiority,” complained Russia’s then president Boris Yeltsin, who insisted, “Russia isn’t Haiti…Russia will rise again.”

Events now confirm that; Russia is back. And it’s back as a bully to former Soviet holdings in Europe, as a challenge to the United States, and as one of the self-proclaimed leaders of what is allegedly a post-Western world.

This isn’t just a burst of imperial nostalgia akin to that of some European states a few decades ago. Nor is it a moment of post-bipolarity funk – a rebellion against an all-powerful America that didn’t make time for Russia when it was the time to do so, and a revolt against a uniting Europe that didn’t make room for its larger neighbour when it had been hoping for an invitation. As always, ghosts linger on. Seven decades of Soviet governance failed to bury centuries of Russian imperial history. La grande Russie doesn’t stay passively silent for long: her vocation is to be heard and expand, not to withdraw and shrink. The “soul” attributed by former U.S. President George W. Bush to Vladimir Putin after their first meeting in June 2001 mourned two decades of disrespect. Shorn of nearly a quarter of the Soviet Union’s post-1945 territories, Russia was still too big, too near and too nuclear for such treatment – not yet a true European power, but still a leading power in Europe. Russia thus longs for its imperial past, and the vexing question is how to impress upon its government in Moscow that there are limits to self-image that the Russian state can no longer sustain and which the West need not tolerate any longer.

“When Russia was weak in the 1990s,” remembers former U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates, a self-described hardliner on the Soviet Union, “we did a poor job…managing the relationship for the long-term.” The mistake, then, was to pay insufficient attention to Russia’s legitimate interests and concerns. Now that Russia looks stronger, the mistake would be to exaggerate the significance and relevance of those interests. America’s unfinished business with Russia is part of Europe’s own unfinished business, one half of which consists of an ever closer Union while the other half is being undone by national identities that challenge the EU member states’ sovereignty.

The end of the Cold War came abruptly. There was no cease-fire, no peace conference, no formal treaty and no settlement. As the Soviet Union held an unprecedented real estate sale, the West helped itself. What was in Europe was the Russian state of 1917. It might have seemed dead – “Mort à jamais?” as Marcel Proust had asked – but not forever or even for long. It was not wise to dismiss centuries of history that had seen Russia’s territories expand by one Belgium a year for 300 years, that had brutally imposed the Russification of ethnic minorities, and had relied on authoritarian and even totalitarian rule to subjugate its people.

Now it’s Vladimir Putin’s turn to dismiss his country’s most recent defeat and ride at the head of an anti-Western posse against what he calls the world’s “one centre of authority, one centre of force, and one centre of decision-making.” But that moment, too, will pass. As Russia’s economy runs out of gas, so to speak, it also finds itself short of energy – meaning; people and even security space. Over time, an under-developed, de-populated, and encircled Russia has no credible alternative to closer co-operation with the West. Too much history and too little geography separates Moscow from a dangerously ascending China, reportedly Moscow’s alternative of choice.

Boris Yeltsin had whimpered that if there was no clear winner, at least the Cold War had produced no loser. “We’re not talking about a relationship between superiors and inferiors, but between equals,” he wanted his “friend” Bill Clinton to know. There were echoes of Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 who insisted that defeated France should be treated as a co-equal. “If there are still allied powers,” Talleyrand told his victorious interlocutors, “then I do not belong here.” Of course, the legendary French diplomat was one of a kind, but in October 1991, on the eve of its collapse, the Soviet Union was also invited by the United States as the triumphant state to co-chair the Madrid Conference which then-Secretary of State James Baker viewed as “the end game for peace” in the Middle East. A decade later, Putin attacked his country’s implicit surrender and its dismemberment as a geopolitical catastrophe, “impossible to imagine” even while it was taking place.

In autumn 2008, the violence and intensity of the war in Georgia were, according to Robert Gates, “eye openers” that demanded “a different set of lenses.” “Russia’s behaviour,” he announced, “has called into question the entire premise of our [strategic] dialogue and has profound implications for our security relationship going forward – both bilaterally and with NATO.” On the whole, though, he ignored his own warnings, which were not heeded by either by the two presidents he served as Secretary of Defence. On the contrary, a newly-elected Barack Obama soon sought a reappraisal, or reset, of U.S.-Russian relations, as if to make amends. Now however, Putin’s will to re-adjudicate the verdict of History restores a sense of conflict that can no longer be ignored by those he charges with having “not simply robbed” but altogether “plundered” his country.

The confrontation between the West and Russia in the spring of 2014 is no more about Ukraine than the 2008 war in Georgia was just about Georgia. Neither of these countries is a core American interest, and the EU states have shown little interest in bringing either into their Union any time soon. Ukraine and Georgia before have been crises for Russia more than for the West, and what has made of “their” crisis “our” problem is Russian behaviour that in each case has threatened the European institutional and territorial order built up over the past 60 years. From the start, though, Putin was not discreet about his intentions – how he viewed Russia and what he thought of the West. “A proud man who loves his country,” nevertheless felt George W. Bush, deceptively moved by a “sense of Putin’s soul.” In his first major speech after Putin returned to the presidency which he had for a while loaned to Dmitri Medvedev, Putin urged the Russians “not to lose themselves as a nation” and to reject the “standards imposed on us from outside” at the expense of “our traditions.” In a dubious replica of Ronald Reagan 20 years earlier, the Russian president unveiled an “evil empire” – a U.S.-led, post-Christian Western world said to be exporting godlessness, permissiveness, and moral depravity. Unlike Mikhail Gorbachev, Putin does not want a common home with Europe, but hopes instead to build one of his own: No longer Russia in Europe or even Europe with Russia, but Europe to Russia and even, at least for the post-Soviet space, Europe in Russia.

Why Nikita Khrushchev chose in 1954 to return Crimea to the Soviet Republic of Ukraine is more puzzling than Putin’s decision to return it to Russia. A proletarian intellectual who goes to the geopolitical barricades to fight for what he believes more than for what he knows, Putin echoes Nikolai Danilovsky, whose brand of Russian nationalism nurtured Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s belief in a “Great Russian hegemony” dedicated to “a great renewal … for the whole world” which, wrote Dostoyevsky, was endangered by a Western civilisation whose invasion “begins with luxury, fashions, scholarship, and art – and inevitably ends in sodomy and universal corruption.” That same conviction makes of Putin a gambler prepared to bet heavily on a doctrine of imposed self-determination for what he claims is, “the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders.”

Nor is the renewed confrontation between Russia and the West about more recent but no less spurious analogies. Comparing Putin to Hitler, and interpreting his discourse as a translated rendition of Mein Kampf, is no more constructive than comparing Nazi Germany to post-Soviet Russia. Tantamount to assimilating spring 2014 with autumn 1938, the analogy is hardly relevant when the Western democracies today show so little interest in waging the war against Russia that they should arguably have favoured in the 1930s over appeasement. History does not grant time outs for the replay of bad calls. Similarly, evoking a new Cold War with Russia is to return to March 1948, and call for the rollback that the United Sates might have favoured over the containment that the influential commentator Walter Lippmann at first dismissed as a “strategic monstrosity.” Get real: conditions with Ukraine are not comparable to those that prevailed in Munich, or on the eve of the coup in Czechoslovakia; Putin is no more a menacing reminder of Hitler or Stalin than Obama is a reincarnation of Neville Chamberlain or Franklin D. Roosevelt.

“There will be costs for any military intervention,” warned President Obama in February 2014, on the eve of the Russian annexation of Crimea. But pray tell: what was there for Putin to fear after he had witnessed a year earlier Obama’s reluctance to enforce his own “red lines” in Syria with John Kerry himself calling their threatened strike “unbelievably small”? There has been little Obama could do relative to how much Putin can take, in Ukraine and even some of the non-NATO territorial space in Europe. After the military option has been taken off the table, what’s left is pontification – about being on the wrong side of history, as Obama put it – to deter an adversary whose sense of history goes the opposite way.

“Not to rush to judgment,” advised veteran American diplomat George Kennan after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, and “not to write off the Russians and their leaders. Patience, patience – that’s what we need.” That may well be sound advice, but for how long and how far? There is a long game to be played: don’t provoke Russia and its leaders with empty threats, to be sure, but don’t indulge Russia and its people with too much “understanding” either. Let it be stated once and for all: History does not owe Russia the apologies it owes Ukraine and other territorial pieces of Europe’s tragic geography of pain. That is the area where can still be heard the silenced sounds of war, and where can best be smelled the worst odours of death. As historian Timothy Snyder has noted, more Ukrainians were killed fighting Nazi Germany than American, British, and French soldiers combined – not to mention the millions who had been starved to death by Stalin before the war. The history of Russia has been written by what it did to its people and in the lands of its neighbours rather than the other way around.

In short, the Russian government does what it does because Russia is what it is: a country unable to imagine life without empire, and unprepared to populate its new democracy with truly democratic leaders. The annexation of Crimea was not just Putin’s way of showing Obama his manhood, rather it is a renewed bid to fulfill the idea the Russians have of themselves and of Europe. Russians may not like all that their president does, but over 80% of them approve his action. Meanwhile, Obama satisfies the broad preference of Americans who wish to do less in the world, but his foreign policy approval rating shows support from fewer than one person in three. It is as if there was public embarrassment and even some shame relative to the way in which Americans as a nation like to think of themselves.

You know where to begin, noted Kennan on more than one occasion, but often ignore where you’re going to end. So it was after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, and with the division of Germany in 1949, and since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. First Georgia, and since then with Crimea and Ukraine, Putin started “something” – but what? Does he know where he is going? In the same vein, Obama has shown he knows how to stand up to the so-called swaggerers – but will he also know where to stand up, and for what? This is Kennan turned inside out: knowing how it will end because of the limits of Russian power may actually be easier than knowing where to begin. War is no longer the way of history, but how do you bring along those whose own history takes them another way?

Over 40 years ago, President Richard M. Nixon hoped to put in place a strategy that would calibrate interests and capabilities. Knowing “when it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest” was not easy then, with a surge of Soviet power and the rise of “new influentials” which Nixon viewed as the introduction of a new multipolar order. America, he pledged, “cannot – and will not – conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defence of the free nations of the world.” Now as then, Obama’s foreign policy reticence is shared by a majority of Americans who want “to come home.” But also like them, it is a source of concern for a large number of America’s closest allies in need of strategic reassurance. The irony is plain for all to see. Ten years after the fiasco in Iraq, the global demand for American power has never been higher, but its credibility rarely lower and its reliability more in doubt.

To convince its friends, a preponderant power must be right; to tame its enemies it must be strong; to do both, it must inspire trust. All too often Obama has appeared to do the reverse – at best, right for what he said but weak for what he did and ineffective in the way he did it. By his own account, comfortable with complexity – “the big things” as Bill Clinton noted – Obama can easily win an argument, but a lack of attention to what follows often leaves his exchanges with adversaries unheard, his reassurances not implemented, and his likeable personality not trusted. In any case, this, too, is not just about Obama but, more broadly, about a post-American world. Long past the Cold War, and possibly past America’s prime too, this is not a world an emerging post-Western America understands well: every power a potential ally but every partner a possible adversary, depending on needs and urgency; every judge a penitent and every penitent a judge, depending on the case and the moment – Kosovo and Crimea, Iraq and Syria, Moscow’s Afghanistan and Washington’s Afghanistan, and so forth.

Obama did not originate this world – one in which the dwindling U.S. supply of security for growing world demand since the Cold War, comes together with a reduced world supply of security for rising American demand since 9/11. Nor did Obama “lose” Putin or “betray” Crimea any more than Roosevelt betrayed Eastern Europe at Yalta and Truman lost to Stalin at Potsdam. Still, there has been too much loose talk in the United States about rebalancing, to Asia or elsewhere; too much ill-timed talk of a reset, with Russia or others; too much vacuous talk, about leadership from behind and too much dismissive talk about the EU and its leaders or about Putin and his leadership. Words can impress momentarily for their elegance, but they matter more durably for their substance. Admittedly, Putin is not in Obama’s intellectual league, but more plainly, he can nonetheless hammer home his points the old fashioned way – with the domineering Slavic idea of a strong and united Russia.

After World War II, the strategy of containment was embraced as a third way between appeasement and war, the two options that had been pursued by the Western democracies during the interwar years – the former to avoid the latter until the latter grew irresistibly out of the former. Fears that containment was too passive and could not rollback Soviet advances were proved wrong, and whether a different strategy would have achieved rollback faster seems unlikely. What is now known is that after some initial geopolitical confusion, the Soviets were stopped until they ran out of time, and the United States was careful to look elsewhere whenever the Soviets used force to control their half of Europe, in Hungary and elsewhere. With war on behalf of any non-NATO or non-EU country now largely ruled out in the West, Russia’s renewed passion for empire must be denied with a firm yet prudent narrative similar to that of President Truman in March 1947.

How best to assist Ukraine begins with the plaintive recognition that little can now be done to keep the country entirely whole, or even free. Twenty years of Western neglect stand in the way of the former goal, and centuries of territorial and cultural intimacy with Russia constrain the latter. The echoes of past calls for the early “liberation” of Eastern Europe during the Cold War still resonate. “What are you proposing to do,” John Foster Dulles was asked when Secretary of State. And President Eisenhower answered at the start of the 1956 crisis in Hungary when he announced that “the day of liberation may be postponed where armed forces for a time make protest suicidal.”

What followed – a “holocaust,” wrote Eisenhower – should not be forgotten. But we must face the fact that Russia’s annexation of Crimea will not be reversed any time soon, if ever, and preventing further amputation is the best that can be expected. History still shapes Ukraine’s destiny – two peoples in a single country that urgently needs a new constitutional formula to if it is to maintain its unity. But geography, with borders shared by seven neighbours, also gives Ukraine pivotal significance for Russia and the West. Attempts by either to build Ukraine up as an outpost against the other will not go unanswered and would deepen a dangerous geopolitical fracture in the heart of Europe.

The 1955 neutralisation of Austria, concluded at a time when Moscow could have imposed partition, is an adaptable precedent. For 40 years after that, Austria was left out of the Western institutions, but the West was not kept far away from Austria. That time-out was well used, for Austria gradually became a non-member member of the European Community, thereby easing its transition to full EU membership shortly the end of the Cold War. By comparison, a quarter of a century of bad governments has made of Ukraine a failed state which the EU is unwilling to adopt and which Russia looks unable to rehabilitate. We should also consider Russia’s own condition – the state of its economy, the health of its society, and the efficacy of its own governance. Russia is back, admittedly, but not as Yeltsin had hoped: however influential it wants to be, this is a demandeur state whose staying power suffers from a lack of capabilities, including people; dwindling market power, including oil; and shrinking security space, with an expanding NATO in the West, while China grows ever stronger and more intrusive in the East and Islam more unsettled and even threatening in the South. These are the facts of geographic and economic vulnerability which Gorbachev understood when trade, mostly with Eastern Europe, amounted to less than 4% of the total Soviet economy. Now, Russia’s foreign trade represents 30% of GDP, with more than half of its exports going to the West, mostly to Europe and mainly consisting of oil and gas sales that contribute the major share of Moscow’s revenues. Add to this Russia’s need for Western capital for technology purchases and the question of who needs whom is clear. Even as the West lacks the military will to deter Putin in the short term, it has the economic power to alter Russia’s behavior before long.

When asked what he thought of Western civilisation, Gandhi reportedly answered that “it would be a good idea.” At 65 years of age, the transatlantic alliance, too, still looks as if it would be a good idea. The obstacle to putting the idea into practice is not a matter of capabilities or even commitment. Rather, what is lacking is the confidence that the capabilities will be used effectively and the commitment assumed evenly; absent such confidence, the will to act is lacking. For the European allies who have become used to relying on the United States for waging, winning, and ending their wars, the recent display of inefficacy in Iraq and Afghanistan is squarely un-American. But if not the United States, who? For Americans who have repeatedly urged Europe to do more, the institutional standstill since the 2008 financial crisis is increasingly exasperating. If Europe cannot be rendered capable as a Union, how can it be responsible for its own security?

These questions, and the expectations they raise, have surfaced many times before. Now, however, their resonance is being heightened not only by Russia’s resurgence in the East but also by Germany’s influence in the EU and America’s drift to Asia and other influential newcomers. In other words, the Western alliance is once again troubled by a Russian problem which the United States can no longer ignore, a German problem which the EU can no longer hide, and an American problem which NATO can no longer dilute. The balance of military forces appears to favour Russia more than ever before; rarely, too, has the balance of economic influence been as favourable to Germany as it is now and never has America sounded less European.
In all these cases, the dilemma is daunting. This is a surprising end to a century of total wars that were fought mostly around these two European superpowers and where there was decisive American leadership. Yet as the United States “pivots” to Asia, which it knows to be inevitable, it hopes for a Russia that is strong enough to not be tempted by China, but weak enough to not concern the EU. And it expects a Europe that is united enough to bury the past century with a fully completed union, but divided enough to depend on an American leadership that is still learning how to consult with, rather than merely inform its allies. Meanwhile, as Europe struggles with institutional questions that it knows to be indispensable, it awaits a Germany assertive enough to lead, but compliant enough to be overruled.

Back to Kennan, then: patience, patience – don’t provoke but indulge. What else? This is how the Cold War was won and half of Europe redone; this is how the other half of Europe will make the continent whole after it has been kept free. The strategic recipe hasn’t really changed much: To borrow from the quip of Lord Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General, America is still very much “in”, and while Germany should no longer be kept “down” (now that the EU is up), Russia must be kept “out” until such time as it’s prepared to come in.

First published by the Europe’s World, article re-posted per author’s permission

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Russia–Africa Economic Forum and Summit Organizing Committee Holds Meeting in Moscow

Kester Kenn Klomegah

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The Organizing Committee in charge of preparing for and holding the Russia-Africa Economic Forum and Summit in the Russian Federation in 2019 has held a meeting in Moscow. The meeting was chaired by Russian Presidential Aide Yury Ushakov and attended by Advisor to the Russian President Anton Kobyakov, Roscongress Foundation CEO Alexander Stuglev, Russian Deputy Minister of Finance Sergey Storchak, and Special Representative of the Russian President for the Middle East and Africa and Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mikhail Bogdanov. The meeting was also attended by representatives of ministries and departments that are involved in preparing for the events.

The meeting participants discussed organizational issues concerning preparations for business and protocol events as well as their specific details. Ushakov reiterated just how monumental and important the upcoming events in the Russia-Africa format are. “The organization of the Forum is a serious first step towards our economic and political return to Africa. To date, 50 African heads of state have already confirmed they will be attending the Forum, which is a great success,” he said.

“Preparations for the most important events in the history of Russian-African relations have reached the finish line. A quarter of the world’s heads of state will come to Russia to discuss initiatives and strengthen Russian-African relations. I am certain that the participants in the Russia-Africa Economic Forum and the Summit will demonstrate a readiness to cooperate and develop joint projects in the Eurasian and African spaces, as evidenced not only by their active cooperation during the preparatory stage, but also by the number of them who have confirmed,” said Kobyakov, who serves as the Executive Secretary of the Organizing Committee.

“It is essential that Russia-Africa Summit and Forum produce an economic effect, among other things. We have carried out a lot of work to provide the African side with information. We have prepared a large package of Russian expertise and products in 12 areas. Presentations will be given for heads of state and delegates by the leaders of such companies as Rosatom, Russian Railways, Rosgeo, VTB, and others. They will present the opportunities that can be offered to African countries and so having such a large number of leaders take part in the events is a unique opportunity us to realize economic potential,” Russian Minister of Economic Development Maxim Oreshkin said.

The main event of the Russia-Africa Forum will be the plenary session ‘Russia– Africa: Uncovering the Potential for Cooperation’ during which the presidents of Russia and Egypt are expected to speak. A final declaration of the Summit titled ‘For Peace, Security, and Development’ has been drafted and includes items on the global and regional agendas that are important to Russia as well as proposals on ways to develop the full scope of Russian-African relations.

“At least 23 intergovernmental and interagency agreements and other agreements between African and Russian companies are expected to be signed on the sidelines of the Forum. The Forum will be held under the slogan ‘For Peace, Security, and Development’, which can serve as the foundation of the Summit’s final declaration and was drawn up in cooperation with the participating countries,” Bogdanov said.

The Roscongress Foundation is the organizer of the events, and the Russian Export Center and Afreximbank are the co-organizers.

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Weimar 2.0 and Russia

Alexander Kramarenko

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Power is always a sophisticated and ambiguous exercise in its own disappearance.-Les Strategies Fatales, Jean Baudrillard

For a number of years already in the West, and in Europe in particular, they talk of Weimar or Weimar syndrome alluding to the rise of the protest “populism”, collapse of political centre and the outcomes of direct democracy (meaning not only the referendum in Britain on Brexit, but the Trump phenomenon as well, i.e. his doing away with all intermediaries, be it party machine, traditional media or donors, in communicating with his electorate). That refers us to the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the Nazis coming to power in Germany. In our case it is already about the fruits, by which they judge the tree. This Weimar tree is neoliberal economics, represented by reaganomics/thatcherism and the Lisbon Agenda of the EU, which has been destroying Western societies for the past 30 years. So, one ought to have started talking of Weimar at least in 2008 when struck the Global Financial Crisis being doused since then with printing money (so-called “quantitative easying”). They realized that there was a problem only when the crisis made itself felt in politics which became averaged, alternative-free and, thus, lost any sense or relevance for the electorate. People lost their trust in traditional media, and social nets restored to the “silent majority” their say in public affairs and provided them with a means of self-organization beyond the elites’ control.

Liberal capitalism which reproduces and aggravates inequality brought about the Great Depression and led to WWII. But prior to that the contradictions within a society eradicating illiteracy fast, and the globalization, at the time imperialist, resulted in WWI. In our time all things tend to accelerate and, thus, we witness two parallel and intertwined processes, i.e. those of neoliberal economics and globalization both driven by the interests of the investment classes. While marching back to the future, should we be surprised by the outcomes? Now that war has run its course as a form of collective consumption, it has been replaced with the social state, which, however, has largely come under suspicion at the suggestion of the Anglo-Saxon nations. That turned the crisis into a protracted and irresolvable (French sans issu is closer to the Russian original) affair, all the more so that the elites espousing neoliberalism wouldn’t admit to its contemporary Weimar origins.

The US and Britain bet on further tightening neo-liberal screws, which includes cutting taxes and taxes on business among others. This is how Brexit makes sense as a mobilization project of the elites. After all, liberal capitalism is their creature, as well as, by the way, globalization which is being closed down for being obsolete and for its “mixed results”, particularly the rise of China and the rest. Given the size of their government budgets in relation to the GDP, the EU cannot afford those cuts: if it ever engages in competition on those terms, the social state would crumble and peace in Europe gone with it. Thus, the past bipolarity resurfaces in the Western community, with the poles exchanging the values they stood for if compared to the two world wars. The EU/Germany are now on the side of democracy and social justice, and the Anglo-Americans willing to throw themselves and all the rest into the dark Hobbesian world of the period between two wars with respective consequences not only for society but also for international relations.

Unlike in the past century, there is no need to invent a bicycle and pay with blood for the experience. We’ve got, simply, to find ways to preserve the social state under the new circumstances, while reaching the same goal of making market economy compatible with representative democracy of universal suffrage. The talk of fascist threat is not groundless though not all the “populists” come under the definition. Their further evolution is difficult to predict, but the lessons of history remain valid – neither culture nor civilization couldn’t prevent our continent’s descent into barbarism in the past. All the more so that after the Cold War end the universal meaning of George Orwell’s dystopias dawned upon us.

No doubt, the US and Britain, historically attached to hard socio-economic policies, will continue along that path. Brexit is inevitable due both to the democratic mandate of the referendum and the special nature of the British constitutional system with the executive power fully vested in the government, while traditions are also on the side of Prime Minister Boris Johnson. But the departure of the British might serve a powerful mobilizing push for European elites, stuck in their obsession with the status quo. It would wake them up to the reality and the need to take measures to save the integration project, its future depending to a great extent on the Germans. The Germans will have to pay for preservation of the Euro-zone for its collapse and return of the Mark would bring about economic disaster of Germany making her defenseless in the face of the Anglo-Saxon onslaught. The fact that they succeeded in “stopping” M.Salvini, having avoided holding general elections in Italy, is a poor consolation and cannot be a sound substitute for further systemic strengthening of the European integration which plainly cannot remain stuck in the present limbo for long.

How should Russia position herself in this context? We need Europe in peace with itself. We are in a position to shape such a Europe, which we have been doing over the past three centuries, including at critical moments of its history. There were errors as well, for example, when the Comintern underestimated the danger of Nazism and drew lessons from that at its VII Congress, which was late for all. We cannot afford to make that error again, even if we will have to wait for the European political mainstream to understand that one has to change for things to stay as they are. Conventional wars are out of date in the West, being replaced by trade and currency wars. And here Russia must be on the side of the united Europe providing the EU with a strategic depth by way of intensified trade, economic and investment cooperation, as well as a Eurasian entry to East Asia and South-East Asia. It is in our national interest to have an alternative to the dollar in the global monetary and financial system: here, like in other matters, complexity/diversity amounts to freedom (according to Dmitry Bykov).

Together with us, it will be easier for Europe to stand her ground in the face of Washington’s demands that it supports American Military-Industrial Complex with her taxpayers’ money. Thus, the ghost of war would finally be driven out of European politics. The cause of peace is hugely helped by the fact that, judging by recent events, the American weapons developed in the absence of competitive environment in the area of hard force politics, say F-35s and Patriots, in reality turn out to be badly wanting, sort of Baudrillard’s signs of weapons, not real ones fit for real war.

Fortunately, we have been spared the fate of living under direct oligarchic rule (Berezovsky, Khodorkovsky, etc), which makes it so easy to administer Ukraine from outside. Like early in the XXth Century, the Russian authorities preserve their freedom of Bonapartist maneuver, i.e. the ability to stay above the propertied interests. Russia did march towards fascism on the eve of the 1917 Revolution, which made of our country the chief tool of victory over those countries where fascism prevailed in the final count. Ways of History are unfathomable! The Russian proto-fascist figures who emigrated abroad took part in the Nazi project of the West. We have got to remember that and treat with caution the ideological legacy of our emigration (the People’s Labour Union, used by both the Germans and the Americans has not disappeared), as well as the efforts of those trying to pass fascism for a “Russian idea.” History has shown that fascism is not “our cup of tea.” All the progressive ideas of our time, be it existentialism, communicative action or postmodernism in its various shades, are rooted in Dostoevsky’s philosophy and fiction. What other ideas do we want?

After 1989 and 1991, we dived into the wrong type of capitalism, not socialism/capitalism with a human face (Swedish, German, etc) that we had dreamed of. Some liked it, but far from everybody. That is why we have many problems in common with Europe, those that generate states of inequality and despair, other forms of alienation. They are easier to solve together. We can draw lessons from each other’s mistakes. If we take the pensions reform in France, something could be prompted by the experience of the similar reform in Russia. It has led to a substantial rise in the over-all uncertainty in the country, which might continue well into the 2024 elections, unless a broad maneuver is undertaken at the level of socio-economic policies to improve standards of living and, accordingly, increase the stagnating consumer demand.

These are the reasons why the normalization of the political relationship with the EU is, unreservedly, an imperative for both sides, especially so against the background of the normalization underway between Washington and Minsk. The road lies through settlement of the Ukrainian crisis, which the Presidents of Russia and France are closely working for. Liberalism is no obstacle if it is an idea amongst others, not a dogma. Quite obviously, the words “liberal” and “order” are utterly at odds. No government in Europe is interested in a situation where it equals itself, contrary to Baudrillard’s warning. We had it between two wars in Europe, what other Weimar do we need to get us understand that?

From our partner RIAC

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Russia and China: New Silent War against US deception

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In the doctrine of world politics, US scholars and Political leaders are truly believe, after the entire world, especially Western society, would experience the devastations of world wars, nuclear weapons, and the “balance of terror” during the Cold War; deal with some international issues, or at least push the other powers to make concessions diplomatically and cooperatively . Economic and cultural conflicts have emerged, and soft power has become one of the most sophisticated weapons of many post-Soviet states.

Over past decade or so, new types of warfare and strategies include the “Silent War”, which takes place in the interfaces between peace and war, and in a geo-strategically arena between hidden defensive action and offensive force. It is a war on multiple zone strategies than one and specific tactical arena at the same time. Their speed and effective power are often terrifying.

Yet, As Jim Sciutto, A national security expert and CNN’s chief correspondent, pointed out on his new entitled book “The Shadow War: Inside the Secret Russian and Chinese Operations to Defeat America.” It shows the measures of the secret war to undermined US foreign policy and lessening America’s status and credibility led by Russia and China against the United States, which ended up in very significant outcomes.

Cryptic vision

Those who tend to believe in “Silent War” doesn’t exist or recognized among big power politics, this cryptically war reveals that the United States is in a state of virtual war waged by Russia without recognition, taking aggressive move against Washington and its allies, from cyberspace to outer space, and around the world. US military policymakers, national security officials and political analysts convincingly understand Moscow as a clear adversary of their homeland security.

However, opinion takes a census to indicate that the American public does not fully understand what’s going on behind this scene, especially since President “Donald Trump” did not act in front of the Americans according to that fact, and did not acknowledge that Russia’s actions pose a threat to the US soil.

To certain extent, The international relations scholars acknowledge that this skepticism is an essential move of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s plan, as the American confusion is the outcome and the main goal of a new kind of silent war by Moscow, a campaign systematically targeting American politics and society which is  divided American political ideologies and interrupt American Democratic Community. Therefore, its economy, media environment, and voting systems depend on weak electronic state propagandas technologies.

Additionally, that the goal of this campaign is to attack American interests and undermine US’s foreign policy at the international stage, which means that in the current situation Washington does not prompt to make a military response, and then over time Russia is working to extend this silent strategy even further. As Valery Gerasimov (Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces) clarified the aim of the “Silent War” which is to build up a “permanent front across the territory of the enemy state”.

The Silent War Strategies of the Russian perspective

This is quite superficial with regards to the paper published in 2013 entitled “The value of science in reading the future,” by Gerasimov highlighted that Russian government today is applying new strategies and highly effective mechanism in reversing US public opinion, especially through the social media. During the Cold War, Moscow had inadequate tools to manipulate American public opinion or interfere in American political campaigns. But the emergence of high tech and media platform created vast opportunities for them, and unsafe email systems became also benefit for hackers to take apart with governments in campaigns.

Due to this, some overseas political analysts mentioned that during January 2017, Russia fully intervened in the 2016 US presidential election in order “to discredit and disqualify Hillary Clinton, with a clear preference for President-elect Donald Trump.” The analysts add that Russia tried hard to interfere in the November 2018 congressional elections, and all the evidence suggests that Russia eagerly will do the same in the upcoming 2020 presidential election.

At the same time, Russian military preparations continue, with Moscow deploying in outer space weapons designed to destroy American satellites, which have become the foundations of American military and economic supremacy globally. Below the oceans, two new categories of attack submarines and ballistic missiles have been deployed. It is, therefore, better able to expand the nuclear threat to US shores.

On land, Russia invaded and occupied territory in sovereign states, including Ukraine and Georgia, and attempted a coup in Montenegro, threatening treaties and the rule of law that helped maintain peace in Europe for decades.

As noted, the Russian have annexed Crimea in 2014 in clear violation of its peace agreement with Ukraine, the United States, and Europe. Months later, it occupied and seized large lands of eastern Ukraine. In both cases, Moscow sent special forces, pretending not to be regular soldiers in the Russian army, and appeared in non-uniform, and their argument was just to help citizens of Russian origin there who fear for their safety and sustain their protections.

Actually, in last year (2018) an article published by author Gerasimov was severely describing the precise and effectiveness of strategies and tactics that Russian would soon use, pointing out that: “The open use of forces to sustain peace is often under the hands of UN Peacekeeping mission and crisis management are used only at a certain stage, as a final stage in achieving success in any armed conflict or unstable circumstances. “

Chinese rise strategy

With a new strategy concept turned in world order, “It is no coincidence that China is pursuing a strategy that is almost identical to that of Russia, with similar objectives, from expanding in world trade and government bilateral cooperations to the United States to seizing areas of the disputed South China Sea to its sovereignty, and even to its militarization, to the deployment of high effective missiles.

Surely enough, according to the author, American big companies, even though they are fully aware of Chinese trade abduction and marketing diversion, sometimes those large trading firms are refuse to seek US government for help, or identify Internet violations, for fear of isolating their Chinese partners or losing full access to the Chinese market altogether. therefore “China’s rise strategy propagates and plans to enlarge sows of fear on US deception towards her,” Jim Sciutto points out.

In return for Chinese efforts, the Barack Obama administration did not respond appropriately to Beijing, nor did it properly handle Chinese militarization efforts in the South China Sea. The former US president merely took personal promises from Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Ways of contest

So far, The United States is adjusting its political strategy and foreign policy measures abroad to address these new threats and intimidations especial from big powers. Jim Sciutto confirms that he met several Americans aboard submarines and surveillance aircraft, in NSA operations centers, and in various air overseas bases, all of whom acknowledge silent war is going to take place in this era and also they are becoming aware of the dimensions of Russian-Chinese hostility, and their war against Washington. American people, military leaders, and legislators all agree that an effective and urgent response requires to come from US leadership.

Despite the failures of some of the overseas policies and decision-making plans of the administrations of “Barack Obama” and “George W. Bush”; a many of decision-makers argue that they faced at least Russia directly during its most serious acts of aggression. Condoleezza Rice, the former secretary of state, noted in the Washington Post on August 2018, on the tenth anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Georgia, that the Bush administration had returned Georgian troops from Iraq to help protect Tbilisi. It said it had personally warned Russian Foreign Minister “Sergei Lavrov” of the removal of “Mikheil Saakashvili,” Georgia’s democratically elected president.

Additionally, Some high ranking officials say that “Obama” has advised “Putin” personally twice from interfering in the American elections; the first was in a face-to-face conversation at the G20 summit in China on September 2016, and the second one was eight days before the presidential election in a phone call talks in order to help to prevent world nuclear confrontations.

In contrary, President Trump has shown much fewer concerns to confront Russian and has frequently wondered whether Russia is really an enemy. According to some sayings from within his current administration, his unwillingness to encounter the Russian threat is partly motivated by the perception that recognition of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election will discredit his nomination of being the new president.

Despite the ignorance and inexperience of “Trump” of the encounter of collusion with big powers particularly Russia, but his continued unwillingness to identify and face the Russian threat greatly hurt US overseas interests, and makes American foreign policy unable to handle its homeland security silent war of the Russian side.

To the end, Jim Sciutto comes up with suggestions on how to deal with Russian and Chinese intimidations more effectively. The author as political analysts does not argue that win Silent war will be easy at all but needs new investments and developments in next-generation weapons systems, such as supersonic weapons. He added that investing in conventional weapons, like warships and aircraft carriers, is not enough to maintain US standing and domination of the international system.

Let’s see how the Trump leadership in this Silent War reacts to the threat of their big power and to what extent American foreign policymakers could absorb American public opinion towards Trump’s failed overseas policies.

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