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Presidential Election 2014 and Indonesian Foreign Policy

Igor Dirgantara

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Indonesian Presidential general election has been underway on July 9th. There were 2 pairs of strong candidates for Presidential and Vice-Presidential position: Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Rajasa  (Prabowo-Hatta) and Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla (Jokowi-JK). There will be numerous challenges for the elected pair, and one of the more important challenge will be regarding Indonesia’s future foreign politics policy. This article will try to foresee the type of leadership of each couple and also their foreign politics performance.

The official results of legislative elections on 9 April 2014 General Election Commission put PDIP at the ranked first with 23,681,471 votes (18.95%), followed by Golkar: 18,432,312 (14.75%), Gerindra: 14,760,371 (11 , 81%), Democrats: 12,728,913 (10.19%), PKB: 11,298,957 (9.04%), PAN: 9,481,621 (7.59%), PKS: 8,480,204 (6.79 %), Nasdem: 8,402,812 (6.72%), PPP: 8,157,488 (6.53%), Hanura: 6,579,498 (5.26%), PBB: 1,825,750 (1:46%), and PKPI: 1,143,094 (0.91%). Bottom two of political parties, namely PBB, and PKPI are declared not qualify parliamentary threshold (3%) and did not get any seats quota in parliament. Since none of the party with the most votes above 20%, as a condition of Presidential thrashhold to be able to carry a pair of candidates for president and vice president themselves, the coalition of political parties is a must. In the presidential system in Indonesia, election of coalition partners is also directed by the vote or seats in parliament (at least 50 percent +1), which is then tied in a mutual political platform.

After the legislative elections is resulted in maneuvering the political elite to form a coalition at the presidential election May 9, 2014. Because the public orientation to the above figures of a political party is still a presidential election winning political formula, then the composition selection of the Presidential Candidate – Vice Presidential Candidate is very important to the victory of the candidate pairs. Of the various movements of some leaders of political parties, eventually converging on a two couples of Presidential Candidate – Vice Presidential Candidate for which respectively carried by supporting political parties to compete seizing power in Indonesia from 2014 to 2019. Two strongest pairs are Prabowo-Hatta and Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla. Prabowo-Hatta  named their coalition as a Red White coalition carried by Gerindra, PAN, PPP, PKS, Golkar and PBB that total votes are 48.93%, or 292 seats in parliament. While the duo Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla brought by a coalition party of PDI-P, Nasdem, PKB, Hanura, and PKPI with a total of 39.97% of the total votes in 2014 legislative elections, or 207 seats in the House.

After receiving the serial number of the National Election Commission, the duo Prabowo-Hatta (serial number : one), and Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla (serial number : two), two sets of candidates on June 3 at Bidakara Hotel signed an integrity pact for peaceful election in Indonesia later dated July 9, 2014. Peace Election Post-Declaration, each contestant campaigned to all corners of Indonesia to share their vision and mission to the community, followed with national or global issues considered to be of importance and urgency. The question that a distinguish colleague and dear frined of mine prof. Anis Bajrektarevic has recently asked in his luminary work “Europe of Sarajevo 100 years later”, ‘Was history ever on holiday?’ – is nearly answered, at least this time in Indonesia – the 3rd largest democracy in the world.

 

Two variant of Leaders
Borrowing the term of Herbert Feith, there are two types of political leadership in Indonesia, namely “manager type” (administrator) and type “unifying type” (solidarity maker). Leaders with the administrator type are those who have the technical ability to govern the state. This type is generally represented by educated leaders who master a particular field. While the leaders of the solidarity maker types are the ones who are able to approach the masses, influence them, as well as gain wider sympathy and support from community.
If seen from figures of Presidential Candidates: Prabowo and Jokowi, both are the solidarity maker type because of their capacities to make both of them are not only popular among their supporters, but also have a relatively high electability in the public eye. The difference is, that Prabowo as a solidarity maker figure has high performance characteristics, while Jokowi is more low performance. High performance of Prabowo is manifested in the figure of confident, assertive and bold, while the existing low performance of Jokowi lies in its simplicity aura everyday.
Meanwhile, Vice Presidential Candidate of Hatta Rajasa and Jusuf Kalla, both equally can be characterized as figures considered expert in managing government (administrator) for some experiences as bureaucrats and state officials. The difference, Hatta Rajasa is more low profile, while Jusuf Kalla is quite a high profile in his performance.

Of both pairs have benefits and deficiencies of each. But the leader of solidarity maker type with high performance (Prabowo) could further demonstrate his capabilities as a leader because he had a better motion and political communication, including in attracting public support. While Jokowi looks less good for political communication. The high imaging seems too strong to be on his shoulder. Signaled himself as the party officer and Doll Presidential Candidate is a heavy burden amid the Presidential Candidates and their popularities. Path “on leave” as the governor also indicated that Jokowi judged not to confident in contestation to face Presidential Election 2014. Currently, campaigned as a Presidential Candidate, executing tasks of Jakarta Governor are undertaken by the deputy governor, Basuki Tjahya Purnama (Ahok). It means, if Jokowi lost the battle for the number one seat in Indonesia later, he could take back his position as Jakarta Governor.

Candidate for Vice President has the low profile administrator type (Hatta Rajasa) seeming to be able to work together in government. This type is similar to the figure of Indonesian vice president, Boediono, now. Not much to say, experienced, courteous, and competent. Jusuf Kalla also balanced. Jusuf Kalla has plenty of experiences in the government bureaucracy. The difference, Hatta Rajassa is the General Chairman of the Party (PAN), moreover Jusuf Kalla is the former coriander of the Golkar Party which also rely on the popularity as Jokowi. The problem is also that Vice Presidential Candidate, Jusuf Kalla (72 years) is much older than Jokowi (52 years) as a candidate for president. The Second Symptom Captain in one vessel can not be avoided. Two captains are not among Jokowi with Jusuf Kalla, but also between Megawati and Jusuf Kalla later.

Foreign Politics Performance
During the campaign period ahead of voting until July 9, 2014, the vision-mission of both pairs are louder presented to the public, ranging from a matter of economics, education, health, environment, food, energy, law enforcement, until about fighting corruption. Which did not escape that should be of concern is how the performance of Indonesian foreign politics of the two couple of candidates later. It’s no secret if the issues of foreign politics is often a secondary priority compared to national issues. But the fact that a peaceful election in Indonesia should be able to be a major capital and stimulus to improve active role in regional and global arena, as mandated by the opening of Constitution 1945 paragraph 4 to participate in creating a world order.

Indonesian Foreign Politics Challenges
In the short and medium term, foreign politics still faces two strategic issues. The first is the traditional security challenges, such as separatism and border disputes. Separatist Action of Free Papua Movement (OPM), or the work of Malaysian who do not appreciate status quo territory, at Camar Bulan and Tanjung Datu in West Kalimantan border needs to be addressed explicitly by the new Indonesian leader. The second is non-traditional strategic issues, as transnational crime such as terrorism, money laundering, climate change, maritime security and others. Crimes at sea such as illegal fishing, illegal logging, illegal mining, human trafficking, drug trafficking passing Indonesia sea channel continued. Moreover, Indonesia is directly adjacent to the 10 countries in the sea and only 2 countries on the land.

In the context of maritime security, Indonesia needs to be a leadership pioneer in ASEAN to be bold against China on issue in South China Sea, especially if China enters the water territory of Natuna as part of its claim. Indonesian shall enforce Exclusive Economic Zone and freedom of navigation in accordance with norms of international laws. Therefore, modernizing Indonesia military is a must.

Performance of Presidential Candidate – Vice Presidential Candidate
As has been described above by the author, figures of Presidential Candidates Prabowo and Jokowi has solidarity maker type. The difference is the leadership style off Prabowo Subianto having characteristics of high performance, while Jokowi is more low performance. Meanwhile, Vice Presidential Candidate of Hatta Rajasa and Jusuf Kalla, both equally can be characterized as figures considered expert in managing government (administrator) for some experiences as bureaucrats and state officials. However, Hatta Rajasa is more low profile at work, while Jusuf Kalla has high profile type.

At glance there are similarities if you look at the vision-mission of foreign relations between Prabowo-Hatta and Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla. Both pairs equally lays self-reliance principle of Indonesian people in facing the global challenges ahead. Prabowo-Hatta and Jusuf Kalla Jokowi Visions in maritime sector both want to build ports. Each of the Presidential candidate pairings equally want contract re-negotiation between the Indonesian Government with the foreign companies that have been operating in Indonesia for quite some time, who have a number of issues that deemed harmful to the interest of the Indonesian people, for example Freeport in Papua and Newmont in West Nusa Tenggara. National needs and interests are articulated through foreign politics of both pairs. But masculine characteristics in the implementation of the Indonesian foreign politics from Prabowo-Hatta are more pronounced for protecting the nation, play an active role and confident in facing the global arena (Outward Looking). The hope of Indonesian nationals are more respected by other countries, inside or outside the regions. Prabowo-Hatta is considered to have the competence to anticipate issues and challenges of traditional security. Prabowo-Hatta International slogans about ‘Revival Indonesian’ becoming Asian Tiger is a high performance leadership style in Indonesian foreign politics.

While the more feminine performance of Indonesia’s foreign politics looks of the duo Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla. Concentration of Indonesia’s foreign relations will be more focused inward looking. Visions-Missions of Jokowi-Kalla are more based on the national interest and the desire to strengthen the identity of Indonesia as a maritime nation. The idea is to save Indonesia’s marine wealth that will be done by building the fish processing industries, as well as improving transportation links for large ships at strategic locations. The idea of the need for the Indonesian people to do ‘mental revolution’ as a guide to the ‘Wonderful Indonesia’ is the slogan of the foreign politics implementation of a low-performance-high-profile.

Closing
Visions and missions from both pairs of Presidential Candidate – Vice Presidential Candidate are in fact complement each other and fill the two polugri major issues mentioned above. As head of state and head of government, the elected president later will have to have a vital role and influence on the implementation direction of the foreign politics that strived for the prosperity of the Indonesian people, keep maintaining integrity of the Republic, as well as a commitment to be part of an international collaboration in creating world peace. In 2015, Indonesia will face the ASEAN Community. Indonesia needs to show the attitude of ‘do not come home’ in agreements towards ASEAN economic society later. When viewed from its history, Indonesian foreign politics are closely related to the issue of its national pride, position, and role in the international world. The fact that a peaceful election in Indonesia should be a major capital and stimulus to improve the active role in regional and global arena, as mandated by opening of the Constitution 1945 paragraph 4 to participate in creating a world order, as well as to resolve issues and security challenges

References :
Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia,  Jakarta, Equinox Publishing, 2007.

Rebecca Grant & Kathleen Newland, Gender and International Relations, Buckingham, Open University Press, 1991.

Prabowo Subianto, et. all, Membangun Kembali Indonesia Raya, Jakarta, Institute Garuda Nusantara, 2009.

Anis H. Bajrektarevic, From WWI to www. – Was history ever on Holiday?, Addleton Academic Publishers/GHIR, New York

http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/sideviews/article/on-the-indonesias-election-2014-igor-dirgantara

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/09/18/prabowo-could-be-indonesia-s-lee-kuan-yew.html

http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/voting-trends-in-upcoming-indonesian-elections-4936/

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/05/12/jokowi-wants-start-mental-revolution.html

Mood, Wisdom and Passions of Middle Class in Upcoming Indonesian Election

http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/opinion/race-strengthen-foreign-ties/

http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/93655/observer-raises-suspicion-over-jokowi-blake-meeting

http://www.teraspos.com/en/read/2014/03/15/84284/jokowi-breaks-his-campaign-promise-for-his-presidential-candidacy

Public Favors Presidential Candidates with Military Background

Igor Dirgantara is Lecturer at Faculty of Social Politics, University Jayabaya, Jakarta, and Director Survey & Polling Indonesia (SPIN).

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Southeast Asia

Indo-China integration meets Cambodia’s interests

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Cambodia, which is located between Thailand and Vietnam and has a 440-kilometer coastal zone which is separated from the rest of the country by a mountain ridge, is in need of a “third neighbor” in order to survive economically and politically, and for improving its export opportunities.

Pnomh Penh’s hopes for partnership with the United States fell through. After Washington passed the Cambodia  Democracy Act in 2018 in support of the Cambodian opposition, it became clear that the US was ready to use legal instruments against Pnomh Penh to pursue its interests in the region.

At present, Cambodia’s “third neighbor” is China. Cambodia is doomed to participate in the Chinese infrastructure project “One Belt, One Road” because otherwise it will not get access to South East Asia markets. The extent to which the Cambodian economy is sensitive to market changes was demonstrated by Italy, which initiated extra duties on Cambodian rice imports into the EU. Rice is the main item of Cambodian food exports. Rome thereby secured a review of the Cambodia-EU “Everything Except Weapons” trade scheme.

In the course of a visit to  Beijing in January 2019 by Prime Minister of Cambodia Hun Sen, the Chinese side promised to allocate $ 588 million as aid for Cambodia by 2021, to increase rice imports to 400 thousand tons and boost bilateral trade volume to $ 10 billion by 2023 . This is designed to ensure the economic survival of Cambodia.

In foreign policy, Cambodia avoids aggravating relations with its neighbors lest there appear conflicts detrimental to the weak Cambodian economy, and underscores the importance of maintaining peace in the Asia-Pacific Region.

Phnom Penh is fully aware that it can improve its economic performance only on condition it maintains a long period of peace and strict neutrality. Cambodia is among the world’s fastest growing economies (7.5% in 2018). If the country is to preserve and build on the current pace of development, it will have to boost exports of manufactured goods (80% in the structure of exports) and rice, and should encourage tourism and attract foreign investment.

Phnom Penh is worried about two major problems in Asia – the North Korean issue and territorial disputes in the South China Sea as part of a greater US-China conflict.

Pnomh Penh sees the essence of the North Korean issue in that Cambodia traditionally maintains close economic and political ties with both Koreas. Cambodia and North Korea form a united front at international forums on the issue of human rights, North Korean military experts have assisted Cambodia with the development of a demining service, and North Korea has invested $ 24 million in the country’s tourism industry.

South Korea is the second largest investor for Cambodia after China. By 2018, the total volume of South Korean investments in Cambodia had reached $ 4.56 billion. For Pnomh Penh, Seoul is an influential economic player and cooperation with it contributes to the diversification of the Cambodian economy.

South Korean capital helps Phnom Penh to dilute the financial presence of Chinese investors in the Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone – the country’s main economic gateway. For Cambodia, the conflict between the two Koreas is fraught with significant financial and political losses.

In the opinion of Pnomh Penh, diplomatic clashes between the United States and China over territorial disputes in the South China Sea may exacerbate Cambodian-Vietnamese relations. Although relations between Cambodia and Vietnam have  always been tarnished by conflict,  Phnom Penh, following a policy of strict neutrality, has been promoting broader cooperation with Hanoi in recent years.

As Vietnam, unlike China, is moving closer to Washington, Phnom Penh does not want to find itself in a situation where he will have to make a clear choice in favor of one of the parties to the conflict. Militarization of Vietnam, whose territory blocks Cambodia’s access to the sea, will be ruinous for the economy of Cambodia.

Vietnamese seaports are the final point of the Southern Economic Corridor, which runs from Myanmar via Thailand and Cambodia to Vietnam. Phnom Penh pins  big hopes on cooperation within the framework of the Southern Economic Corridor. An ASEAN report describes Cambodia as a perfect place for an export-oriented economy that serves as a binding link for the regional economy as a whole.

Given the situation, it can be assumed that Phnom Penh’s policy over the next few years will focus on diversifying the economy, attracting a greater number of foreign economic partners (Japan, Australia, Russia, the EU), strengthening regional integration within the Southern Economic Corridor and within the framework of the ASEAN, and minimizing US-North Korean, Sino-US, and Sino-Vietnamese differences. 

First published in our partner International Affairs

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Vietnam Fisheries Brace for EU Yellow Card Review

James Borton

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Vietnamese fishing vessels credit: VNA

The tides wait for no one and each day fisheries, particularly those closest to the shores, are over-fished and harmed by industrialization. For emerging economies like Vietnam, the issuance of a yellow card by the European Union caught the attention of fishers and government officials alike, with a clear warning that the country has not been tackling illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.

Tran VanLinh, the chairman of the Danang Fisheries, like others, is worried about the industry’s export future. After all, the fisheries sector is a cornerstone of the Vietnamese economy and has contributed to an average growth rate of 7.9 percent. Nevertheless, he understands that the yellow card offers not only a roadmap for the government but also for all people to address long-standing conservation and sustainability issues.

“After receiving the commission’s carding system notice, Vietnam has tried to satisfy all the requirements imposed by the EU. We do need to protect our sea and environment,” claims Linh.

The overall picture in the South China Sea or East Sea as Vietnam refers to this body of water, is grim. Total fish stocks have been depleted by 70-95 percent since the 1950s, and catch rates have declined by 70 percent over the last 20 years. Giant clam harvesting, dredging, and artificial island building in recent years severely damaged or destroyed over 160 square kilometers, or about 40,000 acres, of coral reefs, which were already declining by 16 percent per decade.

Challenges around food security and renewable fish resources are fast becoming a hardscrabble reality for more than just fishermen. With dwindling fisheries in the region’s coastal areas, fishing state subsidies, overlapping EEZ claims, and mega-commercial fishing trawlers competing in a multi-billion-dollar industry, fish are now the backbone in this sea of troubles.

Meanwhile, Vietnam’s fisheries employ more than 4.5 million people and the nation is ranked as the world’s fourth largest exporter of fish commodities after China, Norway and Thailand. In 2016, the country’s seafood products were exported to 160 countries and territories with the three major markets of the US (20.6%), EU (17.3%), and Japan (15.7%). Vietnam is currently the largest tra fish supplier and fourth biggest shrimp exporter in the world.

There’s even greater pressure placed on fishermen to meet Vietnam’s ambitious seafood sector target of earning 10 billion USD from exports this year, up 10 percent from 2018.  According to the Vietnamese Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers (VASEP), the goal can be achieved largely from $4.2 billion from shrimp exports, $2.3 billion from tra fish exports, and some $3.5 billion from other seafood shipments.

Meanwhile, coastal fish stocks have become either fully exploited or overfished. As a consequence, the South China Sea is considered Vietnam’s vital fishing ground.

With a delegation of the EU’s Directorate of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries expected to arrive at the end of May, Vietnam is urgently adopting measures to convince inspectors that they have smartly corrected their fishery conservation course.

 “The Danang Fishery Department has implemented numerous educational programs to teach fishermen about the new laws and to train them about the EU requirements,” adds Linh, a respected industry leader.

From Hai Phong, Da Nang, LySon, Phu Quoc and Vung Tau, more fisheries are attempting to reign in bad practices and reach towards modernization, eliminating the destructive fishing practices which affects fishery resources. However, more work is still required to revise their legal framework to insure compliance with international and regional rules, to increase the traceability of its seafood products, and to strengthen the implementation of its conservation and management of fisheries resources.

Mr. Le Khuon, chairman of the fishery association in An Vinh Village located in Quang Ngai Province and a former fisherman, who has stared down an aggressive Chinese fishing vessel or two near the Paracels, knows the hardships of fishing. “Of course the yellow card does impact on our local fishermen since we export sea cucumbers to the EU.”

Along with others in the area, Ly Son fishermen recognize the importance of marine protected areas since the coastal areas are overfished. “It’s a hard life and I have lost friends to the sea,” claims 42 year-old Tran Phuc Linh, who has also been harassed by the Chinese since he often fishes near disputed historic fishing grounds in the Paracel Islands.

In fact, the fishing incidents continue in the Spratlys, where China’s mega steel hulled vessels regularly intimidate Vietnam’s colorful wooden trawlers. Just two months ago, a fishing trawler moored at Da Loiis land, in the Paracel archipelago was chased by a Chinese Maritime Surveillance vessel before it crashed upon the rocks and sunk without loss of life to crew.

According to analyst and consultant, Carlyle A. Thayer, “the Chinese government, as a matter of policy, employs it commercial fishing fleet as a third arm of its maritime forces after the regular navy and civilian maritime enforcement agencies, now grouped into a national Coast Guard.”

Linh and his wife do not want their two teenage sons to make their living as fishermen. They know the perils at sea from the seasonal typhoons and the threats associated with patrol and interdiction of ships violating mutually agreed upon fishing restrictions.

Sent by their governments to find food for their people, fishers find themselves on the front lines of this new ecological battle. These fishing sentinels and their trawlers are fighting the maritime disputes between China and its neighbors.

This fishing competition for available fish has resulted in increased number of fishing vessel conflicts. These hostile sea encounters have been witnessed in Indonesia waters whereat least 23 fishing boast from Vietnam and Malaysia have been accused of poaching in that nation’s waters.

As a result, Indonesia’s fisheries minister, Susi Pudijastuti, ordered the dynamiting of these boats and over 170 fishing vessels have been sunk in their waters over the past several years. The increasing number of fishing incidents reflects not only deeply different interpretations and application of the law of the sea, but a fundamental conflict of interest between coastal states and maritime powers.

Even with these threatening clouds on the horizon, some fisheries are going about responsibly reigning in illegal fishing. In Da Nang, its 509 fishing trawlers (all longer than 15 metres) have installed with GPS. This includes the seven steel hulled vessels subsidized by the government’s generous loan program.

The mandatory installation of the GPS offers more assurance in the identification of catch origins and it also helps that more fishermen are also completing and submitting the required fishing diary or logbook.

Meanwhile, the government insists that statistics on fishing vessels, fishing logs and fishing yields of each commercial trawler are now part of a Vietnam Fish Base, a nationwide fishery software database in accordance with the law.

Within the disputed territory, there are over 1.9 billion people, seventy-five percent of them living within one hundred kilometers of the coast. Nearly eighty-five percent of the world’s fishers are concentrated in Asia, particularly in the South China Sea, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Subsequently, fishing remains a politically sensitive and emotionally charged national security issue for all claimant nations. This ocean plundering presents the region with a looming food crisis. Any effort to balance the economic benefits with the security context within the South China Sea will require a coordinated, multi-level response from scientists, historically engaged in collaborative research and already addressing issues of sustained productivity and environmental security in the region.

It’s a prevailing view that the collapse of fisheries is the major driver of competition for marine resources. This continues to result in a lack of respect among claimants for mutually agreed-upon fishery restrictions within 12 nautical miles of outposts and in the recognition of management area within 200 nautical miles of coastline. Last year 86 Vietnamese fishing boats were destroyed by Indonesia for illegally catching fish in its waters.

However, senior Vietnamese officials are confident that these violations are now being eliminated, if not sharply reduced.

“ Because local governments and relevant agencies such as the Coastguard, and Border guard are conducting more surveillance and enacting stern measures in monitoring and investigating; fishing violations are reduced,” claims Nguyen Manh Dong, Director General of the Department of Maritime Affairs, and National Boundary Commission.

He’s quick to add that while the EU’s requirements have been fulfilled including port control, some cases still happen, particularly with Indonesia.

To offer additional counter-balance, Vietnam’s Fisheries Resources Surveillance Department has stated that it is working to raise awareness of maritime boundaries and international maritime laws among its fishermen, apart from conducting frequent patrols to prevent potential violations

The complicated nature of the Vietnam’s East Sea or the South China Sea (SCS) disputes, makes short term resolution of fishing disputes difficult. More parties, believe that proper management of these disputes to insure stability  becomes a priority.

“Vietnam will never tolerate or permit activities related to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing,” adds Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) Vu Van Tam.

For example, Binh Dinh province is adopting necessary measures to remove the “yellow card” status. All local fishing boats are required to obtain certificates of registration, inviting local authorities to review design documents, supervise the building, improvement and repairing of fishing vessels.

Among policy shapers, and marine scientists, there’s a general consensus that the best approach for managing SCS disputes and addressing IUU issues is to set aside the sovereignty disputes and jointly develop and manage the natural resources, such as fisheries. While advancing fisheries cooperation in the SCS has been increasingly recognized as a political, ecological, socio-economic and security imperative, a crucial question remains unanswered. What objective can be achieved through fisheries cooperation in the SCS?

Marine biologists like Professor Nguyen Chu Hoi advocate the creation of ecosystem- based fishery zones covering reefs that are vital to regional fish stocks, especially in the Spratlys and Paracels. This action requires the adoption of an urgent cooperative marine management system, regardless of the location of their territorial and maritime claims.

While the growing demand for fish by global markets can fray even the strongest fisher’s net, the challenge for Vietnam is the imperative for management of its declining fisheries in order to create long-term sustainability. The protection of the “commons” requires more than a pass fail report card from the EU.

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Joining forces for sustainable development

Armida Salsiah Alisjahbana

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Lao People’s Democratic Republic’s development story is one of a nation with its sights firmly set on building a prosperous future in concert with the broader region. The country’s willingness to embrace an ambitious national development plan has seen the country transition to a market-oriented economy, increasingly integrated into regional and global markets. Substantial reforms paved the way to World Trade Organisation (WTO) membership in 2013. Today, as an active member of ASEAN’s Economic Community, Lao PDR is working to deepen economic integration: to improve market access to regional partners and to achieve the transit routes crucial for any landlocked country to engage fully in international trade.

Lao PDR’s approach has delivered impressive economic growth, above 6.5 percent per year for over a decade and forecast to be 6.8 percent in 2019. Over the past quarter of a century, extreme poverty has been significantly reduced. Income per capita has increased, and access to education and health care services has improved. Targeted development plans and industrial policies have been developed to support the transformation of the economy. Lao PDR could graduate from least developed country status by 2024 if these gains are maintained, which would be a greater achievement still.
At the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), we take a regional approach to supporting our member States achieve sustainable development. Lao PDR’s recent journey is one on which we are keen to build. We work with the whole UN family to overcome challenges which transcend borders and to achieve a sweeping set of economic, social and environmental objectives captured by the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. I am meeting the Laotian leadership this week with these objectives in mind and to join forces with national agencies and development partners to accelerate the implementation of the Eighth 5 Year National Socio-Economic Development Plan.

Our analysis demonstrates that across Asia and the Pacific, much more needs to be done to achieve all 17 Sustainable Development Goals. While Lao PDR has achieved a great deal, its economic growth has not been sufficiently inclusive or sustainable, which has led to inequality. The quality of education and lifelong learning needs to be significantly improved; to give young people opportunity, support entrepreneurship and enable companies to expand and create jobs. Transparency and predictability of policies and legal frameworks would improve the business environment. There is great scope for the Laotian economy to become more productive and diverse, and to attract investment to areas beyond resource extraction and large infrastructure projects.

To unleash this potential and achieve sustainable development, substantial investment is needed. The additional investment required across the whole of the region is $1.5 trillion a year. Our analysis shows the region has the fiscal space to afford this. Yet mobilizing these additional resources will require a concerted effort, particularly for Least Developed Countries. Reforms to increase tax revenue and private sector investment will be necessary in the face of declining overseas aid. For Lao PDR to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, significant investment of an additional $3 a day per person is needed. Investment equivalent to some 3.6 percent of GDP per year could end poverty by paying for basic social protection and financing development programmes. To achieve universal education from pre-primary to upper secondary school by 2030, additional investment equivalent to 2.2 percent of GDP a year is needed to secure the country’s future.

These additional investments must be accompanied by measures to diversify the economy. Raising productivity in rural areas will be key, along with broad based policy interventions in addressing vulnerable groups and communities. Government efforts to promote green and sustainable agro-processing can be complemented by stronger links between agriculture, manufacturing and service sectors. Supporting Lao PDR’s thriving manufacturing base through special economic zones is important for employment but also for government revenue. These can also help encourage investment in the service sector and improve the quality of Lao PDR’s growth, but they must be complemented by improved transport connectivity. ESCAP is supporting the development of dry ports in the region, to make the shipment of sea cargo to inland destinations more efficient.

As we reach for a better future, Lao PDR has a role to play in our region’s effort to achieve the 2030 Agenda. This will require more transformative change, significant investment and a structural shift to activities which improve the quality of economic growth and preserve the country’s precious natural environment; especially along the Mekong, a river on which millions of livelihoods depend. I am looking forward to working with Lao PDR to strengthen its long-term development partnership with the UN family. This is our opportunity to take multilateralism a step further and, building on national and sub regional achievements, deliver sustainable development in Asia and the Pacific.

UN ESCAP

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