Prof. Anis Bajrektarevic famously claimed that “…the conglomerate of nation-states/EU has silently handed over one of its most important debates – that of European identity – to the wing-parties, recently followed by the several selective and contra-productive foreign policy actions.” Elaborating on these actions he went further as to claim that: “…sort of Islam Europe supported in the Middle East yesterday, is the sort of Islam that Europe hosts today. (…) and “…that Islam in Turkey (or in Kirgizstan and in Indonesia) is broad, liberal and tolerant while the one in Northern Europe is a brutally dismissive and assertive.”
Western Europe is phasing the outcomes of the development of two different trajectories. On one side, the immigrant presence from the former colonies, growing since the 1960’s, has turned Western Europe into a multicultural and, by extension, multi-faith mosaic. On the other, the permanent decline of religious performance has brought up a wider consensus concerning the privatization of religion as well as its status of invisibility in the public sphere. These two trajectories can be perceived as oppositional if one bears in mind the significant numbers of non- white immigrants residing in Western European states and the paramount importance most of them place on religion for identification, organization and political representation. Several prominent academics refer to the emergence of the aforementioned phenomenon as a ‘crisis of secularism’.
However, I would like to argue that such clear-cut judgments present several problems. To begin with, ‘secularism’ is a complex term with multiple meanings. Western Europe currently sports two forms of secularism; the radical model of French laicité and the moderate form followed by the rest of the states. Within the latter framework, several kinds of state-religion connections have been developed throughout the years. Even in the radical French model some state-religion connections exist, although they are concealed under cultural terms. As becomes apparent, if we take absolute state-religious separation as a crude definition of secularism, it turns out that ‘a crisis’ occurred well before the advent of multicultural presence.
Indeed, this essay will attempt to clarify that although multiculturalism supports and promotes the recognition of minority religious identities, the statement that it puts secularism under crisis is a bit exaggerated, if not purposefully misleading. Multiculturalism does not opt for a complete disestablishment of secularism. On the contrary, multiculturalism supports moderate secularism as it is believed that the various types of religion-state connections within it can be extended so as to accommodate minority religions, as well. All in all, multiculturalism strives for a rethinking of secularism, a renegotiation of the term, for it to become less restrictive for minorities that feel marginalized because of their religious identity.
The defining characteristics of Western Europe’s multicultural reality
Western Europe started to receive exceptionally large numbers of non-white immigrants after the 1973 oil crisis, in order to rebuild its devastated economy. As its capitalist economy constantly demands a cheap labor force, people continue immigrating to Western Europe for the prospect of a better and safer life. Under these circumstances, Western Europe has reached the diversity previously characteristic of traditional immigrant receptacles such as the USA. There is, however, a fundamental difference in this comparison; the large amounts of Muslim immigrants residing in Western Europe. Specifically, Muslims form the majority of non-white Western European immigrants, with a rough estimate putting them at approximately 6% of the relevant total (Pew Research, 2011). Although Muslims appear to be evenly distributed, their presence in the larger cities is far more noticeable and rapidly growing. Regardless of this strong Muslim presence, non- white immigrant minorities in Western Europe, especially those coming from South Asia, seek to identify themselves, while also being recognized by the state and their fellow-citizens, on the basis of their religious identity (Sikhs, Hindus, Muslims). This strong religious assertiveness, despite having gone unnoticed for a long time as a matter of importance concerning group recognition, has become the main topic of discussion in Western European multicultural politics over the last few decades. The matter of controversy is the position of religious or ethno-religious immigrant identities in the public sphere of Western European states.
Multiculturalism, multicultural citizenship and religious identities
Multiculturalism is a political ideology which, during the last few decades in Western Europe, focuses primarily on the need for recognition of immigrant minorities. According to Modood, multiculturalism ‘refers to the struggle, the political mobilization but also the policy and institutional outcomes, to the forms of accommodation in which ‘differences’ are not eliminated, are not washed away but to some extent recognized’. Moreover, as he proceeds to mention, multiculturalism ‘is a politics which recognizes post-immigration groups exist in western societies in ways that both they and the other, formally and informally, negatively and positively are aware that these group-differentiating dimensions are central to their social constitution’. In summation, multiculturalism avoids group-blind approaches and ‘promotes politics of recognition as a means to secure multicultural equalities between groups’.
Members of ethnic minorities with a strong religious character (such as Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus) experience marginalization on the grounds of their religion. For the members of these minority groups, however, religion is a basic element of their self-identity that they are not willing to surrender so as to become accepted. Jacobson, O’Beirne, Fish and Gillat-Ray are just a few examples that illustrate precisely how religion is an aspect that permeates all aspects of Muslim’s life, representing an integral part of their self as well as a tradition offering a sense of belonging. Thus, these groups react with a strong religious assertion in the public sphere, demanding the same recognition and respect previously given to other minority groups, originally marginalized in terms of their ‘different’ identity (racial, ethnic, sexual).
Multicultural politics support equality for all citizens not on the basis of providing equal rights to all but rather on that of recognition of the existence of group identities
According to Modood, ‘multicultural citizenship is the project to make citizenship-inclusion or integration possible on terms that respect all and in particular those […] whose subjectivities are marginalized or dismissed […]’. Bearing this position in mind, multicultural politics acknowledge ‘the importance of religious identities to some non-white ethnic minorities…and…their centrality to some forms of ethnic minority self-assertions, mobilizations and political claims-making’. Thus, from a multiculturalist perspective, in order for these ethnic minorities to be equally accommodated, the state must respect and recognize their religious identities.
Under such circumstances, it becomes clear that state-religion relations can be seen as a matter of recognition. As religious identities (Sikh, Hindu and most notably Muslim) have become one of the most salient minority status markers, Western European states, driven by a ‘multicultural sensibility’, realize that state-religion connections must be rethought according to the needs presented by the new multi-faith reality. This process of negotiation for the place of religious minority identities in public is perceived by many as a violation of the secular norms of religious neutrality and church-state separation, which are deeply rooted in Western European states. However, to what extent this contention is true is a matter of great controversy.
Secularism in Western Europe
Modood defines political secularism as a condition in which ‘political authority does not rest on religious authority and the latter does not dominate political authority’.
Secularism is a principle deeply embedded in all Western European states since the signing of the treaty of Westphalia. In national narratives, secularism has been referenced as the modern developmental process that brought about the emergence of sovereign states. It has been defined as the principle that disentangled individuals and states from their religious beliefs to halt the potential resurgence of the violent wars of the past. Thus, the need for a separate existence of secular and religious spheres has come to be perceived as the alleged sine qua non for every society that wants to be perceived as modern.
‘The separation of Church and State, the neutrality of the state in regard to religion, religious freedom and understandings of secularisation in terms of the privatisation and decline of religion, are all at the heart of discourses about secularism’. The practical implementation of secularism differs across state borders. Thus, in broader terms, Western European secularism can be divided in two different categories; the radical model and the moderate one.
Laicité is the radical model of secularism adopted solely by France. In this kind of secularism, religion is essentially banished from the public sphere. Religion is perceived as an anachronistic element, which must be completely marginalized in the name of reason and liberal individual freedom. Religion is strictly differentiated from the public domain, only maintaining a place in individuals’ private life. Accordingly, the state takes a neutral stance on any kind of religion in the name of the liberal value of equal treatment for all individuals. Under these circumstances, the state supports a model of assimilationist, civic integration. ‘Integration here is understood as an allegiance to a common civic identity and the joint pursuit of the common good’. In other words, in order for someone to be fully integrated into French society, the civic element of his/her identity should trump all others in the public sphere. As Bouchard & Taylor aptly put it, such a position ‘demands the removal or neutralization of the identity markers (including religion […]) that differentiate citizens’ and ‘[…] assumes that the removal of the difference is a prerequisite to integration’.
However, this rigid a context is destabilized when the need to integrate people not previously nurtured with these hard boundaries between private and public religion arises. Such is the case with immigrant minorities claiming a strong religious identity.
The French state reacted to this multiculturalist challenge with a top-down approach, which sought to restrict the public expression of minority religious identities. The state as well as the majority of the public opinion perceived the wearing of religious symbols in public as a political project violating the secular principle concerning the privatization of religion and the neutrality of the public sphere. Consequently, the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols – clearly aimed at Muslims’ headscarves and Sikhs’ turbans – was banned by law in February 2004. The banning of the full-face veil (niqab) from public spaces followed in April 2011.
Both of these legislation initiatives show an inclination to bracket ‘difference’ through the implementation of the historically contingent principles of secularism in a sort of ‘fetishization of the favored institutional arrangements’. Such movements show the unwillingness of the state to recognize that religion can be a representative element of groups or entire cultures. In other words, the state replies to religious assertiveness with a ‘religious-focused version of different-blindness’. The denial of public religious accommodation conceals the cultural privileges of Christian traditions that are deeply entrenched in the notion of secularism, thus sustaining the inferiority and alienation of non-Christian traditions. This is to say that a concept of ‘neutrality’ is impossible, as the state always reflects specific cultural characteristics, which in the case of France are rooted in Christianity.
The strong insistence of French politics on the preservation of secularism, as presented through the application of the aforementioned measures, reifies the secular-religious dichotomy as an unsurmountable opposition, diminishing any potential for a fruitful mixture between the two sides. Based on a secularist argumentation, the state presents itself as acting in the service of an ‘us’ wanting to assimilate (or exclude) an as yet illiberal (or premodern) ‘them’. As Modood puts it, ‘such totalized dualistic perspectives are not conducive to fostering dialogue, to respect for difference, to seeking common ground and negotiated accommodation[…]and above all to multicultural citizenship’. If religious identities are excluded in a way that no other identity (be it racial, ethnic, sexual or whatever else) is, then there is obviously a profound bias against religious identity which clashes with the multicultural principle of equality between identity groups. If one were to use this radical form of secularism as a model, then multiculturalism clearly makes it ‘at risk’.
However, there is another perspective in the French laicité which is worth mentioning, to illustrate that ethnic minorities’ claims for religious accommodation are not all that contradictory to the existing practices of the Republican state. Rather, they are based on pre-existing state-religious relationships. More specifically, since the establishment of the law of 1905, the state is committed to contribute financially to the preservation of church buildings, as it acknowledges that they are part of French cultural heritage. Moreover, since the establishment of ‘Debré Law’ in 1959, the state, to a great extent, sponsors Catholic Church Schools. Clearly, the secular French state both acknowledges and respects, by law, that religion is a part of one’s tradition and culture that needs to be preserved and moreover that it can contribute to education.
Bearing the aforementioned facts in mind, it seems that even in the radical laicité model, some manner of state-religion connections are already active. Consequently, ethnic minorities’ struggle, based on the multiculturalist principles, for the recognition of their religious identity by the state is not an initiative that places secularism under ‘crisis’. What is requested is not the desecularisation or disestablishment of the privileges of the Christian tradition within a secular context. Rather, the challenge is how to add the new faiths alongside the older ones in a process of ‘equalising upwards’.
A relevant initiative has been launched by president Sarkozi with the establishment of the French Council for the Muslim Faith in 2003, whose function is to act as the primary liaison between the French government and Muslims. Despite the fact that the assembly of the council was a state-construct and that it has, to date, failed to become recognized as representative by the majority of the French Muslim population, such initiatives are necessary for the equal accommodation of religious minorities. Even if these initiatives may seem prima facie contrary to laicité, this is not the case for their relationship to moderate secularism.
b. Moderate secularism
Following Modood, ‘the key feature of moderate secularism is that it sees organized religion as not just a private benefit but as a potential public good or national resource, […]which the state can in some circumstances assist to realise’. Under these circumstances state and church remain autonomous but may still collaborate in several domains. Modood aptly explains what can be perceived as such a state-religion connection; it is a ‘kind of relationship with the state such that a religious organisation participates in the functions of the state or is a partner in governance, helping the state to discharge some of its duties and implementation of policies or it is continuously supported by public funds or it is part of the symbolism of the state in a clearly non-neutralist way’. Through the presentation of a series of empirical examples of states that adopt religion-state connections, an attempt will be made to show that multicultural recognition politics for immigrants’ religious identities do not clash with this manner of arrangements. On the contrary, the latter may be a platform for multicultural integration.
Initially presented to support this argument follows the German example. In Germany, the most important source of funding for religious communities comes from tax receipts. This state financial aid to ‘religious societies being organized as corporations under public law’ is also protected by the law. Moreover, numerous public sponsorships are granted to religious communities. In addition, it must be mentioned that around half of Germany’s welfare provisions are channeled to the public through Church-based organisations, within a climate of a civic society, in which church and state can work together for the accomplishment of common goals. The Muslim presence in Germany is considerable and enduring, especially bearing in mind the large Turkish minority. According to Korioth & Ausberg, Muslims make up approximately 4% of the German population. Of course, Germany is renowned for its anti-multiculturalist sentiments and the ‘Gastarbeiter’ approach in its immigration policy. However, a climate of ‘multiculturalist sensibility’ is present and reflected in ‘corporatist’ forms of Muslim accommodation. More specifically, chancellor Merkel and her government launched the first German Islam Conference in 2006. According to Aslan, this initiative had aimed ‘to restore mutual trust within the society and its Muslim communities’ so as ‘to enhance the religious and social integration of the Muslim population in Germany’. Since then, the conference has been held annually in the form of a dialogue between ‘the state and selected representatives of Muslims in Germany’. Although top-down, such an attempt can be viewed neither as radically secularist nor as assimilationist. Rather, it meets the multiculturalist prerequisites of willingness for mutual negotiation in order to find effective solutions for the accommodation of religious difference. The German state remains secular but understands that Muslims face discrimination on the basis of their religion and that the state needs to take action so as to protect this group. This solution is not sought outside of the secular principles. Rather, the state tries to renegotiate these principles so that Muslim integration can be achieved within them.
England is another relevant paradigm. Religion and the state are first connected ‘symbolically’, as the monarch has also the ultimate authority of the Church of England and can only undertake duties after being blessed by bishops. Accordingly, 26 bishops are members of the House of Lords, the supreme legislative body of the state, having equal rights with the rest of the members. Apart from that, the Church of England has a substantial educational contribution, in which it is almost exclusively supported by state subsidies.
Of import to the argument at hand is the expansion of state connections to incorporate its Muslim immigrant population, as well. During the New Labor governance, the state recognized the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) as the representative voice of British Muslim population (1997). Throughout its period of governance, New Labor in collaboration with the MCB initiated a series of measures that enabled and promoted the smooth integration of Muslims in the national context. They jointly fostered public acknowledgment of the importance of their religious identity, the introduction of state funded Muslim schools (following their Jewish and Christian counterparts) and concentrated policies on tackling religious discrimination, which reached their peak with the establishment of the law against religious discrimination (2003). All of these attempts were backed by the Church in a climate of ‘interfaith respect’ and ‘multi-faith harmony’.
Relevant examples of states that have extended their church connections to accommodate religious diversity can also be found in Belgium’s multi-faith Council of Religions and in Denmark’s model of ‘multiple establishment’, were Muslim religious communities enjoy a formally recognized and approved status as well as state tax benefits.
None of the aforementioned examples drift from the minimalistic definition of secularism presented previously, meaning that a mutual autonomy between state and religion is still ensured. It should by now have become apparent, through the presentation of these empirical examples, that the type of state-religion connections developed within the framework of moderate secularism makes a clear case that religious minorities can be recognized and accommodated without braking the basic secular rule. In other words, multiculturalism and religious diversity do not necessarily equate eradication of established churches or a ‘crisis’ of secularism.
This essay aimed to evaluate the contention that the ‘crisis of secularism’ in Western Europe is the result of multiculturalism. To this end, several points, facts and empirical examples were presented. The presence of immigrants in Western Europe has undeniably brought with it both multiculturalism and religious diversity. Moreover, some immigrants brought, and continue to bring, with them religious beliefs totally alien to Western Europeans, which can lead to their being discriminated against on the basis of their religion. Muslims are the most notable example of the aforementioned observance, since they form the majority of non-Christian immigrants residing in Western European states, with Sikhs and Hindus also sharing similar experiences. It is therefore clear that the minority statuses of the aforementioned immigrant groups are due to their religious identities.
Multicultural politics support equality for all citizens not on the basis of providing equal rights to all but rather on that of recognition of the existence of group identities. Accordingly, multiculturalism acknowledges the fact that for immigrant groups with a strong-religious character to be recognized, the state needs to recognize religious difference and seek to tackle the problem of religious discrimination. Some people, and more specifically adherents of crude secularism, believe that this brings the whole notion of ‘secularism’ under crisis. However, as Modood aptly puts it, multiculturalism’s focus on recognition of immigrant groups’ religious identities ‘is based on recognition and inclusivity, not the truth of doctrines’ and ‘is not opposed to secular or non- religious identities but is additional to them and is not meant to suggest any inherent superiority or desirability of religious over non-religious identities – or vice versa’.
Multiculturalism interacts with two different kinds of secularism in Western Europe. On the one hand, there is the French laicité, which reacts to the multi-faith challenge with religious-blind policies that sustain the inequalities faced by immigrant religious minority groups. On the grounds of an alleged principle of state neutrality as well as the liberal principle of individual freedom, the French state seeks to banish the presence of minority religions form the public sphere. As it becomes clear, if this is the prototypical model of secularism taken into consideration, multiculturalism definitively puts it under great strain. However, the challenge is not one of forcing France to lose its Catholic character or abandon the idea of secularism on the whole. What is requested, is some form of state-religion connection within the secular framework, which would provide some sort of recognition to the Muslim immigrant community.
Such state-religion connections have been a part of the prevalent, moderate, form of secularism implemented in most of the Western European states for some time now. In moderate secularism, religion is not only understood as a private matter but also as a potential public good, which the state seeks to assist. Germany, England, Denmark and Belgium are just some of the states that have positively and effectively responded to the challenge of multicultural religious diversity by extending their state-religion connections so as to accommodate immigrant religious minorities.
In summation, multiculturalism may bring religion to the forefront anew but it does not do so in ways necessarily totally alien to secularism. As it has been shown, several kinds of long-lasting state-religion connections have been developed, especially in moderate forms of secularism, even before the expression of immigrant demand for some sort of public recognition of their religious identities. Seen in this light, multiculturalism cannot be seen as seeking a “crisis of secularism”, but rather as calling for nothing more than an extension of tenets already present in secularism, so that new faiths can be brought into any given secular state model alongside their older, preexisting counterparts.
Asian Pop Culture for the UN Sustainable Futures
As a 16-year-old high school student in Taiwan, I’ve struggled to find opportunities to make an impact on international issues. Like many passionate students who are involved in Global Affairs and Model UN, I’ve always tried to take initiative and seek out opportunities that can promote youth action for a greater cause. With this drive, I decided to commit myself to the UNODC E4J’s “Educating for the Rule of Law” project when I saw the competition poster on the UNODC website.
When I was five, my grandfather’s Filipina caregiver, Aher, told me stories about her friends who were victims of human trafficking in Southeast Asia. As I grew older, with more access to resources and information from the internet, I began to dive into the details and history of the matter. After my grandfather passed, Aher also left the house and went to work for someone else, where, I found out, she faced maltreatment and abuse from the homeowner. Since the incident, I had the urge to work in the social justice and the law enforcement field. Now that I am a student, I can contribute to a wider audience through my art.
With a focus on Sustainable Development Goal 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institution), I decided to dedicate my song to human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants because of those very stories told by Aher. The entire process took me roughly four months in total. Every detail, from writing the lyrics, coming up with the melody and guitar chords with my peers, recording the song, adding instrumentals and beats, gathering video clips, editing video clips, and blending in the music to producing an awareness music video was worth the hard work. The result came as a shock. I couldn’t imagine out of the 1,200 submissions around the world, I was selected. I was in disbelief when I woke up that morning and saw the notification on my phone: Invitation to the UNODC E4J High-Level Conference. Over the next few weeks, I rehearsed over and over again with my guitar and background track to make sure that my performance would be flawless.
Using my prior knowledge in music composition, international affairs, and public performance, I was able to successfully engage with the audience, maintaining my posture, and effectively delivering a speech about my motivation behind the creation of “Heed The Plea, and Set Them Free.”As I wandered around the conference room, I took the initiative and spoke with numerous experts in different fields, gathering a stack of business cards, making long-lasting connections, and witnessing real-time professional operations inside the UN. I could feel a door had been opened.
Mr. Yury Fedotov, Chief Director of the UNODC, tweeted a group picture of himself, me, and the other E4J winners with compliments and words of encouragement for all the effort that the youth have contributed towards promoting the culture of lawfulness. Meeting all the other winners of the contest was amazing as we shared our experiences and talked about our process of hard work. A teenager from the Philippines, who was the winner in the tertiary level, produced a short film about violence with an unforgettable use of emotion and film technique, connecting to the real-world issue of terrorism. The most phenomenal presentation of youth effort in fighting for the rule of law, however, came from a 14-year-old Nigerian girl who delivered a moving call-to-action to stand up for the rule of law, receiving a standing ovation from the crowd.
Although I told myself it was just like the many times performing for my band at school, I wasn’t able to manage my emotions standing on the stage in front of diplomats, organization CEOs, and educators. Stage fright was hitting me like I was in elementary school again. This live performance, however, was not like any music performance at the courtyard or auditorium. This was a pivotal turning point in my life, presenting myself as a representative of a youth movement on an international platform. This performance was proof for every youth who has ever doubted they could impact global issues, and, more importantly, proof for everyone to witness youths’ ability to make a difference in this world and to use art as a medium to influence people.
Beyond the performance
On day two, I had the honor of presenting my song, along with three other #Create4Justice artists, and discuss how various forms of artistic expression can be utilized to promote the rule of law. Along with three other panelists, I introduced my music as a medium to promote justice in an engaging way. I was deeply intrigued by how different manifestations of the arts can bring about awareness and change. Mr. Andrew Newman, a close friend and colleague, talked about the power of journalism and journalists’ efforts to show the world the “truth” behind world issues through the camera lens. An Italian architect and artist talked about how transforming old houses into colorful artworks helps with crime prevention and overall community wellness. The one artist that I talked with the most and still stay in touch with to work on song collaborations was Mr. Leonardo Parrága from Colombia. Our common robust interest in Reggaeton music created a new hashtag,#ReggaetonPorJusticia (R4J) with the purpose of reaching Spanish-speaking audiences, addressing issues relevant to justice and law in South America, and transforming the provocative image of reggaeton-type music. In addition, the head of the UNODC Doha Declaration Global Programme, Mr. Marco Teixeira, showed a strong interest in Reggaeton and expressed a willingness to help with my song creations. Even more encouragement came from Dr.Sofija Bajrektarevic, Director-General of the fascinating Vienna-based platform ‘Culture for Peace – Unifying potentials for the Future’. She suggested series of programs to be organised under her vision of bridging the generational gap through ‘Tomorrow’s People’ Board.
An Album Is Born
I am ambitious. I started with one song, and now I want to kickstart a whole album consisting of 17 songs that showcase different styles of music, are written in a plethora of foreign languages, and appropriately represent each and every one of the UN Global Goals. My original idea was to convey a unique story through the medium of music with a visual (video) accompaniment. However, it wasn’t as easy as I thought. It took me four months to finish producing my human trafficking song, “Heed The Plea and Set Them Free.” I couldn’t imagine the amount of time it would take for me to achieve this dream on my own. So I thought, why not feature different artists around the world, let them tell their own stories, and write their own lyrics in the languages closest to their hearts?
With the help of MUN Impact, I was able to launch my music project—The SDG Album, which involves youth from all over the world, creating songs about various global goal targets in the local language of their respective regions. Through all the hard work from MUN Impact, the outreach team, Mr. Andrew Newman, Ms. Lisa Martin, and the UNODC Education 4 Justice team, the album is now receiving submissions on a rolling basis. A winner, selected for demonstrating the most influential and effective idea through their song, will win a trip to MUN Impact Morocco in June!
During the High-level conference’s first break, UNODC conference press Ryan Haidarian decided to interview me about my motives behind my song and my vision after this once in a lifetime experience. I had the honor to have this video featuring me shared across UN social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook.
This event has helped me come to the realization that young people do have the power to make an impact on this world. The reality is, we, the youth, may not have as many resources, connections, or some would even say, maturity to handle the pressure. What we do have, however, is the most impact when it comes to advocacy because people will think, “If a 16-year-old can do it, I can do it too.” From a middle school student miserably figuring out how Model UN works and how to overcome a paralysing fear of public speaking to an advocate for the SDGs, trying to change the world with his voice and guitar, I have grown. After the conference, it feels strange to receive messages and tweets from UN officials and high-level diplomats complimenting my work and effort in promoting the rule of law. I can’t believe the profound changes a UN conference could bring to a teenager. From the media attention from Twitter and new insights about the United Nations to connections with people from educational institutions, UN agencies, and people with the same musical passion as me, leading to collaboration projects on song-productions on UN Global Goal topics, I can finally tell my friends from Model UN… I made it to the UN!
New Narratives Lab Promotes Next Generation of Cultural Leaders to Advance Change
The World Economic Forum today launches the New Narratives Lab, a year-long fellowship dedicated to fostering a new and diverse generation of Cultural Leaders. Through one-to-one mentorship by the World Economic Forum’s network of Cultural Leaders and support from peers, Fellows will develop leadership skills to navigate circles of power and decision-making to bring about change.
The Lab is developed in collaboration with 2020 Crystal Awardee Lynette Wallworth, with major support from the Ford Foundation. “Many artists from under-represented communities demonstrate great leadership potential and desire but may not have the access or resources to activate that leadership. This fellowship is a platform to support their journeys as leaders”, said Nico Daswani, Head of Arts & Culture at the World Economic Forum.
Fellows will engage with their Mentors throughout the course of 2020, including at the Annual Meeting in Davos in January, during a weeklong residency at their mentor’s location in the spring, during the UN General Assembly week in New York in September, and at other Forum events. In addition, Fellows benefit from targeted introductions to business leaders, policy-makers and media influencers in line with their development goals; a coordinated social media, media and documentation strategy; and a $15,000 stipend. Follow the Lab journey at #newnarrativeslab.
“By creating a new fellowship for cultural leaders who strive to create change and by surrounding them with a team of allies who have experience navigating corridors of power, we hope to elevate the role of artists as leaders and to lift them up as they generate urgent new narratives for a changing world”, said Lynette Wallworth, Artistic Director of the Lab and 2020 recipient of the Forum’s Crystal Award.
Fellow and Mentor pairings include:
Rena Effendi (Fellow, Istanbul) with Platon (Mentor, New York)
Rena Effendi is an award-winning photographer whose work portrays the socioeconomic effects of globalization on marginalized communities around the world. Effendi will be supported by Platon, one of the great photographers of our time, to combine powerful storytelling with real-world impact through the creation of multi-stakeholder coalitions.
Thando Hopa (Fellow, Johannesburg) with Angélique Kidjo (Mentor, Paris/New York)
Thando Hopa is a model, diversity activist and lawyer. In April 2019 she made history by becoming the first person with albinism to appear on the cover of Vogue. Hopa will be supported by Grammy Award winning musician and UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador Angélique Kidjo in advocating for more inclusive representation in media to benefit and support all bodies and identities.
Wanuri Kahiu (Fellow, Nairobi) with Jin Xing (Mentor, Shanghai)
Wanuri Kahiu is a filmmaker whose award-winning stories and films have received international acclaim and screened at more than 100 film festivals worldwide. Celebrated abroad, her latest film Rafiki was banned by her government for depicting a joyful lesbian love story. Kahiu will be supported by choreographer, media personality and one of China’s most popular TV hosts, Jin Xing, in developing the narratives that will empower artists in Kenya and beyond to advocate effectively for their freedom of expression.
“This fellowship is a response to the critical need for a diversity of perspectives and voices, including those of artists, to be in conversation at the most influential levels, about a world guided by the goals of equity, justice and dignity.” Said Cara Mertes, Project Director, Moving Image Strategies, International Programs, Ford Foundation
2020 European Capitals of Culture: Rijeka and Galway
As of 1 January 2020, Rijeka (Croatia) and Galway (Ireland) will hold the title of European Capital of Culture for one year.
“Thanks to their title of European Capital of Culture, Rijeka and Galway will be harnessing the full potential of culture to enrich our life experience and to bring our communities closer together”, stated Vice-President for Promoting our European Way of Life Margaritis Schinas. “Promoting culture as a core element of our way of life has many positive impacts on society, in terms of social inclusion, integration and economic growth. It enables people to gain new experiences, skills and opportunities to participate in society and to make our societies fairer and more inclusive. I wish them every success in this endeavour.”
“The European Capital of Culture initiative brings people together and highlights the role of culture in promoting the values on which our European Union is built: diversity, respect, tolerance and openness”, statedCommissioner for Innovation, Research, Culture, Education and Youth, Mariya Gabriel. “A successful Capital of Culture is inclusive and meaningful to its citizens. It is also open to the world, illustrating our Union’s willingness to promote culture as a driver for peace and mutual understanding worldwide whilst bringing long-lasting socio-economic benefits to its region. I very much look forward to visiting both Rijeka and Galway and wish them every success in 2020.”
Rijeka is the first Croatian European Capital of Culture bringing it international visibility, which will extend to the rest of the Western Balkan region. ‘Port of Diversity’ will be the motto, with hundreds of projects among 250 partners from 40 countries. Rijeka’s cultural programme focuses on the themes of water, work and migration, connected to its identity, but also current issues in the wider world. The opening exhibition will feature Rijeka’s famous artist, David Maljković, with other highlights including ‘The Sea is Glowing’ exhibition; a world music and gastronomy festival – ‘Porto Etno’; and new permanent installations of contemporary art on the coastline. Opening celebrations will take place on 1-2 February 2020.
Galway is the third city in Ireland to hold the European Capital of Culture title (after Dublin in 1991 and Cork in 2005). Galway’s cultural programme motto is ‘Let the Magic In’, exploring quintessential local themes of language, landscape and migration – with a European and universal relevance and resonance. The ‘Hope it rains’ theme will use Galway weather as a source of creativity; while other highlights include a celebration of world literature – with a dramatic interpretation of the world’s oldest surviving literary epic, the story of Gilgamesh; and excerpts from Homer’s Odyssey, read on Galway beaches. Meanwhile, new installations will celebrate the beauty of Connemara and County Galway. Galway 2020 will begin in February 2020, at the start of Imbolc – the first Celtic season in Ireland’s ancient, pre-Christian calendar.
Melina Mercouri, then Greek Minister of Culture, took the initiative to start the European Capital of Culture in 1985. It has since become one of the most high-profile cultural initiatives in Europe. Cities are selected based on a cultural programme that must have a strong European dimension – promoting participation and active involvement by city inhabitants, communities and various stakeholders; and it must contribute to the long-term development of the city and its surrounding region.
Holding the title of European Capital of Culture gives cities the chance to boost their image, put themselves on the world map, promote sustainable tourism and rethink their development through culture. The title has a long-term impact, not only on culture but also in social and economic terms, both for the city and the region.
In 2019, Plovdiv in Bulgaria and Matera in Italy were European Capitals of Culture. Following Rijeka and Galway in 2020, the future European Capitals of Culture will be Timisoara (Romania), Elefsina (Greece) and Novi Sad (Serbia, candidate country) in 2021, Esch (Luxembourg) and Kaunas (Lithuania) in 2022, Veszprém (Hungary) in 2023 and Tartu (Estonia), Bad Ischl (Austria) and Bodø (Norway, EFTA/EEA country) in 2024.
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