Nicolae Timofti elected Moldova’s President: political future of the state
Nicolae Timofti’s election as the President of Moldova is stipulated by the search of a compromise figure that would be able to consolidate political forces-members of governing coalition.
Timofti became Mihai Ghimpu’s protégé, thus causing the Liberals to refuse struggling for the post of Parliamentary speaker.
He hasn’t revealed his political ambitions before; moreover he hasn’t got his own team.
All above-listed testifies ambiguity of his own political game, thus meaning maximal concentration on implementation of the political course that would be in behalf of the AEI (The Alliance for European Integration).
We’re expecting the policy of the new Moldova’s President to be oriented towards relatively fast systematic reforms’ implementation, in the legal sphere uppermost.
We estimate that the opposition law adoption would be one of the primary N.Timofti’s initiatives, aiming at the relocation of the opposition forces’ activity from the streets to the interior of the Parliament.
We’re supposing that the whole block of this draft law would be devoted to the creation of the system of opposition forces’ responsibility and would restrict their possibilities of radical counteraction to the governing regime.
Being a lawyer, the current President would take legal reform implementation (judicial system, prosecutor’s office, procedural legislation) under control in the framework of directions designated by the AEI program “The European integration: Freedom, Democracy, Wellbeing” 2009-2013.
The particular accent could be made on the creation of the independent judicial system and depolitization of law-enforcement machinery.
Timofti’s statements as for his becoming “the president for every citizen” may suggest that the policy of the country’s leader will also be concentrated on fulfillment of the part of the program in the sphere of civil society consolidation and cooperation with public sector.
It foresees the creation of the legislative base favorable for the civil society development in the capacity of the intermediary for the greater public good and the partner of public authority bodies in the process of internal policy implementation.
We’re supposing the main President’s task on a mid-term horizon would mean becoming a mediator between the power and the opposition, thus providing the maximum possible non-conflict and fast harmonization of the European standards with the national legislation.
In our opinion, N.Timofti is likely to initiate the changes in the Constitution of Moldova in so far as it relates to the Presidential election.
Preparation for the Presidential election was accompanied by the active discussion of the national idea search in the Moldovan mass-media.
In the course of his speech in the parliament Timofti said: “Society consolidation is the biggest problem. We need an idea integrating the whole society. And European integration should become this idea”.
According to our assessments, the process of Moldovan European integration, on the whole, is identical to the integration with Romania for the most part of the AEI and the unionists.
In particular, in the beginning of March 2012 members of the National Council for the unification of Romania and Moldova claimed their intentions to conduct the propaganda company inside the country, one of the main theses being: “unification with the neighbor country [Romania] is the most effective way of Europeanisation of the Republic of Moldova”.
Despite the fact that Timofti does not declare officially his support to the unification with Rumania in his comments, confining himself just to the thesis of ill-timing of such discussions, the representatives of the AEI, especially the leader of the National Liberal Party Vitalia Pavlichenko hailed the candidate for presidency not being antiunionist.
It’s worth paying attention that Timofti held talks with the representative of the Moldovan Socialists Dodon, saying that “we shouldn’t discuss the question of unification today, but it doesn’t mean that the generations to come shouldn’t discuss it”.
In response to Dodon’s objection as for the necessity to create conditions in order to exclude the rise of this question for the generations to come, Timofti emphasized that he didn’t know how to do it.
According to our assessments, it means that Timofti’s election, who had received Socialists’ votes in the Parliament, evidently took place as a change to non-stating publicly the unification with Romania.
But there is high probability that the Presidential stand would be altered into more open support of the unification after implementing necessary legal and constitutional reforms.
It should be noted that such scenario will be supported by the official Bucharest.
In January 2011, The President of Romania Traian Băsescu stated: “The Republic of Moldova remains the priority! Romania will further support the process of its approaching to the EU. I hope that in 2012 Kishinev will have the President, and the process of reforms will be intensified”.
In December 2010 «Da Vinci AG» issued the operational report “Scenarios of Romanian policy development in relation to Moldova” where two scenarios of Moldova and Romania unification were mentioned: historical reunification and unification following the EU integration.
At that time we emphasized that the fall of electoral support of the Communists in Moldova favored the realization of the EU integration scenario by Kishinev followed by the further unification with Bucharest.
Ex-President Voronin’s resignation, political crisis and election of the AEI candidate, supporting the plans of signing The EU accession agreement, increase the scenario realization probability.
In this case Kishinev and Bucharest may appeal to Serbia’s precedent that is preparing to the EU joining, regardless the existence of conflict territories.
Timofti’s policy as to Transnistria will apparently correspond to the AEI program of the PMR reintegration.
The main emphasis will be made on the renewal of «5+2» talks, as well as on the attempt to replace peace-keeping forces by the civil mission, thus giving the opportunity to level integration barriers.
The process of “soft integration” with Romania may be dramatized by Bucharest itself.
Romania is supposed to probably start speeding up the events within 1,5 years and try to expedite the process of states convergence at the economical and social and cultural levels.
Two main factors say much for it:
- A) Domestic policy problems among the ruling groups in Romania connected with the deterioration of social and economic welfare of the citizens and upcoming hustings.
As the result of post-crisis agreements with the IMF, budget salaries in Romania have been reduced by 30%, pensions – by 15%, retirement age increasing up to 65 years.
Sales tax has been increased likewise.
In the end of 2011 the decision to “freeze” salaries and pensions increase has also been made.
These and some other measures resulted in the protest moods intensifying, mass riots and negatively influence authorities rating.
In its turn, “The Great Romania” theme, including first of all Moldova affiliation, is traditionally exploited by current ruling groups in order to raise their own rating inside the country, remove social tension and unite the nation.
We consider this technology to be used this time likewise as a response to the social challenges that the new government faces.
It means that the question of Romania and Moldova unification may be enforced by the ruling groups of Bucharest in order to maintain domestic and social stability.
Closer to 2014, when Romania faces fierce presidential election campaign without the direct participation of Traian Băsescu, “Moldovan issue” may become the key point for the electors. Upcomingchanges in the UE structure.
As of today the most likely scenario is to change the EU structure further, alongside with centrifugal tendencies intensification.
Every next year the probability of new members joining the EU or entry of new territories in any other way will decrease.
That’s why the long-term and leisurely strategy as for Moldova will unlikely be convenient for Bucharest, where these risks are estimated beyond all doubt.
At the same time, macroeconomic performance of Moldova as of today is capable of impairing fatally social and economic situation in Romania.
For instance, Moldovan export in 2011 amounted USD 2221,6 mln., whereas import – USD 5191,6 mln.
Meanwhile Romania occupies only the third place in the geographic structure of Moldova’s import after Russia and Ukraine.
So, Romania’s economics, especially at its current, crisis-like stage of development won’t bear the “unification strike”.
Thereby, it is extremely beneficial for official Bucharest to create more effective social and economic model in Moldova and to conduct pro-european reforms.
The main directions of such steps are estimated to be the following:
- Unification of Moldova’s legislative base in social and economic sphere with the Romanian legislation under the auspices of the all-European standards.
- Activation of mutual cooperation at the governmental level, aiming at elaboration of similar development model for two countries.
- Energy resources supply diversification in order to reduce Russia’s influence on Moldova.
Particularly, this direction includes “Iași – Ungheni” gas pipeline construction and mutual link-up of power lines.
- Increase of the level of goods interpenetration to the markets of both countries. The main emphasis particularly being on creation of joint projects in agricultural sector.
- Joint projects in defense sphere and border guard.
- Activation of “Transnistria question” approach and finding compromise in favor of Moldova. It’s worth noting that recently the leaders of Moldova and Transnistria have been trying to start developing constructive dialogue.
- Activation of educational and training projects for Moldovan youth.
- Active propaganda campaign in Moldova as for the European integration of the country alongside with activation of “The Great Romania” thesis implementation by Bucharest on its territory.
Taking into account the above mentioned the main risks for such Romanian strategy in regard of Moldova would be the following:
- Russia’s position as for Transnistria and Moldova. Vladimir Putin, after being elected the President of Russia once more, is likely to pay more attention to the “Moldovan vector” trying to limit Romania’s influence in the region that is strategic for the Kremlin. The latest is evidently to activate its work with left-wing political forces (The Communist Party of Moldova first of all), as well as with political movements representing national minorities’ interests.
- Imbalance in social and economic development of Moldova and Romania. Per capita income in Moldova, according to World Banks’ data, totals USD 1810, in Romania – USD 7840. The average pension amount, in accordance with statistics data, amounts EUR 52, in Romania – EUR 175.
- Antiunionist forces counteraction inside Moldova (with the support of Russia as well), whose actions may be aimed at destabilization of the situation, internal political conflict and republic crushing.
None of these risks is estimated to be insuperable for Bucharest, though the weight of these factors is evident. Thus, we evaluate the possibility of the above-mentioned scenario realization at the level of “probable”.
Thereby we deem necessary to indicate the risks that Ukraine may face in case of Romania’s implementation of this scenario as for Moldova.
- Decline in Ukrainian goods’ part at Moldova’s market. Increase in Romanian goods’ part at Moldova’s market required by Bucharest may be realized through the lowering of the role of two eastern state’s partners: Ukraine and Russia. It’s worth mentioning that in comparison with 2008, export of Ukrainian goods to Moldova has decreased from USD 1,17 bln. to USD 874,4 mln. annually.
- Strengthening of the informational, cultural and diplomatic tension, alongside with the intensification of Romanian intelligence services activity as for Ukraine regarding the territorial questions of Bukovina and the southern part of Odessa region in the framework of strategy of “The Great Romania” construction.
- Decrease in Kyiv’s influence on the processes in Transnistria, reduction of protection possibilities for Ukrainians living within the territory of PMR, and also of Ukrainian capital interests and of the state economic interests within this territory.
Education: Armenia’s Path to Stronger Economic Growth
Better education and a stronger innovation drive are crucial for achieving higher rates of economic growth and prosperity in any country. Countries that prioritize improvements in education – from the pre-primary to the university level – and innovation are better positioned to adapt to economic change and help raise the living standards for their people.
Education equips individuals with the knowledge and skills necessary to contribute to the economy, with the ability to learn – and unlearn – continuously. Innovation involves the creation of new products, processes, and services that expand the capacity of enterprises and economies. In fact, the most innovative countries tend to be the most successful economically.
Take the case of Estonia. In 1993, Estonia’s GDP per capita was a modest about $6,480. In comparison, Japan’s was $24,000. Fast forward 30 years. Estonia’s GDP per capita was equal to that of Japan in 2022, at nearly $43,000. Estonia now boasts the highest PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) scores in math, science and reading in Europe. A similar ‘miracle’ happened in Korea, a country that moved from developing country status to an advanced economy in just one generation. How can countries replicate Estonia’s or Korea’s success and achieve faster economic growth and standards of living that are like to those of high-income countries?
Through education and innovation.
Here in Armenia, education has been a priority since the country’s independence in 1991. The government has made efforts to increase the number of schools, provide free education for primary and secondary schools, and promote STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) education. As a result, Armenia has a high literacy rate of over 99% and over 60% of adults have completed at least secondary education.
Yet, the education system is not producing the needed outcomes. Children born in Armenia today will be only 58% as productive during their lives as they could have been if they had received quality health and education services available. Armenian children are expected to complete 11.3 years of schooling. This decreases to 8 years if the quality of education is factored in. Pre-primary school and secondary school enrollment is low compared to peer countries in Europe and Central Asia (ECA). It is the quality of education that is the most pressing concern. Armenia’s TIMSS mathematics score – a standardized test for children in grade 4 – is one of the lowest in the region. The quality of tertiary education is below the ECA average: it is nearly 30% lower than Georgia, and half as low as the new EU member states. These outcomes are not surprising, given that public spending on education is just under 2.7% of GDP in Armenia, which is half that of the EU.
The World Bank is helping Armenia improve its education system, including through the Education Improvement Project, which is enhancing the conditions for learning across educational levels by extending preschool coverage, providing laboratory equipment, informing curriculum revisions, and improving the relevance and quality of higher education institutions. The many outcomes of the project include new preschools in rural communities, training of preschool teachers, and grants to higher education institutions through the Competitive Innovation Fund. Under the EU4Innovation Trust Fund, the World Bank is also helping improve the quality of STEM education. By September this year, Armenia will have a fully revised STEM curriculum for middle and high schools (grades 5 to 12), improved learning materials, school-based STEM laboratories and as well as enhanced student-centered instructional methodologies/teaching methods.
Education is essential but alone is not sufficient to drive economic growth. How knowledge is applied by firms, researchers and workers through innovation is critical. In Armenia, there is a disconnect between education, research, and the link to entrepreneurs and markets. For example, academic research in Armenia is dominated by the National Academy of Sciences which comprises more than 30 separate research institutes. None of these institutes are formally integrated with any teaching university in the country. There is also a proliferation of universities in Armenia, with 26 public (state) and 33 private universities; many of the latter, in name only. In Denmark, a country with almost twice the population, there are only eight state-recognized and funded universities offering research-based education.
Consolidating the universities in Armenia, merging them with the research institutes, and focusing government attention on accreditation could help address some of these challenges. It is also essential to reform the university admission process to incentivize talented high schoolers to apply. The government could also support the commercialization of research. In many advanced economies, universities are prodigious producers of knowledge and basic research output, and the private sector, the user of this research, is very vibrant. Without practical application, research may have little impact on the country’s growth potential.
Extensive work by the World Bank shows that human capital is at the core of efforts to strengthen innovation and technology adoption. In Armenia, as in many other countries, human capital is one of the main binding constraints to growth.
While the government has taken significant steps and has initiated important reforms to promote both education and innovation, more is needed to realize their potential. By making a greater investment in education and innovation, Armenia can build a knowledge-based economy that can help the country deliver a development miracle and elevate standards of living to those of high-income countries. The dialogue at the recent panel discussion on “Growth, Education, and Innovation” could help policymakers in their efforts to transform education and innovation in Armenia.
This op-ed was originally published in Banks.am via World Bank
The dilemma of China’s role as Mediator in the case of Ukraine
Since the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war unfolding after 24 February 2022, China has maintained so-called neutral stance on the conflict, passively calling for a peaceful resolution. But on the anniversary of Russian invasion, Beijing popped up with concrete suggestions on how to end the war: China claimed its readiness to participate in peaceful adjustment.
Beijing’s peacemaking attitude and Xi Jinping’s legitimacy as Mediator were acknowledged by Putin during Xi’s visit to Moscow and the rumors about the following soon phone call between Xi and Zelensky spread, however, it is arguable whether Kyiv is truly ready to welcome China as the broker. The US, in turn, treated Beijing’s position skeptically.
This piece elaborates on how China became Global Mediator of the 21st century and why now Ukraine is reluctant to accept Beijing’s brokering.
For starters, China is a realist actor across the domain of international relations. Kissinger states that Chinese leaders are making profound foreign policy decisions only when they do not lack the means to achieve the goals [Kissinger, 2010], hereby Xi knew that Beijing’s possible mediation between Moscow and Kyiv during first months of the war would not be realizable. The sides were not sincerely ready for a truce, neither Russia, occupied territories and continued advancements in Donbas, nor preparing counteroffensive Ukraine, backed by vast Western support.
Moreover, from realism perspective, peace achievement lies in accepting and adapting to the irresistible existence of powers involved in security competition [Mearsheimer, 2001] and peacemaking is most likely when there is no hegemon [Morgenthau, 1946].
China adhered tenaciously to aforementioned realist position by declaring that “the security of the country should not be pursued at the expense of others”, obviously referring to NATO’s strengthening and Russian lament about bloc’s eastward expansion. But such Xi’s mediation ceasefire proposition in the heat of the war would be found senseless by Ukraine and the USA, which were publicly committed to peace restoration by beating Russia on the battlefield and reestablishing liberal world order led by predominant power – the U.S.
Beijing had to prepare before ascending as Mediator between Kyiv and Moscow.
Firstly, China gained legitimacy as a global security provider. Ukraine fights for its land, but Washington made a geostrategic mistake by being directly involved in a confrontation with Russia: by imposing enormous economic sanctions on Moscow, tolerating Nord Stream pipeline sabotage and trying to end the Russo-Ukrainian war only by military means, not diplomacy.
While China proposes negotiations, the U.S. is only committed to the war continuation.
As a result, the USA lost worldwide recognized status as the sole provider of economic prosperity and global security; the unipolar liberal world order ideology became an American tool for maintaining the U.S. leadership and Western dominance at any price, despite the economic losses of others.
Therefore, some states, especially from the Global South, did not support American efforts to isolate Russia, perceiving Washington’s strategy as destabilizing. Instead, they opted for cooperation with China as an alternative planetary center within the uprising multipolar world order model; Beijing met the demand by launching Global Security Initiative, posing itself as a stabilizing Mediator.
Secondly, Beijing successfully proved its new status. China became broker between Iran and Saudi Arabia, helping two longstanding Middle East rivals to achieve reconciliation as well as détente, giving them solid security guarantees. Tehran and Riyadh restored relations without Washington’s participation and pleasingly deepened economic interaction with China.
Thirdly, concerning the Russo-Ukrainian war, Xi Jinping can become Mediator and repeat the historical brokering successes of pacification Russia achieved by such famous statesmen like Otto Bismarck and Theodore Roosevelt.
German “iron” chancellor, apologist of realpolitik, frequently played role of mediator among leading European nations in the 19th century, balancing their interests within spheres of influence. Balkans became one of such great states’ competition arenas, where Austria and Russia struggled to gain control over newborn Bulgaria and influence in the region. The war between them was prevented because Bismarck sagaciously established “League of Three Emperors”, through which mediated disputes between two empires, therefore he was known as “honest broker”.
American president contributed to halting the war between Russia and Japan in 1905. His wise brokering helped states to sign the Treaty of Portsmouth. Serving as mediator for combatants, Roosevelt induced two countries to make concessions on the most intense issues regarding reparations and territorial disputes, thereby sides reached peace.
But while Putin acknowledges Xi as broker, Zelensky probably does not, due to Ukrainian survival dilemma – if Kyiv accepts China as a Mediator, it loses Western vital support.
Thus, there are three reasons why Ukraine is not enthusiastic about Beijing’s brokering, at least publicly.
First, Zelensky has his own, approved by the West, peace plan. He wants Xi to take part in Kyiv’s “peace formula.” It assumes restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and Russian troops withdrawal from occupied territories. Chinese “peace position”, on the contrary, suggests the immediate ceasefire and peace talks launch: frozen conflict, not total Ukrainian victory. Moreover, it does not stipulate the matter of Ukraine’s territorial restoration.
Secondly, Ukraine is diplomatically, politically, militarily and economically dependent on the West, i.e. the USA. China, successfully mediating between Moscow and Kyiv, is the worst-case scenario for America, because intensifies Beijing’s global influence at the expanse of the U.S., which has different from Chinese stance on Russo-Ukraine war ending issue. The USA wants to preserve its worldwide leadership. Consequently, Washington will reduce its vital aid to Ukraine if China is chosen as broker. Kyiv needs to consider the stabilization puzzle, given the significantly suffered from the war economy.
Thirdly, Ukrainian ruling elite, opinion leaders and society are ideologically inclined as well as biased to accept West as only one party, which can help Ukraine to stop the war. NATO is seen as the sole security guarantees provider. Besides, there are many West-funded organizations and media outlets in Kyiv, influencing public narratives within Ukrainian society. So, even if Zelensky accepts mediation, economic support and post-war restoration plan from China, elites in Kyiv and Ukrainian society will oppose him, challenging his legitimacy. Zelensky risks repeating former president Yanukovych fate.
To sum up, it should be stated that China’s role as global security provider is inevitable, Beijing will continue to use its economic leverage to reconcile many conflicting rivals in the world. Thus, Beijing mediation option may be considered by Ukraine in the near future, but not today.
Erosion of Russia’s Hegemonic Stability in the South Caucasus and Transition to Risky Instability
In early nineteenth century, following the wars with Persian and Ottoman empires, Russia completed the invasion of the South Caucasus. The region that hosts present day Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia remained under the control of Moscow until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, though the three countries were independent for a brief period after the World War I. Suppressing the independence movements in these countries along with the other parts of Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Moscow also acted as security provider in the region. In this role, Russia subdued conflicts between the subjects of the empire and also countered the intervention of external powers into “its” territories. This created a stability in the South Caucasus, as in other parts of the empire, dubbed by the theories of international relations as “hegemonic stability”.
In early 1990s, the Soviet Union collapsed and, subsequently, most of the newly independent states in the territories of the former empire ushered into inter- and intra-state conflicts. In the South Caucasus, Russia sought to manipulate and ultimately benefit from these flashpoints in order to preserve its influence over the region. Moscow’s support to Abkhaz separatists in Georgia and Armenia’s occupation of the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan in early 1990s helped the Kremlin recover its control over three countries of the South Caucasus. This translated into resurgence of Russia-dominated security order in the region in the post-soviet period but with more assertive independent states that sought to boost their sovereignty while minimizing Russia’s hegemony.
Armenia joined the Russia-led security and economic integration with a full membership at the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Azerbaijan, on the other hand, managed to build neutral and multilateral foreign policy and succeeded to resist Russia’s pressure thanks to economic independence of the country. The only country of the region, Georgia, that sought to escape Russian orbit and join the Eura-Atlantic political and military structures faced insurmountable obstacles on this path and remained in-between. Russia’s occupation of two regions of Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) in 2008 has served for the Kremlin as the Sword of Damocles over Tbilisi’s foreign policy.
The post-Soviet hegemonic stability in the South Caucasus has been, therefore, more volatile compared to earlier periods. The occasional military escalations between Baku and Yerevan along with the war in Georgia (2008) manifested such sporadic disruptions of the regional security order. However, in both cases, Russia succeeded to act as hegemon by recovering ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan and putting a de-fact veto on Georgia’s foreign policy.
Even during the full-scale military operations between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020, known as the Second Karabakh War, Russia appeared as the only mediator with enough authority to bring the sides to ceasefire. Deploying its troops to the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan under the name of peacekeepers, Russia managed to complete its mission of deploying its troops on the soil of each of the three countries of the region.
Hence, in the post-Soviet period, Moscow managed mostly to preserve the security order in the region under hegemony of Russia. The Kremlin, however, has had to swallow growing security ties between Azerbaijan and Turkiye, but reacted more calmly to these ties as Baku demonstrated deference to Russia’s core national interests and concerns in the region.
In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow’s dominance established over the South Caucasus in early nineteenth century came under jeopardy for the third time after the post-WWI and early years of the post-Soviet periods. Facing an unexpected military debacle in Ukraine and massive economic troubles at home, Russia encounters challenges against its dominance in the South Caucasus, the region that has overarching geopolitical significance for Moscow.
This time the challenge to Russian power originates in Armenia and Azerbaijan, as Georgia avoids provoking Moscow and seemingly drifts away from its pro-Western aspirations. On the one hand, Azerbaijan criticizes Russia’s support to the separatist regime in the Karabakh region, tries to end the mission of the peacekeeping contingent, deepens its strategic alliance with Turkiye, increases its contributions to the energy security of Europe, and relies more on the EU’s mediation in the peace process with Armenia. On the other hand, Armenia defies Russia’s authority by distancing itself from Russia’s military bloc, builds closer relations with the European countries and the United States and invited a mission of the EU to monitor the security situation along Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan. The Kremlin reacted rather furiously to these developments and blamed the West on attempts to squeeze Russia out of the South Caucasus.
To the disappointment of Moscow, this signifies a decline in Russia’s dominance over the region, although it is now premature to say how this process will go on and whether this will end up with Russia’s withdrawal from the South Caucasus. The decline of Russian influence over the region creates a period which can be seen through the lens of the power-transition theory of international relations. According to this conceptual framework, the decline of the dominant power might lead to a conflict or war with the rising power as the latter becomes more assertive seeking to challenge the dominance of the declining power. This can be observed also as the emergence of a power vacuum in the respective region which other powerful state(s) might try to fill in which again leads to a conflict or war between the dominant power and rising power(s).
The present situation in the South Caucasus, thus, resembles the period described by the power transition theory. Other external powers, including Iran, Turkiye, the EU and United States try to benefit from Russia’s diminishing influence over the region and increases their power. Particularly, for Iran, the “encroachment” of the external players into the South Caucasus is inadmissible. The Russia-Ukraine war complicated the regional geopolitics for Iran as the European Union (EU) and United States have increased their influence in the South Caucasus by boosting their mediating role in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, effectively sidelining Russia therein and deploying a monitoring mission to the Armenia-Azerbaijan border in the aftermath of Prague summit (October 6). Against this background, increasingly closer relations between Israel and Azerbaijan and the emerging possibility of the formation of Israel-Turkiye-Azerbaijan trilateral cooperation platform further enrage the Iranian authorities.
Tehran is determined to use military and other instruments to fill in the power vacuum emerges in the region in the wake of Russia’s decline. In this endeavor Iran effectively enjoys the support of Armenia whose leaders try to use the Iranian card against their common enemies of Azerbaijan and Turkiye. The recently growing ties between Armenia and Iran have provided Tehran a useful chance to get into the South Caucasus more assertively and form a de-facto alliance against the two Turkic states. Towards this end, Yerevan and Tehran are clearly building up their cooperation in various spheres, including military and economy. Apart from aiming to boost bilateral trade turnover from $700 million to $3 billion, Iran is also discussing supplying combat drones to Armenia.
That said, the hegemony Russia acquired over the South Caucasus in early nineteenth century is fading and with it the security order it built in the region is rapidly eroding. This process might be accompanied by violent conflicts and wars amongst different regional and external actors. For now, the major security threat to the regional stability is Iran and the alliance it builds with Armenia.
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