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West is Unlikely to Slap Heavy Economic Sanctions on Russia. Why?

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The tone of the statements made from Brussels and Washington and their decisions taken with regard to the Russian Federation, Russian businesses and officials imply that West is unlikely to go beyond ‘cosmetic’ sanctions.

Escalation of the Crimean conflict and the risk of further infiltration of the Russian troops into the continental part of Ukraine have raised a concern about international mechanisms of deterrence of the Kremlin policy, economic sanctions being among them. Although Brussels and Washington made rather harsh statements earlier, it is quite improbable that they will really dare impose heavy sanctions on Moscow. This means that the world community now lacks efficient instruments of influence allowing adequate response to the aggression of the countries with nuclear weapons.

The Russian Federation is the third biggest trade partner of the EU (next to the US and China) with the USD 417.4 billion sales turnover in 2013. That is why the sanctions in question may have the reverse effect and thus cause direct loss of about USD 170 billion to European producers. Considering the current state of the EU economy, the results will be grave. At the same time, it is quite remarkable that where the trade is concerned, the biggest losses will be incurred by the Eastern European countries (except Romania), which will result in yet greater misbalance in the EU economy, strengthen the effect of the centrifugal forces impeding stable economic development of the EU countries, and exacerbate economic issues within the EU in general.

Russia is one of the world’s biggest oil producing countries and the world’s second biggest ‘black gold’ exporter. It supplies most of its oil and gas to the EU countries. Hence, the only way to affect Russian economy is slapping sanctions on it that would target Russia’s energy sector. And this implies refusal from Russia’s natural gas supplies resulting in reduction of its state revenues. In 2013, the country’s earnings from oil export amounted to USD 162 billion, from natural gas export — USD 67 billion.

There are more factors which prevent the EU from ‘punishing’ Russia, such as location of Russia’s sufficient energy assets in Europe, complete influence of 11 EU countries on energy supplies from Russia, close partnership with Germany and the Netherlands in the area of gas supplies.

Out of 485 billion cubic meters of gas consumed by the EU countries annually, Russia supplies about 160 billion cubic meters which is almost one third of the total volume. According to the forecast suggested by governments and energy companies, by 2013 consumption may increase up to 585 billion cubic meters annually, and imports from Russia — up to 175 billion. Therefore, Russia’s share in gas supply to the EU will remain about the same.

In its turn, the dynamic of oil import by the EU 2001 through 2013 shows that, despite general decrease in volumes, Russia’s share has never decreased ever since 2005 — it was Kazakhstan, Libya and Saudi Arabia that reduced their exports. Import of natural gas is currently, quite oppositely, increasing steadily, Russia’s share still being the largest.

Talks about compensation of losses caused by lifting some Iran sanctions are absolutely groundless and economically unjustified.
Therefore, ban on Russia’s energy imports will be a blowback to Europe resulting in further aggravation of the current economic crisis. Brussels has no chance to arrange for quick diversification of natural gas supplies. At the same time, sanctions against Russia will result in raising prices for energy resources, which, vice versa, will increase Moscow’s revenues. Moreover, Europe will face economic recession once again, thus negating all anti-crisis programs implemented by Brussels during the last several years. In its turn, this will raise social issues.
So neither the US nor the EU will impose an embargo on oil and gas imports from Russia just because the consequences thereof will have too negative an effect on the global market which is expected to see growth of oil consumption up to 92.5 million barrels daily in 2014. Iran’s Minister of Petroleum Bijan Namdar Zangeneh agrees with this forecast.

Russia’s budget for 2014 was calculated based on the average annual oil price of USD 93 per barrel. In case sanctions become a reality, the prices will well exceed USD 130, and the raise will continue. This will bring Russia additional USD 37 from each exported barrel of oil at the least. Let us not forget that in 2013 Russia exported about 234 million tons of oil and liquid gas.

Imposing sanctions against the key Russian energy companies — Gazprom, LUKoil and Rosneft —also seems quite doubtful. Most of them signed field development contracts with a number of American and European oil and gas producing companies. Therefore, the blow to Russian oil and gas producing companies will affect their western partners whose business interests are concentrated in this country.

According to Bob Dudley, the Group Chief Executive and a director of BP — which is one of the largest foreign investor in Russia’s oil producing industry owning a 20% share in one of the world’s biggest oil exporters Rosneft — his company is not going to stop investments in Russia. He underlined that BP is immensely interested in investing in this country. BP produces one fourth of its oil and keeps one third of its oil and gas reserves in Russia.

President of the French company Total Christophe de Margerie promised to continue investing in the USD 26.9 Yamal LNG project where Total’s share amounts to 20%, its project partners being Novatekom and CNPC (China). The partner plan on starting liquid natural gas supplies from the arctic field in 2017. “We are there for a long term,” Margerie told reporters at the IHS CERAWeek energy conference. “Total and Yamal will definitely survive through this crisis and I hope not too many others.” At the same conference, Paolo Scaroni, the Chief Executive of Eni, said that sufficient gas reserves give Russia powerful instruments of influence on Europe. He believes that the worst possible scenario would be complete termination of gas supplies from Russia through Ukraine.

On March 5, after Russian troops invaded Crimea, top managers of the British energy producing company BP and the French Total promised to continue investing in Russia, and CEO of the Italian Eni underlined once again that huge gas reserves allow Moscow to hold control over the whole Europe.

According to Rainer Steele, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Gazprom’s partner Wintershall, sanctions against Russia will not settle the issue and will be ineffective. Philipp Mißfelder, member of the German Parliament, also said that sanctions against Russia will affect Germany, and that sanctions are never a good method for export-oriented Germany. German Minister for Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier doubted that Europe would even dare expel Russia from the G8.

Direct EU investments in Russia’s economy are yet another issue. Thus, foreign direct investments from the Netherlands in Russia amount to 12% of the overall investment outflows from Amsterdam, 4.3% from Germany, 3.4% from France, 30% from Cyprus (mostly reinvestments), 3.8% from Ireland.

Investment outflows from Russia to the EU are also quite considerable: 37% — Cyprus, 15.9% — the Netherlands, 2.5% — Great Britain, 2.2% — Germany. This shows that blocking of bilateral financial flows between Russia and the EU is not reasonable from the economic point of view.
According to the disclosed secret documents of the British Parliament, Downing Street also recommends to refrain from closing the British market for Russia, and to not go beyond visa restrictions and exclusion for certain Russian officials. In particular, one of the documents tells that Britain should not impose any trade sanctions or close London’s financial centre for Russian capital.

These recommendations also include evasion of the issue of participation of the North Atlantic Alliance in settling the Crimean conflict. This means that the EU will resort only to some political instruments available to the OSCE and the UN that will be targeted at certain persons and not the whole country.

All in all, Britain and Germany will attempt to not affect their own economy, and this is what will determine further London’s behaviour. We believe that Britain and Germany will only act as diplomats in the Crimean conflict, and they might even try to lobby some nominal sanctions about which the US Senator John McCain gave a hint in his interview after his meeting with the British representatives during which he expressed his disappointment about London’s official standpoint and ignoring history’s lessons on the part of Europe. Basically, he said that the US would like but could not possibly impose certain effective sanctions, and Europe is not ready for such serious measures.

Russia only ranks number 20 among the countries consumers of the US products and is not among the top ten of the countries exporters of goods and services to the US. Therefore, Washington has only financial leverages at its disposal in this situation. Moreover, sanctions similar to Iranian, for example, will affect, and most probably, block economic cooperation between Russia and the EU — scenario which is unacceptable for Brussels. This means that neither the US has any flexible economic leverages against Moscow at their disposal.

That is why Washington now counts on, first of all, imposing sanctions by its European partners aimed at limiting access for the Russian President’s wingmen and partners to their bank accounts and financial flows within the territory of Europe. Therefore, they expect some upward pressure, sparking discontent among the political elite which would make it possible to prepare grounds to exert influence on the Kremlin. However, it is not probable that such measures will turn out to be effective.

It is fair to say that the international checks and balances system elaborated back in 1945 is efficient no more, and the depth of integration of the global economy no longer allows control over the countries with nuclear weapons and critical shares in the global export. In view thereof, despite all the strivings of the world community, there are no more ‘innocent’ leverages to exert effective pressure on such players as Moscow, Washington and Beijing. Any instruments which may help achieve the desired results are going to bring serious consequences for the global economy and the initiators of the sanctions. At the same time, as the ‘Crimean precedent’ may be used without any dramatic consequences only by three countries, and Washington and Brussels understand that no mass chain reaction will follow, and most incidents may be precluded by means of traditional diplomatic and economic instruments.

This means that the world is gradually approaching the new round of the Cold War which today, as strange as it may sound, may have a stimulating effect on the development of the key national economies.

Therefore, according to our forecast, West is likely to resort to financial aid for Ukraine instead of further complicating relations with Russia, thus preventing the risk of economic loss in the context of the current crisis. This means that neither Washington nor Brussels will dare impose serious economic sanctions against Russia. Hence, these instruments are unlikely to considerably influence the Kremlin’s policy with regard to Ukraine in the medium term.

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Context and Practice of International Politics: Experience in 2022 and Expectations from 2023

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The dramatic events of 2022, centred on the military-political conflict between Russia and the West over the Ukrainian issue, are a vivid example of the interaction of context and practice in international politics. The global context, within which one cannot help but consider the most acute manifestation of the current clash of interests, is the end of a period which saw the relative monopoly of Western countries in world politics and economics, their ability to determine what the international order should be.

The practice of world politics is determined by the still-colossal resources of the United States and Western Europe, on the one hand, and by the obvious insufficiency of the forces that are their main opponents – China and Russia – insufficient for a real fight. As a result, if the objective factors in the development of international politics and the world economy speak in favour of the inevitable retreat of the former leaders to new positions, then the subjective qualities of their opponents, and indeed of the powers of permanent status, are such that the advent of a new international order looks like a completely uncertain prospect.

The change in context, which is very likely to be one of the factors underpinning Russian resolve, is quite obvious. First, it is easy to see this in the voting in the UN General Assembly on the resolutions adopted by Western countries as part of their anti-Russian campaign.

Despite the fact that, from the point of view of formal international law, condemning Russia would not be a problem for it, an increasing number of countries prefer to exercise moderation, by abstaining or avoiding voting on such resolutions. Of course, this contributes to the infrastructure of institutions created over the past couple of decades that are not oriented towards the West and are not subject to its will – BRICS, the SCO and the Eurasian Economic Union. But first of all, many countries simply do not feel the need to unconditionally support the West in its campaign against Moscow. It does not meet their interests or their main goals of development; these states do not have their own claims against Russia. In general, it should be noted that the reaction to Russian actions since February 2022 has been extremely mild. For example, in 2003, the Indian Parliament passed a special resolution condemning the US and allied invasion of Iraq, which is now unimaginable outside of the West in relation to Russia.

Second, the change in context is underlined by the failure of the US and its allies to build a sustainable broad-based coalition against Russia early in the conflict. Now the list of states that initiate measures of economic war against Russian interests is limited to permanent members of the military-political blocs of the West – NATO and the European Union, with the involvement of Japan and Australia, which have strong bilateral allied relations with the United States. All other countries of the world, with the exception of the microscopic clients of the United States in Oceania or the Caribbean, only enforce “sanctions” at the state or corporate level under pressure. In other words, the circle of those whom the United States and the European Union do not have to force to carry out their decisions regarding Russia turned out to be extremely narrow. This means that relations between the West and the rest of the world are now based on a repressive policy of coercion, which in itself does not mean anything good for the global positions of the United States. First, because it inevitably forces a significant number of countries to strive to extricate themselves from American influence for purely practical reasons. The need to fear Western reprisals is gradually shifting relations with the West from factors that promote development to those that hinder it. Thus, we cannot have serious doubts that the context – the objective development of the international environment – is now very friendly for Russia and its main interests.

This allows Moscow and Beijing to look to the future with relative confidence and to assume that they are on the “right side of history”, while their opponents in the West resist inevitable changes. However, it is worth recognising that a favourable context is an important, but not the only condition for the survival of states in a chaotic international environment. No less significant is the ability of states to respond to current challenges that arise during critical historical periods. The fact is, what we are experiencing now represents just such an era.

Therefore, in addition to the realisation of its selfish interests, the whole world is closely watching the ability of Russia to survive and succeed in various aspects of its conflict with the West. In particular, attention is drawn to the ability of the Ukrainian forces to continue active resistance, especially in the context of a fairly stable supply of weapons from the West. Whether we like it or not, the pace at which Russian goals are being realised on the territory of Ukraine is becoming a factor that influences the behaviour of friendly states. In addition, the apparent concentration of Moscow’s efforts in one direction creates numerous temptations for third countries to solve their problems with less regard for Russian preferences. For example, we see the behaviour of Azerbaijan in its difficult relations with Armenia; it shows signs of haste, caused by the understanding that Russia is not ready for sufficiently decisive action in the South Caucasus. We find less striking examples in Central Asia, where the political regimes perceive the course of Russian operations in Ukraine as an incentive to achieve their own short-term goals. In short, Moscow’s justified delay in resolving the most important aspects of the Ukrainian problem creates nervousness in its environment, which would be better avoided. In a more favourable position is China, which has not yet joined the direct confrontation with the West. Despite the fact that the problem facing the leadership of the PRC is no less significant, as Taiwan is a constitutional part of Chinese territory, Beijing is still showing restraint. This helps to buy time, but increases the world’s fears that the Chinese authorities are behaving this way not because it is part of their long-term strategy, but because of the inability to act more actively. At the same time, one must understand that restraint is good for the time being: for example, the United States 105 years ago chose the moment to enter the war with the Central Powers, and did not experience fears about its consequences. Although, of course, every historical comparison is an oversimplified vision of the situation due to the change in that very context.

In summary, as conflict grows over the structure of the future international order, the tension between context and practice can grow as much as it shrinks. However, in any event, it will be the most important systemic characteristic of the confrontation, which we had the opportunity to observe throughout 2022 and will continue to do so. In this sense, 2023 may turn out to be, in a certain sense, a turning point – the opposing sides will begin to run out of accumulated reserves and the question will arise of mobilising the resources that they originally planned to save for the purposes of future development. In this regard, it will be important for Russia to use a favourable context not only as a confirmation of its strategic rightness, but, first of all, as a source of resources for its own stability. This means making relations with the World Majority a central part of our foreign economic relations and making real efforts.

from our partner RIAC

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The Status of Crimea between Russia and Ukraine: The Reason Why China Stands to Neglect

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The status of Crimea is a contentious issue between Russia and Ukraine. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine, a move that was widely condemned by the international community. The United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution that affirmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty over Crimea, and many countries, including the United States and European Union, have imposed economic sanctions on Russia in response to the annexation.

Since then, Russia has been controlling the region and has been accused of human rights violations and suppression of the Crimean Tatar minority by several countries and international organizations. Ukraine, on the other hand, considers Crimea as an integral part of its territory and has not recognized the annexation. The issue remains unresolved and is a source of ongoing tension between Russia and Ukraine, as well as between Russia and the international community. However, it’s worth noting that China has not taken a clear stance on the issue and has been trying to maintain good relations with both Russia and Ukraine.

China has not taken a clear stance on the issue of the status of Crimea between Russia and Ukraine for a few reasons:

Diplomatic strategy: China is known for its “non-interference” policy in the internal affairs of other countries, and it may choose not to take a clear stance on the issue to avoid offending either Russia or Ukraine, with whom it has important economic and political ties.

Strategic Interests: China has a strong economic and trade relationship with both Russia and Ukraine, and it may not want to risk damaging those relationships by taking a clear stance on the issue.

International politics: China is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and it may not want to isolate itself from other members by taking a clear stance on the issue.

While China not taking a clear stance on the status of Crimea may help it maintain good relations with both Russia and Ukraine and avoid isolation from other members of the international community, it could also pose potential threats for the countries in the international borders. Some of the potential threats include:

Escalation of tensions: If China’s non-interference policy is perceived as support for Russia’s annexation of Crimea, it could further escalate tensions between Russia and Ukraine, and potentially lead to more aggressive actions by Russia in the region.

Loss of trust: If China is perceived as not standing up for its own principles, especially when it comes to international law and sovereignty of other countries, it could lead to a loss of trust among other countries, and make it harder for China to achieve its foreign policy goals.

Economic sanctions: If China’s non-interference policy is perceived as support for Russia’s annexation of Crimea, other countries may impose economic sanctions on China, which could hurt its economy and trade relationships.

Loss of reputation: If China is seen as not standing up for the international laws and principles, it could harm its reputation as a responsible stakeholder in the international community.

Military Conflicts: If tensions between Russia and Ukraine escalates, China might be forced to take a side, and it could lead to military conflicts in the region which might have an impact on China’s own security and stability.

The issue of the status of Crimea between Russia and Ukraine is a complex and longstanding one that has not yet been resolved. A few possible solutions to this issue could include:

Diplomatic negotiations: Both Russia and Ukraine, with the support of the international community, could engage in diplomatic negotiations to find a solution that respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both countries.

International mediation: An international mediator, such as the United Nations, could be brought in to facilitate negotiations and help find a peaceful solution to the issue.

Economic sanctions: Economic sanctions against Russia, imposed by the international community, could be used to put pressure on Russia to withdraw from Crimea and respect Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Military intervention: Military intervention could be used as a last resort if diplomatic efforts fail to resolve the issue, but this would likely lead to a much more serious and prolonged conflict.

As for China, it could play a role in resolving this issue by:

Supporting International Laws: China could support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and respect the international laws and principles.

Mediating: China could act as a mediator in resolving the issue, by bringing both Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table, and help find a peaceful solution.

Taking a clear stance: China could take a clear stance on the issue, and this would show that it is a responsible stakeholder in the international community and that it respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries.

It’s worth noting that resolving this issue will require a coordinated and multilateral effort from the international community, and China could play a key role in resolving the issue of the status of Crimea, by being a responsible stakeholder in the international community, and taking a clear stance on the issue. China is also known to follow a policy of “One country, two systems” which means it would not like to interfere with other countries internal affairs thereby China has been trying to maintain good relations with both Russia and Ukraine and avoid taking sides on this issue. It would evidently mean that China is not able to exert any direct influence on the situation in Crimea, and it may be perceived as not standing up for its own principles, especially when it comes to international law and sovereignty of other countries.

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Asia, Eurasia and the European Crisis: Results of 2022

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The military-political crisis in Europe has created demand for the most important quality of the vast majority of the countries of Asia and Eurasia — the comparative autonomy of their political systems, free from external interference and control to a much greater extent than what is typical, for example, of Western or Eastern Europe, or, for that matter, Latin America, or small countries in Oceania or the Caribbean. This means that with the exception of Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, all countries in this vast region have the ability to conduct a foreign policy based primarily on their own selfish interests or ideas of justice or injustice within the existing international order. As a result, practically all the states of Asia and Eurasia have ended up in that Global Majority — the totality of countries that make up 85 percent of the world’s population — which are not allies of the West in its struggle against Russia.

However, at the same time, most of the countries of the region are faced with a serious challenge that will test the sustainability of their socio-economic systems and development policy instruments in the coming years. We are talking about the problems that the economic war of the US and Europe against Russia creates for the functioning of globalisation in the form we are used to. Almost all countries in Asia and Eurasia are growing economically with varying degrees of intensity, and focused on inclusion in the global trade and production chains. The keys to these ties and the main existing mechanisms for managing them are in the hands of the United States and its European allies. Therefore, now the countries of this vast region, which makes up a large part of the Russian neighbourhood, must look for ways to combine the preservation and strengthening of their political autonomy, on the one hand, and involvement in the system of economic ties that bring them obvious benefits, on the other.

We see that most of the countries of Asia and Eurasia behave with a great deal of restraint within the framework of international organisations; they do not initiate anti-Russian “sanctions” and they only comply with the requirements of the supervisory institutions of the United States and the European Union in this area under heavy pressure. This creates conditions for the gradual formation of a new infrastructure for trade and economic cooperation between Russia and its Asian and Eurasian neighbours. In the coming years, the important features of such an infrastructure may become its independence from the institutions of the West, including such areas as insurance of trade operations and transportation, transition to settlements in national currencies or creation of regional exchanges for trading those goods, where Russia will remain an important player in Asian markets, and it will also be able to oust Western suppliers from there.

As a result, the comparative political autonomy of the countries of Asia and Eurasia has turned out to be the most important factor to undermine the efforts of the West to exclude Russia from the world economy. It turned out to be fruitless in 2022.

Although here, too, the ability of Russia itself to remain open to foreign economic relations, as well as to act objectively as a supplier of critical goods, is of paramount importance.

At the same time, in 2022, serious factors arose compelling a change in the nature of Russia’s policy to develop relations with the countries of Asia, which received the generally accepted name “pivot to the East”. Now there are reasons to believe that this sphere of foreign economic policy has become a matter of prime necessity for Moscow, rather than mere choice. It had been precisely the problem of historical dominance, and the profitability of trade and economic ties with the West, primarily with Europe, that had been the most important hindrance to Russian efforts to develop ties with Asia over the past 15 years. Moreover, against the background of the advantage that the Russian economy received in the markets of the West, even the most interesting plans for cooperation with the states of the former Soviet space faded. Not to mention the gradual establishment of relations with Asian states located at a considerable geographical distance from Russia.

Now the “pivot to the East” seems to many observers, as well as the Russian state, to be the most important way to overcome a significant proportion of the negative consequences of economic aggression from the West. Indeed, over the past 10 months of the crisis in Europe, trade between Russia, on the one hand, and the countries of Asia and Eurasia, on the other, has consistently increased. To a large extent, this was due to the immediate reorientation of Russian exporters to new markets, and in part to the development of parallel imports, which made it possible to compensate for the cessation of deliveries to Russia of some goods from Western countries. The latter also leads to an objective increase in Russia’s trade with some of its closest neighbours, among which, of course, Turkey ranks first, but the countries of Central Asia also play an important role.

Russia is yet to realise that countries of the Global Majority, represented by Asian and Eurasian states, are not subjective, but objective allies of Moscow in its conflict with the West.

This means that their actions are not dictated by their leaders’ political preferences or special ties to Russia. The latter concerns, among other things, the countries of such an important region as Central Asia. The policy of the states of Asia and Eurasia is based on their natural desire to overcome the qualitative gap in development that remains between them and the leading industrial economies of the West. It is quite obvious that it is impossible to fully catch up after several centuries of colonial dependence in a short period of time. However, right now conditions have arisen when a change in the structure of the international order creates a higher chance of obtaining greater benefits from participation in globalisation, a revision of established practices that Russia defines as neo-colonial dependence, and the removal of the economy from Western control. To a certain extent, this can also occur due to the weakening of the main formal institutions of globalisation, where the West plays a dominant role.

However, such an objective coincidence of the interests of the countries of Asia and Eurasia with Russia, as a rule, does not lead to their readiness to join Russia in its conflict with the West. It would probably be a mistake to think that states which remain poorly endowed with everything except demographic resources and are solving the problems that come with the attempt to eliminate mass poverty would be ready to sacrifice their development goals for the sake of abstract strategic constructions. Russia, as a country that is fully self-sufficient in food and energy resources, can hardly understand the complexity of the position of even economically successful Asian countries, not to mention closer neighbours in Central Asia, where the political systems themselves are not fully established and are constantly exposed to serious internal and external challenges. It seems that in the future Russia will treat with understanding the fears of its Asian and Eurasian partners, taking into account their concerns and not making demands, the fulfilment of which could be detrimental to their interests.

Take India, which has a colossal population and economic potential, actively trades with Russia despite Western pressure, but is in no hurry to support Moscow in matters of international politics or the Ukrainian crisis. This is partly due to the Sino-Indian rivalry for the position of the leading Asian power. On this issue, the United States and, to a minimal extent, Europe remain India’s natural situational allies, since their pressure on China makes it behave more restrained than its economic and military capabilities allow. But to an even greater extent, this is true because India itself has not yet been able to gain the weight to talk with the West on an equal footing and put pressure on it where it is of strategic importance. In all other respects, India in 2022 has taken shape as one of the most independent centres of power in international politics, and this, of course, contributes to the realisation of Russian interests.

An exception in this regard is China. Over the past two decades, Sino-Russian relations have gone through an objective convergence of interests, both at the tactical level and in terms of a long-term vision of the international order. Now this allows the parties to cooperate very intensively on global platforms and, moreover, to cultivate positive expectations within themselves about the position of the partner and the future of bilateral relations. At the same time, Beijing itself is subjected to constant pressure and provocations from the United States, which has forced the Chinese leadership to behave with restraint even in its move to resolve the Taiwan problem, which is so important.

Summing up, we can say that the opportunities provided by cooperation with the countries of Asia and Eurasia amid an acute Russia-West conflict, have become the most important foreign policy discovery of the last year for Russia. At the same time, we have no reason to think now that the overall positive dynamics here can be slowed down by something other than internal Russian factors. For Russia, 2023 will be a period of strengthening relations with its natural partners outside the hostile West and forming with them a new infrastructure of international cooperation, which is necessary in the process of building a more just world order.

From our partner RIAC

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