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Middle East

The Two-State Delusion

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Two decades after the signing of the declaration of principles (DOP) by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on the White House lawn, there is something unreasonable in the world’s continued adherence to the Oslo paradigm, tattered and battered as it is by years of a bloody fiasco.

The Palestinian Arab leadership has consistently and adamantly rejected the two-state solution since its first articulation in 1937 by the British Peel commission[1] and has, as consistently, advocated the destruction of the Jewish state. Still, it undertook a successful public relations campaign in the 1980s promoting the notion of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—”the occupied territories.”

Over the years and especially in the wake of the DOP, the Palestinian demand for statehood has gained rapid political momentum and international acceptance. A succession of Israeli prime ministers—from Shimon Peres, to Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Binyamin Netanyahu—embraced the idea, as did U.S. presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. The paradigm for a final peace includes among its primary components Israeli territorial withdrawal and Palestinian sovereignty, political separation with reconciliation, compromise, and coexistence.

Yet twenty years on, the two parties find themselves further apart despite years of diplomatic wrangling. It is thus past time to examine and invalidate the paradigm that has taken hold in the hope that a new and less sanguinary one will take root.

A History of Failure

The concept of a Palestinian state appears just and reasonable. It evolves from the notion of a right to national self-determination for the stateless Palestinian people and their demand to end an Israeli presence in the territories captured in 1967. The terminology of decolonization regarding Jews who have settled in those territories fits this narrative of thwarted native Palestinian rights; ending the “illegality” of Israeli rule over the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem is a global political stipulation for conflict-resolution. From the November 1988 resolution in Algiers that called for Palestinian independence to the extensive diplomatic campaign of September 2011 to promote Palestinian statehood at the United Nations, the PLO dramatically altered the political parameters of the conflict and its resolution. In sketching the two-state solution of Israel and Palestine as representing complementary rather than contradictory elements in the puzzle of peace-making, values of equality and freedom radiated from both sides.

The Palestinian state idea had been proposed repeatedly in the post-1967 era,[2] and its feasibility, viability, and desirability were analyzed and advocated again and again. The idea was central to the Arab-originated Fahd plan of 1981 and the Fez plan of 1982 and was reintroduced two decades later in 2002 by the Saudis as the Beirut peace plan. On the Jewish side, the nongovernmental Council for Peace and Security founded in 1988 was book-ended by the so-called Geneva initiative of 2003—headed by two failed politicians, Yossi Beilin and Amnon Lipkin-Shahak—with centrist Labor and leftist political parties contributing their own details along the way, all promoting a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The two-state solution emerged within PLO circles in 1988 when Bassam Abu Sharif, a political advisor to Arafat, presented a position paper on the theme.[3]

However, when the Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO were signed in September 1993, there was no explicit mention that the peace process would culminate in a Palestinian state. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who had in 1974 rejected the notion of a “third state” between Israel and Jordan,[4] had reiterated this position in an autobiographical work in 1979, contending that a Palestinian “mini-state” in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would serve as a stage toward the “secular, democratic state of Palestine” that would rise “on the ruins of the state of Israel.”[5] Four years before concluding the historic agreement with Arafat at the White House, Rabin asserted that a Palestinian state would be a time-bomb for chaos and warfare,[6] and even with the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994, it remained Rabin’s belief that the final version of the Palestinian entity must be less than a sovereign state.[7]

With that said, Palestinian sovereignty was, nevertheless, anticipated as the end-product of the Oslo process. Israel had acknowledged Palestinian peoplehood and rights in the 1978 Camp David-negotiated framework agreement for Middle East peace. It then recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1993, agreed to the founding of the PA and its police force in 1994, and implemented territorial withdrawals from towns and rural areas in Judea-Samaria and Gaza in 1994-97. The International Donors’ Committee provided billions of dollars in aid to the PA, which established institutions for what could be termed a state in formation. Binyamin Netanyahu, leader of the opposition Likud Party in 1993, said he would abrogate the Oslo accords, but as prime minister in 1996, he failed to do so.[8] The Hebron protocol of January 1997 and the Wye River memorandum of October 1998 demonstrated that Netanyahu operated within the Oslo paradigm for peace by relinquishing Israeli control over land, which was linked to explicit Palestinian obligations such as combating terrorist organizations and preventing incitement. Soon afterward, the Israeli government cancelled additional withdrawals because the PLO did not fulfill its commitments but not because Jerusalem dispensed with the Oslo idea.

Faith in Oslo did not dissolve even when failure struck over and over again. In July 2000 at the Camp David summit, Ehud Barak offered Arafat Palestinian statehood with control over approximately 92 percent of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and a political capital in the vicinity of Jerusalem. But Arafat spurned the offer, and a reign of terror and suicide-bombing ensued.

Despite the basic breakdown of diplomacy and although U.S. Middle East envoy Dennis Ross admitted that Oslo had failed, he remained convinced—having written eight hundred pages of close text detailing the intricacies, efforts, obstacles, formulae, and setbacks regarding “the missing peace”—that “there is room for creative diplomacy.”[9] Should failure not have brought about a reevaluation and some change in policy orientation?

In January 2002, President Bush called for an “end to occupation and [for] a peaceful democratic Palestinian state” as the prescription for peace, a formula endorsed a year later by the international “Quartet” (the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations). Another year later, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon also hitched onto the Palestinian state bandwagon as did his successors in Jerusalem—Olmert and Netanyahu—a few years hence. Yet negotiations, such as those between Olmert and PA president Mahmoud Abbas in the latter part of 2007, dragged on without results. The plethora of issues—from settlements and prisoners, to Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem, to the Fatah/Hamas split—preoccupied and confounded the Israeli-Palestinian discussions without any satisfactory conclusion.[10]

On May 19, 2011, President Barack Obama affixed his name to the distinguished roster of supporters of a Palestinian state by advocating that “the borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps.”[11] Netanyahu reacted sharply that the Palestinian state could not come at the “expense of Israeli existence,” affirming that the 1967 borders were “indefensible.”[12] This set the political stage for a dispute between Washington and Jerusalem and assured that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations were not likely to renew soon. The Oslo paradigm was frozen: There were to be no negotiations, no Palestinian recognition of a Jewish state, and no peace in the offing. The three “nos” on Israel formulated at the 1967 Khartoum Arab summit—no negotiations, no recognition, and no peace—had been transformed and reformulated with their political core unchanged.[13]

Twenty years of the Oslo process filled with optimism and enthusiasm, adorned with Nobel prizes, grand summitry, and historic declarations that peace was “just around the corner” have delivered no peace. Firmly entrenched in its place, however, is a textbook example of cognitive dissonance written on a grand political scale. A final status agreement should have been consummated by 1999, five years following the “Gaza-Jericho First” stage in 1994, but neither Rabin’s assassination in 1995 nor the murder of 1,084 Israelis from September 2000 to October 2010 (along with 250 from 1993 until July 2000)[14] could quash efforts at advancing the process. True believers continue to argue that once a Palestinian state in the territories is established, the Oslo paradigm will be validated. For those afflicted with “Osloitis,” when the evidence counters their utopian paradigm, the bearer of bad news is defamed rather than commended for contributing to an alternative conceptual construct.

Oslo’s Unaddressed Fallacies

At the heart of the failed Oslo paradigm are a core group of fallacies that have been promoted as truths: that the land can sustain two opposing population groups; that the Arab goal of destroying Israel can be appeased through “painful concessions” (rather than defeated by an Israeli victory); and that this is not a conflict based on something as elemental and incendiary as religion. Not one can withstand close scrutiny.

Geopolitical conflict is frequently a function of a dearth of resources and cannot be resolved by a mere wish for human harmony. In this case, both land and water are scarce, and the less than 40-mile width of the land from the Mediterranean coast to the Jordan River is insufficient to accommodate two rival states with expanding populations and vibrant national ambitions. While there are a few small states living cheek by jowl like the Netherlands and Luxembourg that are not at each others throats, they do not face the other factors that have contributed to the Israeli-Palestinian impasse.

There is, moreover, a great likelihood that a Palestinian state ensconced in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would evoke a powerful zeal for further land concessions, not only from the Arabs of Ramallah or Nablus, but also among many Israeli Arabs in the Galilee, for example, of whom opinion surveys indicate their belief that Jews are foreigners in the Middle East.[15] Such a state could easily foment an insurgency within Israel, bringing along further disruptions and destruction in its wake. Indeed, the Palestinian belief that Tiberias, Haifa, and Tel Aviv-Jaffa are lost cities of Arab Palestine fuels a deep-seated rejectionism, which is manifested in the leadership’s adamant refusal to recognize Israel’s very right to exist as a Jewish state.[16]

Finally, the war against Israel is little more than a modern application of Qur’anic hostility toward Jews, expressing the ethos of jihad and the religious definition of Palestine as a sacred waqf (Islamic religious endowment). Buoyed with this faith and ideology, Iran and Hezbollah, al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Muslim elements dedicate themselves to destroying Israel once and for all. In this, they are only more obvious than the so-called moderate Fatah leadership, which makes use of religious imagery and imperatives whenever it suits its purpose. A two-state solution is, in essence, a betrayal of Islam although a Palestinian state could become the springboard for the ongoing campaign to undermine, overrun, and eradicate the Jewish state—fi Sabil Allah (in the path of God). All this is so because, as article 15 of the Hamas covenant declares, “the Palestinian problem is a religious problem.”[17]

The irrefutable conclusion is that the Oslo process brought no discernible change in the Palestinian attitude toward Israel. It remains a state that has to be eliminated. In May 2013, Mahmoud Abbas repeated the PLO’s position that the Palestinians would refuse, as they indeed have, to recognize Israel’s legitimacy as a Jewish state.[18] Jibril Rajoub, Fatah Central Committee member, declared soon thereafter that the Palestinians were the enemies of Israel, adding that if the Palestinians had nuclear weapons they would use them.[19] No less acerbic was a remark by Jamal Zahalka, Arab member of Israel’s Knesset, who on July 31, 2013, railed against his fellow-citizens and parliamentarians: “We [the Arabs] were here before you [the Jews], and we’ll be here after you’re gone.”[20]

In addition, the Oslo paradigm founders on the twin rocks of Palestinian factionalism and extremism as Palestinian society is hopelessly fissured by traditional identities and loyalties with extended family and tribal ties enduring despite a narrative of nationalism. The rural-urban split, the settled-refugee dichotomy, and the Muslim-Christian differentiation all confound integral social cohesion. Such a political tapestry, barely holding together despite decades of trying, baffles national unity, complicating the viability of any Palestinian state project becoming sturdy or stable.

 

These divisions have become further concretized by geopolitical partition. In 2007, Hamas seized control of Gaza after Israel’s disengagement-withdrawal from the strip two years earlier and the Islamists’ electoral victory over Fatah in 2006. The 40-kilometer geographic separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, alongside the ideological and political enmity between Fatah-PA and Hamas, is a powerful obstacle to generating Palestinian unity. The conventional two-state proposal is a misnomer inasmuch as Gaza already constitutes a Palestinian “statelet,” so that another Palestinian state based in the West Bank would actualize a three-state solution. The fathers of the Oslo accords could not imagine in their wildest dream such a bizarre turn of events.

 

Lastly, an ethic of extremism has been embedded in the culture of Palestinian politics for the last one hundred years, beginning with Hajj Amin Husseini (1897-1974) and continuing through the tenure of Yasser Arafat (1929-2004), with a slew of other noteworthy firebrands such as Izz al-Din al-Qassam (1882-1935) and Ahmad Yassin (1937-2004) throwing fuel on the blaze in between. Five days before the Oslo signing, Arafat told an Israeli journalist that one day there would be “a united state in which Israelis and Palestinians will live together” (without Israel)[21] while in 1996, after Oslo, he forecast Israel’s collapse under the weight of an Arab return to the West Bank and Jerusalem, linked to psychological warfare that would convince the Israelis to emigrate.[22] The Arabs of Palestine have every reason to believe that the country is theirs alone because their leaders have been telling them that from the very beginnings of their own self-awareness as a people. For them, extremism is justified although this mental universe of self-delusion and fanaticism has not led them to a political victory.

 

Four Insurmountable Oslo Issues

 

Early in 1993, the Oslo negotiators concluded that a full and immediate resolution of the conflict was an impossible task, preferring instead to conceive of peace-making as a staged process rather than a single, decisive event. The major points of contention would be left to a later phase following the initial and practical launching of the accord. In the final status negotiations, peace would be achieved when the outstanding issues could be settled to the satisfaction of the Israelis and Palestinians alike.[23]

 

The religious-cum-political issue of the holy city of Jerusalem represented perhaps the most intractable problem to be resolved. Despite the Jewish people’s millennial connections to Zion, Israel’s June 1967 decision to apply its law and administration over the entire united city as its capital was rejected by the Palestinians and their abettors in the international community. At Camp David in July 2000, contorted and repeated efforts were made to formulate an agreement that would accord Palestinians sovereignty over the Arab-inhabited peripheral areas of Jerusalem, jurisdiction over the inner neighborhoods, and Palestinian governance over the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City. In these plans, the Temple Mount, the holiest site in Judaism, would be handed over to a Palestinian administration that claimed it as the al-Haram al-Sharif (sacred precinct). Prime Minister Barak’s negotiating position, although it seemed to waver over the summit days, demanded Israeli sovereignty over West Jerusalem and the post-1967 Jewish neighborhoods around the city but also over the inner Arab-inhabited Jerusalem neighborhoods such as Sheikh Jarrah and Wadi Joz. He firmly rejected Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount while Arafat apparently called for Palestinian sovereignty over all of Jerusalem.[24] In the end, Arafat spurned the deal, and the world will never know if further Israeli concessions, like recognizing absolute Muslim control and Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif, would have perhaps elicited Arafat’s agreement. Palestinian militancy regarding Jerusalem has continued over the years, leading to assaults upon Jews in the Old City area and stoning attacks on the Temple Mount. These attacks have occurred despite an Israeli policy to limit and sometimes prohibit Jewish prayer on the mount. Self-imposed Israeli renunciation of Jewish religious rights merges with and perhaps evokes Palestinian violence.

 

An even greater sticking point is the final status of the so-called Palestinian refugees. The unyielding Palestinian demand that the “right of return” be acknowledged and implemented is a call for Palestinian “justice” that carries within it the seed for Israel’s destruction. The “right of return” has become sacred dogma for Palestinians. Perhaps equally fixed is the Israeli rejection of the idea as suicidal for the Jewish state. A growing constituency of Arabs in Israel echoes the “return” theme.[25]

 

This Palestinian position, sustained by a contrived memory of forced dispossession and nurtured by political rigidity, has been met with an equally steadfast Israeli rejection although Barak was willing to concede a symbolic number of returning refugees in July 2000.[26] The refugee issue proves clearly that the Palestinian intent is to Arabize Israel and obliterate the Zionist enterprise. These are not the building blocks for the two-state solution envisaged by the Oslo negotiators.

 

Of late, the issue of the “settlements”—Jewish communities—has become the international community’s bête noire. The Jewish presence in Judea and Samaria, numbering more than 120 localities with more than 330,000 people, may have begun in part as a perceived security imperative, but early on, it also expressed the immutable right of the Jewish people to live in and control the Land of Israel west of the Jordan River. For the Palestinians however, these communities were concrete evidence of Zionist expansionism and colonial occupation. The Palestinian position has become monolithic, demanding a dismantling of all Israeli communities and the expulsion of all their residents.

 

Meanwhile, Israeli governments forged a public consensus around those population blocks to be retained in any future agreement, a position endorsed by President Bush in 2004.[27] The Palestinian position hardened further in 2010 when Abbas, encouraged by President Obama, demanded a complete cessation of all construction activity, not only in the territories but also in post-1967 Jerusalem neighborhoods such as Har Homa and Ramat Shlomo, which are on the eastern side of the city.[28] In short, the settlement issue brought the sides to political wrangling that froze the already-stalled Oslo process. A Judenrein West Bank, recalling what Menachem Begin did in expelling Jews when handing over the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in 1982, and what Ariel Sharon similarly did in the Gaza Strip in 2005, was not the future that many Israelis had in mind when imagining the contours of peace.

 

The fourth intractable issue is one of borders. A final political map delineating the outline of a Palestinian state is tied to the Arab demand that Israel withdraw to the June 4, 1967 lines. No Israeli government ever agreed to such a total retreat, which runs counter to U.N. resolution 242, which established the land for peace formula in the wake of the 1967 war: Barak wavered between 88-93 percent of the West Barak while Sharon and Netanyahu considered withdrawal from perhaps 50 percent of the area.[29] Military control of the Jordan Valley remains of particular importance for Israel to prevent both future smuggling of weapons and terrorists through Jordan into Palestine and to constitute a defensive line for Israel’s eastern front facing the Arab states across the river. Israel would have to evacuate 100,000 residents in the unlikely event that final borders would exclude many smaller Jewish localities dispersed throughout Judea and Samaria beyond the larger population centers such as Ariel, Maaleh Adumim, and the Etzion block.[30] This grim scenario alone would be sufficiently critical to hamper an agreement, considering the national trauma that resulted from the expulsion of 8,000 Gush Katif residents from Gaza in August 2005. This is not the kind of public atmosphere that would generate Israeli support, let alone enthusiasm, for any peace based on the Oslo parameters.

 

Conclusion

 

While Israelis consistently poll in support of a Palestinian state, the reasons for abandoning the idea have multiplied over time. Palestinian nationalism with its malignant and rogue features remains committed to destroying Zionism. The Fatah media and school curricula indoctrinate the Palestinian people and youth to disparage Jews as “evil” and Israel as a “cancer.”[31] Palestinian military forces train for the possibility of future fighting with Israeli military forces,[32] and Palestinian diplomacy, like the recent failed attempt to get the U.N. to grant it unconditional statehood, remains the stuff of wily bazaar bargaining in a diplomatic war of attrition. It is clear that the Palestinian public has never really accepted the two-state solution as a final end to the conflict.[33] This was given vivid expression in the last interview by the late Faisal Husseini, the prominent PLO leader, who infamously compared the Oslo process to a Trojan horse that would bring about Israel’s demise.[34] More recently, Abbas Zaki, Fatah Central Committee member, confessed that “it’s not acceptable to say we want to wipe Israel out … It’s not [acceptable] policy to say so. Don’t say these things to the world. Keep it to yourself.”[35]

 

Obstacles also exist in addressing the practical aspects and nitty-gritty details of a Palestinian state centered in the West Bank. Israel’s security-related conditions regarding demilitarization and control of airspace and military monitoring stations on West Bank hilltops meet with unwavering Palestinian opposition on all counts.[36] A state of Palestine, founded in a moment of desperation and born in bitter acrimony, will lack the space to absorb millions of refugees should the expatriate Palestinian community opt for emigration and be fated for economic impoverishment (discounting the billions of dollars donated to the PA by the international community since 1994). Based on everything a dispassionate observer can testify to since the 1994 establishment of the Palestinian Authority, this Palestinian state, awkwardly sandwiched between Israel and Jordan, has all the likelihood of becoming a failed state—fragile, mismanaged, tending to disorder and civil war.[37]

 

As such, the two-state paradigm trumpeted by Oslo has been invalidated with the growth of the magnitude of dissonance. There is just no sound political basis for an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. All basic final status issues escape resolution. Yet, there has never been an admission of error, let alone an apology by Peres or Bill Clinton, Bush, Sharon, Olmert, Obama, or Netanyahu in their advocacy of a two-state solution. Speaking of the predominant role played by Peres in the Oslo saga, the contemporary grand master of realpolitik, Henry Kissinger, once remarked that Peres had “the trait of French academics who tend to believe that the formulation of an idea is equivalent to its realization.”[38] The same could be said of all those well-intentioned diplomats and politicians who have followed in Peres’s footsteps. Small wonder that, notwithstanding the plan’s abysmal failure and likely calamitous future, the intellectual brainwashing exercised by the Oslo paradigm has not yet loosened its grip over people’s minds as evidenced most recently by John Kerry’s heroic, but ultimately doomed, attempt to resuscitate the “peace process.”[39]

 

Mordechai Nisan is a retired lecturer in Middle East Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and at other academic institutions in Israel. His most recent book is Only Israel West of the River (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform).

 

[1] The Peel commission recommended the incorporation of the Arab part of western Palestine into Transjordan, ruled by Emir Abdullah ibn Hussein, rather than its constitution as an independent state.
[2] For example, Richard J. Ward, Don Peretz, and Evan M. Wilson, The Palestine State: A Rational Approach (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1977); Mark A. Heller, A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel (Cambridge.: Harvard University Press, 1983).
[3] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 2nd ed. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009), pp. 535-8, 711-29.
[4] Yediot Aharonot (Tel Aviv), July 26, 1974.
[5] Yitzhak Rabin, Pinkas Sherut, vol. II (Tel Aviv: Ma’ariv, 1979), p. 583.
[6] Ma’ariv (Tel Aviv), Feb. 10, 1989.
[7] David Makovsky, Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord (Washington and Boulder: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Westview Press, 1996), p. 123.
[8] Yossi Beilin, “Oslo Kvar Betocheinu,” Yisrael Hayom (Tel Aviv), July 27, 2011.
[9] Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), p. 800.
[10] “The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Annapolis and After,” Middle East Briefing, no. 22, International Crisis Group, Jerusalem/Washington/Brussels, Nov. 20, 2007.
[11] Barack Obama, remarks on the Middle East and North Africa, State Department, Washington, D.C., May 19, 2011.
[12] Al-Jazeera TV (Doha), May 19, 2011.
[13] “The Khartoum Resolutions,” Sept. 1, 1967, The Jewish Virtual Library.
[14] Ross, The Missing Peace, p. 782.
[15] The Jerusalem Post, May 19, 2011.
[16] “My Country Palestine,” Fatah PA TV, July 13, 2011, in MEMRI Bulletin, Middle East Media Research Institute, Washington, D.C., July 26, 2011; YNet News (Tel Aviv), Aug. 28, 2011.
[17]Hamas Covenant 1988,” Yale Law School Avalon Project, accessed Oct. 29, 2013.
[18] Al-Hayat al-Jadida (Ramallah), May 4, 2013, quoted by Palestinian Media Watch, Jerusalem.
[19] Al-Mayadeen TV (Beirut), in Palestinian Media Watch Bulletin, May 8, 2013.
[20] Israel Hayom, Aug. 1, 2013.
[21] Efraim Karsh, Arafat’s War: The Man and His Battle for Israeli Conquest (New York: Grove Press, 2003), pp. 59-60; idem, “Arafat Lives,” Commentary, Jan. 2005.
[22] The Jerusalem Post, Feb. 23, 1996; Yedidya Atlas, “Stockholm Revisited,” Israel radio 7, May 10, 1996.
[23] Makovsky, Making Peace with the PLO, chap. 2-3.
[24] Shlomo Ben-Ami, Hazit Le’lo O’ref: Masa el Gvulot Tahalich Hashalom (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2004), pp. 165-95; Ross, The Missing Peace, pp. 686-7.
[25] L. Barkan, “Israeli Arab Leadership Jockeys for Central Role in Palestinian Leadership,” Middle East Media Research Institute, Inquiry & Analysis Series Report, no.721, Aug. 11, 2011.
[26] Ron Pundak, “From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?” Survival, Autumn 2001, pp. 31-45.
[27] The Washington Post, Apr. 15, 2004.
[28] YNet News, Nov. 10, 2010.
[29] Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), Nov. 4, 2006; The Times of Israel (Jerusalem), Feb. 19, 2013; “Peace Negotiations in Name Only,” DebkaFile (Jerusalem), Sept. 23, 2013.
[30] Giora Island, “The Future of the Two-State Solution,” Jerusalem Issue Brief, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Feb. 8, 17, 2009.
[31] Al-Aqsa TV (Gaza), July 13, 2008;Religious War,” Palestinian Media Watch, Jerusalem, July 3, 2013.
[32] Gal Luft, “The Palestinian Security Forces: Capabilities and Effects on the Arab-Israeli Military Balance,” Ariel Center for Policy Research, Shaarei Tikva, Oct. 2001; CNS News, July 7, 2008.
[33] Benny Morris, “Eliminating Israel,” The National Interest, July 19, 2011.
[34] Al-Arabi (Cairo), June 6, 2001.
[35] The Blaze (New York and Dallas), Oct. 3, 2011.
[36] Dore Gold, “Banging Square Pegs into Round Holes,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Dec. 2008.
[37] Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 7th ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1999), p. 372.
[38] Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), p. 376.
[39] The New York Times, July 19, 2013.

 

Middle East

The failure of the US-backed Israeli peace agreements and its normalisation with the Gulf states

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Official White House Photo by Joyce N. Boghosian

Egyptian diplomacy has always played a (positive mediation role to consolidate the ceasefire between the Palestinians and the Israelis, especially in the recent events in Gaza 2021, and Egypt was ready to work with everyone and Israel), in order to promote an early, comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Palestinian issue on the basis of a “the two states solution” and work together to contribute to achieving lasting peace in the Middle East. Israel, as a close ally of the United States of America, considers that “the dismantling of the terrorist infrastructure is the first step in the road map towards peace and stability in the region, and indeed it constitutes a valid basis for any peace process”. Israel has also always emphasized that “building and achieving peace requires creating a positive atmosphere between all its parties in an atmosphere free of terrorism and incitement, which encourages efforts to reach an understanding between its parties”.

   However, if the current US administration of President “Joe Biden” avoided inviting the Egyptian side and all Arab parties and forces not to attend the conference of democracies in the world, with the exception of Israel and Iraq only from the heart of the Arab region, it will have (negative and dangerous repercussions on the security of the Hebrew state, and weaken the Israeli peace plans with the Arab Gulf countries mediated by the United States), and this can be analyzed through:

   It is possible that (Arab countries take collective steps to stop peace plans and political normalization with Israel under American auspices), due to the excessive sensitivity of the description or stigmatization of the United States of America as “non-democratic countries”, and therefore not to invite them to the conference of American democracies.  This may contribute to stopping and freezing all multilateral contacts that Washington had encouraged on regional cooperation between the countries of the region and Israel.  With the American side neglecting that (moving forward and cooperating in areas that affect the lives of all who live in this region will contribute psychologically to confronting the complex political issues that must be dealt with and resolved).

   Likewise, the danger of this American step in avoiding the invitation of Egypt, despite it being one of the most important contributors to regional stability, according to a published report issued by the “National Security Agency of the United States of America”, will lead to a continuous escalation of these terrorist attacks targeting security in the Sinai Peninsula, which could be understanding of the successive Israeli protests for such actions that affect the Israel’s security.

   The American provocation to Cairo will increase the activities and number of terrorist groups in Sinai and direct them to work against Israel itself, including (the Sinai Province organization) and its known terrorist activity in targeting ambushes of the Egyptian army in the city of Rafah and others, as it tries, along with the “Ansar Beit al-Maqdis organization”, which is ssociated with the terrorist organization “ISIS”, intimidating civilians by attacking them and carrying out terrorist operations, near the border strip parallel to the border of Israel.

   The activity of (ISIS Sinai Province) can be seen with (its repeatedly expression of its anti-Israel intentions, although its main goals for now are still focused on harming Egypt). This has remained the case even amid the numerous Israeli strikes that were described in Israel as “urgent”, and will not bear fruit without joint security coordination between Israel and Cairo to control the activity of terrorist groups and their extremist activities and movements in Sinai.

  If the estimates related to the strikes launched by these terrorist organizations in Sinai are aimed at (threatening the stability of Tel Aviv and the Israeli response mechanism against them), it is reasonable to assume that the leaders of the “Islamic State of Sinai” who were realised the growing role of the “Israeli army” in  Sinai.  However, they have not yet changed their policy toward Israel, especially with their awareness of the sensitivity of relations between Cairo and Washington, as a result of the United States not inviting Egypt and the countries of the region to attend the democracy conference.

    The current situation has worsened dangerously at the present time, especially after the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, and ISIS defied Washington by intensifying its attacks on several main targets, especially on “Kabul Airport in Afghanistan”, and the announcement of ISIS with its headquarters in the Afghan state of “Khursan” for its responsibility for the attack and the killing of dozens of American soldiers themselves. This means, that (Israel’s security may have become threatened in light of the close US-Israeli alliance in the region and the extensions of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq “ISIS” to the Sinai land in Egypt, near the border areas with Israel, and thus its security threat).

  Although ISIS forces in Iraq and Syria lost almost all of their territory, from here (the Sinai Peninsula may become the only remaining “province” of the organization), which makes it a suitable haven for fighters from other fronts, all of whom target the security and threat of Israe

   Also, the Egyptian government’s lack of control over the Sinai Peninsula, due to the “annexes of the Camp David agreement with Israel”, carries with it great potential for the extremist organization to target the security of the Hebrew state, as it gives it great opportunities to extort resources from the local population and military personnel, and (expand its support among residents, and perhaps take advantage of its proximity to the Israeli border).

  Here, all Israeli and American military analyzes affirm with certainty that the “Islamic State” organization and its supporters in Sinai will do everything in their power (continuing to work in Israel or working with other countries to threaten Tel Aviv itself).

    However, it is likely that the facts on the ground will make Sinai the next focal point for ISIS, and this will be more important and dangerous than ever, and will serve as a (security dilemma that Israel is severely facing, therefore, the support of the Egyptian army in its battle against these terrorist organizations, their extremist activities and movements has become the duty of both Israeli and American leaders themselves).

  Hence, (Strengthening the stability of the Egyptian state and consolidating its sovereignty to protect Israel security and maintain the security of Sinai is a very important strategic goal).  In recent years, Israel has sought to facilitate the achievement of this goal by agreeing to temporary amendments to the security arrangements of the “Camp David Accords”, and this has already been done recently. Especially with (the successive Egyptian security requests since the revolution of January 25, 2011 until recently from the Israeli and American sides to work together to maintain the security of Sinai), and thus not to endanger Israeli security due to the succession of these terrorist incidents on the Sinai land near the border with Israel.

   Perhaps this explains the reasons for this increasing repeatedly demand from Cairo for getting the required (permission from the United States of America and Israel itself to deploy large-scale armored forces in the Sinai Peninsula, and Israel generally agreed to this request, and Egypt granted extensions of treaty exceptions according to need).  According to published Israeli security and military reports, Israel is also greatly assisting the Egyptian forces in the field of intelligence and air strikes in the region to thwart terrorist operations near the Tel Aviv borders.

  Despite my reading of American and Western academic analyzes, in which other Western analysts assert that Cairo has given the “Israeli army” absolute freedom to target fighters in Sinai with manned and unmanned aircraft.  However, from my point of view, the result is one, and it is represented in the importance of the joint security agreement and coordination between Israel, Egypt, with Washington to “confront the activities of all extremist terrorist organizations against the security of Sinai because of their common danger to the security of Israel and Cairo”.

  Although Cairo’s assistance to Israel is very important, this goal does not cancel the basic security concept on which the “Camp David Agreement” and the military annex of Sinai are based, meaning that:    

(Maintaining Sinai as an impenetrable barrier against any future hostilities  It may reach Israel from Egypt)

   We can explain all of the revolutionary events during the “period of the Arab Spring revolutions”, specifically the revolutions of January 25, 2011 and the June 30 revolution in Egypt in 2013 – especially after the storming of the Israeli embassy in Cairo – during the events of the revolution, and even the subsequent coming of the rule of the “Muslim Brotherhood” after a few months, it is evidence of the extent of the instability of the situation, and how important it is to keep the Sinai Peninsula under the Egyptian-Israeli security control, in view of (the long-term growth and spread of terrorism, extremism and arms movement, which threatens Israeli national security).

  Thus, Sinai constitutes a real and growing dilemma for both Israeli and American policy. On the one hand, it is necessary to provide as much assistance as possible to Cairo to (re-establish its sovereignty and prevent destabilizing shocks to Israel’s stability). On the other hand, the ongoing fighting leads to the possibility of instability in the Sinai borders parallel to Israel, so Israel must be prepared for any scenario. Hence, the (necessity of coordination between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai to eliminate the danger of extremism, terrorism and militants close to the Egyptian and Israeli fronts alike).

   Hence, the Egyptian researcher can accurately analyze the situation and perhaps (from a different analytical angle) that Egypt’s failure to invite “President Joe Biden’s administration to the Conference of Democracies” has serious and long-term repercussions on the security of Sinai and even on the political and regional stability in the region in  “Not inviting any Arab or regional party to the conference of democracies with the exception of Israel and Iraq,” and this would increase the level and degree of security sensitivities between Cairo and Tel Aviv.  the depth of the Israeli state itself), and thus launching more destabilizing attacks from inside Tel Aviv, which Washington did not pay close attention to.

   Hence, it is possible to understand and analyze “behind this American step by excluding Egypt and the countries of the region from their democracy”, which is:

  The effect and implications of not inviting Cairo, the Arab Gulf states, and the entire Arab region to the Conference of American Democracies under the auspices of “Biden”, will inevitably affect the (level of joint contacts to promote more Israeli peace plans with the countries of the region with American support), and will affect the degree of joint security and political coordination between the three (Egyptian, Israeli, American) parties, which will increase the danger, activity and penetration of all these extremist terrorist organizations, especially what is known as, the “Islamic State Organization of the Sinai Province”, as well as the danger of (the intertwining and growing extension of “ISIS” into Sinai itself and launching attacks against Israel)

    Hence, the Biden administration has caused (the spread of extremism, terrorism and religious extremism on the land of Sinai, and the most important threat to Israel’s security from within and on its borders), which Washington may not have taken into account, in order to preserve the interests of its Israeli partner, so perhaps  Israel must urgently demand its American ally to reduce attempts to provoke its Egyptian neighbor and the rest of the Arab and Gulf countries, even the printing press with it, in accordance with peace agreements, normalization, and security and borders coordination, in order to preserve the security of Israel itself, and to preserve the joint military-security coordination mechanism between Egypt and Israel under American auspices, so that the amendment of the “new Camp David security amendment” to allow the Egyptian presence and Israeli coordination and their military deployment in the Sinai does not turn into an extreme and very dangerous targeting of all Israelis, thus undermining and targeting  Washington’s interests, by extension, in Egypt and the region.

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Middle East

The question with contradictory US human rights policies towards Saudi Arabia and Iran

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A cursory look at Saudi Arabia and Iran suggests that emphasizing human rights in US foreign policy may complicate relations but has little impact on regional stability or the willingness of protagonists to reduce tension and manage conflicts when it is in their interest.

A post 9/11 US emphasis on human rights was not what inspired homegrown popular Arab revolts over the past decade that initially toppled leaders in eight Arab countries but were largely rolled back or stymied by counter-revolutionary US allies.

The UAE and Saudi counter-revolutionary efforts put the two Gulf states on the autocratic frontline of President Joe Biden’s democracy versus autocracy dichotomy. They were motivated by a rejection of democracy as an existential challenge to the absolute power of their ruling families.

Subsequent US administrations effectively let the counter-revolutionary moves pass, although, to be fair, the Biden administration has suspended $700 million in aid to Sudan following a military power grab in October. However, it has yet to do the same with an additional $500 million for Tunisia. Democratically elected President Kais Saied disbanded parliament in July and assumed the power to enact laws.

By the same token, Middle Eastern protagonists, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran, opted to reduce tensions and explore ways of managing their differences to focus on reforming and diversifying their economies, fuelling growth, and stimulating trade.

In other words, they would have sought to reduce tensions even if they had not anticipated that the Biden administration would adopt a more human rights and democratic values-driven foreign policy and would want to focus on Asia rather than the Middle East.

If anything, a contentious relationship with the United States could have provided a further incentive for reducing tensions. Yemen, which figured prominently in Iran’s talks with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, may be a case in point.

As a result, the regional moves raise the question of whether a US refusal to stand up for principle produces the kind of short-term results that outweigh the long-term cost of autocracy as well as the price of undermining US credibility.

The short-term results of abandoning principle for pragmatism were evident in this week’s shift in oil politics.

The shift was prompted by US efforts to assure the kingdom and other Gulf states that the United States was no longer in the regime change business. US officials also insisted that the administration would concentrate on maintaining and strengthening regional partnerships. They signaled that the administration’s lip service to human rights and democratic values would not have policy consequences.

The message was well received in Riyadh. In response, Saudi Arabia reversed its rejection of Mr. Biden’s request to increase oil production to reduce soaring prices at US gas stations.

The de facto leader of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the cartel’s largest producer, Saudi Arabia, said the group and its associates, which include Russia, would increase monthly production by 400,000 barrels a day.

The Saudi concession also came in response to the administration’s willingness to sell the kingdom US$650 million worth of missiles. The sale threatened to further call into question the credibility of the United States as it prepared to host this week’s virtual Summit for Democracy, which some 110 countries are expected to attend.

The administration says the sale is in line with its policy of supplying only defensive weapons to the kingdom as US officials push for an end to the devastating, almost seven-year-long Yemen war that has sparked one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.

Administration officials assert that the missiles would enable Saudi Arabia to shoot down Houthi drones in the air before they hit targets in the kingdom but cannot be used for attacks against the rebels in Yemen itself.

The Senate vote could set the tone for the democracy summit. Anti-Saudi sentiment runs deep in the US Congress. A vote against the sale would force Mr. Biden to cancel it or override the Senate with a veto.

Saudi violations of human rights, the killing in 2018 of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the kingdom’s crackdown on dissent and freedom of expression, and its conduct of the Yemen war fueled the anti-Saudi sentiment.

With the arms sale on the line, the administration has remained silent about reports that Saudi Arabia and the UAE had used a combination of economic incentives and threats to pressure African and Asian nations to vote for the shutdown of a United Nations investigation into abuses of human rights in the war.

Meanwhile, the administration’s efforts to reassure Middle Eastern nations that its policy emphasis has changed has done little to prevent Iranian negotiators at the Vienna talks on reviving a 2015 international agreement that curbed the country’s nuclear programme from hardening their positions.

Iran believes that the United States and, at least until recently, some of its Gulf allies, aim to encircle the Islamic republic and foment domestic unrest that will lead to the regime’s fall. The US has imposed crippling sanctions in response to its nuclear programme and harshly criticized Iran for its abusive human rights record.

That has not stopped Iran from engaging in separate talks with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which appear to be producing results in Yemen.

As a result of those talks, Saudi and Emirati forces, and their Yemeni allies, were reportedly withdrawing from positions in southern and western parts of the country.

 “These are very likely the opening moves by Saudi Arabia and the UAE as they prepare to fully exit Yemen,” said former member of the United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen Gregory D. Johnson.

The war has increasingly turned into an albatross around Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s neck, with much of the international community wanting to see an end to the conflict.

It was not immediately clear if and what Iran may have offered in return for the withdrawals that have allowed the Houthis to move into evacuated spaces. “The latest developments seem to suggest that the Houthis seem on the edge of gaining the upper hand,” said NATO Foundation analyst Umberto Profazio.

In line with that assessment, the Houthis have not indicated that they had become more interested in a negotiated end to the war.

“It is clear that the Houthis intend to try to bring down the Yemen government. The Iranians, I believe, would like to see the same,” said US special envoy to Yemen Tim Lenderking.

The Emirati withdrawals, particularly around the strategic port of Hodeida, follow gestures including an effort to return internationally isolated Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to the Arab fold and an exchange of visits with Iran. Syrian membership in the Arab League was suspended early in the civil war.

Some analysts suggested that the withdrawals in Yemen were part of an effort to build confidence. However, it was not clear why the Saudis and Emiratis would cede strategic territory with no apparent Iranian or Houthi concessions in return unless they were looking for a rush to the exit no matter what.

“The pull-out was unnecessary to open new frontlines, and Hodeida seems to have paid the price for confidence-building with Iran,” said Yemen analyst Ibrahim Jalal.

The withdrawals, including from Mara on the Yemeni border with Oman, help Saudi Arabia put its backyard in order. Saudi operations in Mara irritated Oman that sees the Yemeni region as its sphere of influence.

The withdrawals helped facilitate a visit to Oman by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman this week. Mr. Bin Salman may try to reach an agreement during the visit to construct a pipeline from the kingdom’s oil fields to an export terminal in Oman. The pipeline would allow Saudi Arabia is to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz.

In the final analysis of the pros and cons of a values-driven US foreign policy, hardline realists will argue that backing down on rights produces tangible results.

Yet, the United States’ selective and opportunistic hardline emphasis on rights and values in Iran has not prevented the Islamic republic from engaging with Saudi Arabia and the UAE and possibly helping to end the Yemen war. The pressure may have been one factor that persuaded Iran to engage.

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Middle East

Democracy Summit: Excluding countries and igniting the Cold War in the Middle East

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A number of American leaks have appeared at the present time for several American think tanks that have reached a dangerous conclusion, which is: (The United States of America must re-use the influence of the extremist Islamic currents and radical political Islam movements in the Middle East and Africa to confront the rise of China in the first place). Hence, the first practical American application of this through the conference to divide the world democratically, according to the American concept, through the following possible scenarios:

   Washington may have practically started using the game of “rapprochement with extremist currents in the face of communist China”, which can be understood through (the United States of America is currently trying to re-use the strategy of rapprochement with extremist currents and political Islam currents in the face of the Chinese and Russian communist enemy as well), and made them raise  Ideological slogans whose purpose is to “ignite the region sectarianly and religiously and cause chaos and turmoil”, and Washington helps in this the ambitions of some nascent national forces in the Middle East, or perhaps some individuals and civil organizations with narrow, limited interests at the expense and in the face of their homelands.

   The American prominent book, which is called (The Devil’s Game: Political Islam and the United States), which was published by “Robert Dreyfuss”, who is an American scholar, specializing in political Islam, is one of the most academic efforts close to understanding the support of the United States and the West in general for the project of so-called political Islam, as well as presenting, highlighting and analyzing of (all American plans aimed at attracting the extremist currents in the Middle East, bringing them closer and using them by the USA to cause unrest in their regions), by fueling their exploitation in achieving sectarian and religious fanaticism in the Arab world.

   Here, the author of the aforementioned book, “Robert Dreyfuss”, presented many of the mysteries and unknown reasons about those (secret and mysterious alliances that the United States of America made with Muslim Brotherhood groups and the other political Islam movements in Egypt and the other countries in the region), over a period of several decades to sponsor and encourage the Islamic currents and radicalism, whether by US secret agreements with them or perhaps by manipulating them as well, so that (the United States of America will use them later in its cold war against China ideologically).

  Perhaps the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister “Wang Yi” to the Middle East in March 2021, who summarized his trip in several words, concerning the Chinese response in the Middle East to the policy of American alliances and polarization, by asserting that:

 “China and the countries agreed on the need to respect sovereign independence and national dignity for all countries, and to promote independent and diversified avenues of development”

   The official Chinese media also supported the speech of its Chinese Foreign Minister, “Wang Yi” and his assurances to all countries in the Middle East region, by confirming that:

 “It was agreed to oppose interference in the internal affairs of the other countries and slander others under the guise of human rights and the protection of the international system, so that the United Nations “UN” would be the core of the international order based on international law, pluralism, fairness and international justice”

   The analyses and the main visions of the Chinese think tanks, which are considered that: the failure of the United States of America to invite the countries of the region to the conference of democracies in the world is (the beginning of the “Joe Biden’s administration” leaving the Middle East for China).

  So, the logic results for the American provocation to the Middle East region, according to the Chinese way of thinking, represents in: (deepening China’s relations with the Middle East countries outside the scope of trade should worry the United States of America), especially since the administration of US President “Joe Biden” has recently taken steps to reduce interest in the region, thus opening the door to Chinese hegemony in accordance with the American vision.

   And perhaps in my viewpoint that (the Conference of American Democracies is the beginning of the American vacuum in favor of China and Russia), which is the same as what was confirmed by a former senior official in American national security, and a close advisor to President “Joe Biden” in a report published in the “American Politico Newspaper”, confirming it frankly by saying:

  “If you were to rank the regions that “Biden” considers a priority, the Middle East is not among the top three. Because, the main top priorities are: the Asia-Pacific region, then Europe, and the Western Hemisphere, and this reflects a bipartisan consensus that the issues of our interest has changed with the return of the great-power competition with China and Russia”

   Hence, we conclude, that with China competing for more international (militarily, economically, technologically and politically) influence, to become the largest power in the world by 2049, according to its stated strategy. So, here we find that (the Middle East is likely to become decisive, whether the United States of America prioritizes it or not).

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