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Middle East

The Palestinian Refugee Problem Resolved

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During the 1948 war, some 600,000 Palestinian Arabs fled their homes to the neighboring Arab states or to parts of mandatory Palestine occupied by Arab states (the West Bank and Gaza)

.[1] Likewise, within a few years after the establishment of the State of Israel, nearly all of the 850,000-strong Jewish population living in Arab states was either expelled or escaped with just their lives. Most made their way to Israel where they were resettled.

While these latter facts may not be that well known, neither are they completely unfamiliar to students of the Middle East. What is less acknowledged, however, is the de facto agreement of Arab states to resettle Palestinian refugees in their respective territories, expressed in closed-door discussions at cease-fire committee meetings and other gatherings with Israeli representatives.[2] Whether the Arab states properly represented the refugees or treated them and their descendants fairly is a matter for the Palestinians and their Arab brothers to adjudicate on their own.

Population Exchange of the 1948 War

On December 11, 1948, the U.N. General Assembly adopted resolution (3)194 whose paragraph 11 dealt with the problem of the war refugees:

The General Assembly. … Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practical date and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss or damage to property … [and] Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees.[3]

As a General Assembly resolution, the U.N. decision was in no way a binding recommendation.[4] Nonetheless, it put forward the notions that Arab (and Jewish) refugees (a) should be allowed to return to their country of origin within the framework of a comprehensive peace if they could be construed as peaceable; (b) or they could receive reparations for damage to or loss of their property if they decided not to return; and (c) resettlement was a no less reasonable option.

While the Arab states vehemently opposed resolution 194 and voted unanimously against it (only in the late 1960s did they begin to transform the resolution into the linchpin of their claim to a “right of return”),[5] they did not shirk from quietly entertaining the feasibility of resettling the Palestinian refugees in their territories. Iraq, Syria,[6] Jordan,[7] and Egypt[8] all recommended the resettling of the Palestinian refugees within their borders.[9] Most of these states also demanded economic aid from Western powers as payback for agreeing to the option.[10] But their agreement was kept quiet since they did not see eye-to-eye on this matter with both the Palestinians and their own populations.

At the 1949 Lausanne Conference convened by the U.N. Conciliation Commission, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon appeared as one bloc to discuss an agreement that also included a solution to the refugee problem. While they had previously rejected resolution 194, they now demanded that any deal had to be resolved on that basis. They also told the U.N. Conciliation Commission that they, the Arab states, represented the Palestinian refugees. Three delegations of refugees that tried to reach the conference were treated with contempt by their Arab brethren and denied access to the discussions.[11] When they asked for an interview with the Egyptian delegation, they were unceremoniously removed by force. At a later September 1951 Conciliation Commission conference in Paris, only delegations from the Arab states were asked to represent the refugees.[12]

A critical aspect of these discussions and one that has been largely forgotten since that time was that recommendations and attempts at resettling the Palestinian Arabs also focused on issues of compensation to the Arab states for the expenses incurred in the absorption of their brethren. Alongside infusions of cash from Western sources, Arab governments viewed with equanimity the confiscation of Jewish property to help offset costs, property that was coming into their hands as a result of a massive population transfer out of their borders occurring at the same time.

Many Jewish communities in the Arab states predated the Muslim conquest of the Middle East by hundreds of years. Many of their members had grown prosperous, served in their host nations’ law courts, military, and where such existed, parliaments and considered themselves full-fledged citizens. Many more eked out a livelihood as best they could, aware of a precarious situation in which today’s good Muslim neighbor might turn out to be tomorrow’s oppressor. Whatever their material circumstances, within a few years of the establishment of the State of Israel, the bulk of this population was forced out of their homes, leaving behind the vast majority of their possessions.[13]

Contemporary Palestinian spokesmen and advocates are largely silent about the effective population exchange carried out at that time. While they may argue that the Arab states were not empowered to represent them or claim (falsely) that Jews who emigrated did so because of Zionist manipulation rather than persecution and harassment, the fact is that part of the stipulations of U.N. resolution 194 were actualized in that compensation for relocation was obtained—albeit through the forcible divestment of Jewish citizenry—and resettlement occurred. Whether that compensation went to the proper recipients or whether resettlement was done in a half-hearted fashion, the international community, alongside the Arab governments, put in place practicable, if not perfect, solutions. A closer look at that population exchange and the accompanying transfer of billions of dollars’ worth of Jewish property and holdings to the Palestinian refugees is in order.

Hashemite Kingdoms

At the time, both Jordan and Iraq were constitutional monarchies ruled by members of the Hashemite family. Their approaches to the refugee and resettlement problem differed markedly, largely due to geographical and ethnic factors as well as the absence of a Jewish community in Jordan versus the well-established one of Iraq.

It must be remembered that up to 1974, Jordan considered itself the representative of Palestinian rights since most of its citizens (approximately 60-70 percent) were of Palestinian origin. This perception was formalized in a 1962 Jordanian white paper by Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal that explicitly designated Jordan as Palestine and as the representative of the Palestinians in its territory. Amman maintained this position even after the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 and the 1967 Six-Day War. It was only in 1974, after the Arab League recognized the PLO as the “sole representative of the Palestinian people,” that Jordan grudgingly changed its position for the first time due to the political pressures.[14]

Jordan’s founder, emir-turned-king Abdullah (r.1921-51) was the architect of the policy to assimilate Palestinian refugees into his kingdom. In June 1950, there were 506,200 Palestinian refugees listed by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 55 percent of the total of registered UNRWA refugees.[15] Refugees were settled on both banks of the Jordan River. Abdullah’s policy included the granting of full citizenship to the refugees in order to absorb them into his kingdom. The warm welcome they received there impelled additional refugees from Gaza and other Arab countries to come to Jordan and receive suitable living quarters and citizenship.

The majority of refugees and their descendants listed with UNRWA currently live in Jordan. According to the agency, only 350,899 Palestinian refugees live in ten official camps out of the 2,034,061 registered refugees, including the 140,000 registered refugees arriving in Jordan from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip after 1967. This is in addition to the million-and-a-half Palestinians not listed as refugees who are full-fledged Jordanian citizens (out of a total population of 6,508,271 million people).[16]

In fact, about 95 percent of all Palestinians residing in Jordan hold Jordanian citizenship and enjoy its benefits. The exception is the approximately 100,000 refugees from the Gaza Strip who settled in Jordan over the years. The members of this small group hold temporary Jordanian passports but do not qualify for full rights like the others, notably the right to hold a government job.[17] Since 1948, quite a few politicians of Palestinian origin such as Tawfik Abul Huda, Anwar Nusseibeh, Hussein Fakhri Khalidi, Ahmad Tuqan, Kassim Rimawi, among others, have risen to high office in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, including cabinet posts and even the premiership.

The situation in neighboring Iraq was quite different. Though nominally ruled by the Hashemite king, Faisal III, real power was held by Western interests and off-and-on during the 1940s and 1950s by Prime Minister Nuri Said. Iraq also had a large and flourishing Jewish population reaching back to biblical times, which had long been active in Iraqi affairs, including commerce, culture, and in the modern period, the Iraqi parliament.[18]

Despite this, a pogrom in June 1941—the farhud—took place, which changed the entire trajectory of Jewish life in Mesopotamia and which laid the groundwork for the population and wealth transfer plans of the 1950s. Led by a pro-Nazi Iraqi prime minister, Rashid Ali Kaylani, and the exiled Jerusalem mufti Hajj Amin Husseini, the pogrom lasted for three days. Some 190 Jews were murdered, hundreds of Jewish women were raped, and at least 2,000 people were wounded. Jewish homes and Jewish-owned stores were ransacked and destroyed. The farhud was a marker that foretold the end of the ancient Jewish community in Iraq.[19]

While some Iraqi Jews cautiously tried to rebuild their lives, evidence began to mount that they were no longer welcome in their millennial home. During the 1948 war, Iraqis began to take measures against “the enemy within.” In the first days of the war, more than 300 Jews were arrested for having “given support to Israel.” Shafiq Ades, one of the richest members of the Jewish Baghdad community, who had sat with government ministers, represented the Jewish community at court, and who had contributed greatly to Iraq’s economy was accused of Zionism and communism and publicly hanged. All of his assets, estimated at many millions, were confiscated for the benefit of the Defense Ministry. Nor was this an isolated incident: The Jews of Iraq understood clearly that they would be forced to abandon their property if they wished to escape with their lives.[20]

Although he opposed the pro-Nazi leaders who had come to power in Iraq during World War II, Nuri Said was chiefly responsible for the final expulsion of Iraqi Jews and for the confiscation of their property. During the months of May-July 1949, he turned to the U.S. and British representatives in Baghdad with the recommendation that there be a population exchange between the Jewish citizens of his country and the Palestinian refugees.[21] Though the idea was raised, in part, following a British recommendation to resettle the refugees in the fertile river valleys of Iraq, London strenuously objected to Said’s plan arguing that this type of agreement would be an inequitable exchange of educated and often prosperous Jews for a population of uneducated refugees with no professional skills.[22]

On October 14, 1949, Said continued with his attempts to convince the Conciliation Commission that only states that had Jews to expel should resettle the Palestinian refugees.[23] At the same time, an opinion survey was carried out in Iraq regarding a population exchange between Palestinian refugees and Iraqi Jews. This proposal was rejected by Israel’s foreign minister, Moshe Sharett, who declared that Israel could not agree to the confiscation of the vast properties of the Iraqi Jews.[24]

In March 1950, as masses of Iraqi Jews desperately tried to leave the country, Baghdad passed the “Revocation of Citizenship Bill” allowing Jews to leave if they surrendered their citizenship. Tens of thousands departed as soon as they could despite the Israeli government’s difficulty in absorbing them.[25] A year later, the Iraqi parliament passed a law confiscating all properties belonging to Jews who moved, or wished to move, to Israel and who had thus relinquished their Iraqi citizenship, placing the assets under a governmental guardianship department. The seized amount has been estimated at around $243 million (about $6 billion in today’s terms) at the very minimum.[26] Said claimed this was retribution for the confiscation of Palestinian assets by the Zionists.[27]

After the law’s ratification, the British asked Said to absorb at least some Palestinian refugees; the prime minister replied that he was ready to absorb a limited number of refugees but not hundreds of thousands.[28] In the end, Iraq took in only 4,000 Palestinian refugees convoyed in trucks by the Iraqi army, a number “balanced” at that time by the departure of over 130,000 legal (and clandestine) Jewish refugees. UNRWA was not allowed to operate in Iraq; instead, Baghdad established its own refugee division to care for the Palestinians’ needs. Whether any of the confiscated Jewish assets made their way into the hands of the resettled Palestinian refugees remains to be answered.

Syria, Egypt, and the Maghreb

Neighboring and sparsely populated Syria was an ideal country for the mass resettlement of Palestinian refugees. In fact, before 1920, many Syrians and Palestinians considered themselves to be part of one nation—Greater Syria—while what became the British Mandate of Palestine was termed Southern Syria.

In April 1949, Prime Minister Husni Za’im signaled his readiness to sign a peace agreement with Israel in exchange for specific conditions including substantial geographic concessions. He explicitly informed U.S. representatives of Damascus’s willingness to absorb and resettle over a quarter of a million refugees in its territory—at least three times more refugees than Syria actually absorbed in 1948.[29] At the Lausanne Conference, Za’im’s emissaries let Israel know that Syria would absorb 300,000 refugees in exchange for economic aid. In the end, these negotiations went nowhere as Za’im was overthrown in a military coup and executed a mere four and a half months after coming to power.[30]

Even so, Palestinians were resettled in Syria, the majority coming from the 82,194 refugees registered with UNRWA in June 1950.[31] There are ten official refugee camps in Syria today and three more unofficial ones, including the Yarmouk camp, a district of Damascus that became a desired living area. Up until the recent civil war, the Assad regime treated its Palestinians relatively fairly and allowed them to integrate into local and national politics. Since 1956, according to Syrian law 260, the 1948 Palestinian refugees are equal to Syrian citizens in the following areas: employment (including governmental jobs), vocations, and education, but are excluded from being elected and becoming members of parliament. They are allowed to participate in municipal elections like everyone else. Although they retain their Palestinian nationality, according to Palestinian sources, “These are always referred to as those who are in effect Syrians.”[32] The Palestinians even have official status in the Syrian Baath Party and participate in its leadership.[33] In fact, during the Lebanese civil war, many Palestinians escaped to Syria and rebuilt their homes there.[34]

Part of the reason why Syria became an attractive destination for Palestinians is that as in Iraq, the cost of resettling refugees was offset in part by the confiscation of Jewish assets. As did Iraq, Syria had a sizeable and prosperous Jewish community; in 1943, there were at least 30,000 Jews living there. But in 1949, in the wake of Israel’s independence, the Syrian government passed a law freezing all Jewish bank accounts. The main motive behind this action, as declared by the Syrian rulers, was to provide a solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees inside its borders. The regime took the most convenient path, which was to confiscate the Jewish assets in its country, mostly houses, and pass them to Palestinian hands.[35] This practice was institutionalized in a 1967 law stating that the “property and possessions of deceased Jews are confiscated by the government; the heirs must pay for its use. If they cannot, it will be handed over to the Palestinian Arabs.” There are no details regarding the exact number of Jewish properties received by Palestinian Arabs in Syria. Damascus’s implacable hostility to Israel resulted in worsening conditions for its Jewish community, and thus most sought to leave. The government periodically permitted Jewish emigration but only if the Jews were prepared to abandon their assets without selling them.[36]

In 1967, after a decisive Syrian defeat in the Six-Day War, new laws were passed that increased the restrictions on the rights of Syrian Jews. All Jewish assets were confiscated. Governmental proclamations explicitly stated that Palestinian refugees were to enjoy the Jews’ property and were the actual owners of Jewish assets. Those Jews who remained in Syria were forced to pay rent on their own property; if they were unable to keep up the scheduled payments, their property was awarded to Palestinians. Finally, as the result of discussions at the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, the last remnants of the mostly destitute Jewish community in Syria were allowed to leave, most eventually making their way to Israel.[37]

To the south lay Egypt, which had taken a decisive role in invading Israel in 1948 and thus bore its fair share of responsibility towards the resulting flood of Arab refugees. Unlike Syria, Egypt was not interested in absorbing refugees in its interior. Of the approximately 600,000 Palestinian refugees who fled during the war, approximately 82,000 went to Egyptian-held Gaza.[38] A small portion of the refugees, mainly those who had family ties in Egypt or who offered the appropriate bribe, made it to Egypt proper; according to Palestinian figures, in the year 2008, there were 64,728 Palestinians outside of Gaza living in Egypt. Many of the refugees who reached Egypt were forced to leave in the end and were deported back to the Gaza Strip.[39]

A magnificent and well-connected community of approximately 100,000 Jews lived by the banks of the Nile when the Israeli war of independence began. As a consequence of the fighting as well as the involvement of the Muslim Brotherhood in domestic politics, numerous actions against the Jews including riots took place. Hundreds of Jews were summarily arrested and interned. Exit visas for Jews were severely restricted. Looting and bombing became prevalent. As one eyewitness recalled:

After the war broke out [in 1948], my mother, who was in the ninth month of her pregnancy, was arrested. They wanted to butcher her. They had bayonets. They abused her and afterwards they left her. On one of the evenings, a crowd came with sticks and anything else that they could find in order to kill the family because they heard that they were Jews. The gatekeeper swore to them that we were Italians and that is why they only cursed, surrounded my parents, my brothers, and myself, who was only a tiny baby. The next day my parents fled. They left everything, a pension, work, and a home, and they left Egypt.[40]

More than 25,000 Jews left Egypt without their assets following the 1948 war, after being attacked by Arabs mobs. But with the Free Officers Movement’s coup of July 1952, more dramatic changes were soon to follow. Nationalist sentiment against Westerners had already resulted in rioting against the “foreign” Jews, and in the same week that the Egyptian revolution broke out, further attacks took place. Jewish stores were robbed, and Jewish property looted and burned.[41]

In the immediate aftermath of the officers’ coup, there was an attempt by the Egyptian government to allay the Jewish community’s fears, including the return of property seized after the 1948 war. At the same time, under the framework of the 1954 “Alpha Plan,” Washington and London attempted a Palestinian refugee resettlement program in the Sinai Peninsula, but this process was scuttled due to an escalation in Egyptian-Israeli tensions.[42]

In 1954, the exposure of an Israeli spy ring in Egypt that had recruited Egyptian Jews (the so-called Lavon affair) exacerbated ill-feelings. The escalation of the conflict with Israel led Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser to take a number of steps against the Jews in his country, including another roundup of suspected “Zionists.” The nationalization of the Suez Canal, which in turn resulted in the Sinai campaign of October 1956, marked the beginning of the end of the ancient Jewish community in Egypt. On November 22, 1956, all Egyptian Jews were defined as Zionists and labeled enemy citizens. The massive expulsion of Egyptian Jewry began with the total confiscation of Jewish wealth. Some of these assets were given to the Palestinian refugees who were living in Cairo, and the rest went into the Egyptian state treasury. For example, the house of Charles Victor Castro, an exclusive home in an expensive Cairo suburb, became the official residence of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat.[43] None apparently went to the Palestinians housed by Egypt in the Gaza Strip; instead Cairo chose to rely on aid from UNRWA. Conditions worsened for the remnants of Egypt’s Jewish community before and after the Six-Day War, and today, there is no longer any active Jewish community in Egypt. Only a few solitary Jews, most of them women, and a few deserted synagogues remain from the magnificent communities of Cairo and Alexandria.[44]

While the majority of Palestinian refugees did not, for the most part, migrate to the North African countries, these states used the fate of the refugees and the 1948 war to make the lives of their Jewish populations—some of which dated to biblical times—unbearable until they were expelled from their countries or felt compelled to leave.

Having endured a horrible pogrom in the Libyan capital of Tripoli in June 1948, most of the 38,000-strong Jewish community fled the country with 90 percent of them settling in Israel. In 2004, Mu’ammar Qaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, declared that all the exiled Jews could return to Libya and receive reparations based on their former assets though their homes would remain in the hands of Palestinian refugees residing in the country.[45] Likewise, Tunisian Jewry dwindled from some 105,000 people in 1948 to a mere 1,500 by 2010 with 15,000 escaping to Israel during the 1948 war and in its immediate wake, and the rest following suit after Tunisian independence in 1956. A similar pattern occurred in Algeria, whose 117,000-strong Jewish community fled in 1962[46] while in Morocco—where some 270,000 people lived in the largest Jewish community in the Muslim world—secret negotiations between Israel and the royal court, and a $10 million “gift” to the king, produced a royal permit for the Jews to leave—albeit without taking their belongings or selling their properties and businesses. By 1976, only 17,000 Jews remained in the country.[47]

Resettlement and Recompense

Little notice has been paid to the fate of the 850,000 Jewish refugees from the Arab states, about 550,000 of whom were resettled in Israel. Similarly, the resettlement of most of the Palestinian refugees in the host Arab countries, creating a de facto population exchange, has been overlooked.

To be sure, unlike the international community, the Arab states were quite aware of this reality, as was the PLO leadership. On November 9, 1973, the Voice of Palestine broadcast the PLO’s “Plan for Peace.” According to this arrangement, all of the countries of the world including the Arab states should immediately and publicly allow the “Zionist immigrants” to Israel to return to their countries of origin where they would enjoy the same rights and responsibilities that were theirs previously before they were coerced into emigrating due to Zionist propaganda. After all of the Jews who immigrated to Palestine since 1917 had returned to their countries of origin, the Palestinians would be able to return to their homeland.[48]

Nor was the reality of the de facto population exchange lost on many Israeli Arabs. This was especially true for activists in the various Israeli communist parties of the 1950s and 1960s who acknowledged such an exchange but viewed it as a conspiracy between Western imperialist interests and reactionary Arab collaborators. The Israeli Arab author Emil Habibi, for example, argued that backward-looking Arabs—those who supported the Hajj Amin Husseini or Abdullah—were actually working hand-in-hand with the Zionist leadership to steal freedom from the Palestinian nation, throw the best of its sons into jail, and disinherit the workers and the peasants[49]—an absurd proposition given Hajj Amin’s burning hatred of Jews and Zionism and his relentless fight against them. Similar assessments were voiced by Tawfiq Toubi, Fuad Nassar, Suleiman Najab, and many others from the communist parties in Israel, Jordan, and the Gaza Strip.[50]

At the same time, the newly established State of Israel, having just absorbed hundreds of thousands of Holocaust survivors was shortly thereafter confronted with the momentous task of integrating another 550,000 refugees from the Arab countries. Jewish refugees from the Arab states to Israel were settled during the 1950s in transit camps similar in quality to the refugee camps established in Arab countries for the Palestinians. Over time these transit camps were transformed into development towns or neighborhoods in larger cities to which they were adjacent. The last of the camps closed around 1963.

The U.N. did not establish any special agency like UNRWA to help the Jewish refugees (or for that matter, any other refugee community in the world). At the Paris conference of 1951, the topic of the “Arab” Jewish refugees was raised, in particular, the dispossession of Jewish assets left in Iraq. Israel demanded that a link be created between the Jewish exodus and the Jewish assets left behind in the Arab states and that of the Palestinian refugees, but nothing came of the discussion.[51]

As a result, the State of Israel saw no alternative but to pass its own law regarding the use of absentee assets. This enabled the government to use the assets of the Palestinian refugees to help resettle and support its own Arab Jewish refugees. These refugees from the Arab states did not have the right to reparations from Germany or to additional pensions, and most did not have family members that could aid them in their absorption into Israel.

The issue of confiscated and reappropriated assets is habitually brought up by Palestinian advocates, albeit in a one-sided way. In a detailed 1957 report, the Arab states demanded at least $3.5 billion for lost Palestinian assets,[52] a figure that even U.N. officials considered inflated. Arab sources usually refrain from referring to the problem of Jewish property. In her 2009 article “From Plundering to Plundering: Israel and the Assets of the Palestinian Refugees,” for example, Palestinian advocate and Israeli citizen Suhad Bishara demanded the full return of all Palestinian property to its owners in accordance with the current value but studiously avoided any attempt to deal with the more substantial expropriated Jewish property.[53] The Israeli-Palestinian privately negotiated Geneva accord also addressed reparations for Palestinian refugees and their descendants (requiring no evidence of property ownership) but totally ignored Jewish property appropriated by the Arab states ostensibly on behalf of the Palestinian refugees.[54]

Finally, a comparison of lost Palestinian assets and those of the dispossessed Jews bears review. According to 1950 U.N. estimates, Palestinian assets amounted to approximately £120 million, which, in today’s terms, would be the equivalent of $3.4 billion. Meanwhile, the worth of Jewish assets left behind was estimated in 2003 at over $100 billion.[55] Put differently, according to U.N. data, the total value of Palestinian assets is lower than just the minimum estimate of the confiscated assets of Iraq’s Jews (approximately £156 million). In other words, any Palestinian demand for reparations has been paid many times over although the funds went to their host Arab countries.

Conclusions

There was an effective population exchange between the Arab states and Israel, one that was tacitly recognized by leaders of the Arab states at the time. There is also a demonstrated and direct link between the de facto resettlement of the Palestinian refugees and the confiscation of their property by Israel and the expulsion of the Jews from the Arab states and the confiscation of their assets by the various Arab governments.

Yet, while the displaced Jews were fully integrated into Israeli society, Arabs of Palestinian origin, including grandchildren of the actual refugees, living in relative comfort in the host countries (e.g., the 550,000 Palestinians in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States),[56] continue for the most part to list themselves as refugees and to enjoy the monetary and other benefits granted them by UNRWA.

When UNRWA was established in 1949 to ease the plight of Palestinian refugees and facilitate their reintegration into the region’s economic life, all Arab states as well as Israel supported it. The contributing nations, led by the United States, donated $200 million to develop projects in the Arab states, and it was up to UNRWA to undertake this mission and manage the money. As explained by Lex Takkenberg, the agency’s senior ethics officer, UNRWA’s mission during the 1950s was to invest money in the host countries according to the number of refugees living in their respective territories in order to facilitate resettlement. Up to the 1960s, UNRWA’s policy was one of rehabilitation for the refugees and improvement of their living conditions through investments in education and health thereby enabling them to integrate into their host countries, but from the 1960s on, the agency strayed from its policy of refugee rehabilitation and resettlement. This transformation was due to many factors including regime change in many of the Arab states, the rise of the PLO, and organizational changes inside UNRWA. [57]Ultimately, how the U.N. and UNRWA choose to privilege the descendants of Palestinian refugees while discriminating against refugees in other parts of the world is their right and the right of the donating nations to the world body.

From the point of view of the Israeli government, however, during the 1950s and 1960s, the Palestinians, as part of the “Arab nation,” were represented on the world stage and in international forums by the Arab states, which quietly but deliberately solved the Palestinian refugee issue in a de facto manner through a mutual population and asset exchange. According to UNRWA data, only a quarter of the descendants of the Palestinian refugees still live in camps, the majority of these in Lebanon.[58] The descendants of the refugees who arrived in Gaza have been resettled in the quasi-independent area governed by Hamas while the descendants of the refugees in the West Bank are settled, for the most part, in the area of the autonomous Palestinian Authority. The bulk of the Jewish refugees of Iraq, Egypt, and Syria—as well as the Maghreb and Yemen, which took in no significant number of Palestinians—were settled in the Jewish state. This in turn means that Israel has no responsibility whatsoever toward the descendants of the 1948 Palestinian refugees and no obligation to aid them other than out of purely humanitarian concerns, together with the rest of the enlightened world. Any attempt to argue otherwise stems from misplaced political considerations and the rewriting of history.[59]

[1] Efraim Karsh, “How Many Palestinian Arab Refugees Were There?” Israel Affairs, Apr. 2011, pp. 224-46. For a different estimate see the PLO’s official report submitted to the U.N.: Munazzamat at-Tahrir al-Filastiniya, Dawrat Shu’un al-Mufawadat, “Nazara ala al-Mufawadat,” Ramallah, 2009, p. 17.
[2] See, for example, the Lebanese Minister to the Secretary of State, Oct. 1, 1949, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), vol. VI; “Economic Development in the Middle East. British Plans for Social and Economic Development,” British Foreign Office, FO 371/75092, FO Minutes, Events, Dec. 21, 1949, British National Archives (Kew), p. 1416.
[3] “Palestine—Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator,” U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) res. 194 (III), New York, Dec. 11, 1948.
[4] Yafa Zilbershatz and Nimra Goren-Amitai, The Return of the Palestinian Refugees to the Territory of the State of Israel, Ruth Gavison, series ed. (Jerusalem: The Metzilah Center for Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanist Thought, 2010), pp. 38-42.
[5] Efraim Karsh, “The Palestinians and the ‘Right of Return,'” Commentary, May 2001, pp. 25-31.
[6] Report of the director, UNRWA, Sept. 28, 1951, UNGA A/1905, para. 79; Nitza Nachmias, “UNRWA Betrays Its Mission,” Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2012, pp. 27-35.
[7]Summary Record, a Meeting between the Conciliation Commission and the Relief and Works Agency,” U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Feb. 6, 1951, A/AC.25/SR.204.
[8] Ibid.; Nachmias, “UNRWA Betrays Its Mission.”
[9] Lex Takkenberg, “UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees after Sixty Years: Some Reflections,” Refugee Survey Quarterly, no. 2-3 (2009), pp. 254-5; Jacob Tovy, Al Miftan Beita, Hitgabshut Mediniyuta shel Israel Be-Sugiyat Ha-Plitim Ha-Palestinim1948-1956 (Jerusalem: Herzl Institute for the Study of Zionism and History and Ben Gurion Research Institute, 2008), pp. 90-4, 159-71.
[10] Nachmias, “UNRWA Betrays Its Mission.”
[11] Walter Eitan, Bein Israel La-Amim (Tel-Aviv: Massada, 1958), pp. 50-1, 61; Mordechai Lahav, Hamishim Shnot Ha-Plitim Ha-Palestinim 1948-1999 (Tel Aviv: Rosh Tov, 2000), pp. 432-3; Benny Morris, Ledata shel Ba’ayyat Haplitim Haplestinim 1948-1949 (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1991), p. 352.
[12] Lahav, Hamishim Shnot, pp. 431-42.
[13] Yaakov Meron, “Why Jews Fled the Arab Countries,” Middle East Quarterly, Sept. 1995, pp. 47-55.
[14] Moshe Shemesh, MehaNakba LaNaksa: Hasikhsukh Ha-Israeli-Arvi ve-Habeaya Ha-Le’umit Ha-Falestinit, Darko shel Nasser Le-Milhemet Sheshet Ha-Yamim,1957-1967 (Jerusalem: Ben Gurion Research Institute, 2004), pp. 329-67.
[15] Report of the director, UNRWA, July 1, 1956-June 30, 1957, UNGA A/3686, p. 12.
[16] “Where UNRWA Works: Jordan,” U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, New York, accessed Apr. 17, 2013.
[17] Mariam Itani and Mo’in Manna, The Suffering of the Palestinian Refugee (Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre, 2010), pp. 43-4, 52-3.
[18] Martin Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, A History of Jews in Muslim Lands (Cornwall: Yale University Press, 2010), pp. 150-4, 166-9; Dafna Zimhoni, “Memshelet Iraq ve-Haaliya Hagdola Shel Hayehudim Le-Israel,” Pe’amim, 39 (1989), pp. 66-8.
[19] Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 190-3.
[20] Ibid., pp. 221-3.
[21] Zimhoni, “Memshelet Iraq,” pp. 68-9, 70-3; Tovy, Al Miftan, pp. 207-11.
[22] From Jerusalem to Foreign Office, Feb. 14, 17, 18, 1949, British Foreign Office, PRO, FO 371/75182, E1571/93; Yaakov Meron, “The Expulsion of the Jews from the Arab States and the Palestinian Stand vis-à-vis the Jews,” State Government and International Relations, Summer 1995, p. 32; Meron, “Why Jews Fled the Arab Countries“; Tovy, Al Miftan, pp. 208-10.
[23] Tovy, Al Miftan, pp. 210-2.
[24] Ibid.; Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett from the Knesset podium, sess. 239, Mar. 19, 1951, Knesset Minutes, vol. 8, p. 1539.
[25] Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 242-5.
[26] Tovy, Al Miftan, p. 210.
[27] S. Bendor: Report on the Visit of J. McCage to Israel, Apr. 1, 1951, Documents of Israeli Foreign Policy, Israel State Archive, Jerusalem, vol. vi (1951), doc. 99; Zimhoni, “Memshelet Iraq,” pp. 97-8.
[28] British Embassy in Baghdad to Foreign Office, PRO, FO 371/82239, E1823/22, June 5, 1950.
[29] James H. Keeley, U.S. Ambassador to Syria, to the State Department, May 1, 1949, FRUS, vol. IV, pp. 965-6; Itamar Rabinovich, The Road Not Taken, Early Arab-Israel Negotiations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 62-3.
[30] Keeley to the State Department, May 1, 1949, pp. 965-6; Rabinovich, The Road Not Taken, pp. 62-72.
[31] “Annual Report of the Director,” A/3686, UNRWA, New York, June 30, 1957, p. 12.
[32] Itani and Manna, The Suffering of the Palestinian Refugee, pp. 53-4.
[33] Lahav, Hamishim Shnot, p. 479.
[34] Mohsen Mohammad Saleh, History of Palestine: A Methodical Study of the Palestinian Struggle (Cairo: Al-Falah Foundation, 2003), p. 99; Itani and Manna, The Suffering of the Palestinian Refugee, pp. 44-5.
[35] Joan Peters, From Time Immemorial, The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict over Palestine (Tel Aviv: Hakibutz Hamuahad, 2003), p. 75; Adi Schwartz, “Hurban Kehilot Artsot Arav: Hahazon Shenignaz,” Tchelet, May 11, 2011, pp. 34-5.
[36] Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 265-6; Ada Aharoni, “Ha-Hagira Ha-Kfuya shel Ha-Yehudim ve-Hashalom,” International Forum for the Literature and Culture of Peace, accessed Nov. 24, 2011.
[37] Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 303-9.
[38] Samih K. Farsoun with Christina E. Zacharia, Palestine and the Palestinians (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 137.
[39] Itani and Manna, The Suffering of the Palestinian Refugee, pp. 36, 47-8.
[40] Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 219-21; Schwartz, “Hurban,” p. 29.
[41] Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 252-4; Schwartz, “Hurban,” p. 36.
[42] Shaul Bartal, The Fedayeen Emerge: The Palestine–Israel Conflict, 1949-1956 (Bloomington: Author House, 2011) pp. 135-8; H. Byroade, the American Ambassador in Cairo to the State Department, Mar. 4, 1955. U.S. National Archive, RG 884.86/3-455.
[43] Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 251-64.
[44] Elihu Birnbaum, Yehudi Olami (Jerusalem: Makor Reshon, 2010), pp. 268-79.
[45] Alex Sholem, “Come Home: Gaddafi’s Son Invites Libyan Jews to Return,” The Jewish News, Apr. 16, 2004.
[46] Natan A. Shuraki, Korot Ha-Yehudim Betsfon Africa (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975), pp. 246-7; Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 178-97, 271-4, 283-5.
[47] Aharoni, “Ha-Hagira Ha-Kfuya“; Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 278-80.
[48] Yocheved Weintraub, ed., Irgunei Ha-Mehablim (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, Feb. 1974), pp. 58-9.
[49] Hans Lebrecht, Ha-Palestinaim – Avar Ve-Hoveh (Tel-Aviv: University Publishers, 1987), pp. 188-9.
[50] “The Unification Conference,” The Active Committee of the Israeli Communist Party (MAK’I), Haifa, Oct. 22-23, 1948, pp. 24, 36-7; Lebrecht, Ha-Palestinim, p. 189.
[51] Tovy, Al Miftan, pp. 211-6; Lahav, Hamishim Shnot, pp. 441-2.
[52] Tovy, Al Miftan, p. 79; Don Peretz, Israel and the Palestine Arabs (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1958), p. 143.
[53] Suhad Bishara, “Mi-Biza Le-Biza: Israel ve-Rekush Ha-Plitim Ha-Palestinim,” Adalah’s Electronic Monthly, Sept. 2009.
[54]Geneva Accord: A Model Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement,” para. 73, accessed Apr. 19, 2013.
[55] Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, p. 329.
[56] Itani and Manna, The Suffering of the Palestinian Refugee, pp. 36-7.
[57] U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) res. 513, Jan. 26, 1952; UNGA res. 614, Nov. 6, 1952; report of the director, UNRWA, UNGA res. 720, Nov. 27, 1953; Lahav, Hamishim Shnot, pp. 464-9; Zilbershatz and Goren-Amitai, The Return of the Palestinian Refugees, pp. 27-31; Takkenberg, “UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees,” pp. 253-9.
[58]Statistics,” UNRWA, New York, accessed Apr. 19, 2013.
[59] See, for example, Yehuda Shinhav, “Was There a Transfer of Arabian Jews? The Iraqi Jew and National Accounting,” Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), Apr. 10, 1998.

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Syrian Kurds between Washington, Turkey and Damascus

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The recent turmoil over Idlib has pushed the developments in Syrian Kurdistan out of political and mass media spotlight. However, it’s Idlib that will most likely host the final act of the drama, which has become known as the “civil war in Syria”.

The self-proclaimed Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (DFNS), or Rojava, was formed in 2016, although de facto it has existed since 2012. Added later was the hydrocarbon-rich left bank of the Euphrates, which had been cleared of militants of ISIL (an organization banned in the Russian Federation), and now the jurisdiction of the unrecognized DFNS extends to almost a third of the country’s territory.

From the very start the main threat to the existence of this predominantly Kurdish quasi-state came for obvious reasons from Turkey, where Turkish Kurds were set on securing autonomy. In addition, the most influential political force in Rojava, the Democratic Union Party, is affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, and the latter has officially been declared a terrorist organization and unofficially – a number one enemy – in Turkey.

In January-March 2018, the Turkish army, backed by the Arab and Turkomanen allies, occupied part of the territory of Rojava (canton Afrin). And it looks like Ankara plans to settle on these territories: recently, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated that Afrin will be transferred to its residents “when the time comes” and that “this time will be set by us”. In the meantime, according to local media reports, the demographic situation in the canton is changing rapidly. Taking advantage of the fact that many Kurds left their homes at the approach of the Turkish army, the local (in fact, Turkish) administration is bringing in Arabs here, who, in many cases, are not Syrian Arabs.

Kurdish politicians, fully aware of the fact that amid Turkey, Iran and Syria maintaining statehood without outside assistance is hardly possible, opted for the patronage of Washington. And, as it seems, they lost.

In Syria, the Americans decided to replay the “Kosovo scenario”, by turning part of a sovereign state into a political structure, which is allied to them. Washington, which only recently excluded the People’s Protection Units (the armed wing of the Democratic Forces), from the list of terrorist organizations, argues, like Ankara, that its military personnel will remain in the region “for an indefinite period” to protect Kurdish territories from “aggression” on the part of Damascus. And from Ankara’s ambitions as well. But this is read between the lines.

All this enabled Turkey to accuse the United States of supporting terrorism and relations between the two countries quickly deteriorated into a crisis. As mutual accusations, occasionally supported by political and economic demarches, persist, the parties, however, are beginning to look for common ground. Talks on June 4, 2018 in Washington between Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo resulted in a “road map” for the withdrawal of Kurdish forces from predominantly Arab Manbij, which Kurds regained control of from ISIL (an organization banned in Russia) two years ago. The next day, the Turkish minister announced that the Kurdish troops “… would retreat east of the Euphrates. However, this does not mean that we will agree that they stay there. ” On September 24, 2018, upon arriving at the UN General Assembly, Erdogan confirmed: Turkey will expand its sphere of influence in Syria, by including areas that are under control of the Kurdish armed units.

If Turkey does not change its rhetoric, then the assurances of the American authorities that the US troops will remain in Syria are intermingled with statements about the need for the withdrawal of its forces from this country. In any case, it is unlikely that the United States will choose to leave the region “to its own devices”. We can recall how Washington trumpeted the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan! But things haven’t budged an inch since then. The Afghanistan example demonstrates that the Americans will not move out of Syria that easily – they will not pull out in full, at least not of their own free will. US instructors and pilots will remain here “for an indefinite period.” But who will they care of and support? Here are the options:

Firstly, it could be a hypothetical “Arab NATO” with Saudi Arabia in the lead. But there are serious doubts as to the effectiveness of such a structure – even if we forget about the level of combat readiness of these kinds of coalitions (in Yemen, for example), Arab countries could unite only on an anti-Israeli platform. And that, as history shows, is unlikely to yield success. In addition to this, it is still unclear how Kurds, the majority of whom are not religious, will react to Wahhabi commanders.

Secondly, the United States could choose to strengthen the Arab sector of the “Syrian Democratic Forces” (Rojava militia) at the expense of the Kurds. In mid-September, a number of media outlets, citing sources in the Syrian opposition, reported that Saudi emissaries had already suggested this option while meeting with leaders of the Arab tribes living east of the Euphrates. However, this development is also fraught with the Kurdish-Arab confrontation.

Thirdly, Washington persists in its attempts to improve relations with Turkey,  distancing it from Russia and Iran, and instruct it to “maintain order” in the region: the Americans did not intervene in the Operation Olive Branch and made concessions on Manbij. Even though this might seem strange amid the hostile American-Turkish rhetoric, military and political contacts between Washington and Ankara have been on the rise in recent months. Moreover, President Erdogan has already stated that he believes in an early improvement of relations with the United States despite the “inconsistency” and “economic aggression” of Washington.

Meanwhile, we need to remember that the US control over Kurds is far from unlimited. The “people’s protection units” are ideologically close to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (or could even be seen as its “branch” in Syria), and the PKK itself, grown on the Marxist ideas, would normally support the Soviet Union and “by inertia” – Russia. For this reason, the Americans have to threaten the Kurdish allies with a cessation of military and financial support. Reports say the US and Turkish troops are already operating in the Manbij area, having dislodged the Kurdish YPG militia from the area.

These threats, along with the self-withdrawal of the United States during the capture of Afrin by Turkish troops, have made Kurds doubt the reliability of their patron. The result is a move towards rapprochement with Damascus. In late July, the Kurdish leadership announced an agreement with the Syrian authorities on the creation of a “road map” for the formation of a decentralized Syria.

The Americans are not sitting idle either, though it looks like they have no concrete plan of action. Such a conclusion comes from Donald Trump’s somewhat incoherent answers to questions from a correspondent of the Kurdish media group Rudaw (09/27/2018):

Question: What are you planning to do for (Syrian – AI) Kurds?

Answer: We will offer them a lot of help. As you know, we are good friends to them, we fought shoulder to shoulder with ISIL (an organization banned in the Russian Federation), we recently defeated ISIL (an organization banned in the Russian Federation). We accomplished this with the support of the Kurds. They are great warriors. You know, some nations are great warriors, and some are not. The Kurds are great warriors, they are a wonderful people. We are currently negotiating this.

Question: So what will you do to support them?

Answer: As I said, we will negotiate this, we have begun negotiations. The Kurds have helped us a lot to crush ISIS (an organization banned in the Russian Federation).

Most likely, the hot phase of the protracted inter-Syrian conflict is nearing its end, and the preferences of the Kurds will determine the outcome of future elections, a referendum, or another form of will expression of the Syrian people, when the political situation allows it. Moscow has always called for involving Kurds in the negotiation process and on ensuring their full participation in the life of post-war Syria. “Russia insists that Kurds should participate in the process to determine the post-conflict future of Syria on a parity basis with other ethnic and religious groups of this country,” Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in an interview with the Italian magazine Panorama.

Until recently, Damascus did not particularly pedal negotiations with Rojava, but being aware that the capture of Afrin by Turkish troops was not in its interests, it has adjusted its approach to the self-proclaimed territorial entity. It looks like Syrian leaders have opted for softening their stance, which was previously set on the revival of the country on the basis of unitarism. Otherwise, an agreement with the Kurds will be nowhere in sight.

First published in our partner International Affairs

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Jamal Khashoggi rejiggers the Middle East at potentially horrible cost

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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The fate of missing Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, assuming that his disappearance was the work of Saudi security and military officials, threatens to upend the fundaments of fault lines in the Middle East.

At stake is not only the fate of a widely respected journalist and the future of Turkish-Saudi relations.

Mr. Khashoggi’s fate, whether he was kidnapped by Saudi agents during a visit to the kingdom’s consulate in Istanbul to obtain proof of his divorce or murdered on its premises, threatens to severely disrupt the US-Saudi alliance that underwrites much of the Middle East’s fault lines.

A US investigation into Mr. Khashoggi’s fate mandated by members of the US Congress and an expected meeting between President Donald J. Trump, and the journalist’s Turkish fiancée, Hatice Cengiz, could result in a US and European embargo on arms sales to Saudi Arabia and impact the kingdom’s brutal proxy war with Iran in Yemen.

It also would project Saudi Arabia as a rogue state and call into question US and Saudi allegations that Iran is the Middle East’s main state supporter of terrorism.

The allegations formed a key reason for the United States’ withdrawal with Saudi, United Arab Emirates and Israeli backing from the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program and the re-imposition of crippling economic sanctions.

They also would undermine Saudi and UAE justification of their 15-month old economic and diplomatic boycott of Qatar that the two Gulf states, alongside Egypt and Bahrain, accuse of supporting terrorism.

Condemnation and sanctioning of Saudi Arabia by the international community would complicate Chinese and Russian efforts to walk a fine line in their attempts to ensure that they are not sucked into the Saudi-Iranian rivalry.

Russia and China would be at a crossroads if Saudi Arabia were proven to be responsible for Mr. Khashoggi’s disappearance and the issue of sanctions would be brought to the United Nations Security Council.

Both Russia and China have so far been able to maintain close ties to Saudi Arabia despite their efforts to defeat US sanctions against Iran and Russia’s alliance with the Islamic republic in their support for Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.

A significantly weakened Saudi Arabia would furthermore undermine Arab cover provided by the kingdom for Mr. Trump’s efforts to impose a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that would favour Israel at the expense of the Palestinians.

Finally, a conclusive determination that Saudi Arabia was responsible for Mr. Khashoggi’s fate would likely spark renewed debate about the wisdom of the international community’s support for Arab autocracy that has proven to be unashamedly brutal in its violation of human rights and disregard for international law and conventions.

Meanwhile, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has suffered significant reputational damage irrespective of Mr. Khashoggi’s fate, raising the question of his viability if Saudi Arabia were condemned internationally and stability in the kingdom, a key tenant of US, Chinese and Russian Middle East policy, were to be at risk.

The reputational damage suffered by Prince Mohammed embarrasses UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, who together with his aides and representatives in world capitals, worked hard to project his Saudi counterpart as the kingdom’s future.

Saudi Arabia has so far done itself few favours by flatly rejecting any responsibility for Mr. Khashoggi’s disappearance with no evidence that the journalist left the consulate at his own volition; asserting that claims that it was involved were fabrications by Turkey, Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood; seeking to defame Mr. Khashoggi’s fiancé and supporters; and refusing to fully cooperate with Turkish investigators.

Saudi reluctance to cooperate as well as the US investigation and Ms. Cengiz’s expected meeting with Mr. Trump complicate apparent Turkish efforts to find a resolution of the escalating crisis that would allow Saudi Arabia to save face and salvage Turkey’s economic relationship with the kingdom.

Turkey, despite deep policy differences with Saudi Arabia over Qatar, Iran, and the Muslim Brotherhood, has so far refrained from statements that go beyond demanding that Saudi Arabia prove its assertion that Mr. Khashoggi left the Istanbul consulate at his own volition and fully cooperate with the Turkish investigation.

Reports by anonymous Turkish officials detailing gruesome details of Mr. Khashoggi’s alleged murder by Saudi agents appear designed to pressure Saudi Arabia to comply with the Turkish demands and efforts to manage the crisis.

Widely acclaimed, Mr. Khashoggi’s fate, irrespective of whether he as yet emerges alive or is proven to have been brutally murdered, is reshaping the political map of the Middle East. The possibility, if not likelihood is that he paid a horrendous price for sparking the earthquake that is already rumbling across the region.

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A letter to the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Sajad Abedi

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The path to development and development of today and tomorrow is a model of putting the ideology of meritocracy on the basis of the use of professional youth, committed and teaching them better for tomorrow. The best way to rule is to interact between two generations, experienced and experienced managers with ages, and young, energetic and energetic managers. The sum of these two options will undoubtedly bring the crisis to a rapid pace for our beloved homeland, provided that these professionals do not turn into pesky wolves and deceiving foxes over time, and the rulers in the appointment and election offer God It is known to look at the people and the country, not on camaraderie and yesterday’s contests!

Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei

I remember that during the third prayer of Ramadan on September 20, 2009, by explaining the political journey of the martyrs of Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib (PBUH), you considered the political behavior of Imam Khomeini in accordance with the conduct of the Emir of Amman, and emphasized: one of the features of the politics of Imam Ali al-Islam was to avoid deceit, while in secular systems and attitudes based on the separation of religion and politics, there is no problem using any method, including wickedness and deceit.

You added: In the political school of the Imam Ali, there is no resort to oppression and lies to succeed, and Ali Salam seriously urged people not to speak with him flatteringly. Tolerance with the opposition and even the enemies as much as possible was another characteristic of the political conduct of the Imam Ali that you paid for it.

You pointed out in this regard: the Prophet, in so far as possible, was treated with tolerance and good behavior with the opponents and opponents, but if they did not end up with them, they stood firmly against them.

You have included the expression of reasoning and reasoning against enemies and opponents as another characteristic of the political conduct of Amir al-Momenin, Ali (peace be upon him), adding: His behavior was not the same with all individuals and opposing movements, and among those who, despite the purpose of the right, From ignorance and guiltiness, they went astray and mistakenly, differed from those who were in the wrong way from the beginning, while the Prophet Mohammad stood firmly against diversion and appealing to religious appearances.

You considered politics of ethics and spirituality to be the cause of the people and the society, and added: otherwise, politics will be a means of gaining power, wealth, and the advancement of worldly affairs, and will become a perversion for society and even politicians.

At the beginning of the second sermon of prayer in the words of the main audience of political movements and personalities, “the former and present officials of the country”, they examined the splits that have been created in the last 30 years in the genuine process of people and revolution.

You saw the reason for some of these splits as “the fundamentals and beliefs”, and added that some of the splits and differences were actually in the interests of others, but some were disagreements over how the principles were implemented, which should be treated differently with each other. .

By pointing out the encounters of Imam Khomeini with the splits and differences, you pointed out that the Imam used to treat them differently in the light of the political conduct of the Amir al-Mu’minin, “in proportion to the nature and essence of the political and the branching movements.” With the reference to the revolutionary and religious backgrounds of the branching process, you pointed out: the nature of some of these differences was a different view of the principles of the implementation of the principles, but some with fundamental differences or conflicts over the interests brought about the conflict with Imam and the Revolution And tried to penetrate the wrong principles as deadly in the soul and body of the system, when Imam, when he felt this danger, withdrew tolerance and resolved with them.

You, in contrast to the differences in the foundations, have a stake in the interests of society and added that the existence of individuals and streams of critics and possessing different perspectives is in the best interest of the country, provided that this difference of sentiment in the framework of the principles of “Islam, the constitution And the Imam’s will and wisdom, “not the issues that make the name of it, but in fact, are alien to the principles and principles of the revolution.

You pointed out that, unlike some propaganda, if one or the other has dissenting opinions and dissent, the system does not work with him, but if a stream of conflicts and knocking on the sword is carried out, as it is tolerated anywhere in the world In Iran, the system will be resolved in self-defense.

You declared the maximum attraction and the minimum elimination of the policy of the system towards the various currents of the country, adding that the system does not cope with the current as far as it does not have to; therefore, if no one moves to pursue violence, it does not try to undermine the security and comfort of the community, with The foundations of the system do not conflict and do not seek to lie and rumor, they are free to act and express their beliefs, and nobody will work with him.

You called for negligence against small landslides and deviations, which led to great deviations and ultimate fall, and pointed out the Qur’an verses: slippers gradually degrade people from inside, and this corruption, deviation in practice, and sometimes deviation in consequently, everyone should be careful about each other, including our family members, while respecting piety.

In this context, you advised the people to preach and advise the authorities, and added: people advise the authorities on various means and methods so that they will not slip, because the slippage of the authorities is more dangerous for the regime, the country and the people.

You called the Islamic system, like a person, as being at risk of slipping and corruption, and added: If you are not careful, the name and appearance of the Islamic Republic may persist, but the attitude and behavior, and the system’s agenda, will be non-Islamic. You move the society and the country towards justice, religious behavior and ethics, intellectual and scientific development in the free space, and a strong stand against “enemies and the front of international oppression”, including signs of the health and the system of corruption and You know the disease.

You added: people are awake and they know that if the path to society and the system is different, and issues such as the massive gap of the class, the use of freedom for corruption and prostitution, and the feeling of weakness and retreat from global bullying, is created, this sign of the disease of the system Is Islamic.

My Leader, 9 years of your talk in Friday prayers in September 2009, and the youth of this border are looking to change their situation according to your demands. I talk to a father who has always been a youth advocate and asked young people to stay and build Iran.

Dear Leader, Find out that by observing recent appointments and sentences for senior executives, it seems that the use of tools by young people and the use of slogans from their ability to attract accompaniment and synchronization on special occasions has become the current trend in the country. , A process that represents a disaster management in the Islamic Republic. By observing such an average age of the country’s directors and officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the hypothesis is that, after about 40 years of the Islamic Revolution, this system has failed or did not want to educate managers who deserve to have large managerial positions. And so they should continue to use the early young revolutionary leaders who were trained during the pre-revolutionary period. Is such a hypothesis close to reality?

It has been repeatedly experienced when the term “election” or “director” is subject to the election or appointment or the time of speech and presentation. The term “youth” and “youth capacity” is heard from the mouths of people repeatedly and is supposed to It is used so much from the capacity of young people in the country and large administrations that they may raise some concerns about the experience of experienced managers with a background and worry about neglecting the experience of experienced managers, but when the time runs out and everyone waits for young people to enter the management arena And society is hoping for a new atmosphere that will be full of vitality Occasionally, they are the same age-old administrators, who have no new initiative to advance their affairs in their programs, and they are once again called on to promise that they will be used on the mouths of critics and critics, saying they will use middle-class youth Will be, and some will not turn into reality in reality.

Everywhere in the world, especially advanced economies and advanced countries, young people work and give advice to old people, but in Iran it is a reverse! Old men want to work until the 90th minute, and even despite their retirement and salary, they still have jobs and jobs in the third and fourth and even more!

Dear my leader, my question is: Should not these Iranian oppressed youths be crying?

Training future strategists and jihad! Young advisers! Young Parliament! One of the cultural jokes of Iranian management is the use of such titles and phrases that are everything for the young, except water and bread! I emphasize everything is but bread and water! What does this look to the young people who are today in Iran? Yes! Young people are working and they are ashamed of their families, that is: Let’s sit back and do nothing about management, economic and social activity.

At the time of the imposed war, which you yourself were at the front, how did you trust the youth there, but today is not trusted? Because there was no payment and no money, the youth of the god was unwanted worthless? The country does not go the right way. One of the main reasons is the lack of youthfulness in the real sense of the body of management and implementation.

The actual body does not mean meeting and association in the name of “sympathy”, “idea”, “participation”, and so on, but it means the creation of expert and thought-provoking youth at all levels. The country’s management system is faced with a false crisis, the false crisis means that in spite of our abilities and potential, we have problems and some insist on continuing these problems. One of the great potentials of Iran, which has become a weak point and is in its place a source of unfortunate controversy, is our young force and our management and economic elites, some of which are neither in the media nor in the office or position.

My dear leader, my question is that apart from the good ages and genes of the country, how many young people do we have to have responsibility in the country? Unless in this imposed war, young people stood in front of the whole world in combatants and commander-in-chief? So why not trust these young people now? Should young people in Islamic and Iranian management have a special place and of course a particular gene so that they can present themselves? For this, officials and decision-makers should have a proper priority, and if they are not able to prioritize it, they will give the status to specialized people. What we have to do with the young, we need a detailed discussion, but do not rely more and more on the wrong approach.

Sir, I know that you know that young people should be educated for the present and future of the community, who work as leaders and thinkers in the community and politics, rather than those born from one generation to the next, and nothing more than a shame for the system The Islamic Republic of Iran does not have and will not. It should be noted that educated young people pursue the goals and ideals of the Iranian democratic system and beliefs with regard to all the nuances and considerations of Iranian-Islamic society culture on the one hand and the change of generations, the global perspective of threats and international threats, internal harm and so on, on the other hand, To advance. In the contemporary world more than any other time, the survival and survival of organizations and departments depends on the system of meritocracy and the transfer of work to the apprentice. The lack of qualified, expert and elite individuals is an opportunity and the use of seigneur is inadequate to burn the country. It should be noted that the failure to use the elite will lead to the disappearance of political and managerial systems. Competency-based management is a coherent and coherent approach to managing long-term human capital, based on a common set of competencies that are relevant to the macro strategies of the country. It was precisely in this regard that the establishment of a system of merit as one of the major and strategic policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran vision document in the country has been emphasized. In a meritorious system, there should be no appointments based on the financial strength of a person or a social position (the good gene) that has come across the country. In affluent societies, the attitudes of kinship, tribalism, party, and secularism are abandoned. It should be noted that meritocracy, not a government, but an ideology.

My leader, the current state of the country after 1396, the meritocracy has been lost. But what is the purpose of the system of meritocracy? Is not there a better goal than ensuring the future of the country? The best way to ensure the future of the country is to use the right youth in various responsibilities. There is no doubt about the merits of many officials and appointments in government. But the presence of these people in this age group may be favorable for the country, but what will happen next?

The path to development and development of today and tomorrow is a model of putting the ideology of meritocracy on the basis of the use of professional youth, committed and teaching them better for tomorrow. The best way to rule is to interact between two generations, experienced and experienced managers with ages, and young, energetic and energetic managers. The sum of these two options will undoubtedly bring the crisis to a rapid pace for our beloved homeland, provided that these professionals do not turn into pesky wolves and deceiving foxes over time, and the rulers in the appointment and election offer God It is known to look at the people and the country, not on camaraderie and yesterday’s contests!

Thank you very much

SAJAD ABEDI

October 8, 2018

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