During the 1948 war, some 600,000 Palestinian Arabs fled their homes to the neighboring Arab states or to parts of mandatory Palestine occupied by Arab states (the West Bank and Gaza)
. Likewise, within a few years after the establishment of the State of Israel, nearly all of the 850,000-strong Jewish population living in Arab states was either expelled or escaped with just their lives. Most made their way to Israel where they were resettled.
While these latter facts may not be that well known, neither are they completely unfamiliar to students of the Middle East. What is less acknowledged, however, is the de facto agreement of Arab states to resettle Palestinian refugees in their respective territories, expressed in closed-door discussions at cease-fire committee meetings and other gatherings with Israeli representatives. Whether the Arab states properly represented the refugees or treated them and their descendants fairly is a matter for the Palestinians and their Arab brothers to adjudicate on their own.
Population Exchange of the 1948 War
On December 11, 1948, the U.N. General Assembly adopted resolution (3)194 whose paragraph 11 dealt with the problem of the war refugees:
The General Assembly. … Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practical date and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss or damage to property … [and] Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees.
As a General Assembly resolution, the U.N. decision was in no way a binding recommendation. Nonetheless, it put forward the notions that Arab (and Jewish) refugees (a) should be allowed to return to their country of origin within the framework of a comprehensive peace if they could be construed as peaceable; (b) or they could receive reparations for damage to or loss of their property if they decided not to return; and (c) resettlement was a no less reasonable option.
While the Arab states vehemently opposed resolution 194 and voted unanimously against it (only in the late 1960s did they begin to transform the resolution into the linchpin of their claim to a “right of return”), they did not shirk from quietly entertaining the feasibility of resettling the Palestinian refugees in their territories. Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt all recommended the resettling of the Palestinian refugees within their borders. Most of these states also demanded economic aid from Western powers as payback for agreeing to the option. But their agreement was kept quiet since they did not see eye-to-eye on this matter with both the Palestinians and their own populations.
At the 1949 Lausanne Conference convened by the U.N. Conciliation Commission, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon appeared as one bloc to discuss an agreement that also included a solution to the refugee problem. While they had previously rejected resolution 194, they now demanded that any deal had to be resolved on that basis. They also told the U.N. Conciliation Commission that they, the Arab states, represented the Palestinian refugees. Three delegations of refugees that tried to reach the conference were treated with contempt by their Arab brethren and denied access to the discussions. When they asked for an interview with the Egyptian delegation, they were unceremoniously removed by force. At a later September 1951 Conciliation Commission conference in Paris, only delegations from the Arab states were asked to represent the refugees.
A critical aspect of these discussions and one that has been largely forgotten since that time was that recommendations and attempts at resettling the Palestinian Arabs also focused on issues of compensation to the Arab states for the expenses incurred in the absorption of their brethren. Alongside infusions of cash from Western sources, Arab governments viewed with equanimity the confiscation of Jewish property to help offset costs, property that was coming into their hands as a result of a massive population transfer out of their borders occurring at the same time.
Many Jewish communities in the Arab states predated the Muslim conquest of the Middle East by hundreds of years. Many of their members had grown prosperous, served in their host nations’ law courts, military, and where such existed, parliaments and considered themselves full-fledged citizens. Many more eked out a livelihood as best they could, aware of a precarious situation in which today’s good Muslim neighbor might turn out to be tomorrow’s oppressor. Whatever their material circumstances, within a few years of the establishment of the State of Israel, the bulk of this population was forced out of their homes, leaving behind the vast majority of their possessions.
Contemporary Palestinian spokesmen and advocates are largely silent about the effective population exchange carried out at that time. While they may argue that the Arab states were not empowered to represent them or claim (falsely) that Jews who emigrated did so because of Zionist manipulation rather than persecution and harassment, the fact is that part of the stipulations of U.N. resolution 194 were actualized in that compensation for relocation was obtained—albeit through the forcible divestment of Jewish citizenry—and resettlement occurred. Whether that compensation went to the proper recipients or whether resettlement was done in a half-hearted fashion, the international community, alongside the Arab governments, put in place practicable, if not perfect, solutions. A closer look at that population exchange and the accompanying transfer of billions of dollars’ worth of Jewish property and holdings to the Palestinian refugees is in order.
At the time, both Jordan and Iraq were constitutional monarchies ruled by members of the Hashemite family. Their approaches to the refugee and resettlement problem differed markedly, largely due to geographical and ethnic factors as well as the absence of a Jewish community in Jordan versus the well-established one of Iraq.
It must be remembered that up to 1974, Jordan considered itself the representative of Palestinian rights since most of its citizens (approximately 60-70 percent) were of Palestinian origin. This perception was formalized in a 1962 Jordanian white paper by Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal that explicitly designated Jordan as Palestine and as the representative of the Palestinians in its territory. Amman maintained this position even after the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 and the 1967 Six-Day War. It was only in 1974, after the Arab League recognized the PLO as the “sole representative of the Palestinian people,” that Jordan grudgingly changed its position for the first time due to the political pressures.
Jordan’s founder, emir-turned-king Abdullah (r.1921-51) was the architect of the policy to assimilate Palestinian refugees into his kingdom. In June 1950, there were 506,200 Palestinian refugees listed by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 55 percent of the total of registered UNRWA refugees. Refugees were settled on both banks of the Jordan River. Abdullah’s policy included the granting of full citizenship to the refugees in order to absorb them into his kingdom. The warm welcome they received there impelled additional refugees from Gaza and other Arab countries to come to Jordan and receive suitable living quarters and citizenship.
The majority of refugees and their descendants listed with UNRWA currently live in Jordan. According to the agency, only 350,899 Palestinian refugees live in ten official camps out of the 2,034,061 registered refugees, including the 140,000 registered refugees arriving in Jordan from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip after 1967. This is in addition to the million-and-a-half Palestinians not listed as refugees who are full-fledged Jordanian citizens (out of a total population of 6,508,271 million people).
In fact, about 95 percent of all Palestinians residing in Jordan hold Jordanian citizenship and enjoy its benefits. The exception is the approximately 100,000 refugees from the Gaza Strip who settled in Jordan over the years. The members of this small group hold temporary Jordanian passports but do not qualify for full rights like the others, notably the right to hold a government job. Since 1948, quite a few politicians of Palestinian origin such as Tawfik Abul Huda, Anwar Nusseibeh, Hussein Fakhri Khalidi, Ahmad Tuqan, Kassim Rimawi, among others, have risen to high office in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, including cabinet posts and even the premiership.
The situation in neighboring Iraq was quite different. Though nominally ruled by the Hashemite king, Faisal III, real power was held by Western interests and off-and-on during the 1940s and 1950s by Prime Minister Nuri Said. Iraq also had a large and flourishing Jewish population reaching back to biblical times, which had long been active in Iraqi affairs, including commerce, culture, and in the modern period, the Iraqi parliament.
Despite this, a pogrom in June 1941—the farhud—took place, which changed the entire trajectory of Jewish life in Mesopotamia and which laid the groundwork for the population and wealth transfer plans of the 1950s. Led by a pro-Nazi Iraqi prime minister, Rashid Ali Kaylani, and the exiled Jerusalem mufti Hajj Amin Husseini, the pogrom lasted for three days. Some 190 Jews were murdered, hundreds of Jewish women were raped, and at least 2,000 people were wounded. Jewish homes and Jewish-owned stores were ransacked and destroyed. The farhud was a marker that foretold the end of the ancient Jewish community in Iraq.
While some Iraqi Jews cautiously tried to rebuild their lives, evidence began to mount that they were no longer welcome in their millennial home. During the 1948 war, Iraqis began to take measures against “the enemy within.” In the first days of the war, more than 300 Jews were arrested for having “given support to Israel.” Shafiq Ades, one of the richest members of the Jewish Baghdad community, who had sat with government ministers, represented the Jewish community at court, and who had contributed greatly to Iraq’s economy was accused of Zionism and communism and publicly hanged. All of his assets, estimated at many millions, were confiscated for the benefit of the Defense Ministry. Nor was this an isolated incident: The Jews of Iraq understood clearly that they would be forced to abandon their property if they wished to escape with their lives.
Although he opposed the pro-Nazi leaders who had come to power in Iraq during World War II, Nuri Said was chiefly responsible for the final expulsion of Iraqi Jews and for the confiscation of their property. During the months of May-July 1949, he turned to the U.S. and British representatives in Baghdad with the recommendation that there be a population exchange between the Jewish citizens of his country and the Palestinian refugees. Though the idea was raised, in part, following a British recommendation to resettle the refugees in the fertile river valleys of Iraq, London strenuously objected to Said’s plan arguing that this type of agreement would be an inequitable exchange of educated and often prosperous Jews for a population of uneducated refugees with no professional skills.
On October 14, 1949, Said continued with his attempts to convince the Conciliation Commission that only states that had Jews to expel should resettle the Palestinian refugees. At the same time, an opinion survey was carried out in Iraq regarding a population exchange between Palestinian refugees and Iraqi Jews. This proposal was rejected by Israel’s foreign minister, Moshe Sharett, who declared that Israel could not agree to the confiscation of the vast properties of the Iraqi Jews.
In March 1950, as masses of Iraqi Jews desperately tried to leave the country, Baghdad passed the “Revocation of Citizenship Bill” allowing Jews to leave if they surrendered their citizenship. Tens of thousands departed as soon as they could despite the Israeli government’s difficulty in absorbing them. A year later, the Iraqi parliament passed a law confiscating all properties belonging to Jews who moved, or wished to move, to Israel and who had thus relinquished their Iraqi citizenship, placing the assets under a governmental guardianship department. The seized amount has been estimated at around $243 million (about $6 billion in today’s terms) at the very minimum. Said claimed this was retribution for the confiscation of Palestinian assets by the Zionists.
After the law’s ratification, the British asked Said to absorb at least some Palestinian refugees; the prime minister replied that he was ready to absorb a limited number of refugees but not hundreds of thousands. In the end, Iraq took in only 4,000 Palestinian refugees convoyed in trucks by the Iraqi army, a number “balanced” at that time by the departure of over 130,000 legal (and clandestine) Jewish refugees. UNRWA was not allowed to operate in Iraq; instead, Baghdad established its own refugee division to care for the Palestinians’ needs. Whether any of the confiscated Jewish assets made their way into the hands of the resettled Palestinian refugees remains to be answered.
Syria, Egypt, and the Maghreb
Neighboring and sparsely populated Syria was an ideal country for the mass resettlement of Palestinian refugees. In fact, before 1920, many Syrians and Palestinians considered themselves to be part of one nation—Greater Syria—while what became the British Mandate of Palestine was termed Southern Syria.
In April 1949, Prime Minister Husni Za’im signaled his readiness to sign a peace agreement with Israel in exchange for specific conditions including substantial geographic concessions. He explicitly informed U.S. representatives of Damascus’s willingness to absorb and resettle over a quarter of a million refugees in its territory—at least three times more refugees than Syria actually absorbed in 1948. At the Lausanne Conference, Za’im’s emissaries let Israel know that Syria would absorb 300,000 refugees in exchange for economic aid. In the end, these negotiations went nowhere as Za’im was overthrown in a military coup and executed a mere four and a half months after coming to power.
Even so, Palestinians were resettled in Syria, the majority coming from the 82,194 refugees registered with UNRWA in June 1950. There are ten official refugee camps in Syria today and three more unofficial ones, including the Yarmouk camp, a district of Damascus that became a desired living area. Up until the recent civil war, the Assad regime treated its Palestinians relatively fairly and allowed them to integrate into local and national politics. Since 1956, according to Syrian law 260, the 1948 Palestinian refugees are equal to Syrian citizens in the following areas: employment (including governmental jobs), vocations, and education, but are excluded from being elected and becoming members of parliament. They are allowed to participate in municipal elections like everyone else. Although they retain their Palestinian nationality, according to Palestinian sources, “These are always referred to as those who are in effect Syrians.” The Palestinians even have official status in the Syrian Baath Party and participate in its leadership. In fact, during the Lebanese civil war, many Palestinians escaped to Syria and rebuilt their homes there.
Part of the reason why Syria became an attractive destination for Palestinians is that as in Iraq, the cost of resettling refugees was offset in part by the confiscation of Jewish assets. As did Iraq, Syria had a sizeable and prosperous Jewish community; in 1943, there were at least 30,000 Jews living there. But in 1949, in the wake of Israel’s independence, the Syrian government passed a law freezing all Jewish bank accounts. The main motive behind this action, as declared by the Syrian rulers, was to provide a solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees inside its borders. The regime took the most convenient path, which was to confiscate the Jewish assets in its country, mostly houses, and pass them to Palestinian hands. This practice was institutionalized in a 1967 law stating that the “property and possessions of deceased Jews are confiscated by the government; the heirs must pay for its use. If they cannot, it will be handed over to the Palestinian Arabs.” There are no details regarding the exact number of Jewish properties received by Palestinian Arabs in Syria. Damascus’s implacable hostility to Israel resulted in worsening conditions for its Jewish community, and thus most sought to leave. The government periodically permitted Jewish emigration but only if the Jews were prepared to abandon their assets without selling them.
In 1967, after a decisive Syrian defeat in the Six-Day War, new laws were passed that increased the restrictions on the rights of Syrian Jews. All Jewish assets were confiscated. Governmental proclamations explicitly stated that Palestinian refugees were to enjoy the Jews’ property and were the actual owners of Jewish assets. Those Jews who remained in Syria were forced to pay rent on their own property; if they were unable to keep up the scheduled payments, their property was awarded to Palestinians. Finally, as the result of discussions at the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, the last remnants of the mostly destitute Jewish community in Syria were allowed to leave, most eventually making their way to Israel.
To the south lay Egypt, which had taken a decisive role in invading Israel in 1948 and thus bore its fair share of responsibility towards the resulting flood of Arab refugees. Unlike Syria, Egypt was not interested in absorbing refugees in its interior. Of the approximately 600,000 Palestinian refugees who fled during the war, approximately 82,000 went to Egyptian-held Gaza. A small portion of the refugees, mainly those who had family ties in Egypt or who offered the appropriate bribe, made it to Egypt proper; according to Palestinian figures, in the year 2008, there were 64,728 Palestinians outside of Gaza living in Egypt. Many of the refugees who reached Egypt were forced to leave in the end and were deported back to the Gaza Strip.
A magnificent and well-connected community of approximately 100,000 Jews lived by the banks of the Nile when the Israeli war of independence began. As a consequence of the fighting as well as the involvement of the Muslim Brotherhood in domestic politics, numerous actions against the Jews including riots took place. Hundreds of Jews were summarily arrested and interned. Exit visas for Jews were severely restricted. Looting and bombing became prevalent. As one eyewitness recalled:
After the war broke out [in 1948], my mother, who was in the ninth month of her pregnancy, was arrested. They wanted to butcher her. They had bayonets. They abused her and afterwards they left her. On one of the evenings, a crowd came with sticks and anything else that they could find in order to kill the family because they heard that they were Jews. The gatekeeper swore to them that we were Italians and that is why they only cursed, surrounded my parents, my brothers, and myself, who was only a tiny baby. The next day my parents fled. They left everything, a pension, work, and a home, and they left Egypt.
More than 25,000 Jews left Egypt without their assets following the 1948 war, after being attacked by Arabs mobs. But with the Free Officers Movement’s coup of July 1952, more dramatic changes were soon to follow. Nationalist sentiment against Westerners had already resulted in rioting against the “foreign” Jews, and in the same week that the Egyptian revolution broke out, further attacks took place. Jewish stores were robbed, and Jewish property looted and burned.
In the immediate aftermath of the officers’ coup, there was an attempt by the Egyptian government to allay the Jewish community’s fears, including the return of property seized after the 1948 war. At the same time, under the framework of the 1954 “Alpha Plan,” Washington and London attempted a Palestinian refugee resettlement program in the Sinai Peninsula, but this process was scuttled due to an escalation in Egyptian-Israeli tensions.
In 1954, the exposure of an Israeli spy ring in Egypt that had recruited Egyptian Jews (the so-called Lavon affair) exacerbated ill-feelings. The escalation of the conflict with Israel led Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser to take a number of steps against the Jews in his country, including another roundup of suspected “Zionists.” The nationalization of the Suez Canal, which in turn resulted in the Sinai campaign of October 1956, marked the beginning of the end of the ancient Jewish community in Egypt. On November 22, 1956, all Egyptian Jews were defined as Zionists and labeled enemy citizens. The massive expulsion of Egyptian Jewry began with the total confiscation of Jewish wealth. Some of these assets were given to the Palestinian refugees who were living in Cairo, and the rest went into the Egyptian state treasury. For example, the house of Charles Victor Castro, an exclusive home in an expensive Cairo suburb, became the official residence of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. None apparently went to the Palestinians housed by Egypt in the Gaza Strip; instead Cairo chose to rely on aid from UNRWA. Conditions worsened for the remnants of Egypt’s Jewish community before and after the Six-Day War, and today, there is no longer any active Jewish community in Egypt. Only a few solitary Jews, most of them women, and a few deserted synagogues remain from the magnificent communities of Cairo and Alexandria.
While the majority of Palestinian refugees did not, for the most part, migrate to the North African countries, these states used the fate of the refugees and the 1948 war to make the lives of their Jewish populations—some of which dated to biblical times—unbearable until they were expelled from their countries or felt compelled to leave.
Having endured a horrible pogrom in the Libyan capital of Tripoli in June 1948, most of the 38,000-strong Jewish community fled the country with 90 percent of them settling in Israel. In 2004, Mu’ammar Qaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, declared that all the exiled Jews could return to Libya and receive reparations based on their former assets though their homes would remain in the hands of Palestinian refugees residing in the country. Likewise, Tunisian Jewry dwindled from some 105,000 people in 1948 to a mere 1,500 by 2010 with 15,000 escaping to Israel during the 1948 war and in its immediate wake, and the rest following suit after Tunisian independence in 1956. A similar pattern occurred in Algeria, whose 117,000-strong Jewish community fled in 1962 while in Morocco—where some 270,000 people lived in the largest Jewish community in the Muslim world—secret negotiations between Israel and the royal court, and a $10 million “gift” to the king, produced a royal permit for the Jews to leave—albeit without taking their belongings or selling their properties and businesses. By 1976, only 17,000 Jews remained in the country.
Resettlement and Recompense
Little notice has been paid to the fate of the 850,000 Jewish refugees from the Arab states, about 550,000 of whom were resettled in Israel. Similarly, the resettlement of most of the Palestinian refugees in the host Arab countries, creating a de facto population exchange, has been overlooked.
To be sure, unlike the international community, the Arab states were quite aware of this reality, as was the PLO leadership. On November 9, 1973, the Voice of Palestine broadcast the PLO’s “Plan for Peace.” According to this arrangement, all of the countries of the world including the Arab states should immediately and publicly allow the “Zionist immigrants” to Israel to return to their countries of origin where they would enjoy the same rights and responsibilities that were theirs previously before they were coerced into emigrating due to Zionist propaganda. After all of the Jews who immigrated to Palestine since 1917 had returned to their countries of origin, the Palestinians would be able to return to their homeland.
Nor was the reality of the de facto population exchange lost on many Israeli Arabs. This was especially true for activists in the various Israeli communist parties of the 1950s and 1960s who acknowledged such an exchange but viewed it as a conspiracy between Western imperialist interests and reactionary Arab collaborators. The Israeli Arab author Emil Habibi, for example, argued that backward-looking Arabs—those who supported the Hajj Amin Husseini or Abdullah—were actually working hand-in-hand with the Zionist leadership to steal freedom from the Palestinian nation, throw the best of its sons into jail, and disinherit the workers and the peasants—an absurd proposition given Hajj Amin’s burning hatred of Jews and Zionism and his relentless fight against them. Similar assessments were voiced by Tawfiq Toubi, Fuad Nassar, Suleiman Najab, and many others from the communist parties in Israel, Jordan, and the Gaza Strip.
At the same time, the newly established State of Israel, having just absorbed hundreds of thousands of Holocaust survivors was shortly thereafter confronted with the momentous task of integrating another 550,000 refugees from the Arab countries. Jewish refugees from the Arab states to Israel were settled during the 1950s in transit camps similar in quality to the refugee camps established in Arab countries for the Palestinians. Over time these transit camps were transformed into development towns or neighborhoods in larger cities to which they were adjacent. The last of the camps closed around 1963.
The U.N. did not establish any special agency like UNRWA to help the Jewish refugees (or for that matter, any other refugee community in the world). At the Paris conference of 1951, the topic of the “Arab” Jewish refugees was raised, in particular, the dispossession of Jewish assets left in Iraq. Israel demanded that a link be created between the Jewish exodus and the Jewish assets left behind in the Arab states and that of the Palestinian refugees, but nothing came of the discussion.
As a result, the State of Israel saw no alternative but to pass its own law regarding the use of absentee assets. This enabled the government to use the assets of the Palestinian refugees to help resettle and support its own Arab Jewish refugees. These refugees from the Arab states did not have the right to reparations from Germany or to additional pensions, and most did not have family members that could aid them in their absorption into Israel.
The issue of confiscated and reappropriated assets is habitually brought up by Palestinian advocates, albeit in a one-sided way. In a detailed 1957 report, the Arab states demanded at least $3.5 billion for lost Palestinian assets, a figure that even U.N. officials considered inflated. Arab sources usually refrain from referring to the problem of Jewish property. In her 2009 article “From Plundering to Plundering: Israel and the Assets of the Palestinian Refugees,” for example, Palestinian advocate and Israeli citizen Suhad Bishara demanded the full return of all Palestinian property to its owners in accordance with the current value but studiously avoided any attempt to deal with the more substantial expropriated Jewish property. The Israeli-Palestinian privately negotiated Geneva accord also addressed reparations for Palestinian refugees and their descendants (requiring no evidence of property ownership) but totally ignored Jewish property appropriated by the Arab states ostensibly on behalf of the Palestinian refugees.
Finally, a comparison of lost Palestinian assets and those of the dispossessed Jews bears review. According to 1950 U.N. estimates, Palestinian assets amounted to approximately £120 million, which, in today’s terms, would be the equivalent of $3.4 billion. Meanwhile, the worth of Jewish assets left behind was estimated in 2003 at over $100 billion. Put differently, according to U.N. data, the total value of Palestinian assets is lower than just the minimum estimate of the confiscated assets of Iraq’s Jews (approximately £156 million). In other words, any Palestinian demand for reparations has been paid many times over although the funds went to their host Arab countries.
There was an effective population exchange between the Arab states and Israel, one that was tacitly recognized by leaders of the Arab states at the time. There is also a demonstrated and direct link between the de facto resettlement of the Palestinian refugees and the confiscation of their property by Israel and the expulsion of the Jews from the Arab states and the confiscation of their assets by the various Arab governments.
Yet, while the displaced Jews were fully integrated into Israeli society, Arabs of Palestinian origin, including grandchildren of the actual refugees, living in relative comfort in the host countries (e.g., the 550,000 Palestinians in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States), continue for the most part to list themselves as refugees and to enjoy the monetary and other benefits granted them by UNRWA.
When UNRWA was established in 1949 to ease the plight of Palestinian refugees and facilitate their reintegration into the region’s economic life, all Arab states as well as Israel supported it. The contributing nations, led by the United States, donated $200 million to develop projects in the Arab states, and it was up to UNRWA to undertake this mission and manage the money. As explained by Lex Takkenberg, the agency’s senior ethics officer, UNRWA’s mission during the 1950s was to invest money in the host countries according to the number of refugees living in their respective territories in order to facilitate resettlement. Up to the 1960s, UNRWA’s policy was one of rehabilitation for the refugees and improvement of their living conditions through investments in education and health thereby enabling them to integrate into their host countries, but from the 1960s on, the agency strayed from its policy of refugee rehabilitation and resettlement. This transformation was due to many factors including regime change in many of the Arab states, the rise of the PLO, and organizational changes inside UNRWA. Ultimately, how the U.N. and UNRWA choose to privilege the descendants of Palestinian refugees while discriminating against refugees in other parts of the world is their right and the right of the donating nations to the world body.
From the point of view of the Israeli government, however, during the 1950s and 1960s, the Palestinians, as part of the “Arab nation,” were represented on the world stage and in international forums by the Arab states, which quietly but deliberately solved the Palestinian refugee issue in a de facto manner through a mutual population and asset exchange. According to UNRWA data, only a quarter of the descendants of the Palestinian refugees still live in camps, the majority of these in Lebanon. The descendants of the refugees who arrived in Gaza have been resettled in the quasi-independent area governed by Hamas while the descendants of the refugees in the West Bank are settled, for the most part, in the area of the autonomous Palestinian Authority. The bulk of the Jewish refugees of Iraq, Egypt, and Syria—as well as the Maghreb and Yemen, which took in no significant number of Palestinians—were settled in the Jewish state. This in turn means that Israel has no responsibility whatsoever toward the descendants of the 1948 Palestinian refugees and no obligation to aid them other than out of purely humanitarian concerns, together with the rest of the enlightened world. Any attempt to argue otherwise stems from misplaced political considerations and the rewriting of history.
 Efraim Karsh, “How Many Palestinian Arab Refugees Were There?” Israel Affairs, Apr. 2011, pp. 224-46. For a different estimate see the PLO’s official report submitted to the U.N.: Munazzamat at-Tahrir al-Filastiniya, Dawrat Shu’un al-Mufawadat, “Nazara ala al-Mufawadat,” Ramallah, 2009, p. 17.
 See, for example, the Lebanese Minister to the Secretary of State, Oct. 1, 1949, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), vol. VI; “Economic Development in the Middle East. British Plans for Social and Economic Development,” British Foreign Office, FO 371/75092, FO Minutes, Events, Dec. 21, 1949, British National Archives (Kew), p. 1416.
 “Palestine—Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator,” U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) res. 194 (III), New York, Dec. 11, 1948.
 Yafa Zilbershatz and Nimra Goren-Amitai, The Return of the Palestinian Refugees to the Territory of the State of Israel, Ruth Gavison, series ed. (Jerusalem: The Metzilah Center for Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanist Thought, 2010), pp. 38-42.
 Efraim Karsh, “The Palestinians and the ‘Right of Return,'” Commentary, May 2001, pp. 25-31.
 Report of the director, UNRWA, Sept. 28, 1951, UNGA A/1905, para. 79; Nitza Nachmias, “UNRWA Betrays Its Mission,” Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2012, pp. 27-35.
 “Summary Record, a Meeting between the Conciliation Commission and the Relief and Works Agency,” U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Feb. 6, 1951, A/AC.25/SR.204.
 Ibid.; Nachmias, “UNRWA Betrays Its Mission.”
 Lex Takkenberg, “UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees after Sixty Years: Some Reflections,” Refugee Survey Quarterly, no. 2-3 (2009), pp. 254-5; Jacob Tovy, Al Miftan Beita, Hitgabshut Mediniyuta shel Israel Be-Sugiyat Ha-Plitim Ha-Palestinim1948-1956 (Jerusalem: Herzl Institute for the Study of Zionism and History and Ben Gurion Research Institute, 2008), pp. 90-4, 159-71.
 Nachmias, “UNRWA Betrays Its Mission.”
 Walter Eitan, Bein Israel La-Amim (Tel-Aviv: Massada, 1958), pp. 50-1, 61; Mordechai Lahav, Hamishim Shnot Ha-Plitim Ha-Palestinim 1948-1999 (Tel Aviv: Rosh Tov, 2000), pp. 432-3; Benny Morris, Ledata shel Ba’ayyat Haplitim Haplestinim 1948-1949 (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1991), p. 352.
 Lahav, Hamishim Shnot, pp. 431-42.
 Yaakov Meron, “Why Jews Fled the Arab Countries,” Middle East Quarterly, Sept. 1995, pp. 47-55.
 Moshe Shemesh, MehaNakba LaNaksa: Hasikhsukh Ha-Israeli-Arvi ve-Habeaya Ha-Le’umit Ha-Falestinit, Darko shel Nasser Le-Milhemet Sheshet Ha-Yamim,1957-1967 (Jerusalem: Ben Gurion Research Institute, 2004), pp. 329-67.
 Report of the director, UNRWA, July 1, 1956-June 30, 1957, UNGA A/3686, p. 12.
 “Where UNRWA Works: Jordan,” U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, New York, accessed Apr. 17, 2013.
 Mariam Itani and Mo’in Manna, The Suffering of the Palestinian Refugee (Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre, 2010), pp. 43-4, 52-3.
 Martin Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, A History of Jews in Muslim Lands (Cornwall: Yale University Press, 2010), pp. 150-4, 166-9; Dafna Zimhoni, “Memshelet Iraq ve-Haaliya Hagdola Shel Hayehudim Le-Israel,” Pe’amim, 39 (1989), pp. 66-8.
 Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 190-3.
 Ibid., pp. 221-3.
 Zimhoni, “Memshelet Iraq,” pp. 68-9, 70-3; Tovy, Al Miftan, pp. 207-11.
 From Jerusalem to Foreign Office, Feb. 14, 17, 18, 1949, British Foreign Office, PRO, FO 371/75182, E1571/93; Yaakov Meron, “The Expulsion of the Jews from the Arab States and the Palestinian Stand vis-à-vis the Jews,” State Government and International Relations, Summer 1995, p. 32; Meron, “Why Jews Fled the Arab Countries“; Tovy, Al Miftan, pp. 208-10.
 Tovy, Al Miftan, pp. 210-2.
 Ibid.; Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett from the Knesset podium, sess. 239, Mar. 19, 1951, Knesset Minutes, vol. 8, p. 1539.
 Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 242-5.
 Tovy, Al Miftan, p. 210.
 S. Bendor: Report on the Visit of J. McCage to Israel, Apr. 1, 1951, Documents of Israeli Foreign Policy, Israel State Archive, Jerusalem, vol. vi (1951), doc. 99; Zimhoni, “Memshelet Iraq,” pp. 97-8.
 British Embassy in Baghdad to Foreign Office, PRO, FO 371/82239, E1823/22, June 5, 1950.
 James H. Keeley, U.S. Ambassador to Syria, to the State Department, May 1, 1949, FRUS, vol. IV, pp. 965-6; Itamar Rabinovich, The Road Not Taken, Early Arab-Israel Negotiations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 62-3.
 Keeley to the State Department, May 1, 1949, pp. 965-6; Rabinovich, The Road Not Taken, pp. 62-72.
 “Annual Report of the Director,” A/3686, UNRWA, New York, June 30, 1957, p. 12.
 Itani and Manna, The Suffering of the Palestinian Refugee, pp. 53-4.
 Lahav, Hamishim Shnot, p. 479.
 Mohsen Mohammad Saleh, History of Palestine: A Methodical Study of the Palestinian Struggle (Cairo: Al-Falah Foundation, 2003), p. 99; Itani and Manna, The Suffering of the Palestinian Refugee, pp. 44-5.
 Joan Peters, From Time Immemorial, The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict over Palestine (Tel Aviv: Hakibutz Hamuahad, 2003), p. 75; Adi Schwartz, “Hurban Kehilot Artsot Arav: Hahazon Shenignaz,” Tchelet, May 11, 2011, pp. 34-5.
 Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 265-6; Ada Aharoni, “Ha-Hagira Ha-Kfuya shel Ha-Yehudim ve-Hashalom,” International Forum for the Literature and Culture of Peace, accessed Nov. 24, 2011.
 Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 303-9.
 Samih K. Farsoun with Christina E. Zacharia, Palestine and the Palestinians (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 137.
 Itani and Manna, The Suffering of the Palestinian Refugee, pp. 36, 47-8.
 Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 219-21; Schwartz, “Hurban,” p. 29.
 Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 252-4; Schwartz, “Hurban,” p. 36.
 Shaul Bartal, The Fedayeen Emerge: The Palestine–Israel Conflict, 1949-1956 (Bloomington: Author House, 2011) pp. 135-8; H. Byroade, the American Ambassador in Cairo to the State Department, Mar. 4, 1955. U.S. National Archive, RG 884.86/3-455.
 Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 251-64.
 Elihu Birnbaum, Yehudi Olami (Jerusalem: Makor Reshon, 2010), pp. 268-79.
 Alex Sholem, “Come Home: Gaddafi’s Son Invites Libyan Jews to Return,” The Jewish News, Apr. 16, 2004.
 Natan A. Shuraki, Korot Ha-Yehudim Betsfon Africa (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975), pp. 246-7; Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 178-97, 271-4, 283-5.
 Aharoni, “Ha-Hagira Ha-Kfuya“; Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 278-80.
 Yocheved Weintraub, ed., Irgunei Ha-Mehablim (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, Feb. 1974), pp. 58-9.
 Hans Lebrecht, Ha-Palestinaim – Avar Ve-Hoveh (Tel-Aviv: University Publishers, 1987), pp. 188-9.
 “The Unification Conference,” The Active Committee of the Israeli Communist Party (MAK’I), Haifa, Oct. 22-23, 1948, pp. 24, 36-7; Lebrecht, Ha-Palestinim, p. 189.
 Tovy, Al Miftan, pp. 211-6; Lahav, Hamishim Shnot, pp. 441-2.
 Tovy, Al Miftan, p. 79; Don Peretz, Israel and the Palestine Arabs (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1958), p. 143.
 Suhad Bishara, “Mi-Biza Le-Biza: Israel ve-Rekush Ha-Plitim Ha-Palestinim,” Adalah’s Electronic Monthly, Sept. 2009.
 “Geneva Accord: A Model Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement,” para. 73, accessed Apr. 19, 2013.
 Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, p. 329.
 Itani and Manna, The Suffering of the Palestinian Refugee, pp. 36-7.
 U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) res. 513, Jan. 26, 1952; UNGA res. 614, Nov. 6, 1952; report of the director, UNRWA, UNGA res. 720, Nov. 27, 1953; Lahav, Hamishim Shnot, pp. 464-9; Zilbershatz and Goren-Amitai, The Return of the Palestinian Refugees, pp. 27-31; Takkenberg, “UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees,” pp. 253-9.
 “Statistics,” UNRWA, New York, accessed Apr. 19, 2013.
 See, for example, Yehuda Shinhav, “Was There a Transfer of Arabian Jews? The Iraqi Jew and National Accounting,” Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), Apr. 10, 1998.
Between Missiles and Flour: The Inside-Outside Game of Hezbollah in Lebanon
The Hezbollah is armed. Gunfire of Hezbollah and Amal supporters became audible on Beirut’s streets on early Sunday morning on June 7, 2020 after protesters called for the realization of the UN Resolution 1559 from 2004 which requires the disarmament of all militias. Several people were wounded. Actually, the nation-wide protests which started in October 2019 due to the dramatically grave economic situation in Lebanon carried the unprecedented feature of cross-sectarian support. However, the demonstrations on June 6, 2020 were thought to be dominated by parties opposing to Hezbollah because some protesters mentioned directly the Shiite militia when they called for its disarmament. This created a division among the demonstrators because the original aim of the protests was to overcome the sectarian system by chanting “All that mean all”, when it comes to their demand that politicians resign. By doing so, they avoided targetting certain sectarian groupings. Hezbollah and the Christian parties allied with them are getting more and more under pressure due to the economic disaster the small multireligious country is experiencing currently. The economic crisis depicts one of the biggest threats to Lebanon’s stability since the end of the civil war in 1990 and jeopardize its stability. The Lebanese pound lost more than the half of its value in exchange to the US Dollar, the unemployment rate climbed up to approximately 35% and about 45% of the population has to live now below the poverty line. The state’s budget deficit raised to more than 150% of the GDP. While the Lebanese currency remains to be in the free fall, the demonstrations against corruption and sectarianism has continued after the violent clashes of June 7, 2020.
The Inside-Game Of Supply And Demand
The pressure in Hezbollah’s game inside Lebanon is rising. Their long-term coalitions which made it possible for the Shiite militia to dominate the Lebanese political system after 2008 and especially after the elections in 2018, start to crumble. The internal pressure grows because of supply shortages of electricity and food. A blame game about responsibilities has started for example in the electricity field. Sometimes the parties even fall back on somewhat bizarre offers in order to meet the expectation within the patronage system of clientelism. Other times, oppositional parties from the Christian bloc, which were part of the current Lebanese political proportional representation as well, held Hezbollah responsible for the miserable economic situation and questioned their actions in Syria. By taking advantage of inner-sectarian struggles in the Druze community, reigniting unity against Israel among Christian or simply by paying better salaries to converted fighters, Hezbollah sought to extend their influence outside the Shia community in the past. After the 2018 elections the Shiite militia was able to gain a dominant role together with its allied parties. Although Hezbollah showed at least some resources during the Corona Crisis, the US sanctions against Iran continue to influence the budget of the Iran-supported militia. Therefore, Hezbollah’s social services like extra food or other additional subsidies for fighters had to be cut, also amid the corona pandemic. Some analysts say that Hezbollah tries to bypass the manifold crisis in Lebanon with their own parallel systems like the quasi-bank-system “Al-Qard”, an electric generator supply, and by opening towards new products like Marijuana. Moreover, Hannin Ghaddar claims that the Shiite groups seeks to get rid of Nabih Berri, the head of the partially competing and simultaneously partnering Shia party Amal. Protests took place in Shia dominated cities and parts of Beirut as well.
Lebanon is very dependent on food imports because, despite of the fertile Beqaa valley, the country is not able to meet the demand of its citizens and the Syrian refugees living in tents. Lebanon continued to host the largest number of refugees relative to its national population, where 1 in 6 people was a refugee (figures from 2018. Just refugees under the mandate of UNHCR, the ones under the mandate of UNRWA are not included). However, importing food with a weak domestic currency entails several obstacles, some prices have already doubled and some importers consider stopping the trading of certain imported products if no profit can be extracted from it. Hezbollah tried to step in this gap by expanding its smuggling activities between Syria and Lebanon and by substituting some imports with cheaper and tax-free imports from Iran. But the militia provides petrol and flour to their Syrian allies who are facing serious economic problems because of the sanction resulting from the US Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act. New protests broke out even in as-Suwaysa, a city controlled by Assad because of exploding prices for food. Hezbollah’s Nasrallah lashed out at the USA because of the sanctions. Petrol and flour have been subsidized by the Lebanese state. Despite of that, the smuggling activities now are conducted quite more openly than before with truck convoys using the main roads and in daylight. At the verge of the economic precipice the Lebanese state’s economy is approaching the losses caused by the smuggling are immense. Just recently, talks with the IMF about a potential bailout for Lebanon have started. Hezbollah formally supported the start of talks as a member of the central government, but at the same time warned against conditions which would violate the Lebanese sovereignty.
The Outside-Game Of “Resistance”
Lebanon’s sovereignty is the reason for Hezbollah to remain the only militia after the civil war which have not been disarmed. The so-called „Resistance“ against Israel has built the ideological ground for the Shiite terroristic group since its establishment in the 1980s during Israel’s occupation of Lebanon. Hence, the main source of the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s preeminent role has to be located in the field of foreign politics. Over the years the preeminent role of Hezbollah’s arms within Lebanon created a military dualism and constant power scrambling between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the militia.
The outside-struggles of Hezbollah are continuous. The so-called “resistance” against Israel experienced a peak last year. Several Israeli airstrikes in Syria and in Beirut and skirmishes at the Israeli-Lebanese border, when Hezbollah blew up an armed vehicle of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), erupted after the IDF unveiled material about a missile production place in the Beqaa valley. The Iranian efforts to equip Hezbollah with precision-guided missiles would pose a major threat to Israel’s air defence system because even if the system would shoot down 99 % of the missiles, the remaining ones would hit a target with a very high probability. This led to a serious situation close to war-like confrontations. Both sides had already climbed up the ladder of verbal escalations. Nasrallah denied the existence of such a programme and accused Israel of being aggressive, whereas Israeli officials warned Nasrallah not to put the whole Lebanon at stake by launching an attack against Israel. Since some of the targets and delivering routes from Iran to Hezbollah went through Syria, Russia had to enter the stage to calm down the heat. Though the situation has cooled down compared to the last summer, still several incidences at the border or airstrikes take place. However, both sides try to avoid casualties and thus a large-scale war. The hostility between Hezbollah and Israel is something more than a border conflict. Nasrallah’s perception of the USA and Israel as mutual agents towards each other shows that “resistance” fight is the founding base for the militia. Two regional coalitions clash with each other in Syria. Will the Israeli intelligence be able to distinct flour from weapons in convoys?
“War on Iran is war on all the axis of resistance. War on the Islamic Republic means the entire region will be set on fire.” – Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah made this deterrent vow. Israel und the USA seek to reduce Iran’s influence in Syria. Turkey wants to secure its own influence area against Assad, and it even might have comparable strategic aims against Hezbollah’s influence like Israel has. The USA, Israel and Turkey are against the Assad regime. However, Russia and Hezbollah support the Assad regime together with Iran. It should not be forgotten that the war in Syria went on despite the corona crisis. Yet, maybe Iran and Hezbollah shifted their strategies in the face of the corona pandemic and its financial consequences for Iran and Lebanon. Assad’s regime made a great step towards regaining its territories in Syria. Nonetheless, Assad’s Syria is still on war with Israel, and the US recognition of Israel’s sovereignty on the Golan Heights have not changed anything about this status and neither did Assad or Israel with negotiations, nor had Assad the resources to engage in escalation with Israel during the war in Syria. Now the two partners in the “axis of resistance” have to figure out the next steps with the Assad regime, while Syria’s economic situation is rapidly deteriorating. Israeli and American sources claimed that Iranian forces have retreated from Syria.
Hassan Nasrallah indeed declared the threat of a “great war” against Israel during the speech on the 20th anniversary of Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, however, he also gave the priority to the still fighting armed groups in Syria. The formal approval of talks with IMF can be interpreted so as Hezbollah and Iran are missing the financial potential to bring up an alternative for Lebanon’s state finances. In the same announcement on TV Nasrallah addressed domestic problems inside Lebanon like for instance fighting corruption. Nevertheless, it is important to recap Hezbollah’s internal activities in Lebanon based on parallel structures partially competing with the Lebanese state which include smuggling or corruptive clientelism. These networks are challenged by the corona crisis and the devasting economic situation. Would it be surprising if Hezbollah return to its foundational ideology of “resistance” by acting out the resistance outside Lebanon instead of trying to solve structural problems inside the country Hezbollah are part of themselves? The militia’s aim is to preserve the current status quo which secures their legitimacy. It is for this reason that the group has become hostile against the protests.
Inside Lebanon several regional and external actors assert their influence on Lebanese politics. Among them are the two regional rivals: Iran and Saudi-Arabia. Therefore, an almost constant struggle for power balances between sectarian groups marks the Lebanese history – amongst them the two prominent ones: Iranian-supported Hezbollah and Hariri’s alliance backed by Saudi-Arabia. This is nothing new. Hezbollah is playing an inside-outside-game with Lebanon. The Shiite party and terroristic group is gambling on two fields: inside Lebanon within the government and outside Lebanon with fights against Israel and others in the face of the looming risk of war due to a single error. Polls of 2019 show, how the Lebanese people perceive the situation: on the one hand, the vast majority of them consider Israel the greatest threat; on the other hand, the three most important challenges in the eyes of the Lebanese are the economy, corruption and public services, and not foreign interference. The news of 2020 are a stand-off with Israel, an unsure situation in Syria, a devasting economic situation amid the pandemic and huge cross-sectarian protests on the streets of Lebanon. These developments challenge Hezbollah’s internal and external influence currently conducted by means of deterrence, providing services and clientelism. If these means fail, one major strategic asset will remain for Hezbollah against their competitors inside and outside of Lebanon. They are armed.
Arab-Chinese Cooperation Forum: Crucial Decisions in Difficult Times
The ninth session of the Ministerial Meeting of the Arab-Chinese Cooperation Forum was held on the sixth of July. The meeting took place through live broadcasts due to the unstable global health situation as a result of the pandemic. It was a successful meeting rich in firm decisions, and the following documents were agreed upon: “Amman Declaration”, “Executive Program of the Arab-Chinese Cooperation Forum 2020-2022” and “Joint Statement of China and Arab Countries Solidarity in Fighting Pneumonia caused by Corona Virus”.
This session touched on security, political and health issues of mutual interest. The “Amman Declaration” has denounced the Israeli attacks that do not stop against the sovereignty of Palestine; it is an expression of an official Arab-Chinese rejection of Israel’s attempt to annex any other part of the Palestinian territories and dissatisfaction with Israel’s hostile policies against the Palestinian people. This document is an expression of the permanent Chinese endeavor to achieve international peace and security (which is the highest goal that neutral countries and international organizations, especially the United Nations, praise). The Amman Declaration cannot be classified as a Chinese bias alongside the Arabs. China pursues a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and respects the sovereignty of its international partners, and Israel is a huge economic and trade partner of China in West Asia.
Therefore, the “Amman Declaration” is a Chinese political tool to stop Israeli attacks. In this context, I remember the Sudanese issue. At a time when the world boycotted the government of President al-Bashir and was classified as a terrorist, China did not break its ties with him. Rather, it sought to make peace in Sudan and stop fighting. Some described this incident as direct Chinese interference in internal Sudanese affairs, however, this intervention was in the interest of the Sudanese people and in the service of international peace and security, as is the issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict. China raises its tone to ease the dispute, not the other way around. Another example, when many international groups branded Myanmar (formerly Burma) a terrorist state that assaults Muslims, China was making tremendous efforts and was almost the only international actor to make peace and create an atmosphere of harmony, so the “Amman Declaration” is a new Chinese step in the path of international peace and security.
The Chinese delegation affirmed the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. China is always on the side of the oppressed peoples. Although China is an ally of the Assad regime in Syria, it has never stopped standing with the Syrian people with self-determination, freedom and human dignity. From this standpoint, Chinese diplomacy has never worked contrary to its principles, as the People’s Republic of China has been and will continue to be on the side of the Palestinian people, which is a priority for the Chinese. China has called for the enhancement of the Arab-Chinese relations and pushed them forward and to use all legitimate means to develop this relationship. The Arab region is important for the Chinese, due to the great Chinese dependence on Arab oil and other natural resources, as well as the important and huge market for the disposal of Chinese goods.
The distinguished geographical location of the Arab region constitutes a commercial and economic link between East and West. The Arab region contributes to establishing new markets for China in the world, and this region may turn to be a hub for Chinese trade, regardless of the obstacle of the US military presence. The Arab countries are an important political partner of the Chinese government and a key supporter of “One China” in international forums.
I would like to touch here on the issue of Xinjiang. The Western and other anti-China media have sought to promote a propaganda “aimed at tarnishing the image of the Chinese government and portraying it as being against Islam and Muslims in China”. The United States supports this campaign under the pretext of defending the rights of Muslims as it claims, but the irony is that the United States has a bloody history against Arab and Muslim peoples everywhere, and the US regime has committed the most heinous crimes against Muslims, it is the summer and winter policy under one roof. Surprisingly, the Arab governments did not submit to this dirty game. Rather, the Sino-Arab relations became stronger and the majority of the Arab people were not in a position to accept the Western campaigns against the Chinese government. This position has shocked the West and all those who harbor hostility to China. The Chinese soft power has succeeded in the face of the military machine and western greed. Is it reasonable for the Algerian people to forget the revolution of the million martyrs? Will African peoples forget their slavery and treatment on the basis of inferiority? Will the Arabs forget the treachery of the Westerners since the Sykes-Picot agreement and the accompanying Zionist occupation and wars against oil and others?
The Arab region has a prominent role in the Belt and Road initiative, “The Economic Belt and the Maritime Road”, given the strategic location of the Arab region linking Eurasia, Mediterranean Europe and Africa, as well as the sea lanes that are part of the initiative. Arab natural resources are the engine for this initiative. Chinese consumption of Arab natural resources will increase dramatically with this initiative, according to Chinese officials. Members hailed the Chinese efforts made to strengthen the ties of the Arab-Chinese partnership, which supports the progress of the Belt and Road Initiative. Concerning Arab and regional situation, China has called for dialogue and resort to international resolutions and agreements in order to end conflicts and create an atmosphere of calm and stability. China has always advocated peace and dialogue as an economic partner of Arab countries and governments, and it is not inclined to be an international arms factory or a promoter of wars and discord in order to establish armament deals; on the contrary, China is absolutely opposed to wars and the use of weapons, and this is not in the interest of China’s overseas opponents. Also, China has assured that it will be the protector of the unity and sovereignty of the Arab countries. It has openly called for no division of Yemen, Syria or Libya among others.
Emphasis has been placed on adopting the executive program of the Arab-Chinese Cooperation Forum 2020-2022, which strengthens the strategic partnership between China and the Arabs, and which is in the common economic and political interest. On the other hand, the Arab countries have been and will continue to support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, refusing to establish relations with Taiwan and denouncing separatist religious and nationalist groups. The Arabs always affirm the principle of one country with two systems followed by China in Hong Kong, and the two sides agree to support and protect minorities in the Arab region and China. In this context, the Chinese invited Arab officials to visit Xinjiang to inspect it closely and to learn about the Chinese policy followed in this region. In China, many concessions are granted to Muslim and other minorities in China, in addition to the freedom to practice religious rites. The Chinese have gone to Arab officials to promote Arab-Iranian relations, support the policy of good-neighborliness, non-interference in internal affairs, and resolve disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.
It was confirmed that the decision of US President Donald Trump to grant the Syrian Arab Golan to Israel was rejected, as it is a blatant attack on international charters and laws, Israel was also called upon to withdraw from the Golan and the occupied territories to the line of June 4, 1967, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 242, 338 and 497. Israel was also called upon to withdraw from the occupied Lebanese territories and to stop violating the land, sea, and air sovereignty of Lebanon, which could have serious consequences that might not be commended. China contributes to Lebanon’s security and stability by participating in the international peacekeeping forces operating in southern Lebanon.
China has supported Lebanon in the most difficult circumstances, and today China reaffirms its readiness to stand firmly on the side of the government and the people in Lebanon, at a time when many countries have abandoned Lebanon for political interests and considerations, but China has remained steadfast in its positions and has not changed its policy towards Lebanon. In light of the financial crisis that Lebanon is going through, China announced that it will not abandon its partnership with Lebanon, and considered that Lebanon is a host for Palestinian and Syrian refugees, and this will not change from the right to resort to settlement.
The convening of the Arab-Chinese Cooperation Forum in this unstable international circumstance is a message in itself on the strength and strength of Arab-Chinese relations. This relationship has become a role model for international cooperation against all odds. Some groups seek to stir up discord between Arabs and Chinese under the pretexts of religion and human rights, but both sides demonstrated the amount of awareness and sufficient and great insight that drove the progress of this relationship despite all the difficulties. Many reports indicate that China has a promising future in the Arab region and this partnership will have a distinctive position.
AKP and the Evolution of a New Brand of Populism in Turkish Politics
Authors: Nadeem Ahmed Moonakal and Dr.Nanda Kishor*
The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey has had several impacts on Turkish politics and Turkey’s foreign policy outlook. The political situation in Turkey today is largely dominated by the AKP. The recent conversion of UNESCO world heritage site Hagia Sophia into a mosque was one of the election promises made by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. His decision indicates AKP’s appeal to the people and the populism it resorts to with an assertion of religious pride and nationalism.
AKP’s initial rise in Turkish politics should be observed in conjunction with the context in which it came to prominence. The 2001 economic crisis of Turkey is recorded as one of the worst economic crises the country faced ever since World War II. Throughout the 1990’s Turkish economy largely relied upon foreign investments for economic growth. Since the government was already facing budget deficits it lacked the financial means to address the crisis. The political instability that was prevalent in the 1990s in Turkey became another factor for many foreign investors to reconsider their investment plans in Turkey.
Several foreign business enterprises also withdrew billions of dollars during this period and it reflected in the dramatic plunging of the Turkish economy. However, the existing government pushed for several neoliberal policies that also opened the doors for privatization. Turkish economy faced serious challenges concerning its fragile banking sector and poor macroeconomic performance. This also largely led to the currency crisis. The country faced economic turmoil however some of the structural economic reforms and a successful debt-swap helped the country recover and improve investor confidence.
After the collapse of the fragile alliances, a new party came into prominence which changed the political landscape of Turkey significantly. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002 with Recep Tayyip Erdogan as the Prime Minister of the country. The election reflected a clear discontentment and dissatisfaction of people for the traditional political parties. The newly formed government absorbed the direction set by the predecessor and accentuated its efforts in further transforming the economy with neoliberal measures. The government also privatized state-owned enterprises and became more assertive in implementing these measures amid political oppositions and criticisms. The economy grew rapidly during 2003-2007 however the 2008 global economic crisis slowed down the growth. A year later the country showed positive signs of economic growth although in the later years the economic crisis and the corruption allegations did cause severe discontentment towards the government.
Some of the researches have shown that AKP voters are relatively less educated than the Republican People’s Party (CHP) voters. The traditional voter base of AKP also relies much on the lower-middle-class of the society whose income levels are just below the national average. AKP also receives a critical share of votes from people who identify themselves as religious conservatives. Evaluating the recent trends, it is clear that Erdogan is more conservative in terms of religious traditions and societal norms and values whereas liberal in economic measures which the AKP inherited to an extent from the early 2000 economic reforms in Turkey.
What AKP under the leadership of Erdogan also has managed to do overtime isto create a social assistance system that has received significant popularity among economically weaker sections. One of the most popular slogans from Erdogan’s election campaigns rightly captures the perception AKP has built around Erdogan. ‘Milletin Adamı Erdoğan’ (People’s Man Erdogan) resonates with the larger aspirations of the party to project Erdogan as the leader of the common people. However, there is much pressure on Erdogan now with rising unemployment rates and new challenges from his own traditional voter base. The reaction to incidents like protests post-Soma mine disaster indicates Erdogan’s intolerance towards dissent. Crackdown on protests and dissent has become a severe concern as the government now is vying for more control over social networking websites and apps as well.
The conditions for the rise of a populist leader remain conducive in contemporary Turkish politics. With high levels of unemployment, poverty, and religious conservatism– some populist appeal still can attract certain sections of Turkish society. With the foreign policy adventures of Erdogan and his with his strong anti-Israel stance he has also managed to garner wider popularity in the Muslim world. Hence, despite Erdogan’s decrease in vote share over several elections, the Milletin Adamı remains very popular not just in Turkey but among several Muslim societies across the Middle East and South Asia.
The democratic backsliding witnessed specifically in AKP and in the state as such may not sustain for a long time. The concept of Laiklik (Secularism) which served Turkey for a long time being sidelined will further push it to be branded as a religious fundamentalist state and an autocratic one worldwide. Unlike the understanding of AKP that existed till 2013 along with the Gülen Movement with a friendly approach towards the Western Powers, Erdogan has taken anti-Western move by playing to the gallery of Islamist groups such as Naqshbendi, İsmailağa, and Menzil. His policies were not impressive enough to steer through the economic and political challenges in 2019. CHP managed to win the elections in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. Istanbul’s new mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu is seen as a serious threat to Erdoğan. Apart from these, 2019 September also saw defection within AKP by former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and former Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan and their followers. This is precisely the reason why Erdogan thinks religion as a soft power that has the strength to cement his hard power.
The foreign policy challenges to Erdogan are manifold. Turkey’s role in Syria and Libya has been challenged in the region. Failure of any of these would give teeth for the opposition to further challenge him. His blackmailing of the European Union on the refugee issue may not work in the long run. After locking horns with the United States for over ten months, there seems to be some temporary respite with Erdogan and Trump both making certain amendments to their behavior. However, at the backdrop of the conversion of Hagia Sophia to a mosque, the US expressed its “disappointment” in its statement. With respect to the situation in Libya, the US sees a faceoff between Turkey and Russia as Turkey supports the Fayez al-Sarraj government whereas Russia backs Khalifa Haftar with weapons. Egypt is gearing up for a showdown with its partners and allies against Turkey in the Mediterranean and warming up ties with Iran and Qatar may not help Turkey economically.
AKP faces serious economic challenges amid the coronavirus pandemic. While Turkey is now entangled in the conflict in Libya and AKP faces dissent within the party, Erdogan has taken refuge in religion once again and aspires to get the support from the conservative Muslim factions in Turkey and the Muslim societies in the larger Islamic world. The populism he and his party are resorting to indicate elements of an authoritarian regime. This can also cater to the arguments put up by scholars pointing out that political Islam often exhibits a high incidence of authoritarianism. Turkey was seen as a light in leading the Middle East reform movements after World War I. However, in recent years, that credibility is being destroyed brick by brick by Erdogan’s populism. The idea of using religion to ‘control’, ‘eliminate’, and ‘subjugate’ the society is leading to ideological hegemony that would threaten the very foundations of the modern Turkish republic envisaged by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.
*Dr.Nanda Kishor is an Associate Professor at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education, India. His area of experience and expertise lies in the geopolitics of the Middle East and South Asia.
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