During the 1948 war, some 600,000 Palestinian Arabs fled their homes to the neighboring Arab states or to parts of mandatory Palestine occupied by Arab states (the West Bank and Gaza)
. Likewise, within a few years after the establishment of the State of Israel, nearly all of the 850,000-strong Jewish population living in Arab states was either expelled or escaped with just their lives. Most made their way to Israel where they were resettled.
While these latter facts may not be that well known, neither are they completely unfamiliar to students of the Middle East. What is less acknowledged, however, is the de facto agreement of Arab states to resettle Palestinian refugees in their respective territories, expressed in closed-door discussions at cease-fire committee meetings and other gatherings with Israeli representatives. Whether the Arab states properly represented the refugees or treated them and their descendants fairly is a matter for the Palestinians and their Arab brothers to adjudicate on their own.
Population Exchange of the 1948 War
On December 11, 1948, the U.N. General Assembly adopted resolution (3)194 whose paragraph 11 dealt with the problem of the war refugees:
The General Assembly. … Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practical date and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss or damage to property … [and] Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees.
As a General Assembly resolution, the U.N. decision was in no way a binding recommendation. Nonetheless, it put forward the notions that Arab (and Jewish) refugees (a) should be allowed to return to their country of origin within the framework of a comprehensive peace if they could be construed as peaceable; (b) or they could receive reparations for damage to or loss of their property if they decided not to return; and (c) resettlement was a no less reasonable option.
While the Arab states vehemently opposed resolution 194 and voted unanimously against it (only in the late 1960s did they begin to transform the resolution into the linchpin of their claim to a “right of return”), they did not shirk from quietly entertaining the feasibility of resettling the Palestinian refugees in their territories. Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt all recommended the resettling of the Palestinian refugees within their borders. Most of these states also demanded economic aid from Western powers as payback for agreeing to the option. But their agreement was kept quiet since they did not see eye-to-eye on this matter with both the Palestinians and their own populations.
At the 1949 Lausanne Conference convened by the U.N. Conciliation Commission, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon appeared as one bloc to discuss an agreement that also included a solution to the refugee problem. While they had previously rejected resolution 194, they now demanded that any deal had to be resolved on that basis. They also told the U.N. Conciliation Commission that they, the Arab states, represented the Palestinian refugees. Three delegations of refugees that tried to reach the conference were treated with contempt by their Arab brethren and denied access to the discussions. When they asked for an interview with the Egyptian delegation, they were unceremoniously removed by force. At a later September 1951 Conciliation Commission conference in Paris, only delegations from the Arab states were asked to represent the refugees.
A critical aspect of these discussions and one that has been largely forgotten since that time was that recommendations and attempts at resettling the Palestinian Arabs also focused on issues of compensation to the Arab states for the expenses incurred in the absorption of their brethren. Alongside infusions of cash from Western sources, Arab governments viewed with equanimity the confiscation of Jewish property to help offset costs, property that was coming into their hands as a result of a massive population transfer out of their borders occurring at the same time.
Many Jewish communities in the Arab states predated the Muslim conquest of the Middle East by hundreds of years. Many of their members had grown prosperous, served in their host nations’ law courts, military, and where such existed, parliaments and considered themselves full-fledged citizens. Many more eked out a livelihood as best they could, aware of a precarious situation in which today’s good Muslim neighbor might turn out to be tomorrow’s oppressor. Whatever their material circumstances, within a few years of the establishment of the State of Israel, the bulk of this population was forced out of their homes, leaving behind the vast majority of their possessions.
Contemporary Palestinian spokesmen and advocates are largely silent about the effective population exchange carried out at that time. While they may argue that the Arab states were not empowered to represent them or claim (falsely) that Jews who emigrated did so because of Zionist manipulation rather than persecution and harassment, the fact is that part of the stipulations of U.N. resolution 194 were actualized in that compensation for relocation was obtained—albeit through the forcible divestment of Jewish citizenry—and resettlement occurred. Whether that compensation went to the proper recipients or whether resettlement was done in a half-hearted fashion, the international community, alongside the Arab governments, put in place practicable, if not perfect, solutions. A closer look at that population exchange and the accompanying transfer of billions of dollars’ worth of Jewish property and holdings to the Palestinian refugees is in order.
At the time, both Jordan and Iraq were constitutional monarchies ruled by members of the Hashemite family. Their approaches to the refugee and resettlement problem differed markedly, largely due to geographical and ethnic factors as well as the absence of a Jewish community in Jordan versus the well-established one of Iraq.
It must be remembered that up to 1974, Jordan considered itself the representative of Palestinian rights since most of its citizens (approximately 60-70 percent) were of Palestinian origin. This perception was formalized in a 1962 Jordanian white paper by Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal that explicitly designated Jordan as Palestine and as the representative of the Palestinians in its territory. Amman maintained this position even after the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 and the 1967 Six-Day War. It was only in 1974, after the Arab League recognized the PLO as the “sole representative of the Palestinian people,” that Jordan grudgingly changed its position for the first time due to the political pressures.
Jordan’s founder, emir-turned-king Abdullah (r.1921-51) was the architect of the policy to assimilate Palestinian refugees into his kingdom. In June 1950, there were 506,200 Palestinian refugees listed by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 55 percent of the total of registered UNRWA refugees. Refugees were settled on both banks of the Jordan River. Abdullah’s policy included the granting of full citizenship to the refugees in order to absorb them into his kingdom. The warm welcome they received there impelled additional refugees from Gaza and other Arab countries to come to Jordan and receive suitable living quarters and citizenship.
The majority of refugees and their descendants listed with UNRWA currently live in Jordan. According to the agency, only 350,899 Palestinian refugees live in ten official camps out of the 2,034,061 registered refugees, including the 140,000 registered refugees arriving in Jordan from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip after 1967. This is in addition to the million-and-a-half Palestinians not listed as refugees who are full-fledged Jordanian citizens (out of a total population of 6,508,271 million people).
In fact, about 95 percent of all Palestinians residing in Jordan hold Jordanian citizenship and enjoy its benefits. The exception is the approximately 100,000 refugees from the Gaza Strip who settled in Jordan over the years. The members of this small group hold temporary Jordanian passports but do not qualify for full rights like the others, notably the right to hold a government job. Since 1948, quite a few politicians of Palestinian origin such as Tawfik Abul Huda, Anwar Nusseibeh, Hussein Fakhri Khalidi, Ahmad Tuqan, Kassim Rimawi, among others, have risen to high office in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, including cabinet posts and even the premiership.
The situation in neighboring Iraq was quite different. Though nominally ruled by the Hashemite king, Faisal III, real power was held by Western interests and off-and-on during the 1940s and 1950s by Prime Minister Nuri Said. Iraq also had a large and flourishing Jewish population reaching back to biblical times, which had long been active in Iraqi affairs, including commerce, culture, and in the modern period, the Iraqi parliament.
Despite this, a pogrom in June 1941—the farhud—took place, which changed the entire trajectory of Jewish life in Mesopotamia and which laid the groundwork for the population and wealth transfer plans of the 1950s. Led by a pro-Nazi Iraqi prime minister, Rashid Ali Kaylani, and the exiled Jerusalem mufti Hajj Amin Husseini, the pogrom lasted for three days. Some 190 Jews were murdered, hundreds of Jewish women were raped, and at least 2,000 people were wounded. Jewish homes and Jewish-owned stores were ransacked and destroyed. The farhud was a marker that foretold the end of the ancient Jewish community in Iraq.
While some Iraqi Jews cautiously tried to rebuild their lives, evidence began to mount that they were no longer welcome in their millennial home. During the 1948 war, Iraqis began to take measures against “the enemy within.” In the first days of the war, more than 300 Jews were arrested for having “given support to Israel.” Shafiq Ades, one of the richest members of the Jewish Baghdad community, who had sat with government ministers, represented the Jewish community at court, and who had contributed greatly to Iraq’s economy was accused of Zionism and communism and publicly hanged. All of his assets, estimated at many millions, were confiscated for the benefit of the Defense Ministry. Nor was this an isolated incident: The Jews of Iraq understood clearly that they would be forced to abandon their property if they wished to escape with their lives.
Although he opposed the pro-Nazi leaders who had come to power in Iraq during World War II, Nuri Said was chiefly responsible for the final expulsion of Iraqi Jews and for the confiscation of their property. During the months of May-July 1949, he turned to the U.S. and British representatives in Baghdad with the recommendation that there be a population exchange between the Jewish citizens of his country and the Palestinian refugees. Though the idea was raised, in part, following a British recommendation to resettle the refugees in the fertile river valleys of Iraq, London strenuously objected to Said’s plan arguing that this type of agreement would be an inequitable exchange of educated and often prosperous Jews for a population of uneducated refugees with no professional skills.
On October 14, 1949, Said continued with his attempts to convince the Conciliation Commission that only states that had Jews to expel should resettle the Palestinian refugees. At the same time, an opinion survey was carried out in Iraq regarding a population exchange between Palestinian refugees and Iraqi Jews. This proposal was rejected by Israel’s foreign minister, Moshe Sharett, who declared that Israel could not agree to the confiscation of the vast properties of the Iraqi Jews.
In March 1950, as masses of Iraqi Jews desperately tried to leave the country, Baghdad passed the “Revocation of Citizenship Bill” allowing Jews to leave if they surrendered their citizenship. Tens of thousands departed as soon as they could despite the Israeli government’s difficulty in absorbing them. A year later, the Iraqi parliament passed a law confiscating all properties belonging to Jews who moved, or wished to move, to Israel and who had thus relinquished their Iraqi citizenship, placing the assets under a governmental guardianship department. The seized amount has been estimated at around $243 million (about $6 billion in today’s terms) at the very minimum. Said claimed this was retribution for the confiscation of Palestinian assets by the Zionists.
After the law’s ratification, the British asked Said to absorb at least some Palestinian refugees; the prime minister replied that he was ready to absorb a limited number of refugees but not hundreds of thousands. In the end, Iraq took in only 4,000 Palestinian refugees convoyed in trucks by the Iraqi army, a number “balanced” at that time by the departure of over 130,000 legal (and clandestine) Jewish refugees. UNRWA was not allowed to operate in Iraq; instead, Baghdad established its own refugee division to care for the Palestinians’ needs. Whether any of the confiscated Jewish assets made their way into the hands of the resettled Palestinian refugees remains to be answered.
Syria, Egypt, and the Maghreb
Neighboring and sparsely populated Syria was an ideal country for the mass resettlement of Palestinian refugees. In fact, before 1920, many Syrians and Palestinians considered themselves to be part of one nation—Greater Syria—while what became the British Mandate of Palestine was termed Southern Syria.
In April 1949, Prime Minister Husni Za’im signaled his readiness to sign a peace agreement with Israel in exchange for specific conditions including substantial geographic concessions. He explicitly informed U.S. representatives of Damascus’s willingness to absorb and resettle over a quarter of a million refugees in its territory—at least three times more refugees than Syria actually absorbed in 1948. At the Lausanne Conference, Za’im’s emissaries let Israel know that Syria would absorb 300,000 refugees in exchange for economic aid. In the end, these negotiations went nowhere as Za’im was overthrown in a military coup and executed a mere four and a half months after coming to power.
Even so, Palestinians were resettled in Syria, the majority coming from the 82,194 refugees registered with UNRWA in June 1950. There are ten official refugee camps in Syria today and three more unofficial ones, including the Yarmouk camp, a district of Damascus that became a desired living area. Up until the recent civil war, the Assad regime treated its Palestinians relatively fairly and allowed them to integrate into local and national politics. Since 1956, according to Syrian law 260, the 1948 Palestinian refugees are equal to Syrian citizens in the following areas: employment (including governmental jobs), vocations, and education, but are excluded from being elected and becoming members of parliament. They are allowed to participate in municipal elections like everyone else. Although they retain their Palestinian nationality, according to Palestinian sources, “These are always referred to as those who are in effect Syrians.” The Palestinians even have official status in the Syrian Baath Party and participate in its leadership. In fact, during the Lebanese civil war, many Palestinians escaped to Syria and rebuilt their homes there.
Part of the reason why Syria became an attractive destination for Palestinians is that as in Iraq, the cost of resettling refugees was offset in part by the confiscation of Jewish assets. As did Iraq, Syria had a sizeable and prosperous Jewish community; in 1943, there were at least 30,000 Jews living there. But in 1949, in the wake of Israel’s independence, the Syrian government passed a law freezing all Jewish bank accounts. The main motive behind this action, as declared by the Syrian rulers, was to provide a solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees inside its borders. The regime took the most convenient path, which was to confiscate the Jewish assets in its country, mostly houses, and pass them to Palestinian hands. This practice was institutionalized in a 1967 law stating that the “property and possessions of deceased Jews are confiscated by the government; the heirs must pay for its use. If they cannot, it will be handed over to the Palestinian Arabs.” There are no details regarding the exact number of Jewish properties received by Palestinian Arabs in Syria. Damascus’s implacable hostility to Israel resulted in worsening conditions for its Jewish community, and thus most sought to leave. The government periodically permitted Jewish emigration but only if the Jews were prepared to abandon their assets without selling them.
In 1967, after a decisive Syrian defeat in the Six-Day War, new laws were passed that increased the restrictions on the rights of Syrian Jews. All Jewish assets were confiscated. Governmental proclamations explicitly stated that Palestinian refugees were to enjoy the Jews’ property and were the actual owners of Jewish assets. Those Jews who remained in Syria were forced to pay rent on their own property; if they were unable to keep up the scheduled payments, their property was awarded to Palestinians. Finally, as the result of discussions at the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, the last remnants of the mostly destitute Jewish community in Syria were allowed to leave, most eventually making their way to Israel.
To the south lay Egypt, which had taken a decisive role in invading Israel in 1948 and thus bore its fair share of responsibility towards the resulting flood of Arab refugees. Unlike Syria, Egypt was not interested in absorbing refugees in its interior. Of the approximately 600,000 Palestinian refugees who fled during the war, approximately 82,000 went to Egyptian-held Gaza. A small portion of the refugees, mainly those who had family ties in Egypt or who offered the appropriate bribe, made it to Egypt proper; according to Palestinian figures, in the year 2008, there were 64,728 Palestinians outside of Gaza living in Egypt. Many of the refugees who reached Egypt were forced to leave in the end and were deported back to the Gaza Strip.
A magnificent and well-connected community of approximately 100,000 Jews lived by the banks of the Nile when the Israeli war of independence began. As a consequence of the fighting as well as the involvement of the Muslim Brotherhood in domestic politics, numerous actions against the Jews including riots took place. Hundreds of Jews were summarily arrested and interned. Exit visas for Jews were severely restricted. Looting and bombing became prevalent. As one eyewitness recalled:
After the war broke out [in 1948], my mother, who was in the ninth month of her pregnancy, was arrested. They wanted to butcher her. They had bayonets. They abused her and afterwards they left her. On one of the evenings, a crowd came with sticks and anything else that they could find in order to kill the family because they heard that they were Jews. The gatekeeper swore to them that we were Italians and that is why they only cursed, surrounded my parents, my brothers, and myself, who was only a tiny baby. The next day my parents fled. They left everything, a pension, work, and a home, and they left Egypt.
More than 25,000 Jews left Egypt without their assets following the 1948 war, after being attacked by Arabs mobs. But with the Free Officers Movement’s coup of July 1952, more dramatic changes were soon to follow. Nationalist sentiment against Westerners had already resulted in rioting against the “foreign” Jews, and in the same week that the Egyptian revolution broke out, further attacks took place. Jewish stores were robbed, and Jewish property looted and burned.
In the immediate aftermath of the officers’ coup, there was an attempt by the Egyptian government to allay the Jewish community’s fears, including the return of property seized after the 1948 war. At the same time, under the framework of the 1954 “Alpha Plan,” Washington and London attempted a Palestinian refugee resettlement program in the Sinai Peninsula, but this process was scuttled due to an escalation in Egyptian-Israeli tensions.
In 1954, the exposure of an Israeli spy ring in Egypt that had recruited Egyptian Jews (the so-called Lavon affair) exacerbated ill-feelings. The escalation of the conflict with Israel led Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser to take a number of steps against the Jews in his country, including another roundup of suspected “Zionists.” The nationalization of the Suez Canal, which in turn resulted in the Sinai campaign of October 1956, marked the beginning of the end of the ancient Jewish community in Egypt. On November 22, 1956, all Egyptian Jews were defined as Zionists and labeled enemy citizens. The massive expulsion of Egyptian Jewry began with the total confiscation of Jewish wealth. Some of these assets were given to the Palestinian refugees who were living in Cairo, and the rest went into the Egyptian state treasury. For example, the house of Charles Victor Castro, an exclusive home in an expensive Cairo suburb, became the official residence of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. None apparently went to the Palestinians housed by Egypt in the Gaza Strip; instead Cairo chose to rely on aid from UNRWA. Conditions worsened for the remnants of Egypt’s Jewish community before and after the Six-Day War, and today, there is no longer any active Jewish community in Egypt. Only a few solitary Jews, most of them women, and a few deserted synagogues remain from the magnificent communities of Cairo and Alexandria.
While the majority of Palestinian refugees did not, for the most part, migrate to the North African countries, these states used the fate of the refugees and the 1948 war to make the lives of their Jewish populations—some of which dated to biblical times—unbearable until they were expelled from their countries or felt compelled to leave.
Having endured a horrible pogrom in the Libyan capital of Tripoli in June 1948, most of the 38,000-strong Jewish community fled the country with 90 percent of them settling in Israel. In 2004, Mu’ammar Qaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, declared that all the exiled Jews could return to Libya and receive reparations based on their former assets though their homes would remain in the hands of Palestinian refugees residing in the country. Likewise, Tunisian Jewry dwindled from some 105,000 people in 1948 to a mere 1,500 by 2010 with 15,000 escaping to Israel during the 1948 war and in its immediate wake, and the rest following suit after Tunisian independence in 1956. A similar pattern occurred in Algeria, whose 117,000-strong Jewish community fled in 1962 while in Morocco—where some 270,000 people lived in the largest Jewish community in the Muslim world—secret negotiations between Israel and the royal court, and a $10 million “gift” to the king, produced a royal permit for the Jews to leave—albeit without taking their belongings or selling their properties and businesses. By 1976, only 17,000 Jews remained in the country.
Resettlement and Recompense
Little notice has been paid to the fate of the 850,000 Jewish refugees from the Arab states, about 550,000 of whom were resettled in Israel. Similarly, the resettlement of most of the Palestinian refugees in the host Arab countries, creating a de facto population exchange, has been overlooked.
To be sure, unlike the international community, the Arab states were quite aware of this reality, as was the PLO leadership. On November 9, 1973, the Voice of Palestine broadcast the PLO’s “Plan for Peace.” According to this arrangement, all of the countries of the world including the Arab states should immediately and publicly allow the “Zionist immigrants” to Israel to return to their countries of origin where they would enjoy the same rights and responsibilities that were theirs previously before they were coerced into emigrating due to Zionist propaganda. After all of the Jews who immigrated to Palestine since 1917 had returned to their countries of origin, the Palestinians would be able to return to their homeland.
Nor was the reality of the de facto population exchange lost on many Israeli Arabs. This was especially true for activists in the various Israeli communist parties of the 1950s and 1960s who acknowledged such an exchange but viewed it as a conspiracy between Western imperialist interests and reactionary Arab collaborators. The Israeli Arab author Emil Habibi, for example, argued that backward-looking Arabs—those who supported the Hajj Amin Husseini or Abdullah—were actually working hand-in-hand with the Zionist leadership to steal freedom from the Palestinian nation, throw the best of its sons into jail, and disinherit the workers and the peasants—an absurd proposition given Hajj Amin’s burning hatred of Jews and Zionism and his relentless fight against them. Similar assessments were voiced by Tawfiq Toubi, Fuad Nassar, Suleiman Najab, and many others from the communist parties in Israel, Jordan, and the Gaza Strip.
At the same time, the newly established State of Israel, having just absorbed hundreds of thousands of Holocaust survivors was shortly thereafter confronted with the momentous task of integrating another 550,000 refugees from the Arab countries. Jewish refugees from the Arab states to Israel were settled during the 1950s in transit camps similar in quality to the refugee camps established in Arab countries for the Palestinians. Over time these transit camps were transformed into development towns or neighborhoods in larger cities to which they were adjacent. The last of the camps closed around 1963.
The U.N. did not establish any special agency like UNRWA to help the Jewish refugees (or for that matter, any other refugee community in the world). At the Paris conference of 1951, the topic of the “Arab” Jewish refugees was raised, in particular, the dispossession of Jewish assets left in Iraq. Israel demanded that a link be created between the Jewish exodus and the Jewish assets left behind in the Arab states and that of the Palestinian refugees, but nothing came of the discussion.
As a result, the State of Israel saw no alternative but to pass its own law regarding the use of absentee assets. This enabled the government to use the assets of the Palestinian refugees to help resettle and support its own Arab Jewish refugees. These refugees from the Arab states did not have the right to reparations from Germany or to additional pensions, and most did not have family members that could aid them in their absorption into Israel.
The issue of confiscated and reappropriated assets is habitually brought up by Palestinian advocates, albeit in a one-sided way. In a detailed 1957 report, the Arab states demanded at least $3.5 billion for lost Palestinian assets, a figure that even U.N. officials considered inflated. Arab sources usually refrain from referring to the problem of Jewish property. In her 2009 article “From Plundering to Plundering: Israel and the Assets of the Palestinian Refugees,” for example, Palestinian advocate and Israeli citizen Suhad Bishara demanded the full return of all Palestinian property to its owners in accordance with the current value but studiously avoided any attempt to deal with the more substantial expropriated Jewish property. The Israeli-Palestinian privately negotiated Geneva accord also addressed reparations for Palestinian refugees and their descendants (requiring no evidence of property ownership) but totally ignored Jewish property appropriated by the Arab states ostensibly on behalf of the Palestinian refugees.
Finally, a comparison of lost Palestinian assets and those of the dispossessed Jews bears review. According to 1950 U.N. estimates, Palestinian assets amounted to approximately £120 million, which, in today’s terms, would be the equivalent of $3.4 billion. Meanwhile, the worth of Jewish assets left behind was estimated in 2003 at over $100 billion. Put differently, according to U.N. data, the total value of Palestinian assets is lower than just the minimum estimate of the confiscated assets of Iraq’s Jews (approximately £156 million). In other words, any Palestinian demand for reparations has been paid many times over although the funds went to their host Arab countries.
There was an effective population exchange between the Arab states and Israel, one that was tacitly recognized by leaders of the Arab states at the time. There is also a demonstrated and direct link between the de facto resettlement of the Palestinian refugees and the confiscation of their property by Israel and the expulsion of the Jews from the Arab states and the confiscation of their assets by the various Arab governments.
Yet, while the displaced Jews were fully integrated into Israeli society, Arabs of Palestinian origin, including grandchildren of the actual refugees, living in relative comfort in the host countries (e.g., the 550,000 Palestinians in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States), continue for the most part to list themselves as refugees and to enjoy the monetary and other benefits granted them by UNRWA.
When UNRWA was established in 1949 to ease the plight of Palestinian refugees and facilitate their reintegration into the region’s economic life, all Arab states as well as Israel supported it. The contributing nations, led by the United States, donated $200 million to develop projects in the Arab states, and it was up to UNRWA to undertake this mission and manage the money. As explained by Lex Takkenberg, the agency’s senior ethics officer, UNRWA’s mission during the 1950s was to invest money in the host countries according to the number of refugees living in their respective territories in order to facilitate resettlement. Up to the 1960s, UNRWA’s policy was one of rehabilitation for the refugees and improvement of their living conditions through investments in education and health thereby enabling them to integrate into their host countries, but from the 1960s on, the agency strayed from its policy of refugee rehabilitation and resettlement. This transformation was due to many factors including regime change in many of the Arab states, the rise of the PLO, and organizational changes inside UNRWA. Ultimately, how the U.N. and UNRWA choose to privilege the descendants of Palestinian refugees while discriminating against refugees in other parts of the world is their right and the right of the donating nations to the world body.
From the point of view of the Israeli government, however, during the 1950s and 1960s, the Palestinians, as part of the “Arab nation,” were represented on the world stage and in international forums by the Arab states, which quietly but deliberately solved the Palestinian refugee issue in a de facto manner through a mutual population and asset exchange. According to UNRWA data, only a quarter of the descendants of the Palestinian refugees still live in camps, the majority of these in Lebanon. The descendants of the refugees who arrived in Gaza have been resettled in the quasi-independent area governed by Hamas while the descendants of the refugees in the West Bank are settled, for the most part, in the area of the autonomous Palestinian Authority. The bulk of the Jewish refugees of Iraq, Egypt, and Syria—as well as the Maghreb and Yemen, which took in no significant number of Palestinians—were settled in the Jewish state. This in turn means that Israel has no responsibility whatsoever toward the descendants of the 1948 Palestinian refugees and no obligation to aid them other than out of purely humanitarian concerns, together with the rest of the enlightened world. Any attempt to argue otherwise stems from misplaced political considerations and the rewriting of history.
 Efraim Karsh, “How Many Palestinian Arab Refugees Were There?” Israel Affairs, Apr. 2011, pp. 224-46. For a different estimate see the PLO’s official report submitted to the U.N.: Munazzamat at-Tahrir al-Filastiniya, Dawrat Shu’un al-Mufawadat, “Nazara ala al-Mufawadat,” Ramallah, 2009, p. 17.
 See, for example, the Lebanese Minister to the Secretary of State, Oct. 1, 1949, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), vol. VI; “Economic Development in the Middle East. British Plans for Social and Economic Development,” British Foreign Office, FO 371/75092, FO Minutes, Events, Dec. 21, 1949, British National Archives (Kew), p. 1416.
 “Palestine—Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator,” U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) res. 194 (III), New York, Dec. 11, 1948.
 Yafa Zilbershatz and Nimra Goren-Amitai, The Return of the Palestinian Refugees to the Territory of the State of Israel, Ruth Gavison, series ed. (Jerusalem: The Metzilah Center for Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanist Thought, 2010), pp. 38-42.
 Efraim Karsh, “The Palestinians and the ‘Right of Return,'” Commentary, May 2001, pp. 25-31.
 Report of the director, UNRWA, Sept. 28, 1951, UNGA A/1905, para. 79; Nitza Nachmias, “UNRWA Betrays Its Mission,” Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2012, pp. 27-35.
 “Summary Record, a Meeting between the Conciliation Commission and the Relief and Works Agency,” U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Feb. 6, 1951, A/AC.25/SR.204.
 Ibid.; Nachmias, “UNRWA Betrays Its Mission.”
 Lex Takkenberg, “UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees after Sixty Years: Some Reflections,” Refugee Survey Quarterly, no. 2-3 (2009), pp. 254-5; Jacob Tovy, Al Miftan Beita, Hitgabshut Mediniyuta shel Israel Be-Sugiyat Ha-Plitim Ha-Palestinim1948-1956 (Jerusalem: Herzl Institute for the Study of Zionism and History and Ben Gurion Research Institute, 2008), pp. 90-4, 159-71.
 Nachmias, “UNRWA Betrays Its Mission.”
 Walter Eitan, Bein Israel La-Amim (Tel-Aviv: Massada, 1958), pp. 50-1, 61; Mordechai Lahav, Hamishim Shnot Ha-Plitim Ha-Palestinim 1948-1999 (Tel Aviv: Rosh Tov, 2000), pp. 432-3; Benny Morris, Ledata shel Ba’ayyat Haplitim Haplestinim 1948-1949 (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1991), p. 352.
 Lahav, Hamishim Shnot, pp. 431-42.
 Yaakov Meron, “Why Jews Fled the Arab Countries,” Middle East Quarterly, Sept. 1995, pp. 47-55.
 Moshe Shemesh, MehaNakba LaNaksa: Hasikhsukh Ha-Israeli-Arvi ve-Habeaya Ha-Le’umit Ha-Falestinit, Darko shel Nasser Le-Milhemet Sheshet Ha-Yamim,1957-1967 (Jerusalem: Ben Gurion Research Institute, 2004), pp. 329-67.
 Report of the director, UNRWA, July 1, 1956-June 30, 1957, UNGA A/3686, p. 12.
 “Where UNRWA Works: Jordan,” U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, New York, accessed Apr. 17, 2013.
 Mariam Itani and Mo’in Manna, The Suffering of the Palestinian Refugee (Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre, 2010), pp. 43-4, 52-3.
 Martin Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, A History of Jews in Muslim Lands (Cornwall: Yale University Press, 2010), pp. 150-4, 166-9; Dafna Zimhoni, “Memshelet Iraq ve-Haaliya Hagdola Shel Hayehudim Le-Israel,” Pe’amim, 39 (1989), pp. 66-8.
 Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 190-3.
 Ibid., pp. 221-3.
 Zimhoni, “Memshelet Iraq,” pp. 68-9, 70-3; Tovy, Al Miftan, pp. 207-11.
 From Jerusalem to Foreign Office, Feb. 14, 17, 18, 1949, British Foreign Office, PRO, FO 371/75182, E1571/93; Yaakov Meron, “The Expulsion of the Jews from the Arab States and the Palestinian Stand vis-à-vis the Jews,” State Government and International Relations, Summer 1995, p. 32; Meron, “Why Jews Fled the Arab Countries“; Tovy, Al Miftan, pp. 208-10.
 Tovy, Al Miftan, pp. 210-2.
 Ibid.; Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett from the Knesset podium, sess. 239, Mar. 19, 1951, Knesset Minutes, vol. 8, p. 1539.
 Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 242-5.
 Tovy, Al Miftan, p. 210.
 S. Bendor: Report on the Visit of J. McCage to Israel, Apr. 1, 1951, Documents of Israeli Foreign Policy, Israel State Archive, Jerusalem, vol. vi (1951), doc. 99; Zimhoni, “Memshelet Iraq,” pp. 97-8.
 British Embassy in Baghdad to Foreign Office, PRO, FO 371/82239, E1823/22, June 5, 1950.
 James H. Keeley, U.S. Ambassador to Syria, to the State Department, May 1, 1949, FRUS, vol. IV, pp. 965-6; Itamar Rabinovich, The Road Not Taken, Early Arab-Israel Negotiations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 62-3.
 Keeley to the State Department, May 1, 1949, pp. 965-6; Rabinovich, The Road Not Taken, pp. 62-72.
 “Annual Report of the Director,” A/3686, UNRWA, New York, June 30, 1957, p. 12.
 Itani and Manna, The Suffering of the Palestinian Refugee, pp. 53-4.
 Lahav, Hamishim Shnot, p. 479.
 Mohsen Mohammad Saleh, History of Palestine: A Methodical Study of the Palestinian Struggle (Cairo: Al-Falah Foundation, 2003), p. 99; Itani and Manna, The Suffering of the Palestinian Refugee, pp. 44-5.
 Joan Peters, From Time Immemorial, The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict over Palestine (Tel Aviv: Hakibutz Hamuahad, 2003), p. 75; Adi Schwartz, “Hurban Kehilot Artsot Arav: Hahazon Shenignaz,” Tchelet, May 11, 2011, pp. 34-5.
 Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 265-6; Ada Aharoni, “Ha-Hagira Ha-Kfuya shel Ha-Yehudim ve-Hashalom,” International Forum for the Literature and Culture of Peace, accessed Nov. 24, 2011.
 Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 303-9.
 Samih K. Farsoun with Christina E. Zacharia, Palestine and the Palestinians (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 137.
 Itani and Manna, The Suffering of the Palestinian Refugee, pp. 36, 47-8.
 Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 219-21; Schwartz, “Hurban,” p. 29.
 Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 252-4; Schwartz, “Hurban,” p. 36.
 Shaul Bartal, The Fedayeen Emerge: The Palestine–Israel Conflict, 1949-1956 (Bloomington: Author House, 2011) pp. 135-8; H. Byroade, the American Ambassador in Cairo to the State Department, Mar. 4, 1955. U.S. National Archive, RG 884.86/3-455.
 Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 251-64.
 Elihu Birnbaum, Yehudi Olami (Jerusalem: Makor Reshon, 2010), pp. 268-79.
 Alex Sholem, “Come Home: Gaddafi’s Son Invites Libyan Jews to Return,” The Jewish News, Apr. 16, 2004.
 Natan A. Shuraki, Korot Ha-Yehudim Betsfon Africa (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975), pp. 246-7; Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 178-97, 271-4, 283-5.
 Aharoni, “Ha-Hagira Ha-Kfuya“; Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, pp. 278-80.
 Yocheved Weintraub, ed., Irgunei Ha-Mehablim (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, Feb. 1974), pp. 58-9.
 Hans Lebrecht, Ha-Palestinaim – Avar Ve-Hoveh (Tel-Aviv: University Publishers, 1987), pp. 188-9.
 “The Unification Conference,” The Active Committee of the Israeli Communist Party (MAK’I), Haifa, Oct. 22-23, 1948, pp. 24, 36-7; Lebrecht, Ha-Palestinim, p. 189.
 Tovy, Al Miftan, pp. 211-6; Lahav, Hamishim Shnot, pp. 441-2.
 Tovy, Al Miftan, p. 79; Don Peretz, Israel and the Palestine Arabs (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1958), p. 143.
 Suhad Bishara, “Mi-Biza Le-Biza: Israel ve-Rekush Ha-Plitim Ha-Palestinim,” Adalah’s Electronic Monthly, Sept. 2009.
 “Geneva Accord: A Model Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement,” para. 73, accessed Apr. 19, 2013.
 Gilbert, In Ishmael’s House, p. 329.
 Itani and Manna, The Suffering of the Palestinian Refugee, pp. 36-7.
 U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) res. 513, Jan. 26, 1952; UNGA res. 614, Nov. 6, 1952; report of the director, UNRWA, UNGA res. 720, Nov. 27, 1953; Lahav, Hamishim Shnot, pp. 464-9; Zilbershatz and Goren-Amitai, The Return of the Palestinian Refugees, pp. 27-31; Takkenberg, “UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees,” pp. 253-9.
 “Statistics,” UNRWA, New York, accessed Apr. 19, 2013.
 See, for example, Yehuda Shinhav, “Was There a Transfer of Arabian Jews? The Iraqi Jew and National Accounting,” Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), Apr. 10, 1998.
The current economic crisis in Egypt and the attempts to drag the Egyptian army into a war against Iran
The United States of America is trying to force Egypt to enter into a regional war against Iran for the benefit of the countries of the Arab Gulf region and Tel Aviv. Hence, the United States of America and its other partners in the international monetary and financial institutions are putting pressure on Cairo in this regard, through the arbitrary policies of the International Monetary Fund and its major shareholders. And on top of them: the United States of America, Britain, France and Germany, as an attempt to oblige Cairo to agree with them to confront Iran, and with Egypt having to resort to the International Monetary Fund for the fourth time since 2016, after that game of American, Israeli and Western intelligence in confronting the Egyptian army to force it to confront Iran, after the game of withdrawing a number of major international investors from the country for purely intelligence, political and military reasons in favor of the goal of confrontation. with the Tehran regime. This coincided with the practice of Washington and the Western powers, through their arms in Cairo, of several artificial economic crises, such as the shortage of foreign currency in the Egyptian market, the weakness of the Egyptian pound, the rise in inflation rates, and others.
For its part, the United States is trying to gather more allies in its war against Iran. In this regard, it is trying to persuade the European Union to join its alliance in the war against Tehran. Perhaps the big gap in the front of the United States of America remains the European Union, through which the Iranian regime wants to penetrate in order to weaken the American and Israeli position that is motivated and mobilized towards the danger of war. Perhaps because of the refusal of the countries of the European Union and the countries of the NATO military alliance to bow to the American and Israeli demands to enter into direct military confrontations against Iran, it was the main direct reason for the threat of former US President “Trump” to expel the United States from NATO membership and to keep Europe alone in front of the Russian threat, which might force the countries of the European Union, from the point of view of “Trump”, at the time to modify the views of the countries of the European Union and the countries of the NATO military alliance.
From my analytical point of view, what is happening in the region in terms of the American and Israeli attempt to mobilize against Iran with Gulf support, and the attempt to drag the Egyptian army to fight without its direct interest at the present time to confront mainly with Tehran, is a war with different faces and multiple players, but Iran remains the field. The main conflict is in a war fueled by central banks, the economic structure, oil, banking and trade at all levels.
On the other hand, the options available to Iran seem limited to confront the specter of the American-Israeli-Gulf war in confronting it, in addition to the ongoing economic war and the growing threats against it. The options against Tehran appear to be all accompanied by risks and risks. Internally, Iran has to convince its people to bear the policy of austerity, and externally, the Iranian regime is counting on the support of China, Russia, and the armed militias that support it in the countries of the region, perhaps to threaten through it to ignite the situation throughout the region and hint at the danger of the straits and sea lanes in the Red Sea. On top of them are the Straits of Bab al-Mandab and Hormuz and the Gulf of Aden. This may make the situation more complicated for America, Israel and their other allies in the event of entering into any uncalculated military confrontations with Iran, which Egypt and President El-Sisi are well aware of the enormity of engaging in any potential clashes with the Tehran regime.
The point of view of Egyptian President “Abdel Fattah El-Sisi”, as a former military intelligence man, and the Egyptian army, and their response to any attempts to enter into military confrontations with Tehran and try to convince the Arab Gulf states of that, is (the cost of war), in the sense of what the countries of the entire Gulf region and the region will incur by waging a similar war. guerrilla warfare and armed militias. As the issue of establishing and supporting armed militias in the countries of the region has become something that everyone knows and does not need proof. And the matter is not limited to Shiite militias backed by Iran, such as: (Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthis in Yemen), but Iran will also find, in the event that America, Israel and the Gulf enter military confrontations with it, great and direct support from Al-Qaeda and the nearby Taliban movement in Afghanistan. Borders with Tehran, and there are reports indicating the Iranian regime’s complicity with the terrorist organization of “ISIS”, and all of these organizations will be used once in the event of a military confrontation with Iran, and Iran will inevitably resort to re-enriching uranium very quickly and developing ballistic weapons and missiles to confront the imminent war. The entire Gulf and region will be destroyed, as well as the movement of the straits and sea lanes will be affected and the entire international trade movement will be paralyzed, and the security of Egypt, the region and the Suez Canal will be affected, which will disrupt the global trade movement.
And in light of the outbreak of any war against Iran, the Iranian decision-maker will be forced here to resort to and use these militias and armed groups, as a pressure card on neighboring countries, the United States of America and the Gulf. Based on this option, it is likely that the pace of terrorist operations will increase in the countries of the region in the coming period of time. This is clearly understood by President El-Sisi and the Egyptian army, so he distances himself from entering into any confrontations or clashes with Iran, not to push for the complete destruction of the region in favor of Israel in the first place, as it is the only beneficiary of that war, to spread chaos and unrest throughout the region, including the Gulf countries and Arab supporter of the war against Iran.
Perhaps that economic crisis fabricated by the West in the face of Egypt, its indirect result was that American and Western call through their monetary institutions, of the need to restore foreign direct investment as a real way out of the current crisis after the flight of investments estimated at about 20 billion dollars from investment in the Egyptian debt, according to intelligence reasons. Purely, as I mentioned in my analysis, because of the attempt of the extreme right and hardliners in Israel to enter into direct military confrontations with Iran with the generous support of the Gulf countries, and their attempt to drag the Egyptian army and involve it by force to defend Tel Aviv’s malicious dreams of bringing Cairo into serious military confrontations with the Tehran regime. Perhaps this is what the International Monetary Fund declared explicitly in favor of Washington mainly and in support of Tel Aviv’s hard-right policies, by announcing that Egypt will be affected by the global repercussions of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with a funding gap of $17 billion over the coming years. This is the same as what “Ivana Hollar”, head of the International Monetary Fund’s mission to Egypt, declared:
“The reform program of the authorities in Egypt must give a greater role to the private sector, which is urgent, and it is very important that the state ownership policy be approved at the highest levels, including by the president”
This is what Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi understood with the mentality of a military intelligence man, as a former head of the Military Intelligence Service in Egypt, by trying to exert maximum American and Israeli pressure on Cairo in order to enter into a confrontation with unsafe consequences to confront Iran, by giving “El-Sisi” his orders to form a “crisis committee”, to follow the situation on a weekly basis as soon as the Russian invasion of Ukraine begins, as well as current events. President El-Sisi also instructed the army to provide food commodities to citizens, after President Putin’s war against Ukraine caused the largest global food crisis, if we add to it those reprehensible American and Israeli attempts to force the Egyptian army to enter into direct military confrontations with Tehran. Perhaps this was one of the main reasons, from my analytical point of view and my reading of the general political and economic scene in Egypt, behind those tours that Egyptian President “El-Sisi” made in the Arab Gulf region, specifically those presidential tours to (Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Qatar).
Then, the Egyptian government, represented by the “Egyptian Council of Ministers”, issued an official report issued, based on directives and presidential orders from President El-Sisi to address the Egyptian people, in a framework of transparency to address in this report the most important issues related to the general economic situation in the Egyptian state during the year 2022. Specifically, and in the context of the official report issued by the Egyptian Council of Ministers, 17 main claims and allegations were answered, in terms of (the size of the external debt, the state’s general budget, the exchange rate, the state’s credit rating, as well as the feasibility of national projects, the terms of the Monetary Fund loan, and the rise in prices. Crisis in the situation in banks), and other issues that occupied the Egyptian street during the last period.
This brings us to the general political scene in Tel Aviv, and that successive Israeli pressure on the regimes of the Arab Gulf states for a possible and imminent attack on Iran, and perhaps that is the main reason for the use of an Israeli extreme right-wing government at the present time, which facilitated the Israeli Prime Minister “Benjamin Netanyahu” to form an alliance that is the largest of its kind in the history of Tel Aviv is the far-right parties and the religious extremists, who are pushing for the inevitable confrontation with the Tehran regime to protect the interests of Tel Aviv.
Where the Israeli hard-right, led by Israeli Prime Minister “Benjamin Netanyahu”, raises many slogans in the direction of war against Iran, including: preserving the security of the region, assisting the Gulf countries that have signed peace agreements with Israel and others, such as the UAE and Bahrain, and indirect support for Saudi Arabia in the wake of these multiple Houthi attacks on Saudi oil facilities, and the Iranian-backed Houthi militias targeting Saudi Aramco facilities in the Red Sea, which Iran denied, in addition to the “Netanyahu” government’s promotion in Israel towards war among most segments of Israeli society, under many and varied allegations, such as: stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and promoting that this has become one of Israel’s most important priorities in its foreign policy.
In the event of a confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah, the turmoil emanating from Syria and the control of ISIS, which has swept the greater part of the region, will reach directly to the Egyptian border. This particular development was raised by President El-Sisi in an official and popular public speech to him, emphasizing:
“We do not need additional complications related to Iran and Hezbollah”, adding: “I am against war, as crises can be resolved through dialogue”
This confirms the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s endeavor to avoid the region witnessing any tensions, especially between the Arab Gulf and Iran, or witnessing further escalation with the help of Washington and Tel Aviv. Egyptian President “Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi” left no doubts about his position, assuring that:
“The Middle East does not need security in the Gulf, which constitutes a red line. We believe in Egypt that any threat to the Gulf states also affects our national security”, with President El-Sisi acknowledging in several official speeches to him, that:
“Security in the Gulf constitutes a red line, and we believe in Egypt that any threat to the Gulf states also affects our national security”
Tel Aviv, along with Washington, has also become involved in promoting between the countries of the region and the Gulf, primarily about the feasibility of a military war against Iran, and exporting a file for Israel’s fear of Iran’s interference in countries close to its borders, with leaks that Tehran has supplied a group of ballistic missiles and precision ammunition to its proxies in “Hezbollah group” in Lebanon and in Syria as well. Therefore, Israel announces its fear of the nuclear agenda to produce nuclear weapons for Iran and the equipment that carries it as a threat to the security and safety of the entire region and the Gulf in particular as an ally of the Tel Aviv regime through normalization and peace agreements with it. Hence, the attempts of Israeli intelligence and its Mossad apparatus to strike a number of nuclear reactors in the Iranian city of Isfahan are attempts that the Israelis are promoting internally, regionally and internationally, as a “part of Israel’s attempts to strike Iranian capabilities and prevent them from supporting their proxy groups in the region”
The fundamental question remains here, when talking about how all regional and international parties view the extent of support that China and Russia can provide to the Iranian regime in the event of war with Israel and the Gulf, with direct US-Western support? The answer to this question will make us analyze the reasons for Washington’s efforts to curry favor with the political system in Egypt in the first place, through the visit of US Secretary of State “Anthony Blinken” to Cairo and then his departure to Tel Aviv as part of the American game of moves and probing the pulse of Egypt and the countries of the region. Perhaps relying on Chinese and Russian support for Iran will be one of the strongest cards that the Iranians bet on, especially given the existence of vital and necessary Egyptian and Gulf interests with the Chinese and Russians in the first place. This is what China stated directly, that it is likely to continue buying Iranian oil after the conclusion of the second phase of sanctions against Tehran in November 2018. “Mohsen Karimi”, as deputy governor of the Central Bank of Iran, confirmed in official statements published to him in the Persian media on Monday, January 30, 2023, that (Iran and Russia) have linked the communication and transfer systems of their banks to each other, to help promote commercial and financial transactions under the sway of Tehran and Moscow to Western sanctions.
This Russian financial and economic support for Iran has been mainly since the re-imposition of US sanctions on Iran in 2018, after Washington withdrew from the nuclear agreement concluded between them in 2015, which was mainly between Tehran and the world powers, after which Iran was separated from the “Swift” financial network, as an International Bank Transfers, which is headquartered in Belgium. The similar restrictions have been imposed on a large number of Russian banks since Moscow’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022. This is what was confirmed by “Mohsen Karimi”, deputy governor of the Central Bank of Iran, in a public challenge to Washington and the West with the help of China and Russia, by stressing that:
“Iranian banks no longer need to use the Swift system for transfers and financial transactions with their Russian counterparts, which can all the parties may open letters of credit, transfers or joint guarantees between the two parties”
This was confirmed by the Russian Central Bank, in agreement with the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Iran, “Mohsen Karimi”, stressing that “about 700 Russian banks and 106 non-Russian banks from 13 different countries will be linked to a new credit and banking system.” This is without going into details about the names of foreign banks that will accept such banking and financial trading away from the global financial system of “SWIFT” for financial and monetary trading, which is officially approved internationally.
This is precisely understood from him, as the Chinese and Russians did not leave Iran alone in the midst of the danger or the wind of any imminent military war against them. Perhaps, in this case, Russia will try to take revenge on Washington and Tel Aviv with generous military and economic support for Iran, especially in light of its facing sanctions by the United States of America and the European Union.
This brings us to the political scene in Egypt in a more precise and objective manner, emphasizing the smooth and clear vision of the Egyptian approach in Cairo, and that Egypt actually does not share the concern of the Gulf countries about the West’s nuclear agreement with Iran, just as Egypt did not adopt the assessment expressed by the United States of America that Iran It supports terrorism, in addition to the fact that Egypt plays a very conservative role in the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis, who are sympathetic to Iran.
Hence, we conclude, based on our reading and analysis of the general scene, that this economic crisis in Egypt is fabricated by the Americans, Israelis, Westerners, and even the Gulf states, to push the Egyptian army, as the strongest armies in the region, to bear the cost and burden of the war, which is not fundamental to Egyptian interests on behalf of everyone. precedent for Egypt, in addition to the withdrawal of a number of foreign investors, mainly, suddenly and at once, and at the same precise and sensitive time from the Egyptian financial market within the framework of “pressuring the Egyptian regime, in order to respond to the conditions of the International Monetary Fund, and those in charge of it politically and economically in the first place, who are Washington and its allies in the West, As a part of a systematic campaign against Egypt and its army to bear the cost and burden of the war against Iran on behalf of Israel, the Gulf and everyone, and in favor of competition between Washington, Beijing and Moscow as allies of Iran in the Middle East.
The Netanyahu’s return
A highly diverse company – Palestinians, Arab countries, retired military, the US, which has its own interests in the Middle East, and even the Israelis themselves, is opposing the most radical right-wing government in Israeli history.
The Israeli top brass is seriously concerned about what they see as a possible encroachment by the government of Binyamin Netanyahu into their area of responsibility by expanding the powers of a number of far-right ministers. The IDF believes this could adversely affect the armed forces and lead to chaos in strategic decision-making.
Chief of General Staff Aviv Kochavi, resigning, told Netanyahu that the situation in the army is intolerable – in fact, two ministers now head the Defense Ministry, and the military does not understand who to obey. The IDF leadership opposes the re-subordination of the civil administration and the Palestinian Territories Government Coordinator Office to the head of the Religious Zionism Party, Betsalel Smotrich, who claims to be an “additional” or “junior minister” in the Israel Ministry of Defense.
The army is also dissatisfied with the possible granting the right to command the Israel Border Police (Magav) to Itamar Ben-Gvir, a leader of the Otzma Yehudit party and Minister of National Security. Such an innovation, according to the General Staff, not only disrupts the command chain, but also undermines the authority of the Central District generals.
Another feature by the far-right relats to the desire of the country’s Chief Rabbinate to grant itself the right to appoint the IDF rabbi, and this is supposedly dictated by the need to correct the “questionable moral situation within the army.” In a message to Netanyahu, General Kochavi urged the Prime Minister to first consult with professional military personnel before making a final decision. Netanyahu promised to look into it before making a decision.
The current military was supported by some 1,197 retirees, including Dan Halutz, who served as Chief of Staff in 2005–2007, former commander of the Israeli Air Force Avihu Ben-Nun and former head of the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate Amos Yadlin. In a letter to the Supreme Court, the Office of the State Attorney and other Israeli justice bodies, they asked to “stop the calamity that is engulfing the country”, referring to the far-right who won the elections.
A third intifada threat
But this is not the only and perhaps not the biggest problem caused by the return of the far-right to power. As we know, bloody clashes between the IDF and armed Palestinian militants have long been commonplace in the occupied Arab territories. But a third intifada is out of the question as long as Palestinian factions are divided. But that could all change if radical Israeli ministers deliberately provoke the Palestinians into action.
This is “outrageous” politicians especially true such as Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, who forbid displaying the Palestinian flag in public places, or actually storm the Al-Aqsa Mosque on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, which, we should remember, is Islam’s third most important holy place. As for Hamas, it has so far refrained from firing rockets at Israel, but this has not prevented it from organising Palestinian resistance. Therefore, the mobilisation of various Palestinian factions for the intifada cannot be ruled out, and this is a very dangerous moment.
According to the UN, last year was the deadliest since 2006, when more than 170 Palestinians were killed, including 30 children. By comparison, only 20 people were killed in terrorist attacks in Israel. The situation is standard: violence in response to violence. Besides, it is clear what can be expected if the Israeli policy towards the Palestinians under the new government has only got tougher.
Netanyahu’s allies claim that he is trying to avoid conflict as much as possible, but if events continue to unfold as they have recent weeks, it cannot be ruled out that the situation will get out of the Prime Minister’s control.
Israeli indignation has also been sparked by the Netanyahu government’s intentions to encroach on the judiciary foundations. The plan of Minister of Justice, Yariv Levin, a member of the right-wing Likud party, is to pass a law that would make it possible to set aside the Supreme Court decisions. Levin considers the present judicial system reform to be sound, for it would, in his view, give too many rights to judges and legal advisers, for whom no one voted.
The judiciary reform opponents, among them the former Minister of Justice, Gideon Sa’ar, believe that if the reform bill is passed by the Knesset, it will lead to a “regime change” in Israel: a partial democracy instead it will be an openly authoritarian government. Netanyahu’s enemies are certain that the new cabinet has deliberately opted for a judicial reform in order to protect the returning prime minister from prosecution.
As we know, power corruption and abuse several criminal cases were opened against Netanyahu even before his re-election.
Former Prime Minister Yair Lapid also criticized the judicial reforms, arguing that “regime change” could lead to a civil war. Then the Ministry of Defense former head Benny Gantz, called on Israelis to “march en masse and make the country tremble” – some ninety thousand people followed his call.
After Israel’s most right-wing government came to power, Washington has serious concerns about Tel Aviv’s plans to permanently annex the West Bank. The US administration is convinced that the legalisation of dozens of Israeli settlements in the occupied territory undermines hopes for an independent Palestinian state.
Recall: when Washington pushed the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan as well as the Saudis to normalise relations with Israel, it promised to give the Palestinians statehood in return. Now it turns out that Tel Aviv is not eager to facilitate the emergence of a Palestinian state, but will continue to try to expand ties with the Arabs — especially with the rich countries of the Persian Gulf.
However, these countries, too, are disappointed with the rise of right-wing politicians to power in Tel Aviv and openly declare that the normalisation of relations with Israel has been one-sided and extremely ugly. This is not what was expected when the Abraham Accords was signed. Perhaps this is why the Palestinians perceive the Agreement as a betrayal.
In any case, the hatred and contempt shown by the new Israeli government for the Palestinians is the reason why Sultan of Oman, Haitham bin Tariq, refused to ratify the relations a law that will ban normalizing relations with Israel. Although until a couple of months ago, the Sultanate was considered next in line to sign Abraham Accords with Israel. The Israelis attribute this to a change in Oman’s political orientation in favour of Iran.
Between Kyiv and Moscow
After Netanyahu’s team won the elections, it was thought that Bibi would begin to mend relations with Moscow, which his predecessor Naftali Bennett had almost reduced to a plinth. Indeed, shortly after New Year’s Eve Foreign Minister Eli Cohen phoned his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. Their conversation was not made public and they do not say much about it in Moscow or Tel Aviv. Nevertheless, that telephone conversation very fact gave the reason for the foreign affairs Kyiv minister Dmitriy Kuleba to declare that Netanyahu’s cabinet was changing its foreign policy towards Russia.
Meanwhile, there has been no particular change, although Netanyahu did say after he was elected that Israel would limit its aid to Ukraine to humanitarian aid. In reality, mercenaries are still coming from Israel to Ukraine and Israeli specialists, together with Americans, are testing new weapons in the war zone, course, while they are in Ukrainian combat ranks.
It would not be a bad idea to deal with the Israeli “humanitarian aid”, which in addition to body armour and helmets, includes electronic anti-drone weapons and air-raid warning devices.
In short, what Netanyahu wants from Moscow is for the Kremlin not to react too painfully to Israeli strikes on Syria and the Iranian installations on its territory. However, such strikes may over time become more destructive and one day may even go nuclear.
This is not a silly joke. Tzachi Hanegbi spelt the head of the National Security Council this out Council, at the Chief of General Staff change ceremony (General Herzi Halevi was replacing Aviv Kochavi, who was retiring). He said that if everyone turns their backs on Israel and Israel is left alone, it will do everything to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state, and therefore it will deal a crushing blow to its nuclear facilities.
Recall: Palestinians fire rockets into Israeli territory after an Israeli military operation. The Iron Dome went off. The Israeli army reports the interception of at least two rockets. The situation escalated after the Israelis carried out a surprise and swift operation in the West Bank. Backed by armoured vehicles, the military entered the town of Jenin and eliminated several members of the Islamic Jihad terrorist group.
Locals clashed with the Israelis but suffered casualties. Nine Arabs were killed and dozens wounded. The Palestinian Authority deemed the operation an illegal invasion of its territory and said it could no longer hold a political dialogue with Tel Aviv.
The Israeli Air Force struck Hamas training centres. Aircraft and drone strikes were carried out.
On Friday evening, Israeli police reported a terrorist attack on a synagogue in East Jerusalem. Local media reported that at least eight people were killed and 10 injured in the Neve Yaakov area. The police later specified that the victims were seven.
*It should be recalled that Israel has never officially announced that it has nuclear weapons.
Why and How the EU Should Take Command of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process
January has proved to be a bloody start to the year in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. An Israeli raid on January 26 in the West Bank left nine dead – the deadliest single day in more than a year – raising the January death toll to 30. A day later, a Palestinian gunman killed seven Israelis and wounded three others outside a synagogue in Jerusalem. Hamas in the Gaza Strip has joined the clashes by launching rockets into Israeli territory.
Meanwhile, the United States, seen as the international leader in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, called for the two sides to de-escalate the mounting tension. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has leveraged his pre-planned trip in the region to speak directly with Israeli and Palestinian leaders to prevent more bloodshed. Blinken’s visit with leaders might help ease the situation in the interim – but it is more akin to placing a Band-Aid on a hemorrhaging wound.
President Joe Biden has worked to highlight the American commitment to the two-state solution upon taking office in January 2021 and to distance himself from Donald Trump’s controversial approach to the region. But, besides reversing the diplomatic rhetoric, the Biden Administration has not veered far away Trump’s regional policies, nor has it made any groundbreaking advancements vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. And it is not likely that Biden will seek to prop up negotiations any time soon, since the Israeli-Palestinian conflict currently sits low on America’s foreign policy agenda.
However, the wound caused by the continuous cycle of violence in Israel and Palestine needs effective leadership to stitch it up and stop the bleeding. If the United States is no longer able or willing to serve as the bulwark of peace negotiations, it is time for a new leader to take the reins. One of America’s partners in the Quartet on the Middle East – the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and Russia – have the diplomatic history and power to help pave the road to new negotiations.
Of the three, the EU is the most natural fit to replace the United States. The UN now finds itself unable to create any progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front, most often due to the United States vetoing any resolution it views as unfavorable to its ally Israel. Since it invaded Ukraine, Russia has become a pariah state in the international community and lacks the legitimacy to solve a dispute as high-profile as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Conversely, the EU has substantial diplomatic engagement with Israel and Palestine, has dedicated “considerable time and sources to address the conflict,” and has the necessary legitimacy to act as an international negotiator.
For the moment, the EU’s diplomatic corps is extensively focused on the outbreak of war on the continent, which could dilute its engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian theater. The war in Ukraine, however, should not distract diplomats from pursuing a resolution to what some argue is “one of the world’s most intractable and geopolitical conflicts.” For over two decades, analysts have consistently labeled Israel and Palestine as potential flashpoints for large-scale violence. The EU even communicated as recently as 2021 that the Union “should renew efforts to reach a settlement in the [Israeli-Palestinian] Peace Process.” While the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may not be as geographically close to Europeans as the war in Ukraine, it should deserve equal weight in terms of diplomatic importance.
First and foremost, forging a peace plan will require the EU to balance its diplomatic capabilities to manage a solution for both the war in Ukraine and the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Historically, the European community has successfully juggled the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with other pressing subjects on its diplomatic agenda. During the Cold War, the European Community – the EU’s precursor – was busy grappling with how to handle relations with the Communist bloc. Still, the EC coordinated its efforts to release the 1971 Schumann Document, the 1977 London declaration, and the 1980 Venice Declaration. These documents and statements called for the Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, creating a Palestinian homeland, and establishing concrete parameters for solving regional disputes, respectively. While war raged on the European continent in the 1990s, the EU balanced its priorities effectively to seek a resolution to the Kosovo War while also working towards ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the Berlin Declaration in March 1999. This EU declaration reaffirmed the organization’s commitment to recognizing Palestine as a state in due course.
Second, the EU must establish deeper connections with civil society in Israel and Palestine. International legitimacy is necessary to solve disputes, but Israelis and Palestinians also need to have faith in who is leading the reconciliation effort. Israelis have, in recent years, viewed the EU with skepticism. Only 42 percent of Israelis in a 2021 EU poll stated they had a “positive view” of the organization. For Palestinians, there has been an increasing sense of feeling “abandoned” by Western governments in recent years. The EU does have an advantage in establishing closer ties with Palestinian society, as a reported 57 percent of respondents in another 2021 EU poll have a positive view of the Union. Direct engagement with civil society and increasing trust will help create fresh approaches to resolving the conflict and allow the EU to better understand the short- and long-term needs of individuals.
Third, the EU must leverage regional partners to push for reconciliation between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The 2007 split between Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank has become a considerable roadblock toward a two-state solution. Any path leading to Palestinian statehood must re-unite the Palestinian cause into one cohesive unit. Doing so will cross off a necessary pre-requisite to generate a new Israeli-Palestinian peace framework. Yet, the EU has listed Hamas as a terrorist organization and maintains a zero-contact policy with the entity. Working with regional actors, such as Egypt and Turkey, who have direct links to both Hamas and the PA, can help push the two parties to the negotiating table to work towards a political settlement.
These three steps are by no means revolutionary in the history of Middle East peace negotiations, but they are necessary given the current environment. By increasing the diplomatic importance of the crisis, creating deeper overtures into civil society, and leveraging partners to mend the Hamas-PA schism, the EU can help lay the preliminary foundations for a new peace plan. The vicious cycle of violence and status quo ceasefires between the two camps has gone on long enough. The time is now for the EU to flex its diplomatic muscles and be the capstone negotiator in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
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