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A Jewish Majority in the Land of Israel

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Growth trends and population forecasts have played a significant role in the political landscape of the Middle East, especially over the thorny question of Israel and the disputed territories.

The notion that the Jewish majority of Israel is in danger of being swamped by Arab fertility has repeatedly been used as a political and psychological weapon to extract territorial concessions from the Israeli government. In September 2010, U.S. president Barack Obama referred to the so-called “hard realities of demography” that threaten the survival of the Jewish state.[1]

Such a conclusion is wrong. Analysis of long-term demographic developments leads to quite the opposite conclusion: In the long run, a strong Jewish majority, not only in the state of Israel—as this author projected almost twenty-five years ago[2] and the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics recently reaffirmed[3]—but also in the Land of Israel[4] is quite possible.

Middle East Population Annual Growth

It is useful to analyze the processes among world populations in general and in the Middle East and the Arab world in particular. Such scrutiny helps to determine whether demographic trends within the Jewish and Arab population groups living in the Land of Israel differ or resemble the general tendencies observable within the global population over the last sixty plus years, the same general time frame as that of the state of Israel.

Beginning in 1966, the annual population growth in the Middle East rose consistently until it peaked at 3.24 percent in 1980[5] when it began to ebb—at a faster pace than in the developed world.[6] In the subsequent thirty-two years, the Middle East population increase has gone down by more than a half, to 1.45 percent in 2012.

During that same period, the annual growth rate of the Jewish population in Israel was much higher than in developed countries, largely due to the ongoing repatriation of Jews from various countries to Israel.[7] For the same reason, the annual increase of the Israeli Jewish population was, for the most part, higher than the population in less-developed countries. During the times of mass immigration to Israel, the Jewish growth rate was also significantly higher than the aggregated growth rate of Middle Eastern countries.

Since 2003, the annual increase of Jewish Israelis has grown steadily from 1.48 percent to 1.81 percent[8] while the aggregated annual increase of the Middle Eastern countries has decreased to 1.45 percent.

Population Changes among Israelis

After reaching its all-time peak of 2.89 percent in 1951, the natural increase rate of Israeli Jews began to decline, dropping to 1.07 percent by 1995. This sharp decrease was due to the influx of close to 600,000 Jews from the former Soviet Union in 1990-95,[9] which paradoxically lowered the natural increase rate for the Jewish population as it took approximately five years for the new citizens to settle in properly and start families. Thus, despite a lowered natural increase rate, the Jewish population grew in total by 24 percent. By 1995, the total fertility rate[10] of these new Israeli citizens increased, reaching 1.72 children per woman (compared to 2.66 for native-born Israelis), presumably due to their successful absorption into the larger society as well as a continued influx of others from the former Soviet Union along with Ethiopian immigrants during the 1980s and 1990s. Beginning in 1996, the natural increase rate of Israeli Jews has trended upward, rising to 1.5 percent in 2010, increasing by 25.2 percent in one decade.[11] The same natural increase rate of Israeli Jews was also maintained in 2011 and 2012.[12]

At the same time, the trend for Israeli Arabs has moved in the opposite direction. Having reached a peak of 4.41 percent in 1964[13]—a figure significantly higher than that of the rest of the Arab world —the natural increase rate of the Israeli Arabs declined by 37.2 percent from 1964 to 1987.[14] Furthermore, while the natural increase rate for Israeli Jews rose by 41.6 percent from 1995 to 2012, the Arab natural increase rate declined during the same time by 30.6 percent, with the rate in 2012 at its lowest level since 1955.

The main reason for such decline is the rapid decrease in Arab birth rates from 36.4 births per 1,000 in 1998 to 24.7 births in 2012. While the Arab mortality rate also dropped from 3.37 deaths per 1,000 in 1995 to 2.69 in 2010, it has risen to 2.78 deaths per 1,000 in 2012.

Population Age Structure

These demographic developments have an impact on the proportion of Israeli Jews versus Israeli Arabs. As a result of declining fertility, significant changes in the age structure of the Israeli Arab population have taken place during the past fifteen years.

For example, in 2000, the number of Israeli Arabs born was 39,579 (including 34,667 Muslims).[15] By 2012, the number of Israeli Arab newborns was 40,080 (35,730 Muslim).[16] The number of children born within the Jewish population rose from 90,900 in 2000 to 125,492 in 2012 and in the expanded Jewish population, which includes Jews, any population not classified by religion, and non-Arab Christians, from 94,327 to 130,460 in 2012. Thus the share of babies born to Jews increased from 67.9 percent in 2000 to 73.6 percent and of expanded Jewish population from 70.4 percent to 76.5 percent in 2012.

Taking a broader view, the number of Jewish children in the 0-4 age cohort rose by 26.7 percent while that of Arab children in this group rose by a mere 1.9 percent.[17] Thus, the share of Jewish toddlers within the general population increased from 68.2 to 72.8 percent and of the expanded Jewish population from 70.7 to 75.6 percent in 2012.

The shape of the age structure presented in Figure 3 clearly shows that the younger the age, the more the number of Jews increases while the number of Arabs either decreases or remains stable.

While in 2012 there were 81,600 21-year-old Jews (86,300 expanded Jewish population), their number steadily and continuously grew for the younger ages: 125,492 Jewish babies (130,460 for expanded Jewish population) born in 2012. By contrast, there were 31,100 21-year-old Arabs and 40,080 newly born Arabs in 2012—a smaller relative increase than their Jewish counterparts.

There were 98,100 Jews (or 2.38 per every Arab) at the age of “9” when the Arab population reached its peak for all ages—41,300 people. When checking this proportion of each age group down to age “0”, this ratio continuously increases, up to 3.13 Jews for every Arab at the “age 0” group.

The share of Jews among the “0” age group reached 73.6 percent compared to the lowest share of 67.4 percent at the age of “11.” The expanded Jewish population among age group “0” reached 76.5 percent (compared to the 70.4 percent at the age of “11”), or 3.25 children for every Arab child. Such developments started influencing the Israeli education system because the share of Hebrew education pupils among all pupils in the first grade began increasing in the 2008-09 school year. Taking into account the numbers of babies born in 2012, there will be at least 76.5 percent Hebrew-education first-grade pupils in the 2018-19 school year. The addition of the children of new immigrants (olim) will enhance this proportion still further.

Another way to look at the population dynamics of the two groups is to examine the other end of the aging spectrum. Israel’s Jewish population share of the 65+ age group was 88.5 percent (91.8 percent for expanded Jewish population) in 2012 versus 8.2 percent for the Arabs. Taking into consideration that the 45-75 age group of 2012 will belong to the 65+ age group of 2032, the share of the Jews in this age group would diminish to 81.7 percent (86.5 percent for expanded Jewish population), while the share of Arabs would increase to 13.5 percent, 64.8 percent larger than it was in 2012. The share of the Israeli Muslims at the 65+ age group will increase even more drastically, by 75.5 percent, from 6 percent in 2012 to 10.5 percent in 2032. In other words, during the last ten years, the share of Israeli Jews versus Israeli Arabs within the overall young Israeli population has increased, indicating that the Jewish population has started to become younger while the Israeli Arab population is getting older. With existing life expectancies factored in, the natural aging of Israeli Arab “baby boomers” will significantly increase their mortality level over the next two decades, causing an accelerating decline in the overall Arab natural increase rate.

Continuation of current trends will result in a convergence in 2025 of the natural increase rate for Jews and Arabs in Israel. For the first time in the modern history of the Land of Israel, the Arab natural increase rate may not be higher but rather equal to the natural increase rate of the Jews. Given the possibility of continued Jewish immigration, one can expect an intensification of the steadily rising Jewish share of the total population of the Land of Israel.

This trend becomes even more pronounced when studying the population of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, which until recently had been under Israeli administration and is now either part of the Palestinian Authority—dominated by the Palestine Liberation Organization—or a quasi-independent Hamas enclave.

Under the Israeli administration (1967-93), the natural increase rate of the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza Strip rose markedly from 2.52 percent in 1965 to peak at 4.21 percent in 1989.[18] However, over the next two decades, it declined noticeably to 2.88 percent in 2012. [19] It appears that the decline in the Palestinian natural increase rate in Judea and Samaria is accelerating even faster than among Israeli Arabs.

Combined with a massive emigration of Arab youth from these territories, especially from Judea and Samaria, the size of the younger age group will be reduced and coincidentally, the elderly age cohort of the population will increase, resulting in an increased mortality rate in the near future. Following these trends, the natural increase rate of Arabs in Judea and Samaria will be decreasing even faster.

Migration Balance and Population Annual Growth

Any proper analysis of demographic developments in the Land of Israel must take into account the critical role of the migration balance. Aliya—Jewish repatriation—has been a significant factor in narrowing the difference between Jewish and Arab natural increase rates. For example, while in 1990, the natural increase rate for Jews was equal to only 1.29 percent, their annual growth, due to immigration, was 6.18 percent, more than twice as high as the Arab natural increase for that year.

 

From 2008 to 2011, Jewish immigration to Israel rose 30 percent.[20] An analysis of immigration patterns reveals some surprising data about the countries of origin of these émigrés and points to future developments with important consequences.

 

In 2010, Israel ranked 15 out of 169 on the Human Development Index (HDI)—a comparative measure used to rank countries by life expectancy, education levels, and standard of living.[21] While about a million and a quarter Jews live in twenty countries with an HDI lower than Israel, another eight countries with significant Jewish populations (about 6,500,000) have a higher HDI than Israel.[22]

 

In 2000-10, 284,907 new immigrants moved to Israel alongside 44,639 returning expatriates.[23] Not surprisingly, about 87 percent of the newcomers came from countries with an HDI lower than Israel’s—59.4 percent of all repatriates came from the former Soviet Union, 10.2 percent from Ethiopia, and 4.1 percent from Argentina.[24] Only 13.5 percent came from countries with a higher HDI such as the United States or France. Yet in the first ten months of 2011, the largest growth of repatriation to Israel (compared to the previous decade) came from countries with a higher HDI: Their share of the total immigrant population more than doubled. Twenty-nine percent of these immigrants came from eight developed countries, 14.6 percent from the United States and 10.3 percent from France.

 

It may very well be that a combination of factors contributed to this change. The recent world economic crisis may be one. According to Reuters: “Employees of universities and researchers are among the biggest sufferers of economic slowdown in the United States … As a result, universities are cutting their budgets and staff, and many researchers are going home.”[25]

 

The other likely contributor is a rising wave of anti-Semitism, especially in Western Europe. According to Benjamin Jacobs, Holland’s chief rabbi, “the future for Dutch Jewry is moving to Israel.”[26] Relentless harassment in the south Swedish city of Malmö has driven most of its Jewish population out of the city, or even the country.[27] Recent years also have seen increasing numbers of Jews moving to Israel from France and the United Kingdom. There have been reports of Muslims assaulting Jews in Norway and Denmark and stone-tossing Arabs driving Jewish dancers from a stage in Germany.[28] A recent poll found that 38 percent of Muslim youth in Austria agree that “Hitler had done a lot of good for the people.”[29]

 

A spring 2008 survey by the Pew Research Center’s Pew Global Attitudes Project finds

 

46% of the Spanish rating Jews unfavorably. More than a third of Russians (34%) and Poles (36%) echo this view. Somewhat fewer, but still significant numbers of the Germans (25%) and French (20%) interviewed also express negative opinions of Jews. These percentages are all higher than obtained in comparable Pew surveys taken in recent years. In a number of countries, the increase has been especially notable between 2006 and 2008.[30]

 

This situation has brought increasing numbers of Jews to Israel. According to data from 2012 published by the Israeli Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, the majority of olim continued to come from Europe (10,088, 49.4 percent of all immigrants), and the numbers rose by 30 percent in 2008-12.

 

The immigration from France with 1,923 individuals (9.4 percent of all immigrants) in 2012 remained steadily in third place from Europe after Russia (3,566, 17.5 percent of all immigrants) and Ukraine (2,100, 10.3 percent). Former USSR countries accounted for 35.9 percent of all immigrants to Israel in 2012. From 2008 through 2012, repatriation from Russia rose by 32.4 percent and from Ukraine even more by 58.9 percent.

 

A significant number of immigrants came from the United Kingdom (641, 3.1 percent). Repatriation from Scandinavian countries rose by 65.8 percent and from Italy by 161.9 percent; the increase from Holland was 22.2 percent and from Belgium, 24.6 percent. However, the most impressive growth of immigration during these four years came from Spain, by 232.1 percent.[31]

 

If these conditions persist, Israel may experience a substantial aliya wave into the near future, including an influx of skilled professionals, a welcome addition to Israel’s fast developing economy. The recent discoveries of huge gas deposits create an enormous momentum for the Israeli economy that is bound to change the geopolitical situation in the Middle East.

 

Many Israeli expatriates may also seriously consider returning to the Jewish state. During the years 2000-10, the number of returning Israelis was 21.3 percent higher than the previous decade. These developments would lead to a further increase in the annual growth of the Jewish population.

 

Of equal importance are emigration trends of the Arab population that began long before the 1967 Six-Day War. Demographer Justin McCarthy has estimated that about 200,000 Arabs emigrated from Judea and Samaria between 1949 and 1967. “After 1948, Palestinian high fertility and the limited economic potential of the land led to out-migration. The West Bank, in particular, had sizable out-migration from 1948 to 1967… emigration was now large-scale and directed mainly to the Arab world.” Migration rates from Gaza were much lower because until the 1960s, the Egyptian government, which controlled the territory, restricted emigration.[32]

 

According to Mustafa Khawaja, director of the Jerusalem Statistical Department of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS): “The net balance of arrivals and departures for the West Bank in the period 1967 to the present has been consistently negative, with an average of about 10,000 leaving annually … The main reason for migration by Palestinians relates to the economic factors resulting from the political instability and the infighting between the Palestinian parties.”[33] This view is supported by journalist Khaled Abu Toameh who wrote in August 2002:

 

Approximately 80,000 Palestinians have left the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since the beginning of the year (a rise of 50 percent compared to last year), a senior Palestinian Authority official said Monday. The official … told The Jerusalem Post another 50,000 Palestinians are now trying to leave through the Jordan River bridges and the Rafah border crossing [between Gaza and Egypt].[34]

 

Two years later, Egyptian journalist Bissan Edwan stated that “according to Jordan[ian] statistics, at least 150,000 Palestinians left the West Bank during the intifada years from 2000 to 2002 and did not return,” concluding that the economic situation in the Palestinian Authority territories could lead to new waves of emigration. She also dismissed the myth of a demographic time-bomb by noting that net Jewish migration offset the higher Palestinian natural increase and that better access to birth control lowered Palestinian fertility rates.[35] The impact of out-migration was further reinforced by a 2006 poll published by An-Najah University in Nablus, which found that “one in three Palestinians wanted to emigrate. The 1,350 people surveyed in the West Bank and Gaza Strip cited dire economic conditions as the first reason, followed by lawlessness, political deadlock, and fears of civil war.”[36]

 

Arab emigration from Judea and Samaria increased even more in 2007-09. During the first seven months of 2008, the Jordanian-Palestinian border-crossing point located near the Karame bridge registered a negative migration balance of 63,386 people while in the first eight months of 2009, there was reported a negative migration balance of 44,000 people.[37]

 

World Bank figures also indicated a decrease in the size of the Palestinian population, by 0.45 percent in 2009 and by 0.37 percent in 2010.[38] Thus, in 2009-10, the negative migration balance was higher than the natural increase of the Arab population in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip.

 

Population Projections for the Land of Israel

 

It is a well-documented fact that Palestinian population figures as well as Palestinian-supplied growth projections are seriously flawed, rife with double-counting, presumed (and unsubstantiated) mass immigration, inflated birth numbers, and deaths not counted.[39] Considering those issues alongside the emigration trends should lead policymakers in Israel and abroad to a more nuanced view of demographic projections and decisions based upon them.

 

Consider the PCBS’ 2001 annual Statistical Abstract of Palestine.[40] According to its projection, the Arab population in the Palestinian-administered territories would amount to 4,077,981 people in 2005, then increase to 5,027,580 in 2010, to 5,354,988 in 2012, and finally to 6,632,439 in 2020. In fact, at the end of 2005, the actual PCBS population estimate was lower by 315,976 persons than the PCBS projection published just four years earlier.[41]

 

In December 2006, the PCBS proclaimed that the “Palestinian population and the Jewish population [east of the Jordan river] will be equal in 2010 … the Palestinian population will increase to 5.7 million in mid-2010.”[42] The reality was different: At the end of 2010, the PCBS issued a press release claiming that there were actually 4,108,631 Arabs in Palestinian-administered territories,[43] 918,949 less than it had projected in 2001. Similarly, a PCBS press release on December 31, 2012, estimated the Arab population at 4.4 million,[44] a number smaller by 955,000 than it had previously predicted.

 

The recent PCBS projection made at the end of 2012 stated that “the number of Palestinians in historical Palestine will total 7.2 million compared to 6.9 million Jews by the end of 2020.”[45] According to the recent Israel Central Bureau of Statistics projection, there will be about 1.9 million Israeli Arabs in 2020. Reducing this figure from the PCBS projection for all Arab population in historical Palestine in 2020 gives 5.3 million Arabs in Palestinian-administered territories. This estimate is 1,362,439 less than projected by PCBS in 2001.

 

But projections from Palestinian sources are not the only forecasts that need to be adjusted. In October 2007, this author prepared a demographic projection of the Israeli population based on observable trends since the founding of the Jewish state.[46] The resulting numbers, 12,805,000 persons in 2050, fell somewhere between two U.N. population projections—11,942,000 using the high forecast variant and 13,064,000 using the constant fertility rate variant.[47]

 

The author’s projection was based on certain assumptions: That just as in each of the last 120 years, the annual growth of the Jewish population would consist of natural increase as well as immigration. Some of the predictions, however, proved to be far more conservative than what actually transpired. For example, in 2003-10, average annual growth was 14.7 percent higher than originally estimated.[48] The 2007 report had also predicted that the natural increase rate of the Arab citizens of Israel would continue diminishing in the future. In fact, the natural increase rate of Israeli Arabs was 2.2 percent in 2012, 21.1 percent lower than assumed in 2007. In sum, based on the new data, the share of the Jewish population in Israel is expected to decrease to its lowest point of 79.2 percent in 2015, but starting in 2024 may begin to rise up to 81.8 percent of the total population in 2050 and to 83.2 percent by 2059.

 

Further, it is reasonable to conclude that an existing trend of growing natural increase in the Jewish non-ultra-Orthodox population will continue. This will likely be augmented by a positive migration balance since the majority of Jews living in the Diaspora are not ultra-Orthodox (Haredim).[49]

 

There were apparently no Haredim among the immigrants from the former Soviet Union and just 4.5 percent of these declared themselves as religious. There were only 7.2 percent of Haredim and 14.8 percent of religious people among immigrants from Europe and the United States. Just 3.1 percent of immigrants from Asia and Africa declared themselves as Haredi and 26.4 percent declared themselves as religious. All in all, the Haredi share of 2012 immigrants could be estimated at 3.6 percent and of religious people at 10.4 percent.

 

This would be accompanied by an accelerating decline in the natural increase among the Haredi population. According to the ICBS, the total fertility rate (TFR) of the Haredim has declined by 14.3 percent in just six years from 7.62 children per woman in 2003 to 6.53 children per woman in 2009, back to the level that existed twenty-five years before in the middle of the 1980s.[50] At the same time, the TFR of secular women rose by 8.9 percent from 1.90 children per woman in 2003 to 2.07 in 2009.

 

Likewise, from the beginning of the twenty-first century the TFR of Israeli Muslims decreased considerably, from 4.7 in 2000 to 3.5 children per woman in 2011.[51] The TFR of all Arabs decreased still further to 3.3 children per woman, very close to the 3.09 for Jews born in Israel.[52] In November 2011, a new comprehensive ICBS projection was published in which the government office admitted that in the past it had overestimated Israeli Arab fertility and underestimated Jewish fertility.[53]

 

An updated version of the author’s 2007 projections for the population of the State of Israel (extended from 2050 to 2059) appears in Figure 6. The numbers are presented side by side with the ICBS’s second and third scenario projections.

 

According to the author’s forecast prepared in 2007, the Arab population in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza Strip would reach 2,496,000 in 2050. Extending the forecast for nine more years, this population could reach 2,761,500 people. Combined with the estimated population of the State of Israel, the total population of the Land of Israel would comprise some 19,487,000 people in 2059.

 

Based on these estimates, the expanded Jewish population share would be 83.19 percent of the population of the State of Israel and 71.4 percent of the total population of the Land of Israel in 2059.

Conclusions

Population growth for the Land of Israel at the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century will be influenced by the Arab and Jewish natural increase rates reaching a convergence point based on similar live birth and mortality rates. It will also likely be influenced by continued Jewish immigration, including a new, possibly strong wave in the near future following the prolonged world economic crisis and manifestations of rising anti-Semitism around the globe. Repatriation will also be encouraged if the Israeli economy continues to be strong in the near future, an increased likelihood based in part on the huge gas and shale oil fields recently discovered in Israel. The share of Jews in the total population of the Land of Israel may also increase as a result of continued Arab emigration that may include Israeli Arabs as well. According to the results of the first-ever survey on political-social attitudes of Arab youth in Israel, conducted by the Baladna Association for Arab Youth and the Mada al-Carmel Arab Center for Applied Social Research, both in Haifa, 25 percent of the Arab youth in Israel want to emigrate.[54]

Every country has a natural and objective carrying capacity limit for the population living on its territory and, in this respect, Israel is no different than any other. With that in mind, demographic projections can and should be used as a tool for planning by the state as well as by municipalities to avoid mistakes that can damage vital infrastructure and public services, such as health, education, and welfare systems. Ignoring the impressive demographic changes of the last twenty years in Israel has produced heavy burdens on Israel’s health system due to a lack of hospital beds and a scarcity of medical personnel.[55] Overpopulated classrooms and a lack of qualified teachers is another such consequence.[56] Similarly, lower than necessary construction starts in the residential sector is causing pain for young couples.[57]

Developing proper demographic policies can be important tools for planning national security needs to assure internal order and the security of the state’s borders. Jerusalem must bear in mind that without developing such a professional, comprehensive, and long-term demographic policy, it will be very difficult to reach the vital goals of assuring a stable and secure future for generations to come.

Yakov Faitelson is the author of Demographic Trends in the Land of Israel, 1800-2007 (Israeli Institute for Zionist Strategies, 2008).

[1] NBC News, Sept. 23, 2010.
[2] Dan Petreanu, “Demography: Men or Myth,” The Jerusalem Post, Aug. 16, 1988, quoted in Yakov Faitelson, “‘Demography: Men or Myth‘ – 24 years later,” Apr. 4, 2012.
[3] The Jerusalem Post, June 25, 2013.
[4] The term “Land of Israel” is used here to denote the areas of Mandatory Palestine west of the Jordan River, namely, the territories constituting the State of Israel as well as Judea and Samaria (the “West Bank”) and the Gaza Strip.
[5]Annual Growth Rate Percent, Near East Countries, U.N. Regions,” U.S. Census Bureau, International Programs, International Data Base, accessed Mar. 12, 2013.
[6] Dominique Tabutin and Bruno Schoumaker, “The Demography of the Arab World and the Middle East from 1950 to the 2000s. A Survey of Changes and a Statistical Assessment,” Population, 2005/5-6, Institute de démographie, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, pp. 505-615.
[7] “Table 13: Jewish Population, by Sex and Age (1948, 1951, 1954, 1956),” Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 1956 (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, [hereafter ICBS], 1956), p. 19; “Table B/13: Jewish Population, by Sex and Age (1948-1965),” Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 1966 (ICBS, 1966), p. 38.
[8]Table B/1: Population, by Population Group,” Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, May 2013 (ICBS, June 6, 2013), p. 4.
[9] Petra Nahmias, “Fertility behaviour of recent immigrants to Israel: A comparative analysis of immigrants from Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union,” Demographic Research, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Mar. 17, 2004, pp. 83-120.
[10] The average number of children that would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime.
[11] Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 2002 (ICBS, 2002), st3.02; Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 2001 (ICBS, 2001), st3.01.
[12] Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 2012 (ICBS, 2012), st3.01; “C. Vital Statistics,” Monthly Bulletin of Statistics-February 2013 (ICBS, Mar. 7, 2013).
[13] “Statistic Tables for Live and Death Rates by Population Group,” Yearbook of Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 1955-2010 (ICBS, 2010).
[14]World Development Indicators: Birth Rate, Crude,” World Bank, Washington, D.C., accessed Mar. 7, 2013; “World Development Indicators: Death Rate, Crude,” idem, accessed Mar. 7, 2013.
[15] Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 2001, st2.18.
[16]C. Vital Statistics,” Monthly Bulletin of Statistics-February 2013.
[17] Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 2001, st02.20; Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 2011 (ICBS, 2011), st02.21.
[18] “Demographic Characteristics of the Arab Population in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, 1968-1993, #1025,” ICBS, July 1996, p. 15.
[19]World Development Indicators: Birth Rate, Crude,” World Bank, Washington, D.C., accessed Mar. 7, 2013; “World Development Indicators: Death Rate, Crude,” idem, accessed Mar. 7, 2013.
[20] “Emigration and Tourism, Table E/2: Immigrants by Type of Permit,” Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, ICBS, no. 11/2011, p. 143.
[21]Table 1: Human Development Index and Its Components,” Human Development Report 2010, U.N. Development Programme, New York, p. 143.
[22] Sergio DellaPergola, Jewish Demographic Policies: Population Trends and Options in Israel and in the Diaspora (Jerusalem: The Jewish People Policy Institute, 2011), p. 61.
[23] “Immigrants by Type of Visa,” Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 2011, st04.03.
[24] “Immigrants, by Period of Immigration, Country of Birth and Last Country of Residence,” Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 2011, st04.04.
[25] Ynet News (Tel Aviv), Jan. 22, 2012.
[26] “Interview with Holland’s Chief Rabbi: Dutch Anti-Semitism,” Arutz Sheva (Beit El and Petah Tikva), July 4, 2010.
[27] YNet News, May 21, 2013.
[28] Fox News, June 24, 2010.
[29] David J. Rusin, “The Slow-Motion Exodus of European Jews,” FrontPage Magazine (Sherman Oaks, Calif.), Jan. 7, 2011.
[30]Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe,” PEW Research Center Project, Sept. 17, 2008.
[31]Statistics,” Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, Tel Aviv, accessed June 17, 2013.
[32] Justin McCarthy, “Palestine’s Population during the Ottoman and the British Mandate Periods: Migration,” PalestineRemembered.com, Sept. 8, 2001.
[33] Mustafa Khawaja, “Highly-skilled into, through and from the southern and eastern Mediterranean and sub Saharan Africa. The Case of Palestine,” Robert Shuman Centre for Advanced Studies and the European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy, 2010, p. 8.
[34] The Jerusalem Post, Aug. 26, 2002.
[35] Bissan Edwan, “al-Qanbala ad-Dymoghrafiah fi Israil wa-Khidaal-Nafs,” Apr. 16, 2004.
[36] Reuters, Nov. 22, 2006.
[37] Khawaja, “The Case of Palestine,” p. 3.
[38] “Population Growth (annual %): West Bank and Gaza,” World Bank, Washington, D.C., accessed June 7, 2013.
[39] Bennet Zimmerman, Roberta Seid, and Michael L. Wise, “The Million Person Gap. The Arab Population in the West Bank and Gaza,” Mideast Security and Policy Studies, no. 65, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Feb. 2006.
[40] “Palestinians in the Palestinian Territory (West Bank and Gaza Strip): 3.2 Population,” Statistical Abstract of Palestine, No. 2, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (hereafter, PCBS), Ramallah; “Table 3.2.1: Projected Population in the Palestinian Territory in the End Year by Region, 1997-2024,” PCBS, Nov. 2001, p. 470.
[41] Annual Report for 2005, Population and Demography, Health Status in Palestine 2005 (Ramallah: Ministry of Health-Palestinian Health Information Center, Oct. 2006), p. 1.
[42] “Palestinians at the End of Year 2006,” PCBS, Dec. 2006, p. 11.
[43] “Palestinians at the End of 2010: Table 2: Estimated Number of Palestinians in the Palestinian Territory by Status and Region,” PCBS, Dec. 30, 2010, p. 34.
[44] “Palestinians at the End of 2012,” PCBS, Dec. 2012, p. 1.
[45] Ibid., p. 3.
[46] Yakov Faitelson, “The Demographic Forecasts for the Population of the Land of Israel and the Reality (1898-2005),” Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual International Conference on Jewish Studies, Part 1: State of Israel, 60 Years of History (Moscow: Moscow Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization “Sefer,” Institute for Slavic Studies, 2008), p. 68; idem, “Demographic Trends in the Land of Israel (1800-2007), accessed Mar. 7, 2013, p. 47-70; idem, Table 1: Comparison of Forecasts for Citizens of the State of Israel up until 2050, “Demographic Forecast Scenarios until 2050,” The Institute for Zionist Strategies, Jerusalem, 2008.
[47] High-fertility assumption: Under the high variant, fertility is projected to remain .5 children above the fertility in the medium variant over most of the projection period. That is, countries reaching a total fertility of 1.85 children per woman in the medium variant have a total fertility of 2.35 children per woman in the high variant at the end of the projection period. Constant-fertility assumption: fertility remains constant at the level estimated for 2000-05.
[48] Faitelson, “Demographic Trends in the Land of Israel (1800-2007),” accessed Mar. 7, 2013, p. 50-3.
[49] According to a comprehensive survey conducted by the ICBS in 2009, 8 percent of Israeli Jews defined themselves as Haredi, 12 percent as religious, 13 percent as traditional religious, 25 percent as less traditional religious, 27 percent as not so religious, and 18 percent as nonreligious. See Seker hevrati 2009. Pirsum mispar 1433. B. mimtsaim ikariim. a. datiyut umeafienim demografiim uhevratiim kalkaliim beisrael (bnei 20 umala), ICBS Social Survey 2009, no. 1433, Jerusalem, Apr. 2011, p. 13.
[50] Ahmad Hleihel, “Fertility among Jewish and Muslim Women in Israel by Level of Religiosity, 1979-2009,” ICBS, Working Paper Series, no. 60, June 2011, pp. 32-4.
[51] Ibid., p. 15; “Fertility rates, Average Age of Mother and Sex Ratio at Birth, by selected characteristics of the mother. Muslims. 2011,” Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 2011, Table 3.14.
[52] “Fertility rates, Average Age of Mother and Sex Ratio at Birth, by selected characteristics of the mother. Israeli born. 2011,” Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 2011, Table 3.14.
[53] Ari Paltiel, Michell Spulker, Irene Kornilenko, and Martin Maldonado, “Tahaziot Haukhlusiyah le-Yisrael Letvah Arokh: 2009-2059,” Demography and Census Dept., Jerusalem, Nov. 30, 2011.
[54] Ynet News, Apr. 22, 2004.
[55]The Physician Shortage in Israel,” Israeli Medical Association, Tel Aviv, May 2011.
[56] Karen L. Berman, “Israel Must Overhaul Education System,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Mar. 29, 2012.
[57] Ron Diller, “What happened to affordable housing in Israel?” The Jerusalem Post, May 8, 2010.

 

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Beyond the dire needs of Iraq’s demonstration: National renaissance and a new challenge to Iran

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For many, Iraqis have long been gone into hibernation to hold the politicians accountable for corruption in OPEC’s second-largest oil producer. So the first of October 2019  was a turning point when the young Iraqis have taken the streets in Baghdad, and to gather hugely in the symbolic place of Tahrir square, which separates a hundred meters of the Republic Bridge from the green zone. Shockingly the contagion of the protest spilt over into the other Shiite-dominated cities in southern the country, such as Wasit, Basra, Maysan, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Babylon, and Diwaniyah.

Several demonstrations erupted in different parts of Iraq over last years to be sure, yet none of which was as spontaneous and outstanding as October’s one. Youths have taken the initiative without support neither from clerics nor any political party. The grievances have, primarily, limited to the basic needs of offering jobs and making substantial strides in services. Though, quickly, inflated to change the government whom the wrathful youths blame for turning a blind eye to the corruptors.

In this circumstance of the unconscious co-presence, the protestors unprecedentedly overstepped their differences to rally around the Iraqi flag. Concurrently, they lambaste Iran for meddling into their affairs. That was a grave alarming for Iran’s policies not only in Iraq but inside Iran also regarding its populace is upset about the current economic crisis due to the US sanctions.

Iraqi government in predicament  

In 2018, the Adeel Abdul-Mahdi’s government was formed by a fragile contract between al-Fatah and al-Binna Alliances plus Kurd’s bloc. Abdul-Mahdi was one of the dissenters who once received by Iraqis with flowers bouquet and festoon when he returned home after the US invasion in 2013. At that time, most of the current adolescent protestors were either had a few years or not yet born; nonetheless, they grew up on the pledges of the successive governments that didn’t amount to more than repetitive slogans.

On the 25th of October, the tight deadline for the government to commence decisive reformations came to an end without concrete change. Against this backdrop, the second wave of anti-government campaign erupted, this time more massively to exceed Baghdad to disseminate into the other southern cities of the country. Influx of all walks of life have joined in with the angry mob what put the government between the devil and the deep blue sea.

First option for Abdul-Mahdi was to call for an early election that means dissolving the parliament, as per (64) article of the constitution, that required the absolute majority of its representatives upon the prime minister request and the President’s consent. Practically such a process is difficult to achieve timely considering the current government has yielded from intricate coalition of competitive parties. Another troublesome article of the constitution is of the interim sixty days in which the government converts into a caretaker government until new government receive the office, that means to be paralysed to achieve the urgent reforms sought by the angry youths. On similar premise was the answer of the prime minister to the plea of well-known cleric Muqtada al-Sadr for the former to resign.

The second alternative is to actualize swiftly the dire needs of the protestors who are significantly increasing in number and raising their demands. The prime minister, however, preferred remaining in the office so it can work on the people’s needs, for the time being at least until the two blocs in the parliament form a new government. The protestors have perceived these gestures suspiciously, arguing whether a pile of pledges haven’t realized within years, they wouldn’t definitely be achieved over a few months. In a desperate attempt to appease the demonstrators, Iraqi President Barham Salih delivered live televised speech promised to hold an early election, reversely, people’s reactions became far more violent.

Whether the government would answer protestors’ call to step down, or it would utterly resist, the essential question remains is how to fulfil the rest of their demands. Especially, they made their claim quite lucid; the “real country” is sought for, not merely socio-economic reforms.

From dire needs to National renaissance   

There is little doubt that Britain had established Iraq with multi-identities in the 1920s, composing of Sunni, Shiite, and Kurds, that shaped, afterwards, the ruling elites which would be in enduring conflict for decades to come Ironically, after 2003, the same paradigm has been rearticulated by the US civil governor to compose the Iraqi political system of different ethnic and sectarian elites in order allegedly to avoid marginalising any community. These elites, however, adopted increasingly extreme stands on their constituencies’ issues for their own political purpose that indulged the country into endless chaos for over sixteen years.

Notwithstanding, in a much similar trajectory to many states of the Arab Spring, some impoverished segments in Baghdad have begun to protest sporadically, then the sentiment has spread rapidly like wildfire amongst Iraqi youths. The protest rose a severe challenge as much to the official government as to the politically active elites. when the demands peaked to expel all the political parties whom the protestors accuse of foreign allegiance. Nonetheless, couple of incidents got the government into a tight corner; on the one hand, students of the colleges and even primary schools abruptly got out of their institution, waving the flag and singing the national anthem collectively. On the other hand, the demonstration blew up in the Shiite holy city of Kerbala which supposedly supports wholeheartedly the Shiite-dominated government. The situation aggravated when the furious people have set fire to the Iranian consulate In Kerbala.    

Noteworthy, these public claims have also brought about a couple of neoteric events that might reproduce the Iraqi identity, if not reintroduce it differently. First: the youths who have mainly led the public rally have vowed to fly nothing but Iraq flag despite the majority of them were from the Shiite sect. Second: in unusual phenomenon after 2003, the women from diverse speciality stood shoulder to shoulder with the men despite the brutal reaction of the security forces. Together they are chanting slogans against the politicians and clerics too; some of those women even didn’t put a veil on.

Needless to say that the demonstrators founded for a new political practice within which the prospective governments would be responsible not only to their political collations but to the laypeople as well. Ultimately,  the protesters need to incarnate their movement as a social entity to maintain constant momentum on political life.

Iran is anxious

At the eve of the collapse of the tyrant government in Baghdad, Iran emerged as the most influential player, benefiting from its historical religious and cultural ties as well as a long shared border of1400  km with Iraq. It developed complicated relationships with all competitive political groups in Iraq, especially with those who took Iran their exile during Saddam Hussein’s rule. It has significantly entrenched its clout after defeating ISIS in 2014, by backing up each of  Kurdish Peshmerga and Iraqi forces including the Popular Mobilization Forces.

Therefore, the anti-Iranian demonstration shocked the Iranian leaders seeing the protesters are not their traditional foe in Iraq, Sunni sect, instead they are mostly kids from the pious Shiite neighborhoods. Iran, publically, downplayed the effectiveness of the protest, and they connected the Iraqis’ movement to US-sedition. Additionally, on October 6, 2019, the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei tweeted on his official account “Iran and Iraq are two nations whose hearts & souls are tied together through faith in God, love for Imam Hussein and the progeny of the Prophet. This bond will grow stronger day by day. Enemies seek to sow discord but they’ve failed and their conspiracy won’t be effective”.  

On the contrary, the Iraqi streets exploded in outrage from Iran and its affiliations inside the country, particularly, when anonymous snipers killed dozens of them. While Iraqis accused Iran and its affiliates of the executions, Iran claimed the assassinators are from the Iranian opposition of Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq. They sneaked in the crowd of demonstrations, pretending they are  Iranian security forces, so the Iraqi would attribute their murders to Iran. However, the demonstrators have attacked the buildings of all parties, and they executed two leaders of full-hearted pro-Iran militia, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq in Maysan province. Furthermore, many effigies of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Qasem Soleimani were insultingly burnt, that even occurred repeatedly in Shiite-dominated cities in southern Iraq.

These rapidly spiralling events in Iraq imposed new burdens on Iran to unobstructedly continue its strategies in the region, chiefly because:

First: As Iraq is a sole conduit for it to elude the US sanctions, Tehran doesn’t tend to compromise the domination upon it.

Second: Iraq presents the strategic corridor of what once King Abdullah of Jordan called ” Shia Crescent“, in which Iran domination stretch from Iraq to Syria and Lebanon reaching to the Mediterranean sea.

Third; Iranians’ worry is the Iraqi demonstration might spill over into their constituencies at home, especially Iranians are suffering from the current economic and financial hardships due to the last package of the US sanction. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Iran GDP anticipated to shrink by 9.5 per cent at the end of 2019, after it grew healthy last year to reach 4.8 percent.   

Though seems it is not as capable as used to be in the last ten years in Iraq, Iran attempted despairingly to contain the demonstration. For that reason, the Iranian Gen. Qassim Soleimani flew by helicopter to meet with the Iraqi prime minister and politicians. Perhaps he realized now the demonstration is much immense than the heavily fortified of Green Zone where he held his meetings.  After all, these social movements of anti-sectarianism would more or less make the Iranian domination upon the surrounding region inoperative in the near future.

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Americans return to Syria for oil

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Soon after the adoption of the Russian-Turkish Memorandum on Syria, President Trump, known for his “consistency” in decision-making, made it clear that he had no intention of withdrawing US troops, which had already been moved to Iraq, from the east of Syria. The reason for the US forces to stay on is the need to protect the local oil reserves against the “Islamic State” (which is prohibited in the Russian Federation). The American president even reflected on which company should be contracted to produce Syrian oil, eventually opting for ExxonMobil (who else!).

The Pentagon spoke to this effect as well, in more concrete terms. The oil of northeast Syria will go to the allied Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), – said US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, adding: “We want to make sure that the SDF have access to these resources, in order to guard prisons and arm their own units . Our mission is to ensure the safety of the deposits.” When asked by reporters whether Syrian and Russian forces would have access to these resources, Esper answered in the negative. Thus, the United States has yet again demonstrated that they do not deem themselves bound by international law. At the same time, they confirmed the American so-called “businesslike” approach to international problems.

The Russian Foreign Ministry has repeatedly insisted that Syrian oil should belong to the Syrian people. Speaking at a press conference following the recent meeting with Turkish and Iranian counterparts, Sergey Lavrov said: the United States plans to protect Syrian oil from Syria.

According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the Americans found it normal to trade in Syrian oil before. Igor Konashenkov, spokesman for the Russian Defense Ministry, the United States extracts oil using de facto “contraband” equipment that was brought on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic bypassing American sanctions. According to the Russian military, revenue from these transactions exceeds $ 30 million per month.

Compared to neighbors, Syria is far from an “oil giant.” Its developed reserves amount to about 2.5 billion barrels, while Saudi Arabia has reserves of 268 billion, Iran – 158 billion, Iraq – 144 billion, Kuwait – 104 billion, UAE – 98 billion barrels. Oil reserves in Syria are not that abundant for the US to “cling” to them. So what’s the matter?

Only a fraction of oil reserves are located on the territory liberated by the Syrian army and its allies, the lion’s share of the reserves is controlled by SDF units (and the Americans, of course). By means of depriving Damascus of oil revenues, which made a major source of the country’s pre-war budget, Washington hopes to weaken Syria’s resistance. In addition, the United States won’t stop short of supporting the Kurdish state. By “gifting” Syrian oil to their political protégés, the Americans encourage the Kurds to refrain from making an alliance with Damascus and continue to act as a counterweight to Turkey and Russia and play the role of an anti-Iranian bastion.

It’s the Americans themselves who will buy this oil. In all likelihood, they will buy it cheap. “I want to bring our soldiers back home, but I want oil too. I’m a civilian, I don’t understand why the war in Iraq was needed at all. If my people go to Iraq, let them at least keep the oil,” – Donald Trump shared his thoughts not so long ago,  criticizing the policies of his predecessors. Bashar al-Assad responded by describing Trump as “the best American president ever” because he is the most transparent and honest.” “He says he wants oil, and that’s absolutely true – it’s  American policy,” –  the Syrian leader concluded.

Simultaneously, while maintaining control of the oil fields, the Americans continue to “punish” Ankara for its “excessive” independence in international affairs. After all, they are not going to pump stolen oil through Turkey, which is trying hard to become the southern energy hub for Europe.

Furthermore, the majority of oil-bearing regions in Syria are populated by Arabs, rather than Kurds. Peshmerga captured the fields during the struggle against the Islamic State, prohibited in Russia. Now, should the Americans change their minds about the “protection” of the oil reserves, they will use this to “explain” their yet another betrayal to the Kurds.

In all likelihood, there will be no serious armed clashes over Syrian oil. The problem could be solved through reaching a power-sharing agreement between Damascus and the Kurds, which means dividing the powers between the central government and the local authorities. The Constitutional Committee, which is currently in session in Geneva, could play an important role to achieve this but for the fact that neither Ankara nor Damascus wants the Committee to comprise representatives of the SDF – a bloc that de facto controls the north-east of the country. As a result, Hikmat Habib the Executive Committee of the Assembly of Democratic Syria said: the outcomes of the Geneva meeting will not mean anything “for the people of northern and eastern Syria” (Kurds – A.I.).

However, Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have been taking  steps towards each other: after the start of another Turkish military operation, the Kurds allowed Syrian troops to enter the territory under their control, while Damascus proposed that peshmerga should become part of the Syrian army. As it happens, chances to maintain the territorial integrity of the country are there for grabs.

From our partner International Affairs

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US-Iran confrontation amid Lebanon, Iraq protests

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The U.S welcomes to spread uprising to Iran and weakening Iran`s influence in Lebanon and Iraq, whereas Iran seeks up political stability in the two countries.

Enormous antigovernment demonstrations in Iraq and Lebanon have been the spotlight around the world since last month. People in the two countries are dissatisfied concerning socio-economic problems include mismanagement in urban services, recession, governmental corruption, increasing unemployment, and growing injustice. Both countries have a common factor. Iran is the only country that has an important influence on their governments. So, the country has followed the related happenings carefully.

A few days after the protests, Iranian officials expressed their position. The first man was Amir Abdollahian, who is the special assistant to the speaker of Iran`s parliament. He wrote in his Instagram Page that “yesterday in Yemen, the United States and Saudi Arabia forced the prime minister to resign and failed, as they are currently struggling in quagmire of Yemen” he said then. “Today in Lebanon and Iraq, they also launched the same project of chaos and destroying governments that the new copy of political terrorism will undoubtedly fail.”

But Iran`s president and foreign minister have not said anything about the crisis, although recently Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has blamed the U.S and its allies for spreading “insecurity and turmoil” in Iraq and Lebanon, urging anti-government protesters in both countries to seek changes in a lawful way.

“Their people also have to know that although they have legitimate demands, those demands can be met only through the framework of legal structures,” he added.

In fact, Iraq and Lebanon are very sensitive for Iran. Iraq has a long border with the country and Hezbollah as a proxy force in the south of Lebanon is its security border along Israel. So, any changes in both can be hazardous for Iran`s interests because the country has an effective position in their governing body structures.

On the other side, the U.S has conducted full support to protesters especially in Iraq where some protesters have stated slogans against Iran`s intervention. Some protesters in Karbala attacked Iran`s consulate. Although the socio-economic is the main problem of Iraqis, Iran`s influence had been a side issue and an interesting subject for critics of the Islamic regime.

Iraq`s prime minister has agreed to resign as well as Saad Hariri resigned in Lebanon. In the meantime, governmental media of Iran have attempted to portray that any resign or government changing is a wrong solution for two countries. Just as Seyed Hasan Nasrollah, leader of Hezbollah had disagreed with Hariri`s resign but the U.S has supported to form a new government in Lebanon and Iraq. 

The U.S Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called on “Lebanon’s political leaders to urgently facilitate the formation of a new government that can build a stable, prosperous, and secure Lebanon that is responsive to the needs of its citizens.”

Pompeo also sent a message about to accountability necessity of government concerning killed people amid protests in Iraq, unlike Iran that wants to abate the chaos.     

U.S Secretary of State said the Iraqi government’s investigation into the violence in early October “lacked sufficient credibility” and that “the Iraqi people deserve genuine accountability and justice.”

After that, Iranians rail against U.S. Brigadier General Hossein Nejat, who is the deputy of the I.R.G.C`s chief said, “The U.S has invested in the social faults in Iraq and Lebanon.” Still, he said “this is America sedition”

“From a long time ago, Americans had brought many persons from Iraq to America for training, and they formed extensive social media. The U.S wants Iraq to be insecurity intensively until a dictator comes and catches the power,” he added.

Also Mohammad Ali Movahhedi Kermani, Tehran’s provisional Friday prayers leader said that “Based on the available information, the U.S ambassador to Iraq has openly backed the ongoing violence in Iraq and has called on Iraqi police to let such behaviors continue.

Iran has exported its Islamic ideology to some countries in the region such as Iraq and Lebanon in years ago. But now, the economic problems are the most important subject for people of the two countries. That`s why one protester told Foreign Policy that “hungry has no religion.” This sentence has the same meaning Imam Ali`s hadith, Shias’ first Imam that “the poverty is bigger death.” 

Simply put, ideology is not working without money and social welfare. Now, Iran is under tough sanctions by America and its people have economic problems with high-level inflation. But the U.S and its allies have more chance to increase influence in two countries in terms of the economic situation. The U.S has aided $1.5 billion to Lebanon`s army since 2005. But according to the WSJ, the financial assistance by the U.S has stopped recently to Lebanon due to Israel`s pressure. WSJ wrote, “The Trump Administration has suspended security assistance to Lebanon, congressional officials said, including more than $100 million for the Lebanese armed forces.”

Also, a meeting held between United States Secretary of the Treasury Mnuchin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In this negotiation, Netanyahu complained that Iran was financing new missile-development activities inside Lebanon for the Hezbollah militant movement.

Several Israeli news organizations reported this week that Mr. Netanyahu has asked government officials to urge allied capitals to impose conditions on their aid to Lebanon to ensure Lebanese officials clamp down on the missile-development activities—one possible reason for a U.S. funding suspension.

In related news, Saudi Arabia as a close ally of The U.S recently has suspended the assistance to Lebanon to weakening the Hezbollah.

“In a way, you bail out Lebanon, you bail out Hezbollah,” said Shafeeq Ghabra, the political science professor at Kuwait University, according to Daily Star.

One Gulf official, who declined to be identified by name when talking about sensitive foreign policy, “Prime Minister Saad Hariri had refused financial help to avoid money going to Hezbollah via the government,” the Daily Star reported too.

Based on some reports, America has suggested rebuilding oil and power Iraq`s facilities instead of Iraq`s companionship with sanctions against Iran. So, Lebanon and Iraq are under economic pressure and both need foreign aids, whereas Iran now has a severe budget shortage. This situation can be a factor to reduce Iran`s influence compared to the U.S in two countries after uprisings.

Analysts said the power-sharing system in the two countries is very important for Iran because the Shiite has a high position currently. Both have different religions and sects. In Iraq, the prime minister is Shiite. Also in Lebanon based on the agreement of 1989, the power divided into religion and sects, such that parliament speaker must be a Shiite Muslim. The current condition is acceptable by Iran because Shia’s power is insured. But protests now are not examples of deep sectarian divisions in two countries. For the first time, the protesters seek the end of sectarian power and power-sharing system. They want to root out corruption by a new government. So, the unprecedented protests can be dangerous for Iran`s investments in the Shiite groups in the region. Due to America’s attempts and some slogans in protests against Iran, it is possible the power of Shiite`s groups in the two countries will be abated finally. 

In fact, The U.S wants the uprising will extend to Iran because Iranians are in the same situation in terms of economic problems, just as Iran`s government is wary about protests infectious power. If Iran`s Shiite allies like Hezbollah and Amal in Lebanon and Al-Hashd Ash-Shabi in Iraq be able to separate Shias from other protesters, its spread range will reduce.

The U.S welcomes to spread uprising to Iran and weakening Iran`s influence in Lebanon and Iraq, whereas Iran seeks up political stability in the two countries. Iran also attempts to say the U.S is behind the protests and insecurity in the two countries is their work.

Lately, Hossein Shariatmadari, the representative of supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei and editor chief of the conservative Kayhan newspaper, wrote addressed to Iraqis that “seize the American and Saudi embassies.”

Some suggested that President Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran has been almost defeated because Iran has not come to the negotiation table so far, so perhaps the protests in Lebanon and Iraq lead to Iran’s surrender.

Nowadays, Iraqis and Lebanon`s people seek up a better future by changing the political structures in their countries. Thinking to welfare, removing the corrupted politicians and protecting their countries from any foreign interference. But amid the protests, the confrontation has begun in two countries between America and Iran but would not finish simply.

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