It is a truism that as the Syrian civil war has progressed, factions of a hardline Islamist inclination – most notably the Al Qaeda affiliates Jabhat Al Nusra (JN) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) – have come to the forefront.
This naturally gives rise to the question of what can be done to counter the rise of extremists?
One suggestion put forward by Hussein Ibish in The National last week is to arm factions under the banner of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to create an Iraq-style Sahwa movement against Al Qaeda affiliates in Syria. However, many of those advocating this approach rightly tell us that Syria is not Iraq.
It is true that the very beginnings of the Sahwa movement in Iraq were rooted in disillusionment with Al Qaeda brutality, but the main factor that caused it to become a viable ally for the coalition forces and the Iraqi government is the fact that from 2007 onwards, large numbers of Sunni insurgents realised that they were losing the war, which had been focused on a decisive “Battle for Baghdad” that saw most of the mixed neighbourhoods ethnically cleansed of Sunni Arabs.
Survival therefore depended on a willingness to cooperate against Al Qaeda, and it is fear of what could happen to Sunnis in another sectarian civil war that helps maintain Sahwa militias across Sunni areas of Iraq despite marginalisation by the central government.
The situation in Syria is not at all analogous. There is no decisive battle being played out over a single city. Instead, Syria is continually fragmenting into smaller shards, as the number of different militias has multiplied.
The concept of an FSA Sahwa is based on posing a strict dichotomy between FSA and JN/ISIS that does not actually exist and is primarily rooted in propaganda from the circles of the western-backed rebel Salim Idriss and his Supreme Military Command (SMC). The question of whether a battalion by the banner of FSA works with JN/ISIS goes beyond simple differences in ideology, and varies from locality to locality.
A good example is the recent fall of Mannagh airbase in Aleppo Governorate to rebels. Analysts have disputed which battalion was the main actor, though the fact that jihadi media circles have released photos of the ISIS banner flying high over the main tower would suggest it played the decisive role. In any event, the more important observation to draw is that ISIS worked with a number of groups under the banner of the FSA, including the FSA Military Council of Aleppo.
Later in his piece, Ibish argues that the continuing conflict between Kurdish forces and mujahideen illustrates “how fluid and dynamic Syrian realities are”. Indeed, but if it is his hope to arm factions deemed more moderate to take on ISIS/JN, then the Kurdish dynamic has pushed the trend somewhat the opposite way. For the conflict has actually drawn some FSA battalions to take ISIS/JN’s side against the PYD/PKK Kurdish forces.
For example, at the beginning of this month a number of battalions in rural northern Aleppo province issued a joint statement against the PKK, denouncing it as a regime agent. The battalions included ISIS and some under the banner of the FSA, like Liwa Al Tawheed.
More dubious is Ibish’s idea that members of the Salafist Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) could be won over as allies. Of course Ibish is right that not all SIF fighters are necessarily hardline ideologues, but there is a risk of downplaying the ideological component of the SIF’s outlook.
While it is common to refer to the SIF as “Salafi nationalist”, the reality is that the boundaries of nationalism/transnationalism are blurred in SIF thought at best. This is most apparent in statements by SIF battalions that talk about the Ummah and the notion of artificial borders imposed on it.
As a result of their ideological bent, SIF battalions as a rule never side with non-Islamists against JN or ISIS. This has been apparent in the SIF groups coordinating with JN/ISIS in Hasakah and Raqqa provinces against Kurdish forces, and in Raqqa where Ahrar ash-Sham supporters have rallied with JN/ISIS backers in light of sit-in demonstrations held by civil activists to protest kidnappings.
In short, it does not make sense at this stage to talk of arming more moderate factions to create a Sahwa movement against Al Qaeda forces in Syria. The dynamics at work in the country are far too complex for analogies with Iraq.
If the goal is to counter extremist influence, then there needs to be a better understanding among analysts and policymakers of why Al Qaeda affiliates have gained influence and been able to appeal to locals. While there is understanding of JN’s outreach, I have come across too many pundits who seem mystified by ISIS’ expansion in Syria.
Since ISIS contains a large number of foreign jihadists, it is often assumed that they are incapable of winning local support.
On the contrary, pro-ISIS media output shows that it is actively reaching out to locals. This has included days of fun and games in conjunction with da’wah meetings in the suburbs of Aleppo (including tug-of-war and musical chairs), provision of iftar dinners and food aid during Ramadan, and Eid gatherings with the handing out of presents for children. These forms of outreach are hardly removed from JN’s tactics.
Only by appreciating that Al Qaeda fighters in Syria have been adapting and learning from their predecessors can one hope to devise strategies of countering their influence, such as encouraging more moderate factions to try to counter widespread perceptions of corruption and criminality.
For now, besides provision of aid, the most viable form of outside intervention remains some kind of no-fly zone in the hope of reducing the civilian death toll and reducing the Assad’s air power advantage.
What is the public sphere today in Turkey?
The concept of public sphere, which was started to be examined in Europe in the 1960s, has different meanings according to different perspectives, as a definite definition cannot be made today, and this situation creates important discussion topics about the use of such spaces.
Long debated the definition of public space in Europe, in Turkey also began to affect 1980”l year. After the 1980 coup, some communities, which were kept out of sight, fearing that the Republic project would be harmed, demanded the recognition of their ethnic and cultural identities. Thus the concept of the public sphere in Turkey, especially since the early 1990s to be addressed in various academic publications, use and began to discuss political issues.
Especially in the past years, the public sphere debates on the headscarf issue were discussed from various angles. The debate started with Prime Minister Erdogan’s criticism of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who did not invite his wife to a NATO dinner, saying “Dolmabahçe is not a public space”, and the President of the Council of Higher Education, Prof.Dr. Erdoğan Teziç; He responded by emphasizing that the public sphere is not a “ geographical definition ” but a functional concept.
Before defining the public sphere, the understanding that shows that the definition of space in the Ottoman Empire was shaped as less private, private, very private and very very private is still one of the biggest reasons for the definition of the public sphere. While expressing, it reminds that he entered the Ottoman literature in a different way in the 19th century. Thinkers who indicate the association of the public sphere with the state in general express it as the sphere that is related to the state, not the “public”. “When you say ‘public’, the state comes to mind immediately; We mean something like government administration, its organs, organizations, officials, or activities, an official domain that is owned or run under state control. However, as Habermas said, the public sphere is above all the sphere in which the public opinion is formed in our social life ”.
As citizens of the city, we observe that some projects have spread to the spaces defined as public space due to the fact that today’s public space and public space concepts have not been defined precisely and construction activities have increased due to the anxiety of rent.
Erdogan’s Calamitous Authoritarianism
Turkey’s President Erdogan is becoming ever more dangerous as he continues to ravage his own country and destabilize scores of states in the Middle East, the Balkans, and North Africa, while cozying up to the West’s foremost advisories. Sadly, there seems to be no appetite for most EU member states to challenge Erdogan and put him on notice that he can no longer pursue his authoritarianism at home and his adventurous meddling abroad with impunity.
To understand the severity of Erdogan’s actions and ambitions and their dire implications, it suffices to quote Ahmet Davutoglu, formerly one of Erdogan’s closest associates who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and subsequently Prime Minister. Following his forced resignation in May 2016 he stated “I will sustain my faithful relationship with our president until my last breath. No one has ever heard — and will ever hear — a single word against our president come from my mouth.”
Yet on October 12, Davutoglu declared “Erdogan left his friends who struggled and fought with him in exchange for the symbols of ancient Turkey, and he is trying to hold us back now…. You yourself [Erdogan] are the calamity. The biggest calamity that befell this people is the regime that turned the country into a disastrous family business.”
The stunning departure of Davutoglu from his earlier statement shows how desperate conditions have become, and echoed how far and how dangerously Erdogan has gone. Erdogan has inflicted a great calamity on his own people, and his blind ambition outside Turkey is destabilizing many countries while dangerously undermining Turkey’s and its Western allies’ national security and strategic interests.
A brief synopsis of Erdogan’s criminal domestic practices and his foreign misadventures tell the whole story.
Domestically, he incarcerated tens of thousands of innocent citizens on bogus charges, including hundreds of journalists. Meanwhile he is pressuring the courts to send people to prison for insulting him, as no one can even express their thoughts about this ruthlessness. Internationally, Erdogan ordered Turkish intelligence operatives to kill or smuggle back to the country Turkish citizens affiliated with the Gülen movement.
He regularly cracks down on Turkey’s Kurdish minority, preventing them from living a normal life in accordance with their culture, language, and traditions, even though they have been and continue to be loyal Turkish citizens. There is no solution to the conflict except political, as former Foreign Minister Ali Babacan adamantly stated on October 20: “… a solution [to the Kurdish issue] will be political and we will defend democracy persistently.”
Erdogan refuses to accept the law of the sea convention that gives countries, including Cyprus, the right to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for energy exploration, while threatening the use of force against Greece, another NATO member no less. He openly sent a research ship to the region for oil and gas deposits, which EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell called “extremely worrying.”
He invaded Syria with Trump’s blessing to prevent the Syrian Kurds from establishing autonomous rule, under the pretext of fighting the PKK and the YPG (the Syrian Kurdish militia that fought side-by-side the US, and whom Erdogan falsely accuses of being a terrorist group).
He is sending weapons to the Sunni in northern Lebanon while setting up a branch of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) in the country—a practice Erdogan has used often to gain a broader foothold in countries where it has an interest.
While the Turkish economy is in tatters, he is investing hundreds of millions of dollars in the Balkans, flooding countries with Turkish imams to spread his Islamic gospel and to ensure their place in his neo-Ottoman orbit. Criticizing Erdogan’s economic leadership, Babacan put it succinctly when he said this month that “It is not possible in Turkey for the economic or financial system to continue, or political legitimacy hold up.”
Erdogan is corrupt to the bone. He conveniently appointed his son-in-law as Finance Minister, which allows him to hoard tens of millions of dollars, as Davutoglu slyly pointed out: “The only accusation against me…is the transfer of land to an educational institution over which I have no personal rights and which I cannot leave to my daughter, my son, my son-in-law or my daughter-in-law.”
Erdogan is backing Azerbaijan in its dispute with Armenia (backed by Iran) over the breakaway territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is inhabited by ethnic Armenians and has been the subject of dispute for over 30 years.
He is exploiting Libya’s civil strife by providing the Government of National Accord (GNA) with drones and military equipment to help Tripoli gain the upper hand in its battle against Khalifa Haftar’s forces. Former Foreign Minister Yasar Yakis said in February 2020 that “The unclear Turkish foreign policy by Erdogan may put Turkey in grave danger due to this expansion towards Libya.”
He is meddling in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in an effort to prevent them from settling their dispute unless Israel meets Palestinian demands. He granted several Hamas officials Turkish citizenship to spite Israel, even though Hamas openly calls for Israel’s destruction.
He betrayed NATO by buying the Russian-made S-400 air defense system, which seriously compromises the alliance’s technology and intelligence.
He is destabilizing many countries, including Somalia, Qatar, Libya, and Syria, by dispatching military forces and hardware while violating the air space of other countries like Iraq, Cyprus, and Greece. Yakis said Turkey is engaging in a “highly daring bet where the risks of failure are enormous.”
Erdogan supports extremist Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and an assortment of jihadists, including ISIS, knowing full well that these groups are sworn enemies of the West—yet he uses them as a tool to promote his wicked Islamic agenda.
He regularly blackmails EU members, threatening to flood Europe with Syria refugees unless they support his foreign escapades such as his invasion of Syria, and provide him with billions in financial aid to cope with the Syrian refugees.
The question is how much more evidence does the EU need to act? A close look at Erdogan’s conduct clearly illuminates his ultimate ambition to restore much of the Ottoman Empire’s influence over the countries that were once under its control.
Erdogan is dangerous. He has cited Hitler as an example of an effective executive presidential system, and may seek to acquire nuclear weapons. It’s time for the EU to wake up and take Erdogan’s long-term agenda seriously, and take severe punitive measures to arrest his potentially calamitous behavior. Sadly, the EU has convinced itself that from a geostrategic perspective Turkey is critically important, which Erdogan is masterfully exploiting.
The EU must be prepared take a stand against Erdogan, with or without the US. Let’s hope, though, that Joe Biden will be the next president and together with the EU warn Erdogan that his days of authoritarianism and foreign adventurism are over.
The views expressed are those of the author.
Syrian Refugees Have Become A Tool Of Duplicitous Politics
Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria the issue of Syrian refugees and internally displace has been the subject of countless articles and reports with international humanitarian organizations and countries involved in the Syrian conflict shifting responsibility for the plight of migrants.
The most notorious example of human suffering put against political games is the Rukban refugee camp located in eastern Syria inside the 55-km zone around Al-Tanf base controlled by the U.S. and its proxies.
According to official information, more than 50,000 people, mostly women and children, currently live in the camp. This is a huge number comparable to the population of a small town. The Syrian government, aware of the plight of people in Rukban, has repeatedly urged Washington to open a humanitarian corridor so that everyone can safely return home. However, all such proposals were ignored by the American side. U.S. also refuse to provide the camp with first aid items. Neighbouring Jordan is inactive, too, despite Rukban being the largest of dozens other temporary detention centres in Syria, where people eke out a meager existence.
At the same time, the problem is not only refugee camps. Syria has been at war for a decade. The country’s economy has suffered greatly over this period, and many cities have been practically grazed to the ground. Moreover, the global coronavirus epidemic didn’t spare Syria and drained the already weakened economy even more. However, Damascus’ attempts of post-war reconstruction and economic recovery were undermined by multiple packages of severe sanctions imposed by the U.S. At the same time, U.S.-based human rights monitors and humanitarian organizations continue to weep over the Syrian citizens’ misery.
The situation is the same for those refugees who stay in camps abroad, especially in countries bordering on Syria, particularly Jordan and Turkey. Ankara has been using Syrian citizens as a leverage against the European states in pursuit of political benefits for a long time. No one pays attention to the lives of people who are used as a change coin in big politics. This is equally true for Rukban where refugees are held in inhuman conditions and not allowed to return to their homeland. In those rare exceptions that they are able to leave, refugees have to pay large sums of money that most of those living in camp are not able to come by.
It’s hard to predict how long the Syrian conflict will go on and when – or if – the American military will leave the Al-Tanf base. One thing can be said for sure: the kind of criminal inaction and disregard for humanitarian catastrophe witnessed in refugee camps is a humiliating failure of modern diplomacy and an unforgivable mistake for the international community. People shouldn’t be a tool in the games of politicians.
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