Events in Egypt this week prompt many responses. Here are some thirteen (complementing my article suggesting that Morsi was removed from power too soon to discredit Islamism as much as he should have).
Was Morsi the democratically elected president of Egypt? Every press account affirms he was but that is wrong. I co-authored three articles on this topic with Cynthia Farahat, looking at the first round of parliamentary elections (“Egypt’s Sham Election“), the second round (“Don’t Ignore Electoral Fraud in Egypt“), and the presidential elections (“Egypt’s Real Ruler: Mohamed Tantawi“). In them, we documented the extensive manipulation of the 2011-12 elections, which we saw as “a ploy by the ruling military leadership to remain in power.” I remain puzzled and frustrated why these elections, with their don’t-pass-the-laugh-test results, continue to be portrayed as legitimately democratic. That they were not skewers the whole business about the military overthrowing a legitimate leader.
Morsi was never in command: Obviously, he did not control the military, but he also did not control the police, the intelligence services, the judiciary, or even the Presidential Guard assigned to protect him. As one report from Cairo put it, “in a sign of how little Mr. Morsi ever managed to control the Mubarak bureaucracy he took over, the officers of the Presidential Guard … burst into celebration, waving flags from the roof of the palace.” In other words, Morsi always sat in his office at the sufferance of the deep state, the very agencies that brokered his “election” in June 2012.
There are only two powers, the military and the Islamists: This sad truth has been confirmed repeatedly in the past 2½ years of Arabic-speaking upheaval, and it has been confirmed again now in Egypt. The liberals, seculars, and leftists do not count when the chips are down. Their great challenge is to become politically relevant.
1952, 2011, 2013: The Egyptian military has now thrice in modern times overthrown existing leaders – a king, a former air force general, and a Muslim Brotherhood figure. No other institution in Egypt enjoys its power. In both 2011 and now, the street demonstrators congratulated themselves on deposing the president, but had the military sided with those presidents and not the demonstrators, the former would still be in office.
Military, Inc.: The military officer corps has a vast and unhealthy control over the country’s economy. This interest transcends all else; officers may disagree on other matters, but they concur on the need to pass these privileges intact to their children. Conversely, this materialism means that they will make a deal with anyone who guarantees its privileges, as Morsi did (adding new benefits) a year ago.
Ruling from behind the scenes: The 1½ years of direct military rule by Mohamed al-Tantawi and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) from February 2011 to August 2012 went badly; this presumably explains why Gen. Abdul-Fattah al-Sisi immediately handed the government over to a civilian.
Coups d’état have changed: On the evening of July 22, 1952, Col. Gamal Abdul Nasser told Anwar el-Sadat to come to Cairo from Sinai. But Sadat took in a movie with his family and nearly missed the overthrow of the monarchy. This anecdote points to two huge changes: First, the overthrows are now part of a national catharsis, as opposed to the obscure and furtive effort back then. Second, it’s now the top military figures who remove the head of state and not hot-headed junior officers. Put differently, Egypt has entered the more sophisticated arena of the Turkish-style coup d’état, all four of which were carried out by heads of the military, not lesser officers.
The military’s fascism: Hillel Frisch notes that Sisi’s reference to “the will of the people,” when the people are clearly very divided, points to his and SCAF’s inherently dictatorial vision. True, and there’s nothing new here; military men have since 1952 ruled Egypt with this sort of anti-democratic pomposity.
Analogy to Algeria: The Algerian army’s intervened in the political process in 1992, just as Islamists there appeared to be on course to winning elections; this offers a comparison to the current situation in Egypt and raises the prospect of years of civil insurrection. But the analogy is not useful for Algeria experienced nothing like the mass opposition to Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt. It would be surprising if the Egyptian Islamists resorted to violence after their earlier experiences with this tactic and after seeing the vast numbers of their engaged opponents.
Is Sisi in league with the Salafis? It was striking that Sisi invited Galal Morra as one of the select group attending his declaration that Morsi had been removed from office, and all the more striking so because Sisi’s plan of action corresponds to the Salafis’ own ideas. In particular, he neither appointed a leftist like Mohamed ElBaradei as interim head of government nor did he scrap the existing, Islamist constitution , but only suspended it.
Adli Mansour a mere figurehead? That’s what the smart money is saying. But they said the same about Anwar el-Sadat after Gamal Abdul Nasser’s sudden death in 1970, only to be proven wrong. Mansour could well be transient but it’s too soon to know, especially given his near anonymity.
Anne W. Patterson, “hayzaboon“: The U.S. ambassador to Egypt has been a disgrace, siding with the Muslim Brotherhood. Being the object of loathing on the streets of Cairo and called “old hag” has been her not undeserved reward for this betrayal of American principles.
Will Saudi Arabia fund Egypt? David P. Goldman notes the Saudi monarchy’s fear of the Muslim Brotherhood as a republican rival to its power and its huge relief at Morsi’s expulsion. He raises the prospect that Riyadh, with reserves of $630 billion, could without much of a stretch provide the $10 billion or so needed annually to keep Egyptians from starving. This is probably the only solution in sight for Egypt’s hungry population. But will the gerontocracy open its purse?
What will Middle East gain from US’ “retreat”?
Throughout the year, American commentators have been sounding alarm over the weakening of the US positions in the Middle East. Optimists say Washington has intentionally been “cutting down on its commitments”. According to pessimists, America is quickly losing credibility amid an acute crisis of trust in its relations with its closest allies. Some of these allies are even working to harmonize relationships with Washington’s geopolitical rivals, or are looking for common ground to strike with those who are officially deemed “US enemies”.
Experts say the policy of the Trump administration in the Middle East should be more consistent, both in conceptual and personnel terms. This policy should be devoid of any sudden or drastic moves which could only undermine trust between the United States and the Gulf countries, Yasmine Farouk of the Carnegie Foundation said in February. Over the past six months, there have appeared sufficient grounds to believe that Iran “is gripped by fear and experiences a sense of despair in the confrontation with the United States.” However, the White House’s current policy on Tehran, which is lacking clear vision and trustworthy strategy, is sowing more and more seeds of distrust between America and its Sunni allies. This schism is the very “fundamental geostrategic success” that Iran has “sought to achieve over the past 40 years.” Now, Tehran sees more and more “opportunities and advantages” for itself, wrote Kenneth Pollack, an expert with Foreign Policy, at the end of September.
From 1991 to 2010 the United States enjoyed “incontestable supremacy in the Middle East. Even on the eve of the “Arab Spring”, most states in the region depended on America for help and “understanding” in many vital issues. However, the results of the Middle East policy of recent years are disappointing, Dennis Ross and Dana Stroul from the Washington Institute for Middle Eastern Policy say. The recent moves taken by the Trump administration, starting from the US withdrawal from the “nuclear deal” in May last year, which aimed at forcing Iran to make concessions, have “fallen through.” The attempt to reduce Iran’s activities in the region to zero by tightening sanctions, which, according to the White House, were to deprive Tehran of resources to pursue a full-fledged foreign policy, “did not work to effect.” If President Trump had actually managed to “isolate” anyone in the region, then it is not Iran, but the United States. Experts believe that the ambitious statements that have been made by Washington on a daily basis were not supported by convincing action, political or military. The White House’s flagrant reluctance to defend its allies deepens the gap between America and its partners in the Gulf Region. In addition, the policy of ill-thought sanctions led to the alienation of the European allies as well, without whom pressure on Tehran makes no sense.
Donald Trump strongly disagrees with such criticism, emphasizing that his foreign policy is based on “pragmatism” and “objective interests”. Concerning the Middle East, these words can be understood in at least two different ways. On the one hand, the current US administration believes that “cooperation” implies, first of all, the promotion of the “monetization” of the alliance, which was unequivocally announced in the Trump National Security Strategy in December 2017. Allies and partners are required to “contribute” by allocating more funds for the purchase of American weapons.
On the other hand, domestic oil production in the US has increased significantly in recent years, primarily due to the introduction of shale oil extraction technologies. As a result, America is rapidly turning “into a major competitor” of oil and gas suppliers from the Middle East. The presence in Washington’s regional policy of many Cold War – era features, including the dominance of ideology and the division of countries into “friends” and “foes,” may also have a new, extremely unpleasant interpretation for the Persian Gulf states. What is meant is Washington’s attempts to breathe new life into maintaining (or formal strengthening – despite the apparent setbacks, for example, of the concept of “Arab NATO”), a political architecture in which the region is divided into warring blocs. Given the situation, the deeper the region plunges into the chaos of destabilization, the easier it will be for the United States to deprive Saudi Arabia of its current status as the “regulator” of the global oil market.
Meanwhile, the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape is becoming ever more polycentric as more and more countries of the region demonstrate their intention to “stand for their interests”. In this context, the Trump administration’s obsession with the “Iranian threat” is causing ever more bewilderment among some Arab allies, as Tehran, for its part, has put forward and supported initiatives to alleviate regional tensions. According to IRNA, on September 23, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announced proposals “to ensure the safety of navigation in the region” and promote interstate cooperation in the Persian Gulf. The project, known as the “Hormuz Peace Initiative”, encompasses “both security and economic issues.” “All countries of the Persian Gulf are invited to participate in a new format of regional dialogue,” – the Iranian president said. On October 1, Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani welcomed a statement made the day before by Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, that he was ready to start a dialogue between the two countries.
Six months ago, Riyadh, as well as Bahrain, unconditionally supported the US line for a tough confrontation with Iran. However, serious doubts were voiced by leaders of Egypt, Jordan and Qatar. Kuwait, Qatar and Oman even came up in favor of diplomatic methods of resolving disagreements with Iran. In recent months, this policy has also been backed by the UAE. However, on September 14, a number of Saudi Arabia’s major oil infrastructure facilities came under a massive attack by drones and cruise missiles. Saudi Arabia and the US “have no doubts” that Iran is behind the attack. A lot will be clarified after the results of an inquiry by the international commission are made public: the publication of evidence that proves Tehran’s direct involvement in the attack could become a casus belli for the Saudis.
In this case, America’s Arab allies will be waiting for the White House’s reaction, which puts the Trump administration “in a pretty difficult position”. Whether part of the leadership in Riyadh is ready to go all-in and strike at Iran on their own, in the hope that the United States will not be able to stay away in case of a new war in the Gulf, will become a relevant issue again. However, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated a “weakness of its army” in Yemen. And the blow against the Saudi oil refining facilities, whoever was behind it, has raised the question of the effectiveness of American means of control of regional airspace, as well as the combat readiness of the air defense system based on American technology. The absence of a clear and decisive reaction from Trump can ruin the authority of the United States, both in the Gulf countries and in the entire Middle East Region. In addition, this may have a negative effect on American voters. Meanwhile, “… America cannot and does not want to wage a war against Iran”.
Russia’s position is aimed at resolving disagreements and potential conflicts in the Middle East through negotiation with the participation of all parties involved. In a recent interview with International Affairs Chief Editor Armen Oganesyan, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov expressed hope that “the crisis involving Iran will be settled without a new outbreak of conflict”. According to Ryabkov, Moscow believes in the triumph of common sense in the region, which is being torn by several conflicts. In early October, in response to questions from the Valdai Discussion Club, the head of Russian diplomacy Sergey Lavrov dwelled on Russia’s vision of the challenges facing the region. “Undoubtedly, security must be ensured in the Persian Gulf, but Iran has proposals that are not directed against anyone, they are not exclusive, they invite all countries to join forces.”
Russia, in turn, has come up with a proposal to begin a comprehensive and constructive dialogue on the concept of a Collective Security Treaty for the Persian Gulf with the prospect of its expansion to the entire Middle East. Addressing the participants in the Valdai Forum on October 3, President Vladimir Putin recalled how Moscow “together with partners of the Astana format” had brought together the interested countries in the region and the international community to launch a political settlement in Syria. The negotiations were joined by the United States. President Putin paid tribute to “President Trump’s courage and ability to take extraordinary steps”. The crisis involving the Korean Peninsula dissolved very quickly, he said, once the US administration moved from head-on confrontation to dialogue. The Syrian settlement “may become a kind of model for resolving regional crises. And in the vast majority of cases, it will be the diplomatic mechanisms that will come handy. The use of force is an extreme measure, a forced exception,” – President Putin emphasized. Moscow advocates convergence of efforts to address common threats. The latest initiative, which is based on this principle, is the idea of creating an organization “for security and cooperation, which, in addition to the Gulf countries, could comprise Russia, China, the USA, the EU, India and other countries concerned as observers”.
According to optimistic-minded American observers, the US leadership’s demonstration of restraint and caution on the use of force can have positive consequences – it could prompt countries of the Middle East to seek diplomatic solutions . But is Washington ready and able to “seize on the chance” and join international efforts to launch an extensive dialogue of all regional countries concerned? Up to now, the Trump administration has demonstrated the potential to weaken, or even completely destroy, multilateral institutions and formats, rather than create or support them. In the end, it is the “credo” of unilateralism that is behind the US doctrinal documents and foreign policy practice.
The Middle East faces a long and difficult search for solutions if it wants to successfully address many internal problems, which, in most cases, are knotty, to say the least. The process of overcoming the consequences of the “crises of the decade” will take years. Considering this, the Middle Eastern states will have to play an ever greater role in resolving regional problems. Contributing to this will be the weakening of the former hegemon, which has been increasingly hinging on the use of force in recent years. Russia’s return to the Middle East for securing a balance of strength will make it possible to avoid the detrimental consequences of underestimating the international dimension of threats coming from a number of regional conflicts. In addition, it will encourage a departure from the counterproductive policy of forming artificial “division lines”.
From our partner International Affairs
Turkey in the Kurdish Rojava
Since the beginning of clashes in Syria, Turkey has aimed at annexing the left bank of the Euphrates up to Mossul, a strip of land about 500 kilometers long and 30 kilometers wide – an area which is large enough to accommodate the 3.6 million Syrian refugees who have entered Turkey since the beginning of the hostilities against Bashar el Assad.
The above mentioned area between the Kurdish Rojava and Turkey was established by the latter, in agreement with the United States, in August 2019.
It is the area that was invaded a few days ago.
Since the beginning of the clashes in Syria, the United States has wanted the Turkish Armed Forces to be targeted directly against President Assad’s forces, so as to lead either to a splitting of Syria or to the creation of a new regime, open to US and Western influences.
President Erdogan, however, has never agreed to do all the “dirty” work against Assad’ Shiites on his own. He has always asked for the direct and equal support of the US forces.
Here the US and its allies’ operations in Syria have essentially stopped.
The United States has quickly responded to this substantial refusal of Turkey to do the US work in Syria, by involving the Kurds and organizing a Force uniting the YPG Kurds and the Syrian Democratic Forces. It has done so with a military mechanism that – in principle-oversees mainly the areas already bombed by the US Air Force and by the coalition that supported the US dual struggle against Assad and the jihadists of the “Caliphate”.
In any case, however, Turkey does not want any Kurdish organization to monitor the borders between Turkey and Syria.
Hence, this is the dilemma. Turkey has already penetrated the Rojava area on the border with its country, while the Kurds – be they from the PKK or the YPG, two often overlapping organizations – try to ally precisely with Assad, while there is also the concrete possibility of a further Iranian penetration between Mossul and the Southern area of the Kurdish Rojava.
Turkey will also use its Syrian alliances, such as those of the Syrian Interim Government, to unite them with the Syrian National Army, which operates in the region north of Aleppo, and with the National Liberation Front stationed in Idlib.
It should also be noted that President Erdogan knows the real reason for the recent electoral defeat of his AKP Party. Obviously Turkish voters are worried about the economic crisis and the monetary tensions on the Turkish lira, but they are mainly terrified of the pressure that the 3.6 million Syrian refugees on the ground put on the whole Turkish economic and social system.
This is another political prospect for President Erdogan, namely becoming the protector – so to speak – of all Sunnis.
In addition to the pan-Turkish project in Central Asia, President Erdogan knows that militarily Saudi Arabia is a giant with clay feet, while Egypt is unable to project itself onto Central Asia and the Islamic Republic of Iran is finally focused on its pan-Shiite project, with an inward-looking attitude.
For some time now, the Turkish police has been monitoring and arresting a large number of Syrian, Christian or Shiite immigrants, while some leaders of the Syrian community have already been deported to Idlib.
It should also be recalled that the economic and financial effort to build at least 200,000 houses and services in the currently occupied Rojava area, mostly with non-Turkish funds, would be a major boost for the entire Turkish economy, which has long been floundering in a deep crisis.
Clearly, the inclusion of at least 3 million Syrians onto the Kurdish Rojava’s border with Turkey would greatly change the ethnic complexion of the area but, in the future, also of the whole Kurdish Rojava, with obvious positive effects for Turkey.
But there is also the other side of the coin, since there would be an increase of tensions between the Arab world, to which most Syrians belong, and the Kurdish and non-Arab universe that is alien to most of the political, religious and cultural traditions of the Shiite or Sunni Islam.
It should be recalled, however, that this has been the third Turkish penetration into the Kurdish Rojava since 2016.
As far as we can currently see, Turkey’s entry into the Kurdish country is limited to the “Kurdish canton” of Hasakah- Kobanè- Qarmishli.
The rest of the Turkish operation will obviously be calibrated on international reactions, especially of the countries directly concerned by Syria.
The Kurds, however, with their structure of Syrian Democratic Forces, have been among the few real winners of the war in Syria.
This has enabled them to stabilize the internal political structures and the borders of the Kurdish country, although no Kurdish leader has ever spoken of true independence of Rojava, but only of autonomy.
Therefore, the Kurds’ optimal strategic equation depends on the US presence in the East and North-East of their area.
Otherwise- as indeed happened – Turkey would take the whole strip of land at the border.
For the time being, the focus of Turkish operations goes from Ras Al Ain to Tell Abyad, in a span of about 100 kilometers.
As far as we know, in Tall Abyad, the Turkish penetration has been stopped by the Kurdish forces.
This is an area, however, with a very high number of Arabs, that Turkey has already penetrated with its intelligence Services and its organizations.
If the Kurds wanted to keep the territory already invaded by Turkey, there would be very hard clashes and it is not certain that they could win.
Pending the Turkish invasion, the Russian Federation has declared that Turkey has every right to defend its borders, but it has also added that the Syrian state and territorial unity needs to be preserved.
Moreover, the invaded area is not yet under Assad government’s control, but the presence of the Turkish Armed Forces would trigger instability also for Syria, considering that the Kurds of Rojava were (and are) much more friendly with Assad than with the Turkish regime, which has often declared its intention to eliminate Assad’s power system.
There were also massive gold acquisitions by the Turkish Central Bank immediately before the invasion of Rojava.
From January to August 2019, Turkey’s gold reserves reached 362.5 tons (+109), for a total value of about 17.9 billion euros.
Obviously, the fear of sanctions and the concern for national security have currently pushed Turkey to become one of the world’s largest gold buyers.
The above mentioned militiamen linked to the Turkish army are already 7,000, while the Kurdish ones operating in the area are at least 35,000, in addition to the 15,000 soldiers of Asaysh, the internal Kurdish security and intelligence organization.
Too many, and too well trained, not to be a very tough nut to crack also for the Turkish Armed Forces.
The United States – apart from the troops already withdrawn – still have 1,500 soldiers in the area, including special forces, military advisers and Marines – not at the border, but within the area of Rojava, on the border with Turkey and Iraq.
The US bases still operational in the area are ten, plus three aerial installations that allow to operate with transport vehicles, drones and helicopters.
Not to mention the French and British special forces that continue to operate in the area.
The operational assumptions are the following: President Assad could permit Turkey to take Rojava, in exchange for Syria’s green light on Idlib, still largely in the hands of the various forms of sword jihad.
Needless to say, the oil resources of the area are still in Kurdish hands and that both Assad and the other countries of the region want to quickly put their hands on it.
In President Erdogan’ strategic equation the energy problem is not secondary at all.
In Syria, in the Persian Gulf and -as we will see -also in Libya.
The Turkish ship Yavuz will shortly leave for Cyprus to drill the seabed.
The Northern Cyprus State, a direct emanation of Turkey, blocks any autonomous economic action by Cyprus and the Turkish Navy has sealed the Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus.
Three large energy companies are interested in Cyprus’ natural gas, namely ENI, Total and Exxon-Mobil.
The ship Saipem1200 was blocked by the Turkish Navy in February 2018, while in January 2019 the French Navy sent the ship Aconit for joint exercises with the Cypriot Navy, with the clear aim of opposing Turkey.
The traditional lack of character – so to speak – of the Italian ruling class.
Turkey, however, has never accepted the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and hence does not recognize Greece’s Exclusive Economic Zone, since it aims at acquiring the island of Kastellorizo, which is very close to the Turkish coast.
President Erdogan, the Head of a traditional land power that, indeed, was essential in the Cold War vis-à-vis the Caucasus and Southern Russia, wants to reach full military autonomy by 2023, according to the Turkish plan Vision 2023.
But, in particular, it wants to turn Turkey into a great maritime power, with a view to controlling the whole Aegean Sea and most of the Mediterranean.
Greece, however, is becoming the new US military center in the Mediterranean. The United States will support the new Greek military build-up but, above all, will help Greece to explore the depths of the Aegean and Ionian seas, as well as Crete, for oil.
In terms of migration, which is the EU No. 1 problem, President Erdogan skillfully exploits the EU weak presence and strategic irrelevance – if not non-existence.
In 2016, the Turkish leader collected the 6 billion euros promised by Germany and paid by the whole EU to keep the refugees in his country.
Turkey, however, wants a new agreement, much more burdensome for the EU, claiming it has already stopped as many as 270,000additional migrants in 2018 and 170,000 in 2019.
It is easy to predict that the silly Europe will give President Erdogan what he wants.
It is by no mere coincidence that boats of migrants leave the Turkish coasts – without any control – heading to the Greek islands of Kos, the ancient kingdom of Hippocrates, and Chios, the homeland of Homer and Lesbos.
Migration management is an indirect strategy technique.
Reverting to the Syrian case, another example of this new project of Turkish grandeur, we wonder why – assuming that there was a moment “x” – the United States gave the “green light” to President Erdogan for his invasion of Northern Rojava.
Probably the United States is thinking of a possible future clash between Turkey, Russia and Iran, which right now are organizing a Syrian Constitutional Committee, with the UN support.
Causing difficulties for Turkey in the Astana negotiations? It is a possibility, but much more would be needed to create tension around Turkey.
Turkey, however, should also deal with the 60,000 “Caliphate” fighters, detained in the Kurdish prisons.
It is not at all certain that Turkey wants to take care of them.
Dropping a jihadist bomb would be a threat for which no one could say no to Turkey.
A trace of Turkey’s current “policy line” can also be found in Libya.
Turkey has provided Fayez al-Sarraj’s Government of National Accord (GNA) with missiles, armored vehicles, drones and light weapons.
Probably Turkey has also favored the arrival of Jihadist militants from Syria to Libya.
The real clash is, here, between Turkey and Egypt, supported by the Gulf States.
Through their base in Niger, the Emirates support Haftar, who can thus control Fezzan.
Furthermore, through its support to the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups, Turkey wants to have a Libya divided between various areas of influence – as in Syria – with the aim of getting its hands – through al-Sarraj’s government – on the huge Libyan oil reserves: 48 billion barrels, plus the possible reserves from fracking, i.e. additional 26 billion barrels.
Apart from the size of oil production, which is much more relevant in Libya, now we can clearly see it is the same project that Turkey is carrying out in Syria.
Not to mention Misrata, where there is a tribe of Turkish origin, the Karaghla.
In any case, Turkey will reach the maximum power of blackmail vis-à-vis the poor EU and, in the future, vis-à-vis the Atlantic Alliance itself, to play the game of Islamic radicalism in contrast with Egypt and the Gulf countries.
The starting point will be the Turkish presence in Syria, which will be used for a rational division of the spheres of influence.
Has Assad succeeded in overcoming the Syrian crisis?
A series of revolutions swept through the Arab region. The first torch was from Tunisia when protester Mohamed Bouazizi burned himself in opposition to the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. This wave of revolts led to the overthrow of many Arab regimes and leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and other Arab countries. There has been a state of destruction, displacement and economic collapse in the countries affected by the revolutions, a lot of killing, torture and political division, as well as the penetration of terrorist groups in the Arab world.
The revolution began in the form of peaceful protests, but soon developed using violence between the Syrian army and opposition groups. Over time, the Syrian opposition was divided into a peaceful opposition aimed at overthrowing the Assad regime through diplomatic means and the armed opposition, which was divided into several factions: the Free Syrian Army, Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, as well as other armed factions.
This difficult situation brought the Syrian regime into a stage of internal popular and military pressure, which led to a request for military assistance from Russia. Russia responded to Assad’s request and defended the Syrian regime in earnest. Russia, which had good relations with the Libyan regime, did not veto the UN Security Council in favor of the Gaddafi regime. In the Syrian crisis, however, Russia and China have vetoed the UN Security Council in favor of the Assad regime, and they defended the Syrian regime in international forums.
Russia, which has historical ties with the Syrian regime, regards Syria as an extension of its strategic interests in the Middle East. Evidence of this is the presence of Russia’s military base in Syria, which is Russia’s only military base in the Middle East. Iran also stood by the Syrian regime in its war, and there was constant coordination between the Syrian and Iranian leaderships. On the other hand, the United States, Saudi Arabia and Turkey demanded that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad step down and replace the existing regime with a new regime. The United States has repeatedly threatened military intervention to strike the Syrian regime, but the American threat has always been matched by a Russian willingness to retaliate, creating a balance of power on the Syrian battlefield.
Russia’s active support of the Syrian regime and its allies’ support led to Assad’s steadfastness, despite widespread international dissatisfaction with this outcome. Syria’s political position has not yet changed, but the Syrian-Russian-Chinese-Iranian alliance has been strengthened. Many military analysts believe that what happened in Syria cannot be repeated with other countries. The most important reason is Syria’s strategic geographic position and the need for a regime like Assad to govern Syria for the time being.
The Assad regime has not collapsed, but there has been an internal and international resentment that did not exist in the past. This is expected to happen because of the nature of the Syrian regime’s alliances and the division of the region between an eastern and a Western axis. But the Assad regime has been able to withstand and maintain its position in the face of the severe crisis in Syria.
The Syrian regime must work hard to involve the Syrian opposition in government and form a government that includes all strata of Syrian society so as not to feel a large segment of the Syrian people injustice, and must increase the margin of freedom in the country. These steps should change the perception that prevailed towards the Syrian regime, and lead to its acceptance internally and internationally in the next stage.
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