Both are fully devoted, supported and promoted by the social media. Highly polarizing, both are fracturing any consensus. What Lady Gaga with her gay/gender gigs (or any similar sort of stage-acting à la Pussy Riot) is for the human rights, are the so-called Islamists for the Muslim world– strategic obstructers, assertively trivializing important larger contents that are essential for any human advancement. Does the placement on a proper Facebook page automatically mean being on the right side of history? Is our emphatic and socio-political interaction (increasingly irrelevant as it becomes trivial) reduced to a lame datafied, and monetizable cyber commodity?
Let’s get Sy(i)ria-ous: Where is the counter-narrative?
The MENA theatre is situated in one of the most fascinating locations of the world. It actually represents, along with the Balkans-Caucasus, the only existing land corridor that connects three continents. It also holds over a half of the world’s proven oil-gas reserves (56% – oil, 48% – gas). Further on, the Gulf OPEC states and Libya have –by far– the lowest costs of oil extraction, thanks to the high crude ‘purity’ (measured by overall properties such as the state of aggregation, excavation gravity, viscosity, weight, sulfuric content and other contaminants) which simplifies and cheapens the refinement process. These petrol-exporters also enjoy the close proximity to open warm seas for the fast and low-cost, convenient overseas shipments. Hence, the costs per barrel of crude for Libya and the Persian Gulf states are under 5USD, for other OPEC members below 10USD. This is in a sharp contrast to countries such as the US, Russia, Norway, Canada and many others that bear production costs of several tens of USD per barrel – according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).
Therefore, it is an absolute imperative for the external/peripheral powers to dominate such a pivotal geo-economic and geopolitical theater by simply keeping its center soft (e.g. by pre-empting, preventing or hindering the emancipation that might come through any indigenous socio-political modernization and economic diversification). This is the very same imperative that has remained a dominant rational of inner European and Asian machtpolitik for centuries.
No wonder that the competition in the MENA theatre, which has a lasting history of external domination or interference (and largely the Versailles, Anglo-French drawn borders), is harsh, multiple, unpredictable. The region is predominantly populated by the Sunni (Arab) Muslims. With its high population density and a demographic growth far outpacing the economic one, this very young median population (on average 23–27 years old) – that is frequently lacking any (universal) access to education, health and housing – is dominated by juvenile, mainly unemployed or underemployed, but socially mobilized and often angry males. An exceptional fact that the Middle East is a cradle of all four monotheistic religions is thus turned into its own paradox: Fueled by severe socio-economic exclusions and exacerbated by exploitation of the Shia–Sunni and of Muslim–Jewish–Christian antagonism, political radica-lization is surely one of the most convenient instruments of tacit control aimed at preserving local governing authorities predatory-alienated, unauthentic and weak, if not incapacitated.
It should not be of any surprise that each and every one of the predominantly Sunni-Muslim Balkans-MENA countries of the secular republican type, where the external powers have brokered the political settlement – often by compromising the very sovereignty and territorial integrity, is enveloped in perpetuated instabilities, remaining thus paralyzed. So far, not a single absolutistic monarchy has been significantly affected. Starting in Bosnia – nearly 20 years ago – followed by Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya as well as in the post-Spring Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, all the way to ‘ungoverned’ Mali, South Sudan and Algeria’s south, and up to the post-assassination revolt-torn Tunis or anti-Avanti Mursi‘ Cairo, a purposely dysfunctional and indecisive central government seems to have been put in place.
For one thing, as it now seems, the euphorically tam-tamed ‘Facebook revolutions’ across MENA were rather a strategic distractions ‘innocently’ dressed up in the diverting banality of social media networks
Policy of Timing or No Spring on a single string
Conclusively, most observers would agree that while the so-called Arab Spring had a cross-Arab impact, this was still far from a pan-Arab ripple effect: It was more of a spontaneous social revolt; a series of isolated events (related to each other more by Al-Jazeera-connecting-pots potting and fanning), rather than a directional process. To channel something so unexpectedly inflammatory and cross-Arab, while studiously avoiding pan-Arabism let alone any hint of real structural socio-economic reform and political emancipation – that could have only been achieved by lighting the torch of Islamism. Lacking any enlightenment, this torch far too often and far too easily brought about the extremist blindness of Islamo-fascism.
No Spring on a single string, right?! How could any social cohesion indispensible for the MENA democratization possibly work where primary loyalties are (returned) to sect, tribe or ethnicity? This dilemma relates not only to democracy, but also to the very quest of secularism – for the one presupposes the other – ever since the French Revolution. In this or any other part of the (developing) world, institutionalization of democracy without secularization of state inevitably leads to a dysfunctional, destabilizing and (self-)debilitating government: divinization of the post and personalization of power. The current state of the MENA republics affected by the Arab Spring as well as that of the GCC monarchies provides the best proof of this.
For one thing, as it now seems, the euphorically tam-tamed ‘Facebook revolutions’ across MENA were rather a strategic distractions ‘innocently’ dressed up in the diverting banality of social media networks. The very same role those networks well played elsewhere too. (Hence, is it of any surprise that the broad and universal right of self-determination has been sadly reduced to the right of internet-freedom? Contrary to the established apotheosis, many fundamental human rights are currently compressed like a zip-file, emailed and entrusted to just a pair of omnipotent, self-centered and self-interested non-state and semi-state actors of unilateral globalism/egoism: private IT corporations and shadowy intelligence agencies. )
Presently, the announced reduction of the American physical presence in Afghanistan, the limitations it faces in the nearly failed (nuclear bomb holding) Pakistan, and the massive overextensions suffered all over the southwestern flank of the Euro-Asian continent including the recent US Army pullout from Iraq, is felt within the GCC (and in France, UK, Israel and Turkey too) as resulting in dangerous exposure to a neighboring (increasingly anticipated as assertive) Iran as well as to Russia and China behind it. Right now, Syria pays a proxy-war price for that: This multi-religious country of subtle ancient cultural layers may end up entirely combusted, thereby creating a dangerous security vacuum in the heart of MENA. Or to use the words of frustration of the senior French diplomat who recently told me in Brussels: “we have to demonize and quickly delegitimize the legitimate Syrian government, and topple al-Assad in order to convince Israel not to bomb Iran…”
“Western national interests will no longer determine the moral and political impulses of today’s global community… Whatsoever the outcome, Syria’s agony has underscored a further irreversible weakening of the West’s dominant global role…” claims India’s former Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh. Perhaps so; the West has indeed become too weak to architecture, but it certainly remains strong enough to destabilize its conceived political peripheries:
As recently, the ‘Group of Friends of Syria’- induced recognition of the so-called Syrian opposition means also that Turkey is now practically at war with Syria. At this point, let me be both instructive and predictive: The fall of al-Assad will most certainly trigger the dissolution of Syria. It will also lead to a formalized federalization of Iraq, in a desperate move to prevent its total decomposition as well as to a serious crisis of Lebanese and Jordanian statehood – in both cases probably beyond reparation. The winners in such a scenario would then seem to be Israel (a country that remains enveloped in its traumatic European holocaust past and detached from its present neighborhood) along with the GCC monarchies – at least in the short run. However, over the long term the ‘winners’ would be the Kurds and Shias – even though the northern portions of Syria have already been occupied by the Turkish army for quite some time.
Consequently, with any proclamation of a Kurdish state (inevitably being of a Black Sea –Eastern Mediterranean stretch, a dream line of all Russian tsars in past), the Erdoğan government (as well as Iraq) would not be able to survive – as it has already created enough enemies at home and in its near abroad. Ergo, besides the dispersed, rarified and terrified MENA Christians, the moderate (Arab) Sunnis are definitely the long-term losers.
Possible, yet not probable epilogue
However, while the cacophony of European contradictions works towards a self-elimination of the EU from the region, Turkey tries to reinsert itself. The so-called neo-Ottomanism of the current (Anatolian, eastern rural power-base) government is steering the country right into the centre of grand bargaining for both Russia and for the US. To this emerging triangular constellation, ambitious and bold PM Erdoğan wishes to beat his own drum.
Past the Arab Spring, neither will Russia effectively sustain its presence in the Middle East on a strict pan-Arabic secular, republican and anti-Islamic idea, nor will the US manage to politically and morally justify its continuous backing off of the absolutistic monarchies that are so energized by the backward, dismissive and oppressive Wahhabism. Ankara tries its best to sublimate both in an effective manner: blending a mix of secular republican modernity and leavened with a traditional, tolerant and emancipating Islam, and to advertise this as an attractive future model across the Middle East. Simply enough, Bosporus wakes up to itself as the empiric proof that Islam and modernity work together. In fact, it is the last European nation that still has both demographic and economic growth.
Moreover, Ataturk’s Republic is by large and by far the world’s most successful Muslim state: It was never resting its development on oil or other primary-commodity exports, but on a vibrant socio-economic sector and solid democratic institutions. This is heavily contesting, not only for Russia, but primarily for the insecure regime of the House of Saud (and the other GCC autocracies), which rules by direct royal decree over a country of recent past, oil-export dependent and fizzing present and improbable future. No wonder that on the ideological battlefield these two belligerent parties will be dominating the Middle East, which is currently in a self-questioning, past yet another round of calamities. The outcome will be felt significantly beyond the Arab region and will reverberate all across the Sunni Muslim world.
Ankara is attempting to justify that the Saudi-promoted Islam is actually a toxic, separatist/ sectarian Wahhabist ideology that self-constrains Muslims, and keeps them on a wrong side of history by hindering their socio-economic and political development. It does so, Turkey would claim, by entrenching Muslims on a permanent collision course with the rest of the world, while Turkey-promoted Islam would not be a weaponized ideology, but a Modus Vivendi, one which would permit progress and be acceptable to all (including non-Muslims), with a centuries-long history of success.
1. Wilkinson, R.G. and Pickett, K. (2009), The Spirit Level: Why more equal societies almost always do better?, London, Allen Lane (Why Equality is Better for Everyone, Paperback 2nd Edition, Penguin )
2. Bajrektarevic, A. (2012), Geopolitics of Technology and the Hydrocarbon Status Quo (Why Kyoto Will Fail Again), Geopolitics of Energy, 34 (1), CERI Canada 2012
3. UNDP (2013), Human Development report HDR-2013 – The Rise of the South: Human progress in a Diverse World, UN – UNDP Publications
4. IEA (2012), World Energy Outlook 2012 – Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas, OECD – IEA Publications
5. World Bank (2012), World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development, WB Publications
6. OECD (2012), OECD Economic Outlook, (Issue 1, June 2012; and Issue 2, December 2012), OECD Publications
7. Bajrektarevic, A. (2012) Is There Life After Facebook, Addleton Academic Publishers RCP 11(2) 2012
8. Rushkoff, D. (2010), Program or Be Programmed – Ten Commands for a Digital Age, OR Books New York
9. Pariser, E. (2011), The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You, Penguin (page: 43)
10. Dassù, M. (2013), How Obama II is likely to see Europe, Europe’s World – the EU Policy Journal, Spring 2013/23 (page 96)
11. Krugman, P. (2013) Marches of Folly, IHT/The New York Times (19 MAR 2013, page: 7)
12. Singh, J. (2012), What Syria means to global community, Jakarta Post – Indonesia (04 SEP 12, page: 6)
Where is the end of Iran Nuclear Crisis?
Following the years of tension over Iran’s alleged efforts to develop a nuclear weapon, a long-term deal called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia – plus Germany, known as P5+1— was reached on July 14, 2015. Based on these developments, the UNSC Resolution 2231 endorsed the nuclear deal among these parties, adopted on July 20, 2015.
As per the deal, the IAEA remains under the charge to verify Iran’s compliance with the nuclear-related provisions of the JCPOA set forth in the agreement. Iran started providing the IAEA with necessary information to complete its investigation on the past records of its nuclear activities. The IAEA inaugurated increased monitoring and confirmed Iran’s adoption of numerous actions and key steps towards the limitation of its nuclear program.
Under the 2015 accord, Iran was allowed to enrich uranium only up to a 3.67 percent concentration, to stockpile no more than 300kg of the material, and to operate no more than 5,060 centrifuges. Iran also agreed to limit the size of its stockpile of enriched uranium, used to make both reactor fuel and nuclear weapons for 15 years – until 2031 and the number of centrifuges installed to enrich uranium for 10 years -until 2026.
These developments triggered the relief of sanctions imposed by the United States, the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN) on Iran. The former US President, Barack Obama, referred to the deal as the significant step towards building “more hopeful world” and “opportunity to move in a new direction”.
However, the first crisis over landmark nuclear deal arose soon after the announcement of the US President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018. In light of Trump’s decision, the US took actions to re-impose all sanctions on August 6, 2018 that were lifted in connection with the JCPOA.
President Trump denounced the Obama-era nuclear agreement with Iran as “defective, decaying, and rotten” as well as “one-sided deal”. He also accused that the accord only restricted Iran’s nuclear activities for a fixed period that failed to stop Iran from the development of its ballistic missiles and to facilitate real, comprehensive, and lasting solution of the nuclear crisis.
President Trump also raised the concern of the continuation of Iran’s aggression and malign activities under the cover of the JCPOA to threaten the US and its allies as well as to exploit the international financial system and support terrorism and foreign proxies in favor of its withdrawal from the deal. Iran responded the US withdrawal from the JCPOA with its further preparation for the restoration of uranium enrichment required for both nuclear energy and weapons on an industrial level without any limitations.
The second tension over Iranian nuclear crisis emerged from Donald Trump’s signing of an executive order imposing “hard-hitting” new sanctions on Iran on June 24, 2019 in response to the downing of an unmanned U.S. surveillance drone in international airspace by Iranian surface-to-air missile one week ago of the same month. Donald Trump also reaffirmed Washington’s stand of continuing pressure on Tehran until latter’s complete abandonment from nuclear activities.
It elevated tensions and worsened relations between the US and Iran. The confrontation was about to turn into military dimension though finally it did not happen thanks to Trump’s swift repeal of its decision of launching military strikes against Iran.
The third and most recent crisis generated from Iran’s announcement on boosting its uranium enrichment above the limit set by 2015 nuclear deal has drawn attention to international community in general and the involved global powers in particular, mostly the US, UK, and France. In the first week of July 2019, Iran declared to resume enriching uranium to higher levels, up to 5 percent concentration, to provide fuel required for its Bushehr nuclear power plant.
Iran also threatened to abandon more commitments under 2015 nuclear deal unless practical and tangible steps from the European powers are taken to implement European mechanism, known as, Instrument In Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) in order to facilitate trade and circumvent US sanctions on Iran.
Iran argued for the decision of its uranium enrichment as a step against the Trump administration’s unilateral exit from the 2015 nuclear deal and the re-imposition of multilateral sanctions in Iranian regime. Iran also accused that the world powers had failed to abide by their commitments. Since the beginning, Iran has been averring the development of its missile program as entirely peaceful and defensive in nature with the compliance of the principles verified by the IAEA.
In response, the US confirmed its policy of “maximum pressure” on Tehran acknowledged by the Trump administration referring to Iran’s infringement to the limit as “playing with fire”. The rest world powers such as the UK and Germany urged Iran for reversing its decision. France, Germany, and Britain expressed concerns over Iran’s new announcement in the wake of heightening tensions certainly condemning Iran’s decision as a “violation” of the nuclear pact.
The IAEA arranged an urgent nuclear agency meeting on July 10, 2019 requested by the US soon after Iran’s confirmation of exceeding the stockpile of enriched uranium permitted under JCPOA. The rest concerned powers, Germany, France and the UK confirmed their supports for the JCPOA only after Iran’s full compliance with its commitments. The closed-door meeting however ended without any unified stance.
However, China mentioned the US “unilateral bullying”, e.g. the maximum pressure exerted by the US on Iran, as the major cause behind Tehran’s announcement of breaching its uranium enrichment cap and the escalating Iranian nuclear crisis. China also expressed “regret” on Tehran’s decision for further enrichment of its nuclear activities.
The re-imposition of the US sanctions and Iran’s announcement of uranium enrichment have already generated high tension not only in US-Iran relations but also for global security. Iran’s threat to enrich uranium beyond the limit has become a major issue of concern for the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Middle Eastern region. The peaceful solution of Iran nuclear crisis has thus become uncertain. The strategic rivalry among great powers, lack of mutual trust between the US and Iran, and absence of the fulfillment of commitments under the nuclear deal have been posing severe challenges to the durable solution of the nuclear crisis.
Is Iran safe for Americans to visit?
The matter of security in Iran is essentially considered as a complex question for any U.S. citizen willing to visit the Islamic Republic.
In this regard, Skift Inc., a New York City headquartered media company that provides news, research, and marketing services for the travel industry, has tried to answer the question from two different points of view; one from the U.S. government and the other by U.S. travel agents and tour operators.
On a Monday article, the media outlet noticed a hint of a “perception problem” deemed to be fueled by the Trump administration’s rhetoric toward Iran.
Official answers to the query comes from the U.S. State Department, which has had a travel advisory against Iran since 1979, citing “the risk of kidnapping, arrest and detention of U.S. citizens.” On the other hand, tour operators who spoke with Skift strongly disagree, maintaining that Iran has proven to be a safe and remarkably hospitable place for travelers, including Americans.
The dilemma arises when an antagonism intensifies between the Trump administration and Iran that makes some American tourists rethinking plans to visit the country though nearly all tour operators say Iran is a safe and hospitable destination even for U.S. visitors.
“It is a country that is often portrayed as unwelcoming, but the reality is quite the opposite,” said Jenny Gray, the global product and operations manager of the Australia-based Intrepid Travel.
“Iranians are warm, friendly and eager to show off their country to foreigners. The feedback from our travelers is a testament to this.”
“Once they [Iranian authorities] have been approved for entry [issuing visas], people are welcomed warmly—we’ve never encountered a problem or even a cold shoulder,” said Robin Pollak, the president of Journeys International, which is offering Iran tours since 2015.
“People in Iran are very curious about visitors from a culture that is off-limits to them. They understand that American visitors do not reflect the way America is portrayed to them by their government,” she added.
Janet Moore, owner of Distant Horizons, which has offered customized tours to Iran for over 20 years, says “We’re used to getting questions on politics and safety, but this time frame seems more serious than what we’ve been through before.”
“People are worried about the rhetoric from (President) Trump and (national security advisor John) Bolton. They don’t want to be anywhere where there’s military activity.”
With an Iran tour scheduled for September, Moore said she’s uncertain whether the trip will actually go forward.
“People have really started to get skittish,” she said. “We’re not getting new sign-ups and most of our American travelers have pulled out and are making alternative plans. While people feel Iran is probably still safe, they also feel it’s something they can do later when things calm down.”
Reverting to foreign arrivals, Skift reports that Journeys International has seen interest fall off sharply among its clientele, which is primarily from the U.S., during the past month.
G Adventures, which offers a 14-day Iran itinerary, says that bookings among American travelers has fallen by 14 percent this year, said communications director Kim McCabe. At the same time, she noted that bookings from non-U.S. travelers increased by about that same amount.
“Global visitor interest in Iran seems to be modestly growing,” Kim said.
“Demand for Iran has been a real up and down situation,” Moore said. “Four years ago it was at a high point. Then we ran into problems in 2017 when Trump announced the travel ban on Muslims. Some people cancelled travel plans to Iran because they feared Iran would stop issuing visas or that they would be met with antagonism.”
Skift concludes that despite setbacks, the tour operators are optimistic about long-term growth in tourism to Iran, which in recent years has stepped up efforts to increase international visitation and has the stated goal of attracting 20 million annual visitors by 2025.
Last December, Ashely Duncan, an American fashion psychologist who accidentally landed in Iran, announced that her perception of the country was “totally different” from what mainstream Western media outlets portray.
Duncan told IRNA in an interview that “As an American, I did have a pleasant experience. I did not allow the politics and the diplomatic relationship to taint my view of Iran’s people.”
Iran hosts some of the world’s oldest cultural monuments including bazaars, museums, mosques, bridges, bathhouses, madrasas, gardens, rich natural, rural landscapes as well as 22 UNESCO World Heritage sites.
From our partner Tehran Times
UAE withdraws from Yemen: Managing alliances and reputational threats
A United Arab Emirates decision to withdraw the bulk of its forces from Yemen shines a spotlight on hard realities underlying Middle Eastern geopolitics.
The pullback suggests that the UAE is preparing for the possibility of a US military confrontation with Iran in which the UAE and Saudi Arabia could emerge as prime battlegrounds.
It also reflects long-standing subtle differences in the approaches of Saudi Arabia and the UAE towards Yemen.
It further highlights the UAE’s long-standing concern for its international standing amid mounting criticism of the civilian toll of the war as well as a recognition that the Trump administration’s unquestioning support may not be enough to shield its allies from significant reputational damage.
The withdrawal constitutes a finetuning rather than a reversal of the UAE’s determination to contain Iran and thwart political Islam witness the Emirates’ involvement in the Libyan civil war and support for renegade field marshal Khalifa Belqasim Haftar as well as its support for the embattled Sudanese military and autocrats like Egyptian general-turned-president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.
While the UAE may have withdrawn the bulk of its troops from key regions of Yemen, it leaves behind Emirati-trained local forces that will continue to do its bidding. The withdrawal, moreover, is not 100 percent with the UAE maintaining its Al-Mukalla base for counterterrorism operations.
The UAE’s commitment to assertive policies designed to ensure that the small state can continue to punch above its weight are also evident in its maintenance of a string of military and commercial port facilities in Yemen, on the African shore of the Red Sea, and in the Horn of Africa as well its hard-line towards Qatar and rivalry with Turkey.
As part of its regional and international projection, the UAE is keen to maintain its status as a model for Arab youth and preferred country of residence.
The UAE’s image contrasts starkly with that of Saudi Arabia, the custodian of Mecca and Medina, Islam’s two holiest cities.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s policies, including the clampdown on domestic critics and the Yemen war, have prompted embarrassing calls by prominent Islamic scholars for a boycott of the pilgrimage to Mecca, one of the five pillars of Islam.
Wittingly or unwittingly, the withdrawal leaves Saudi Arabia and Prince Mohammed, the instigator of the more than four-year long war that has sparked one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, exposed.
Nonetheless, despite differing objectives in Yemen, the UAE too suffered from the reputational fallout of bombings of civilian targets that were largely carried out by the Saudi rather than the Emirati air force.
Operating primarily in the north, Saudi Arabia focussed on countering Iranian-backed Houthi rebels whose stronghold borders on the kingdom while the UAE backed South Yemeni separatists and targeted Muslim-Brotherhood related groups.
With the withdrawal, the UAE may allow differences with Saudi Arabia to become more visible but will not put its alliance with the kingdom at risk.
If past differences are anything to go by, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are able to manage them.
The differences were evident in recent weeks with the UAE, unlike Saudi Arabia, refraining from blaming Iran for attacks on tankers in the Gulf of Oman.
Leaked emails written by Yousef al-Otaiba, the UAE’s influential ambassador in Washington, laid bare the Emirates’ strategy of working through the Saudi court to achieve its regional objectives despite viewing the kingdom as “coo coo.”
Similarly, differences in the two countries’ concept of Islam failed to rock their alliance despite the effective excommunication in 2016 of Saudi-backed ultra-conservatism at a UAE-sponsored conference in the Chechen capital of Grozny.
The alliance is key to the two countries’ counterrevolution aimed at maintaining the region’s autocratic status quo in the face of almost a decade of popular revolts, public protests and civil wars.
The UAE-Saudi-led counterrevolution is driven by Prince Mohammed and his UAE counterpart, crown prince Mohammed bin Zayed’s desire to shape the Middle East in their mould.
The UAE rather than the kingdom was the driver behind the Qatar boycott with Saudi King Mohammed and Prince Mohammed initially reaching out to the Qatar-backed Muslim Brotherhood when they came to power in 2015.
Four years later Saudi Arabia, is unlikely to radically shift gears but could prove less intransigent towards the group than the UAE.
While preparing for possible conflict with Iran may be the main driver for the withdrawal, it is unlikely to protect the UAE from damage to its reputation as a result of its involvement in Libya and Sudan as well as its draconic clampdown on dissent at home.
Mr. Haftar’s UAE-armed forces are believed to be responsible for this week’s bombing of a detention center for African migrants in the Libyan capital Tripoli that killed 40 people and wounded 80 others.
The bombing came of the heels of a discovery of US-made missiles on one of Mr. Haftar’s military bases packed in shipping containers stating they belonged to the “UAE Armed Forces.” The UAE has denied ownership.
The UAE’s withdrawal from Yemen will likely help it evade calls for Yemen-related arms embargoes.
Libya, however, could prove to be the UAE’s Achilles heel.
Said Robert Menendez, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in a letter to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo: “You are surely aware that if these allegations prove true you may be obligated by law to terminate all arms sales to the UAE.”
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