In the last few years, a marked shift in Saudi thinking on nuclear issues has become evident. Saudi princes have explicitly and publicly stated that a nuclear military option is something the kingdom is obligated to examine if Tehran is not stopped in its march toward nuclear weapons.
In March 2011, Prince Turki al-Faisal, former head of Saudi intelligence and ambassador to the United States, called for the Gulf states to acquire “nuclear might” as a counterweight to Iran should efforts fail to persuade it to abandon its military nuclear program, a point he repeated several months later. U.S. diplomat Dennis Ross confirmed that Saudi King Abdullah explicitly warned Washington in April 2009: “If they get nuclear weapons, we will get nuclear weapons.” Ross’s quote of the Saudi king appears to be the first public confirmation of Riyadh’s position. An unconfirmed report alleges that Abdullah made a similar statement to Russian president Vladimir Putin in their February 2007 summit.
Despite its wealth and status, the kingdom operates out of a deep sense of inferiority and vulnerability: Some of its neighbors, notably Iraq and Iran, are powerful and historically hostile; its long borders are porous; it has a large Shiite population of questionable loyalty in its sensitive oil-producing regions, and its strategic installations are vulnerable. In Riyadh’s view, nuclear capabilities in Iranian hands would allow Tehran to dictate the Gulf agenda—including its oil markets—as well as incite the Shiites in Saudi Arabia’s eastern province, undermining the kingdom’s status in the Muslim world as well as the royal family’s grip on power.
The public statements reflecting Saudi intent to acquire nuclear weapons may be intended primarily to convince Tehran that obtaining the bomb will have unintended consequences. They may even be intended to pressure Washington to deal more forcibly with Tehran in order to prevent it from becoming a nuclear state. Nonetheless, these statements are not something to be taken lightly. Given Riyadh’s historical involvement (albeit not all of it proven) with nuclear weapons programs and its military inferiority to Tehran, it is liable to strive for a nuclear deterrent of its own. Saudi Arabia may indeed become the first nuclear state to acquire rather than develop nuclear capabilities.
Riyadh would view nuclear weapons as a counterweight to Tehran. The kingdom, which has traditionally achieved its goals through behind-the-scenes maneuvering backed up by enormous wealth, would probably not change this paradigm if it acquired a nuclear weapon. The lack of transparency typical of Saudi decision-making does not afford knowledge of what, if any, decisions have been made on nuclear matters. Decisions on sensitive issues are made in very secretive settings usually involving the king and the brothers closest to him and are affected by a sluggish process that tends to seek consensus through consultation within the family, requiring the placation of various factions within it and within the broader circles of regime supporters.
Due to its extremely limited research and development capabilities and know-how, Riyadh’s possible nuclear pursuit is likely to be done with external help and acquisition of an off-the-shelf deterrent. It has nowhere near the level of indigenous technical capacity needed to produce, maintain, or deploy nuclear weapons. No long-term strategy for developing its nuclear sector has been publicly issued, nor does Riyadh possess the necessary institutional support (across regulatory, technical, and legal fields) to effectively retain nuclear deployments. Therefore, it might partner with China or Pakistan or both, which have the necessary technological and human infrastructures.
Saudi Arabia’s track record merits some well-placed concern over the issue of nuclear weapons. In the late 1980s, China secretly supplied Riyadh with thirty-six CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). A recently inked civilian nuclear cooperation deal with Beijing, supplier of the CSS-2s and reported supplier of newer and still nuclear-capable DF-5 ICBMs, may also be troubling. Furthermore, the recent inauguration of a new command and control center belonging to the Strategic Missile Force near Riyadh raises a question: Why would Saudi Arabia invest billions in updating its strategic command and control facilities if it still possesses only outdated Chinese missiles?
The visit by the late Saudi defense minister, Crown Prince Sultan, to a uranium enrichment facility and a Pakistani missile production plant near Islamabad in 1999 (hosted by A.Q. Khan, accused of passing on nuclear secrets) raise concerns about Riyadh’s future relations with Islamabad in this matter. On at least one occasion, Khan visited Riyadh, and reports have surfaced about Pakistani scientists coming to Saudi Arabia under the guise of Hajj pilgrims.
These concerns and connections are not merely speculative. Islamabad’s willingness to provide security support for Riyadh, should the Saudis feel that there is a real danger to the kingdom’s stability, was put to the test in the spring of 2011. The Saudi royals’ fear that the Shiite uprising in Bahrain would spread to Shiite centers in northeast Saudi Arabia (where most of the kingdom’s oil reserves are located) prompted Riyadh to ask Islamabad to place an expeditionary force on alert ready to be deployed on Saudi soil should the security situation deteriorate. Pakistan responded positively to the Saudi request.
Riyadh views Islamabad as its strategic hinterland. The Saudis are behind the financing of many arms deals, and in exchange, receive training of their aerial and naval personnel by the Pakistanis. During a visit by Pakistani president Zardari to Riyadh in July 2011 (a visit that reportedly enhanced the strategic relations between the countries), King Abdullah thanked him for his support in Bahrain, where Pakistani mercenaries helped put down the Shiite uprising, and in maintaining regional stability. A month later, Pakistani prime minister Yousuf Raza Gilani also visited the kingdom, asking for Saudi help with oil supplies in light of Islamabad’s economic situation and Washington’s threats to cut off support; it is unclear what Pakistan promised in exchange for the aid. Riyadh maintains a very close relationship with the heads of Islamabad’s military and intelligence services. This is significant in the nuclear context because from the start, the Pakistani nuclear program was under the control of the military establishment without any real involvement on the part of the political leadership.
The two nations, both with Sunni majorities, border Iran on two sides and are interested in curbing Tehran’s power and influence. Pakistan, lacking the monetary resources, has the requisite knowledge and skilled manpower for developing nuclear arms whereas Saudi Arabia is wealthy but lacks the relevant infrastructure and trained personnel. One cannot rule out the possibility that Riyadh may seek to balance Tehran’s power by increasing cooperation in the nuclear field with its long-standing friend, despite the political risks of jeopardizing well-established defense relations with Washington. In October 2010, the head of the strategic planning unit of Pakistan’s armed forces, who is responsible for the production, security, and storage of the nation’s nuclear weapons, said that Islamabad had the right to provide its expertise in the nuclear field to other nations. In the past, both Islamabad and Riyadh denied such a scenario.
Should Saudi Arabia find itself in a sensitive security situation, it may seek to capitalize on its investment in the Pakistani nuclear program and pressure Islamabad for assistance. It is unclear whether there is, in fact, a binding nuclear agreement between the states though the assessment is that both states have at least discussed the option. If such an agreement exists, the two have presumably trained for operational cooperation in this field. Gary Samore, President Obama’s advisor on arms control, has said that the possibility of Pakistani nuclear forces being placed in Saudi Arabia cannot be ruled out.
Although there has never been a precedent of one state selling or transferring actual nuclear warheads to another, there is the precedent of exchange of nuclear technology between Pakistan and North Korea as well as proliferation of forbidden nuclear equipment and know-how to countries including Iran and Libya and possibly Syria or Saudi Arabia. As Tehran progresses, Riyadh is likely to exert more pressure on Islamabad to fulfill its presumed commitments. It is by no means certain that Pakistan will yield to Saudi pressure and inducements, but it is impossible to rule out the deployment of Pakistani fighter jets or surface-to-surface missiles with nuclear warheads, controlled by Pakistan, on Saudi soil.
At the same time, the kingdom is accelerating its independent nuclear development—one of the largest development projects in its history—as another option in response to Iran. Saudi Arabia has in recent years started to prepare openly for the development of a civilian nuclear program and is broadening efforts to construct a knowledge base in the field, possibly as another way of establishing nuclear military capabilities over the long term. It has initiated a string of projects and signed cooperation agreements with France, Russia, the United States, South Korea, and China. In 2006, Riyadh called for the Gulf Cooperation Council (a regional bloc that includes Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) to develop a shared program to use nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes in accordance with international treaties. The Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, sought to assuage concerns about possible intentions to develop nuclear weapons stating, “It is no secret and we’re doing everything out in the open. Our goal is to pursue technology for peaceful uses—no more and no less.” Yet notwithstanding similar declarations over the years, the kingdom has signaled that it would not surrender the capability to enrich uranium on its soil, which continues to raise doubts about its intentions.
In April 2010, King Abdullah called for the establishment of a national body for nuclear research and development. In addition, he stated that Riyadh would invest more than $100 billion over two decades to establish no fewer than sixteen nuclear reactors with the first reactor set to be connected to the power grid by 2020. While the civilian nuclear program seems designed to be a symbolic response to Tehran’s nuclear project in the short term, this does not preclude the possibility of its serving as a cover or preliminary stage for a military nuclear project in the future. In June 2005, Riyadh signed the Small Quantities Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but this protocol exempts it from intrusive inspections and makes it difficult for the IAEA to ensure there is no forbidden development underway. The concern that loopholes in the protocol could allow nations to develop military nuclear capabilities has moved the IAEA to attempt to change it. Riyadh’s response was to hurry to sign the present text, despite Washington’s opposition.
Still Relying on America?
A signal from Riyadh that it intends to pursue the nuclear route may indeed be an effective way to pressure Washington to demonstrate its commitment to defend the kingdom more convincingly. Saudi doubts about their U.S. allies preceded the Obama administration’s conduct during the recent Arab upheavals but have been intensified by them. In the last two years, the kingdom has missed few opportunities to express its displeasure with Washington’s policy toward Tehran. Although Secretary of State Hillary Clinton promised to extend the U.S. “defense umbrella” to the Gulf states should Tehran acquire military nuclear capabilities, this type of declaration allays few fears as it is liable to be seen as a grudging acceptance of a nuclear-armed Iran. While Washington would not have to deploy nuclear forces on Arabian soil to deter aggression, such a move would make the message of deterrence more credible and calm Saudi nerves. However, any U.S.-Saudi security arrangement would likely be covert so as not to embarrass the kingdom vis-à-vis elements opposed to hosting “infidels” on “sacred” lands. Another possibility would be to deploy nuclear forces offshore. A hint that such an option might be in the making came in March 2010 when the U.S. navy fired a missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead from a submarine near the Saudi coast.
Continued Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapon, Iraq’s increasing alignment with Tehran, and an expedited U.S. exit from Afghanistan are all changing the Saudi strategic landscape. The Obama administration’s “lead from behind” approach in Libya and its hesitation to get involved in the Syrian civil war all contribute to a reassessment of U.S. commitments. With the U.S. “pivot to Asia”—taking the form of a series of military, economic, commercial, and diplomatic initiatives aimed at contending with the rising power of China—and a changing global energy map due to expansion of oil and natural gas production in the United States, Riyadh and others are beginning to prepare for a post-U.S. Middle East.
According to recent reports, Washington is considering expanding its nuclear cooperation with Riyadh on the basis of a 2008 memorandum of understanding: In exchange for foregoing the operation of nuclear fuel cycles on its soil, Saudi Arabia was to receive nuclear assistance. Such a move, should it come to pass, may be meant to persuade Riyadh to abandon its strategic goals, prevent other players from gaining a foothold in the attractive Saudi market, and challenge Tehran’s nuclear policy. The United States is still Saudi Arabia’s most effective security support, but if Washington distances itself from regional matters, the gradual entrance of new players into the Gulf is inevitable.
The question of Saudi acquisition of a nuclear deterrent is more relevant than ever when both enemies and friends of the United States are looking at a possible regional drawdown on Washington’s part as well as a lack of support for the pro-Western regimes that remain in place. If the U.S. government provides Riyadh with formal security guarantees, it would be natural for it to demand that the kingdom forego its strategic goals. But Riyadh’s inclusion under a U.S. defense umbrella is not a given and depends both on the quality of relations between the two countries and other Saudi considerations. Riyadh remains skeptical over Washington’s willingness to come to its aid and may thus seek to purchase a nuclear deterrent, which would provide it with more freedom vis-à-vis its stronger ally. Under present circumstances, it is not unreasonable for Riyadh to rely on other states for its defense in addition to Washington for the simple reason that it has done so in the past. Likewise, it is more than likely that the Saudis will not act transparently because they have acted in secret previously.
After Iran, Saudi Arabia is the number one candidate for further nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Open source evidence remains circumstantial, but perhaps more than any other regional player, Riyadh has the requisite ideological and strategic motives as well as the financial wherewithal to act on the option.
The kingdom may conclude that its security constraints as well as the attendant prestige and influence generated by having a bomb outweigh the political and economic costs it will pay. The difficulty in stopping Tehran’s dogged quest for a nuclear capability coupled with Riyadh’s doubts about the reliability of Washington is liable to encourage Riyadh to shorten timetables for developing an independent nuclear infrastructure, as well as to opt to purchase a turnkey nuclear system, an off-the-shelf product, or to enter into a security compact of one sort with another power. Sunni-majority Pakistan has emerged as the natural candidate for such an arrangement.
Heavy U.S. pressure is likely to be brought to bear on the Saudis not to acquire nuclear capabilities. Indeed, it seems that, at present, the price Riyadh is likely to pay should it acquire military nuclear capabilities might outweigh the advantages of such a move. But strategic interest, motivated by considerations of survival, could have the upper hand. Should it seem that the kingdom’s vital security interests are threatened, it may prefer to take a series of steps, including obtaining a nonconventional arsenal, to reduce risks and ensure the continuity of the House of Saud.
 Kuwait News Agency, Mar. 21, 2011.
 The Wall Street Journal, June 2, 2011; The Guardian (London), June 29, 2011; The Jerusalem Post, June 30, 2011.
 Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), May 30, 2012.
 Ibid., May 30, 2012.
 Thomas Lippman, Saudi Arabia on the Edge: The Uncertain Future of an American Ally (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2012), pp. 229-30, 236-7.
 Ibid, pp. 231, 237-43.
 Joseph Kostiner, “The GCC States and the Security Challenges of the Twenty-First Century,” The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, no. 86, Sept. 2010.
 Shmuel Bar, “Culture of Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia,” working paper, Twelfth Herzliya Conference, Jan. 2012.
 Mark Jansson, “Conceding the Saudi Nuclear Breakout,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., Feb. 21, 2012.
 “Pakistani Journalist Examines Saudi-Pakistani Nuclear Cooperation,” Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Washington, D.C., Special Dispatch, no. 4205, Oct. 14, 2011.
 William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, eds., Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: A Comparative Perspective (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 93.
 Asia Times (Hong Kong), Apr. 2, 2011.
 Bruce Riedel, “Brezhnev in the Hejaz,” National Interest, Sept.-Oct. 2011.
 Francisco Aguilar, Randy Bell, Natalie Black, Sayce Falk, Sasha Rogers and Aki Peritz, “An Introduction to Pakistan’s Military,” Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center, Cambridge, July 2011.
 Islamic Republic News Agency, Aug. 10, 2011.
 Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, “Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism,” Arms Control Today (Washington, D.C.), July/Aug. 2009.
 Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Iran’s bomb and Pakistan,” The Express Tribune (Karachi), Jan. 15, 2012.
 “Head of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program: Pakistan Has the Right to Use Nuclear Weapons Should the Need Arise,” MEMRI, Special Dispatch, no. 3330, Oct. 31, 2010.
 Bruce Riedel, “Enduring Allies: Pakistan’s Partnership with Saudi Arabia Runs Deeper,” Force, Dec. 2011.
 Thomas Lippman, “Nuclear Weapons and Saudi Strategy,” Policy Brief, no. 5, Middle East Institute, Jan. 2008.
 “Country Profiles: North Korea, Nuclear,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Washington, D.C., Aug. 2012.
 William Langewiesche, “The Wrath of Khan,” The Atlantic, Nov. 2005.
 Asharq al-Awsat (London), Oct. 15, 2012.
 The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 16, 2012.
 The Gulf News (Dubai), Dec. 11, 2006.
 Ha’aretz, Dec. 10, 2006.
 Arab News (Riyadh), June 17, 2010; Asharq al-Awsat, Oct. 15, 2012.
 Arab News, June 1, 2011.
 Global Security Newswire, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Washington, D.C., June 16, 2005.
 The Washington Post, May 16, 2011; Asharq al-Awsat, Nov. 8, 2012.
 Fox News, July 22, 2009.
 The Washington Post, Mar. 31, 2010.
 The Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2011.
The failure of the US-backed Israeli peace agreements and its normalisation with the Gulf states
Egyptian diplomacy has always played a (positive mediation role to consolidate the ceasefire between the Palestinians and the Israelis, especially in the recent events in Gaza 2021, and Egypt was ready to work with everyone and Israel), in order to promote an early, comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Palestinian issue on the basis of a “the two states solution” and work together to contribute to achieving lasting peace in the Middle East. Israel, as a close ally of the United States of America, considers that “the dismantling of the terrorist infrastructure is the first step in the road map towards peace and stability in the region, and indeed it constitutes a valid basis for any peace process”. Israel has also always emphasized that “building and achieving peace requires creating a positive atmosphere between all its parties in an atmosphere free of terrorism and incitement, which encourages efforts to reach an understanding between its parties”.
However, if the current US administration of President “Joe Biden” avoided inviting the Egyptian side and all Arab parties and forces not to attend the conference of democracies in the world, with the exception of Israel and Iraq only from the heart of the Arab region, it will have (negative and dangerous repercussions on the security of the Hebrew state, and weaken the Israeli peace plans with the Arab Gulf countries mediated by the United States), and this can be analyzed through:
It is possible that (Arab countries take collective steps to stop peace plans and political normalization with Israel under American auspices), due to the excessive sensitivity of the description or stigmatization of the United States of America as “non-democratic countries”, and therefore not to invite them to the conference of American democracies. This may contribute to stopping and freezing all multilateral contacts that Washington had encouraged on regional cooperation between the countries of the region and Israel. With the American side neglecting that (moving forward and cooperating in areas that affect the lives of all who live in this region will contribute psychologically to confronting the complex political issues that must be dealt with and resolved).
Likewise, the danger of this American step in avoiding the invitation of Egypt, despite it being one of the most important contributors to regional stability, according to a published report issued by the “National Security Agency of the United States of America”, will lead to a continuous escalation of these terrorist attacks targeting security in the Sinai Peninsula, which could be understanding of the successive Israeli protests for such actions that affect the Israel’s security.
The American provocation to Cairo will increase the activities and number of terrorist groups in Sinai and direct them to work against Israel itself, including (the Sinai Province organization) and its known terrorist activity in targeting ambushes of the Egyptian army in the city of Rafah and others, as it tries, along with the “Ansar Beit al-Maqdis organization”, which is ssociated with the terrorist organization “ISIS”, intimidating civilians by attacking them and carrying out terrorist operations, near the border strip parallel to the border of Israel.
The activity of (ISIS Sinai Province) can be seen with (its repeatedly expression of its anti-Israel intentions, although its main goals for now are still focused on harming Egypt). This has remained the case even amid the numerous Israeli strikes that were described in Israel as “urgent”, and will not bear fruit without joint security coordination between Israel and Cairo to control the activity of terrorist groups and their extremist activities and movements in Sinai.
If the estimates related to the strikes launched by these terrorist organizations in Sinai are aimed at (threatening the stability of Tel Aviv and the Israeli response mechanism against them), it is reasonable to assume that the leaders of the “Islamic State of Sinai” who were realised the growing role of the “Israeli army” in Sinai. However, they have not yet changed their policy toward Israel, especially with their awareness of the sensitivity of relations between Cairo and Washington, as a result of the United States not inviting Egypt and the countries of the region to attend the democracy conference.
The current situation has worsened dangerously at the present time, especially after the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, and ISIS defied Washington by intensifying its attacks on several main targets, especially on “Kabul Airport in Afghanistan”, and the announcement of ISIS with its headquarters in the Afghan state of “Khursan” for its responsibility for the attack and the killing of dozens of American soldiers themselves. This means, that (Israel’s security may have become threatened in light of the close US-Israeli alliance in the region and the extensions of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq “ISIS” to the Sinai land in Egypt, near the border areas with Israel, and thus its security threat).
Although ISIS forces in Iraq and Syria lost almost all of their territory, from here (the Sinai Peninsula may become the only remaining “province” of the organization), which makes it a suitable haven for fighters from other fronts, all of whom target the security and threat of Israe
Also, the Egyptian government’s lack of control over the Sinai Peninsula, due to the “annexes of the Camp David agreement with Israel”, carries with it great potential for the extremist organization to target the security of the Hebrew state, as it gives it great opportunities to extort resources from the local population and military personnel, and (expand its support among residents, and perhaps take advantage of its proximity to the Israeli border).
Here, all Israeli and American military analyzes affirm with certainty that the “Islamic State” organization and its supporters in Sinai will do everything in their power (continuing to work in Israel or working with other countries to threaten Tel Aviv itself).
However, it is likely that the facts on the ground will make Sinai the next focal point for ISIS, and this will be more important and dangerous than ever, and will serve as a (security dilemma that Israel is severely facing, therefore, the support of the Egyptian army in its battle against these terrorist organizations, their extremist activities and movements has become the duty of both Israeli and American leaders themselves).
Hence, (Strengthening the stability of the Egyptian state and consolidating its sovereignty to protect Israel security and maintain the security of Sinai is a very important strategic goal). In recent years, Israel has sought to facilitate the achievement of this goal by agreeing to temporary amendments to the security arrangements of the “Camp David Accords”, and this has already been done recently. Especially with (the successive Egyptian security requests since the revolution of January 25, 2011 until recently from the Israeli and American sides to work together to maintain the security of Sinai), and thus not to endanger Israeli security due to the succession of these terrorist incidents on the Sinai land near the border with Israel.
Perhaps this explains the reasons for this increasing repeatedly demand from Cairo for getting the required (permission from the United States of America and Israel itself to deploy large-scale armored forces in the Sinai Peninsula, and Israel generally agreed to this request, and Egypt granted extensions of treaty exceptions according to need). According to published Israeli security and military reports, Israel is also greatly assisting the Egyptian forces in the field of intelligence and air strikes in the region to thwart terrorist operations near the Tel Aviv borders.
Despite my reading of American and Western academic analyzes, in which other Western analysts assert that Cairo has given the “Israeli army” absolute freedom to target fighters in Sinai with manned and unmanned aircraft. However, from my point of view, the result is one, and it is represented in the importance of the joint security agreement and coordination between Israel, Egypt, with Washington to “confront the activities of all extremist terrorist organizations against the security of Sinai because of their common danger to the security of Israel and Cairo”.
Although Cairo’s assistance to Israel is very important, this goal does not cancel the basic security concept on which the “Camp David Agreement” and the military annex of Sinai are based, meaning that:
(Maintaining Sinai as an impenetrable barrier against any future hostilities It may reach Israel from Egypt)
We can explain all of the revolutionary events during the “period of the Arab Spring revolutions”, specifically the revolutions of January 25, 2011 and the June 30 revolution in Egypt in 2013 – especially after the storming of the Israeli embassy in Cairo – during the events of the revolution, and even the subsequent coming of the rule of the “Muslim Brotherhood” after a few months, it is evidence of the extent of the instability of the situation, and how important it is to keep the Sinai Peninsula under the Egyptian-Israeli security control, in view of (the long-term growth and spread of terrorism, extremism and arms movement, which threatens Israeli national security).
Thus, Sinai constitutes a real and growing dilemma for both Israeli and American policy. On the one hand, it is necessary to provide as much assistance as possible to Cairo to (re-establish its sovereignty and prevent destabilizing shocks to Israel’s stability). On the other hand, the ongoing fighting leads to the possibility of instability in the Sinai borders parallel to Israel, so Israel must be prepared for any scenario. Hence, the (necessity of coordination between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai to eliminate the danger of extremism, terrorism and militants close to the Egyptian and Israeli fronts alike).
Hence, the Egyptian researcher can accurately analyze the situation and perhaps (from a different analytical angle) that Egypt’s failure to invite “President Joe Biden’s administration to the Conference of Democracies” has serious and long-term repercussions on the security of Sinai and even on the political and regional stability in the region in “Not inviting any Arab or regional party to the conference of democracies with the exception of Israel and Iraq,” and this would increase the level and degree of security sensitivities between Cairo and Tel Aviv. the depth of the Israeli state itself), and thus launching more destabilizing attacks from inside Tel Aviv, which Washington did not pay close attention to.
Hence, it is possible to understand and analyze “behind this American step by excluding Egypt and the countries of the region from their democracy”, which is:
The effect and implications of not inviting Cairo, the Arab Gulf states, and the entire Arab region to the Conference of American Democracies under the auspices of “Biden”, will inevitably affect the (level of joint contacts to promote more Israeli peace plans with the countries of the region with American support), and will affect the degree of joint security and political coordination between the three (Egyptian, Israeli, American) parties, which will increase the danger, activity and penetration of all these extremist terrorist organizations, especially what is known as, the “Islamic State Organization of the Sinai Province”, as well as the danger of (the intertwining and growing extension of “ISIS” into Sinai itself and launching attacks against Israel)
Hence, the Biden administration has caused (the spread of extremism, terrorism and religious extremism on the land of Sinai, and the most important threat to Israel’s security from within and on its borders), which Washington may not have taken into account, in order to preserve the interests of its Israeli partner, so perhaps Israel must urgently demand its American ally to reduce attempts to provoke its Egyptian neighbor and the rest of the Arab and Gulf countries, even the printing press with it, in accordance with peace agreements, normalization, and security and borders coordination, in order to preserve the security of Israel itself, and to preserve the joint military-security coordination mechanism between Egypt and Israel under American auspices, so that the amendment of the “new Camp David security amendment” to allow the Egyptian presence and Israeli coordination and their military deployment in the Sinai does not turn into an extreme and very dangerous targeting of all Israelis, thus undermining and targeting Washington’s interests, by extension, in Egypt and the region.
The question with contradictory US human rights policies towards Saudi Arabia and Iran
A cursory look at Saudi Arabia and Iran suggests that emphasizing human rights in US foreign policy may complicate relations but has little impact on regional stability or the willingness of protagonists to reduce tension and manage conflicts when it is in their interest.
A post 9/11 US emphasis on human rights was not what inspired homegrown popular Arab revolts over the past decade that initially toppled leaders in eight Arab countries but were largely rolled back or stymied by counter-revolutionary US allies.
The UAE and Saudi counter-revolutionary efforts put the two Gulf states on the autocratic frontline of President Joe Biden’s democracy versus autocracy dichotomy. They were motivated by a rejection of democracy as an existential challenge to the absolute power of their ruling families.
Subsequent US administrations effectively let the counter-revolutionary moves pass, although, to be fair, the Biden administration has suspended $700 million in aid to Sudan following a military power grab in October. However, it has yet to do the same with an additional $500 million for Tunisia. Democratically elected President Kais Saied disbanded parliament in July and assumed the power to enact laws.
By the same token, Middle Eastern protagonists, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran, opted to reduce tensions and explore ways of managing their differences to focus on reforming and diversifying their economies, fuelling growth, and stimulating trade.
In other words, they would have sought to reduce tensions even if they had not anticipated that the Biden administration would adopt a more human rights and democratic values-driven foreign policy and would want to focus on Asia rather than the Middle East.
If anything, a contentious relationship with the United States could have provided a further incentive for reducing tensions. Yemen, which figured prominently in Iran’s talks with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, may be a case in point.
As a result, the regional moves raise the question of whether a US refusal to stand up for principle produces the kind of short-term results that outweigh the long-term cost of autocracy as well as the price of undermining US credibility.
The short-term results of abandoning principle for pragmatism were evident in this week’s shift in oil politics.
The shift was prompted by US efforts to assure the kingdom and other Gulf states that the United States was no longer in the regime change business. US officials also insisted that the administration would concentrate on maintaining and strengthening regional partnerships. They signaled that the administration’s lip service to human rights and democratic values would not have policy consequences.
The message was well received in Riyadh. In response, Saudi Arabia reversed its rejection of Mr. Biden’s request to increase oil production to reduce soaring prices at US gas stations.
The de facto leader of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the cartel’s largest producer, Saudi Arabia, said the group and its associates, which include Russia, would increase monthly production by 400,000 barrels a day.
The Saudi concession also came in response to the administration’s willingness to sell the kingdom US$650 million worth of missiles. The sale threatened to further call into question the credibility of the United States as it prepared to host this week’s virtual Summit for Democracy, which some 110 countries are expected to attend.
The administration says the sale is in line with its policy of supplying only defensive weapons to the kingdom as US officials push for an end to the devastating, almost seven-year-long Yemen war that has sparked one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.
Administration officials assert that the missiles would enable Saudi Arabia to shoot down Houthi drones in the air before they hit targets in the kingdom but cannot be used for attacks against the rebels in Yemen itself.
The Senate vote could set the tone for the democracy summit. Anti-Saudi sentiment runs deep in the US Congress. A vote against the sale would force Mr. Biden to cancel it or override the Senate with a veto.
Saudi violations of human rights, the killing in 2018 of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the kingdom’s crackdown on dissent and freedom of expression, and its conduct of the Yemen war fueled the anti-Saudi sentiment.
With the arms sale on the line, the administration has remained silent about reports that Saudi Arabia and the UAE had used a combination of economic incentives and threats to pressure African and Asian nations to vote for the shutdown of a United Nations investigation into abuses of human rights in the war.
Meanwhile, the administration’s efforts to reassure Middle Eastern nations that its policy emphasis has changed has done little to prevent Iranian negotiators at the Vienna talks on reviving a 2015 international agreement that curbed the country’s nuclear programme from hardening their positions.
Iran believes that the United States and, at least until recently, some of its Gulf allies, aim to encircle the Islamic republic and foment domestic unrest that will lead to the regime’s fall. The US has imposed crippling sanctions in response to its nuclear programme and harshly criticized Iran for its abusive human rights record.
That has not stopped Iran from engaging in separate talks with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which appear to be producing results in Yemen.
As a result of those talks, Saudi and Emirati forces, and their Yemeni allies, were reportedly withdrawing from positions in southern and western parts of the country.
“These are very likely the opening moves by Saudi Arabia and the UAE as they prepare to fully exit Yemen,” said former member of the United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen Gregory D. Johnson.
The war has increasingly turned into an albatross around Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s neck, with much of the international community wanting to see an end to the conflict.
It was not immediately clear if and what Iran may have offered in return for the withdrawals that have allowed the Houthis to move into evacuated spaces. “The latest developments seem to suggest that the Houthis seem on the edge of gaining the upper hand,” said NATO Foundation analyst Umberto Profazio.
In line with that assessment, the Houthis have not indicated that they had become more interested in a negotiated end to the war.
“It is clear that the Houthis intend to try to bring down the Yemen government. The Iranians, I believe, would like to see the same,” said US special envoy to Yemen Tim Lenderking.
The Emirati withdrawals, particularly around the strategic port of Hodeida, follow gestures including an effort to return internationally isolated Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to the Arab fold and an exchange of visits with Iran. Syrian membership in the Arab League was suspended early in the civil war.
Some analysts suggested that the withdrawals in Yemen were part of an effort to build confidence. However, it was not clear why the Saudis and Emiratis would cede strategic territory with no apparent Iranian or Houthi concessions in return unless they were looking for a rush to the exit no matter what.
“The pull-out was unnecessary to open new frontlines, and Hodeida seems to have paid the price for confidence-building with Iran,” said Yemen analyst Ibrahim Jalal.
The withdrawals, including from Mara on the Yemeni border with Oman, help Saudi Arabia put its backyard in order. Saudi operations in Mara irritated Oman that sees the Yemeni region as its sphere of influence.
The withdrawals helped facilitate a visit to Oman by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman this week. Mr. Bin Salman may try to reach an agreement during the visit to construct a pipeline from the kingdom’s oil fields to an export terminal in Oman. The pipeline would allow Saudi Arabia is to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz.
In the final analysis of the pros and cons of a values-driven US foreign policy, hardline realists will argue that backing down on rights produces tangible results.
Yet, the United States’ selective and opportunistic hardline emphasis on rights and values in Iran has not prevented the Islamic republic from engaging with Saudi Arabia and the UAE and possibly helping to end the Yemen war. The pressure may have been one factor that persuaded Iran to engage.
Democracy Summit: Excluding countries and igniting the Cold War in the Middle East
A number of American leaks have appeared at the present time for several American think tanks that have reached a dangerous conclusion, which is: (The United States of America must re-use the influence of the extremist Islamic currents and radical political Islam movements in the Middle East and Africa to confront the rise of China in the first place). Hence, the first practical American application of this through the conference to divide the world democratically, according to the American concept, through the following possible scenarios:
Washington may have practically started using the game of “rapprochement with extremist currents in the face of communist China”, which can be understood through (the United States of America is currently trying to re-use the strategy of rapprochement with extremist currents and political Islam currents in the face of the Chinese and Russian communist enemy as well), and made them raise Ideological slogans whose purpose is to “ignite the region sectarianly and religiously and cause chaos and turmoil”, and Washington helps in this the ambitions of some nascent national forces in the Middle East, or perhaps some individuals and civil organizations with narrow, limited interests at the expense and in the face of their homelands.
The American prominent book, which is called (The Devil’s Game: Political Islam and the United States), which was published by “Robert Dreyfuss”, who is an American scholar, specializing in political Islam, is one of the most academic efforts close to understanding the support of the United States and the West in general for the project of so-called political Islam, as well as presenting, highlighting and analyzing of (all American plans aimed at attracting the extremist currents in the Middle East, bringing them closer and using them by the USA to cause unrest in their regions), by fueling their exploitation in achieving sectarian and religious fanaticism in the Arab world.
Here, the author of the aforementioned book, “Robert Dreyfuss”, presented many of the mysteries and unknown reasons about those (secret and mysterious alliances that the United States of America made with Muslim Brotherhood groups and the other political Islam movements in Egypt and the other countries in the region), over a period of several decades to sponsor and encourage the Islamic currents and radicalism, whether by US secret agreements with them or perhaps by manipulating them as well, so that (the United States of America will use them later in its cold war against China ideologically).
Perhaps the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister “Wang Yi” to the Middle East in March 2021, who summarized his trip in several words, concerning the Chinese response in the Middle East to the policy of American alliances and polarization, by asserting that:
“China and the countries agreed on the need to respect sovereign independence and national dignity for all countries, and to promote independent and diversified avenues of development”
The official Chinese media also supported the speech of its Chinese Foreign Minister, “Wang Yi” and his assurances to all countries in the Middle East region, by confirming that:
“It was agreed to oppose interference in the internal affairs of the other countries and slander others under the guise of human rights and the protection of the international system, so that the United Nations “UN” would be the core of the international order based on international law, pluralism, fairness and international justice”
The analyses and the main visions of the Chinese think tanks, which are considered that: the failure of the United States of America to invite the countries of the region to the conference of democracies in the world is (the beginning of the “Joe Biden’s administration” leaving the Middle East for China).
So, the logic results for the American provocation to the Middle East region, according to the Chinese way of thinking, represents in: (deepening China’s relations with the Middle East countries outside the scope of trade should worry the United States of America), especially since the administration of US President “Joe Biden” has recently taken steps to reduce interest in the region, thus opening the door to Chinese hegemony in accordance with the American vision.
And perhaps in my viewpoint that (the Conference of American Democracies is the beginning of the American vacuum in favor of China and Russia), which is the same as what was confirmed by a former senior official in American national security, and a close advisor to President “Joe Biden” in a report published in the “American Politico Newspaper”, confirming it frankly by saying:
“If you were to rank the regions that “Biden” considers a priority, the Middle East is not among the top three. Because, the main top priorities are: the Asia-Pacific region, then Europe, and the Western Hemisphere, and this reflects a bipartisan consensus that the issues of our interest has changed with the return of the great-power competition with China and Russia”
Hence, we conclude, that with China competing for more international (militarily, economically, technologically and politically) influence, to become the largest power in the world by 2049, according to its stated strategy. So, here we find that (the Middle East is likely to become decisive, whether the United States of America prioritizes it or not).
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