U nder the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), Turkey’s foreign policy has been associated with the prescriptions and efforts of three men: Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President Abdullah Gül, and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu.
Davutoğlu, a former international relations professor, has been the most articulate exponent of the troika’s ideas,
penning perhaps the most authoritative summary of its worldview in his 2001 Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth) and coining its foremost article of faith: a “zero-problems policy” with Turkey’s neighbors because Ankara “wants to eliminate all the problems from her relations with neighbors or at least to minimize them as much as possible.”
This might all be well and good if such words were supported by actions. But Davutoğlu has also described Turkey as a “heavyweight wrestler,” hinting that it may use “the maximum of its abilities” when dealing with its neighboring “middleweight wrestlers.” A survey of Ankara’s relations with these “middleweight wrestlers” reveals its “zero problems policy” to be little more than a cover for the AKP’s reasserted “neo-Ottoman” ambitions.
The Eastern Mediterranean
Achieving a zero problems status with Greece and Cyprus would seem to be the most difficult goal for Ankara to attain, given both countries’ painful history with Turkey.
Even if one could put aside the long and tortuous past—from the Greek war of independence of the 1820s, to the 1923 uprooting of Greeks from Asia Minor, to sporadic crises over Aegean islands (1976, 1987, 1996), to the continuing standoff over air space and territorial waters—the AKP’s rise to power has exacerbated, not allayed, tensions.
Far from following a zero problems policy with Greece, Turkey maintains existing problems and adds new ones: It has made alleged violations of the Muslim minority’s rights in Western Thrace an item on the Islamic Conference’s agenda and has muddied the waters over what constitutes Greece’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) by questioning the role of the Greek island of Kastelorizo (one mile off Turkey’s coast) in determining that EEZ. And Davutoğlu’s ambitions did not stop here:
The security of the Balkans is increasingly identified with the security considerations of Turkey’s western border. The security zone that has been established in eastern Thrace during the Cold War should be extended to the west with multilateral and bilateral agreements which should be made on a Balkan level.
These are not mere words. Ankara has recently signed a military cooperation agreement with Albania, allowing docking privileges for Turkish warships at Durës, thereby marking the return of the Turkish navy to the Adriatic Sea after centuries. The press has reported that Turkey is responsible for the cancellation of an agreement between Athens and Tirana over the delimitation of maritime zones, and Turkey has also initiated major programs of military assistance to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, a state with which Greece is in dispute over the use of the name “Macedonia.” Finally, Turkey continues to flood Greece and the European Union with tens of thousands of mostly Muslim illegal immigrants.
Meanwhile, the already fraught relations with Cyprus have worsened. Turkey not only works against ending the continued and illegal occupation of the northern half of the island but seems bent on increasing problems. Such behavior is not all that surprising considering Davutoğlu’s belief:
It is not possible for a country that neglects Cyprus to have a decisive say in the global and regional politics … Even if there was not one Muslim Turk there, Turkey had to maintain a Cyprus issue. No country can stay indifferent toward such an island, located in the heart of its very own vital space … Turkey needs to see the strategic advantage which it obtained … in the 1970s, not as the component of a Cyprus defense policy, directed toward maintaining the status quo, but as one of the diplomatic main supports of an aggressive maritime strategy.
Small wonder, therefore, that Ankara reacted to the discovery of new energy resources in the Cypriot EEZ in a heavy-handed manner, stating that it too had rights and interests in the region and warning that support for the Republic of Cyprus on this issue would have consequences in future negotiations with Nikosia. It attempted to stop Cyprus and Noble Energy, which planned to drill for natural gas off southern Cyprus’s coast, from proceeding, then signed an agreement delimiting the continental shelf between itself and the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (recognized by no one except Ankara), so as to carry out its own energy exploration in the area. This culminated in Ankara dispatching a research vessel into the Cypriot EEZ to protect its “national interests,” simultaneously ignoring U.S. and EU entreaties and alarming Israel.
Notwithstanding claims about zero problems then, Turkish behavior in the eastern Mediterranean remains impenitent, bordering on the aggressive, and seemingly indifferent to the consequences it may have for any possible future with the rest of Europe.
Former Soviet Republics of the Caucasus
After the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 and the resulting independence of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, Turkey perceived a power vacuum in the region and attempted to expand its presence into areas of former Soviet influence in both the Caucasus and Central Asia. But its current zero problems policy is being tested in a region of past enmities, fractious ethnic interests, lucrative energy resources, and a resurgent Russian presence.
Due to historical, cultural, and linguistic ties, relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan seem to offer the best prospects, despite their religious differences (Sunni and Shiite, respectively). The benefits for Turkey could be substantial due to proximity, trade links and especially Azerbaijan’s energy resources. Unfortunately, such relations do not exist in a vacuum, and in its effort to improve relations with other neighbors, Ankara has sometimes acted in a way that threatens its relationship with Baku.
Take for example, the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute in which both Turks and Azerbaijanis assert that Armenia is illegally occupying the area. This meeting of minds was set back when Ankara attempted to improve relations with Armenia, leading to Azeri assertions that such contemplated agreements would undermine regional peace and security. Nor did Ankara take into account Azerbaijan’s interests when it recognized Kosovo, which had seceded from Serbia. For Azerbaijanis, recognition of such a breakaway republic (similar in this way to Nagorno-Karabakh) was far from reassuring.
In addition, Ankara’s on-again off-again relations with Tehran bear on its relationship with Baku. Iran threatens that it will explore for hydrocarbons in parts of the Caspian Sea claimed by Azerbaijan while not allowing the latter to do the same. Concurrently, there is growing restiveness among Azeri-speaking Iranians against perceived suppression of their heritage and language by the mullahs and even talk of some form of union with Azerbaijan. On these topics, Ankara is apparently silent, leading some Azerbaijanis to wonder about the true intentions of their “friend.”
Armenia, of course, presents its own set of problems with the Turks, largely due to the genocide of Turkish Armenians in 1915, which Ankara refuses to recognize. These differences were exacerbated by the struggle over Nagorno-Karabakh; and in 1993, Turkey closed its land border with Armenia in support of Azerbaijan’s claims over the territory.
In 2008-09, there was an effort to improve relations between the governments of Turkey and Armenia centering, in part, on the possibility of Armenian participation in the long-planned Nabucco pipeline project. The two countries drafted the so-called “Zurich protocols,” but when Turkey tried to link ratification with its position on the Armenian genocide and Nagorno-Karabakh, the initiative floundered. Relations between the two countries remain problematic; from time to time they worsen, especially when third parties attempt to recognize the Armenian genocide officially as France did in 2001. While Davutoğlu may assert that Turkey “rejects the concept of freezing problems with her neighbors,” relations with Yerevan have barely begun to thaw.
Likewise, while Davutoğlu has claimed that Ankara aims “to solve problems in line with a win-win approach,” its behavior vis-à-vis another Caucasian neighbor, Georgia, belies that assertion. This is largely due to an unspoken recognition that its neo-Ottoman efforts run up against its old nemesis from actual Ottoman days—Russia.
In the immediate post-Cold War period, when Turkey’s orientation was still largely pro-Western, Ankara was eager to recognize Georgia’s independence from the Soviet Union. In 2011, the two countries signed and ratified a protocol, according to which their citizens could travel in both countries without travel documents. According to the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs, Turkey is Georgia’s largest trading partner (with a positive balance in Turkey’s favor) and cooperates with it in the field of energy pipelines.
But these good relations are clouded by Ankara’s two-faced approach to the questions surrounding the breakaway Russian-backed republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.As a NATO member, Ankara feels bound to follow, at least in word, the Western line defending Georgia’s territorial integrity. Its actions, however, are more equivocal. Turkish officials have visited Abkhazia while there have been cases where ships, under a Turkish flag, have unsuccessfully tried to break the sea blockade the Georgians have imposed on Abkhazia or to strengthen the latter in any way they can. Likewise, regarding South Ossetia, whose independence only Russia recognizes, Turkey has taken a more moderate stance than that of its Western allies; it tried to broker a distinct compromise of its own, which “got a cold reception in the United States, a close ally of Turkey, where officials complained they had not been informed in advance and criticized the initiative for failing to include Western nations.” According to the Jerusalem Post, Erdoğan’s Caucasus proposal was met with “disbelief in both Georgia and Azerbaijan, since it effectively promised to freeze all territorial disputes in the region, including legitimizing Russia’s recent territorial grab in Georgia.” Finally, Turkey, by using the Montreux Treaty, delayed allowing Western ships to cross the Bosphorus.
This ambivalence has a number of root causes. Abkhazia is home to a small Turkish population over which Ankara may feel protective; at the same time, there are Abkhazians in Turkey who actively promote Abkhaz interests. Further, Turkey’s interests in Georgia, regardless of trade ties, are naturally better served with a weakened neighbor to the north. A weakened Georgia is also what Turkey’s more northerly neighbor craves; and for all its imperial pretensions, Ankara is not ready or willing to provoke the Russians and will thus follow a policy ranging from appeasement to the freezing of problems. Notwithstanding Davutoğlu’s claims, zero problems are only for selected neighbors.
Northern Middle East Neighbors
Syria and Iraq, according to Davutoğlu, form both the “northern Middle East” region and the Mesopotamia-Persian Gulf “axis.” In his view, Ankara is “obliged to act in these regions not simply as a NATO member but also as a regional power, defending its own national strategies.” With such an admission, it is hardly surprising that the policy of zero problems has come up hard against a regional reality that is, to say the least, transitional and turbulent.
Turning first to Syria, it must be acknowledged that there is a long and difficult history between the two nations, revolving around issues of territorial integrity (e.g., Alexandretta), control of water resources (the headwaters of the Tigris and the Euphrates), Ottoman behavior toward its former Arab subjects, and most importantly, the Kurdish problem.
Turkish-Syrian relations began to improve with the signing of the Protocol of Adana on October 20, 1998, under which Syria expelled from its territory Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party—Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan), and his Kurdish rebels. Under Erdoğan, these relations continued to improve with mutual visits at the highest level, Turkish support for Syria during the 2005 Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, and a 2007 memorandum of understanding between the two countries creating conditions for cooperation in the fields of politics, security, economics, energy, and water resources. In 2009, the two countries met, along with Iraqi representatives, to resolve issues related to control of the Tigris and Euphrates water resources. Turkish-Syrian relations were further strengthened after Ankara’s condemnation of Israel’s incursion into Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009 and formalized in early 2011 when the Turks signed an agreement to train Syrian armed forces (simultaneously raising questions within NATO.)
With the emergence of serious domestic opposition to the Assad dynasty in 2011, Turkish leaders sensed an opportunity for increasing the country’s influence and dramatically changed their behavior toward Damascus. After an initial delay, Ankara froze relations with Syria, began to criticize the regime, and lobbied for greater participation by Sunni Muslims in Bashar al-Assad’s government, and when that failed, raised the banner of democratization and human rights, pressuring Assad to step down.
At present Ankara is pursuing multiple goals in Syria, some of which are mutually exclusive. It seeks first and foremost to overthrow Assad and to help accomplish this, obtain the assistance of Masoud Barzani, the Iraqi Kurd leader, as well as incite the sizable Kurdish population in Syria to join the opposition against Assad. This must not, in Ankara’s eyes, evolve into the creation of a separate Kurdish enclave should Syria disintegrate, thereby igniting the aspirations of its own restive and autonomy-seeking Kurdish population. Turkey also seeks to limit the influence of Iran and Russia in the Syrian crisis, a task made all the more difficult by Moscow’s clear stake in keeping the Assad regime in power: Syria is an important purchaser of Russian equipment, and Tartus is the only naval facility open to Russia in the Mediterranean. For its part, Iran’s only state alliance in the region has long been Syria, which has also served as a transit point for arming Tehran’s Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah.
Like Syrian relations, Turkish-Iraqi relations are colored by a past history of Ottoman rule as well as the Sunni-Shiite divide. Although Ankara antagonized both its NATO allies and Iraq’s nascent post-Saddam regime by denying use of its territory for the 2003 coalition invasion, it has over the past five years made efforts to promote its interests in Iraq though these efforts have hardly fostered zero problems.
One of Ankara’s highest priorities has been to exclude the PKK from operating in Iraq.At the same time, it seeks, for various reasons, to improve relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq. Most importantly, it wants to play a major role in the transfer of the landlocked oil deposits from northern Iraq to the West via either Kirkuk-Ceyhan or Nabucco pipelines. As such, it signed an agreement in May 2012 with the Kurdish Barzani government to build a new pipeline for transporting crude oil. In doing so, Turkey has adopted a tactic of momentarily forgetting its opposition to an independent Kurdistan but without abandoning previous declared positions or practices of military intervention when it so chooses.
While Turkey has officially declared its support for the territorial integrity and national unity of Iraq, its actions have contributed to the forces that threaten to tear the country apart. Much of this instability has its origins in Shiite-Sunni antagonism: Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Maliki, a Shiite, is considered too close to Iran while Iraqi vice president Tareq al-Hashemi, a Sunni, is close to Turkey, the Arab countries, and the Regional Government of Kurdistan.
The withdrawal of U.S. troops in December 2011 has increased centrifugal forces in Iraq. When a governmental crisis erupted around an arrest warrant issued for Hashemi, Ankara quickly reacted, siding with the Sunnis and criticizing the policies of the prime minister. Maliki’s reaction was unusually strong by diplomatic standards, excoriating the Turks for interference in the internal affairs of his country “as if Iraq is controlled or run by them.” Having fled to Turkey, Hashemi was sentenced to death by an Iraqi court. Erdoğan gave his full support to the exiled leader, declaring, despite Interpol’s “red notice,” that Turkey would host Hashemi for “as long as he wants,” and that it “will not hand him over” to Iraqi authorities.
Further, Ankara sought to obtain a non-Kurdish status for the oil-rich Kirkuk area in northern Iraq after the fall of Saddam and supported its “cousin” Turkmens in their claims to the area, thus creating a tool of leverage within Iraq against the Kurds and the Iraqi government.
In sum, Ankara seeks its own interests in Syria and Iraq, which, while often contradictory, are clearly independent of the interests of both states. Whether supporting an insurgency in Syria or encouraging the Kurds of northern Iraq, Turkey’s behavior cannot be characterized as that of a good neighbor. And while Ankara may reap some short term gains, notably the transfer of Iraqi Kurdish oil through its territory, it also risks losing its land access to the Arabian Peninsula by angering Baghdad. It remains to be seen whether all these Turkish actions will bear long-term fruit.
Iran has been a Turkish rival in some form or another at least since the days of the old Ottoman and Safavid empires, and the AKP Erdoğan government has vacillated between drawing closer to Tehran and confronting it over various issues.
Some analysts consider Ankara’s outreach to Tehran as being purely economic in origin. Certainly trade with Iran has increased significantly from $1 billion at the beginning of the decade to $10 billion in 2009, to $16 billion in 2011. It is Iran, however, that mostly benefits from these trade relations while simultaneously using its Turkish connection to break out of its international isolation.
Erdoğan seems happy to oblige the ayatollahs and has repeatedly acted as an apologist for Iranian behavior. His congratulations to Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on his fraudulent reelection in 2009 outraged many in the West. He has argued that Tehran is unjustly accused by outsiders and has characterized discussions regarding the Iranian nuclear weapons program as “gossip,” deriding any potential military operation against it as “crazy.” While serving as a non-permanent Security Council member, Ankara voted against U.N. Security Council resolution 1929 of June 2010, which imposed serious sanctions on Tehran in various spheres. In opposition to the wishes of its NATO partners, Turkey joined in a trilateral meeting with Iran and Brazil, the upshot of which was an agreement for Iran to send 1200 kilograms of uranium for enrichment to Turkey and receive, in exchange, nuclear fuel for its reactor. To Ankara’s deep embarrassment, Iran almost immediately reneged on the agreement, vowing to continue its efforts to enrich uranium.
Ankara has further distanced itself from its NATO allies by embracing Tehran’s positions regarding a proposed missile shield to be installed on Turkish soil to safeguard against Iranian threats. When it failed to convince its partners not to install the antimissile shield, Turkey worked to ensure that Iran would not be named its target and has assured the Iranians that no non-NATO country (i.e., Israel) would have access to the radar’s data.
True, there are areas of disagreement between Ankara and Tehran. The Turks would like to see better conditions for their Iranian Azeri “cousins” while the Iranians want Turkey to stay out of its internal affairs and to keep neighboring Azerbaijan from inflaming this issue. While both states reject an independent Kurdistan, neither is above playing the Kurdish card with each other’s minority group. And the two governments have starkly divergent positions vis-à-vis the Syrian civil war where Turkey has thrown its support behind the rebels while Tehran sends arms and soldiers to bolster the Assad regime. Is this behavior a successful example of zero problems? For all its bluster, Ankara’s choices may merely reflect recognition that Tehran has dangerous military capabilities that must be blunted.
Turkey and Israel
Significantly, Turkish policies toward Iran are also potentially damaging Ankara’s standing with the West and its closer neighbor—and former ally—Israel. Turkish overtures to Iran have often come at the expense of Israel, which has borne the brunt of Ankara’s revived imperial ambitions, coupled with an Islamist disdain for the Jewish state.
Until the rise of the AKP, relations between Ankara and Jerusalem had ranged from good to excellent. Not only did the two countries not compete, but during the Cold War, they benefited from U.S. as well as British foreign policy imperatives. In the post-Cold War era, as two regional Western strongholds in a turbulent area, the governments cooperated on addressing common risks such as terrorism, strengthening their relationship in all areas.
Under Erdoğan, this has changed dramatically. By way of reasserting its leading regional role and winning over the Arab world, Ankara has progressively distanced itself from Israel and the West. In 2004, Erdoğan accused Israel of practicing “state terrorism;” in 2006, his wife publicly endorsed the Valley of the Wolves, an anti-American and anti-Semitic movie; also in 2006, instead of inviting extremists to renounce violence, Erdoğan personally received Hamas leader Khaled Mashal after the militant Islamist group won the Palestinian elections.
Matters worsened in late 2008 and early 2009 when Israel, reacting to years of rocket and missile attacks against its southern citizens, launched Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. In January, Erdoğan publicly railed against longtime dove and Israeli president Shimon Peres at an international conference in Davos, Switzerland. In April, Turkey conducted joint military exercises with Syria, and in October, excluded Israel from the “Anatolian Eagle” military exercise, in which the latter had participated in every year since 2001.
Turkish hostility to Israel reached its zenith on May 31, 2010, when the Mavi Marmara boat, under Turkish flag, attempted to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza under the pretence of transferring aid to the Palestinians. According to Turkish press reports, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in contact with the organizers of the operation despite claims to the contrary. When Israeli troops boarding the ship were met with violence, which resulted in the death of nine people, Ankara downgraded its diplomatic relations with Israel and cancelled all military cooperation with Jerusalem. Despite Israeli offers of compensation for the victims’ families, Turkey continues to spurn any efforts at reconciliation. Most recently, it announced the intention to sell uncensored images of Israel when it launches the GokTurk satellite, something that could damage Israeli security interests and has threatened Israeli and Cypriot energy explorations in the eastern Mediterranean.
While Israel may not border Turkey directly, it is the only true democracy in the region and a country with which Turkey not only had zero problems for decades but also the closest of relations. In an effort to woo the neighboring Arabs by being seen as a champion of the Palestinians and, to some degree, of Islam, Turkey has initiated a cold war with the Jewish state. At the same time, it seems that Iran has earned more from Ankara’s policy of rapprochement while Israel accumulates the costs.
Thanks to continuous Western support, the end of the Cold War found Turkey stronger, both militarily and economically, and with a power vacuum to its immediate east. Within this context, the AKP’s foreign policy decisions demonstrate the insincerity of its “zero problems with neighbors” claims. Rather than solve problems, Ankara is, at best, freezing them, in the hope of building better commercial relations to satisfy its growth needs. In many instances, it is worsening them at its neighbors’ expense.
The Turkish government’s insincerity manifests itself in an attempt to mask its expansionist ambitions and an attitude that can be described as “what applies to others does not apply to me.” Thus, Erdoğan accuses foreign leaders of “killing children” while fighting against the recognition of past genocides (Armenians, Greeks of Pontus, and Assyrians). It exploits the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in which nine Turks were killed while downplaying its far more numerous killings of Kurdish civilians in Iraqi territory. It accuses Israel of occupying Palestinian territories while illegally occupying northern Cyprus, claims the right to invade Iraq with impunity, and frequently violates its neighbors’ airspace. It accuses others of terrorism while facilitating the transfer of weapons to terror organizations. It participates in and benefits from NATO while obstructing the organization’s policies as in the case of Iraq in 2003, Lebanon in 2005, Georgia in 2007, and Iran.
Initial improvements with the Arab world have stalled. Despite statements to the contrary from its minister of economics, Turkey has lost the Syrian market. It risks losing access to the energy resources of the Arabian Peninsula through Iraqi or Syrian pipelines and is desperately trying to replace this route with shipping routes from Mersin to Port Said, Egypt. Due to its policies toward its Western-oriented neighbors—Greece, Cyprus, Armenia, and Israel—the AKP has also undermined Ankara’s relations with the West, particularly those nations who were contemplating its joining the EU.
The policy of zero problems appears to be operative with only two states: Iran and Russia. In contrast to their behavior toward Greece, Cyprus, Syria, and Iraq, which have at various times either been threatened with violence or have been attacked, the Turks remain conspicuously silent toward Armenia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia where Russian armed forces are present. Similarly, Ankara behaves toward Iran as if it were not a member of NATO, excusing Tehran’s nuclear program and delaying the installation of a NATO missile shield system. Since both Russia and Iran are stronger than Turkey, Ankara seems, for the most part, to be doing its utmost to avoid upsetting their regional interests, but this has nothing to do with neighborly solicitude.
The zero problems policy has not failed, as has been suggested, because it was tested against authoritarian governments: Greece, Cyprus, Armenia, and Israel are hardly governed by dictators, and Iraq, for all its failings, has not descended to this level. The policy has failed because it was a tool for neo-Ottoman ambitions and global aspirations that have now become all too obvious.
The unvarnished truth is that Ankara acts, to use Davutoğlu’s metaphor, like a heavyweight wrestler seeking to intimidate its middleweight neighbors. As such, “zero problems with neighbors” may turn into the country’s zero hour as Ankara finds itself increasingly considered an unreliable partner by its allies and a regional bully by its neighbors.
Ilias I. Kouskouvelis is Professor of International Relations at the University of Macedonia, Greece, and Director of the Laboratory of International Relations and European Integration. The author thanks Nikolaos Raptopoulos, Alexander Koutsoukis, and Revecca Pedi for their incisive comments.
 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik. Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001).
 “Policy of Zero Problems with Our Neighbors,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, Ankara, accessed Sept. 21, 2012.
 Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, p. 147.
 See, for example, “On the situation of the Turkish Muslim Minority in Western Thrace, Greece,” res. 3/33-M, 33rd Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM), Baku, June 19-21, 2006; “On the Situation of the Turkish Muslim Minority of Western Thrace, Greece,” res. 3/34-MM, 34th ICFM, Islamabad, May 15-17, 2007.
 Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, p. 124.
 The Sofia (Bulgaria) Echo, June 3, 2010.
 SKAI TV (Greece), accessed Oct. 1, 2012.
 See “Annual Risk Analysis 2012,” Frontex, European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, Warsaw, Apr. 2012.
 Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, pp. 176-80.
 Hurriyet (Istanbul), Dec. 17, 2010, Jan. 5, 2011.
 Ibid., Aug. 5, 2011, Sept. 21, 27, 2011.
 “National Security,” Country Studies, Turkey (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Jan. 1995), chap. 5.
 BBC News (London), Oct. 11, 2009; Today’s Zaman (Istanbul), Dec. 26, 2011.
 “Azerbaijan,” The World Factbook 2002, CIA, Mar. 19, 2003.
 “Background note: Armenia,” U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., Mar. 22, 2012.
 Eurasia Insight (New York), Eurasianet.org, Sept. 29, 2008.
 New Caucasus (Armenia), Jan. 29, 2011.
 See, Génocide arménien, Assemblée Nationale, Paris, Jan. 30, 2001. For Turkish reactions to French actions, see Today’s Zaman, Jan. 23, 2012, Reuters, Jan. 23, 2012.
 “Policy of Zero Problems with Our Neighbors,” accessed Sept. 21, 2012.
 “Relations between Turkey and Georgia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, Ankara, accessed Sept. 21, 2012.
 Today’s Zaman, Apr. 28, 2010.
 Georgia Times (Tbilisi), June 11, 2006.
 Today’s Zaman, Aug. 15, 2008.
 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Washington, D.C.), Sept. 5, 2008.
 The Jerusalem Post, Jan. 14, 2009.
 Radikal (Istanbul), Sept. 20, 2008.
 See Mitat Çelikpala, “From immigrants to diaspora: Influence of the North Caucasian diaspora in Turkey,” Middle Eastern Studies, 3 (2006): 423-46.
 Igor Torbakov, “The Georgia Crisis and Russia-Turkey Relations,” The Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C., 2008.
 Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, pp. 397-405.
 “Syria,” Country Studies, Turkey (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Jan. 1995).
 CNN World, Sept. 3, 2009.
 See, for example, “Latest Developments,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, Ankara, Sept. 21, 2012.
 “Syria Economic and Trade Relations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, Ankara, accessed Sept. 21, 2012.
 CNN World, Sept. 3, 2009.
 Ibid., Sept. 3, 2009.
 Ibid., Dec. 14, 2010.
 CNSnews (Alexandria, Va.), Feb. 11, 2011.
 BBC News, Nov. 30, 2011.
 Today’s Zaman, Dec. 18, 2011; United Press International (Washington, D.C.), Jan. 12, 2012.
 “Latest Developments,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, Ankara, Dec. 15, 2011.
 United Press International, Dec. 22, 2011.
 Southeast European Times Türkiye (U.S. European Command), June 21, 2012.
 Today’s Zaman, Aug. 10, 2012.
 CNN News, Dec. 30, 2011.
 BBC News, Dec. 22, 2011.
 Today’s Zaman, Jan. 14, 2012.
 BBC News, Sept, 10, 2012.
 Today’s Zaman, May 8, 2012; Reuters, Sept. 11, 2012.
 AEI Irantracker, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., June 24, 2010; CNN World, Sept. 7, 2011; Tehran Times, Mar. 28, 2012.
 Today’s Zaman, Jan. 25, 2012.
 Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C., Mar. 3, 2009.
 CNSnews, Feb. 11, 2011.
 BBC News, Oct. 26, 2009.
 Ibid., May 17, 2010.
 CNN World, May 17, 2010.
 Today’s Zaman, Mar. 30. 2012.
 “Iran,” Country Studies, Turkey (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Jan. 1995).
 The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 27, 2012.
 BBC News, June 3, 2004.
 Al-Ahram Weekly (Cairo), Feb. 23-Mar. 1, 2006.
 BBC News, Oct. 11, 2009.
 Milliyet (Istanbul), June 5, 2010.
 The New York Times, May 31, 2010.
 CNN World, Sept. 6, 2011.
 The Guardian (London), May 24, 2012.
 Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), Mar. 10, 2011.
 CNN World, June 6, 2011.
 The Guardian, Dec. 29, 2011; The Sofia Echo, Aug. 19, 2009.
 See, for example, Voice of America, Aug. 24, 2012; Hurriyet, Sept. 18, 2012; The Guardian, Sept. 27, 2012 .
 Reuters, Dec. 7, 2011.
 Today’s Zaman, June 4, 2012.
 O Fileleftheros (Cyprus), Jan. 11, Dec. 9, 2011; Hurriyet, Sept. 28, 2011.
 Damla Aras, “Turkish-Syrian Relations Go Downhill,” Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2012, pp. 41-50.
 Piotr Zalewski, “The Self-Appointed Superpower: Turkey Goes It Alone,” World Policy Journal, Dec. 2010, 27, pp. 97-102.
China’s role to make FIFA 2022 Successful
Argentina won the World cup in FIFA Football World Cup held on 20 November – 18 December 2022, in Doha Qatar. FIFA 2022 attracted global attention and since the beginning Foot Ball lovers spared time, either to travel to Qatar and watch the matches or sit in front of TVs and watch live transmission. Big LED screens were used to attract Foot Ball Lovers worldwide. It was really a festival mode in many countries. Analysis, Debates, and Arguments also took place, regarding the expected Champion. French was pretty sure to retain its previous title “World Champion” which they got in FIFA 2018, held in Russia. Brazil, Germany, Argentina, and many other nations were keeping high expectations. Even, though some were guessing that Morocco to be World Champion, strong arguments were given that in FIFA 2018, actually, the French team consisted of many Morocco-origin players, with very few original French. As a matter of fact, France has attracted good players from its former colonies and offered them immigration, and used them in FIFA 2018, to win the Championship. There was certainly a strong argument that if Moroccan can make France World Champion, they can also possess the potential to become World Champions.
The FIFA World Cup, often simply called the World Cup, is an international association football competition contested by the senior men’s national teams of the members of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the sport’s global governing body. The tournament has been held every four years since the inaugural tournament in 1930, except in 1942 and 1946 when it was not held because of the Second World War. The reigning champions are Argentina, who won their third title at the 2022 tournament. But the history goes back to Prior to the Lipton competition, from 1876 to 1904, games that were considered the “football world championship” were meetings between leading English and Scottish clubs, such as the 1895 game between Sunderland A.F.C. and the Heart of Midlothian F.C., which Sunderland won.
The World Cup is the most prestigious association football tournament in the world, as well as the most widely viewed and followed single sporting event in the world. The viewership of the 2018 World Cup was estimated to be 3.57 billion with an estimated 1.12 billion people watching the final match.
Seventeen countries have hosted the World Cup, most recently Qatar, which hosted the 2022 edition. The 2026 tournament will be jointly hosted by Canada, the United States, and Mexico, which will give Mexico the distinction of being the first country to host games in three World Cups.
It was a matter of great prestige and honor for Qatar to host FIFA 2022. It is the first World Cup held in the Arab world and Muslim world, and the second held entirely in Asia after the 2002 tournament in South Korea and Japan.
In 2010, the State of Qatar, having been awarded the rights to host the FIFA 2022 World Cup, embarked on remarkable projects in different fields to meet the expectations outlined in the bid document. It is worth mentioning that Qatar has a population of around 3 million and almost 1.5 million people from all over the world have visited FIFA 2022. A country’s preparations to host an international sporting event need serious consideration. Many aspects must have taken care of including but not limited to changing existing legislation, building infrastructure, workers’ rights and immigration, sponsorships, consumer protection, tourism, free trade, intellectual property (IP) rights, accessibility to stadia, taxation, counterfeiting, gambling, betting, to name but a few. Any country has to meet FIFA’s standards to host such an event. Qatar has the option of introducing new laws, amending existing legislation, and have concluded mutually beneficial bilateral agreements with FIFA. Qatar has directly employed more than 26,000 people to prepare the stadiums only. It is pertinent to note that in the wave of massive infrastructural developments legislation was not left out. Countries such as Russia and South Africa enacted new laws to meet FIFA’s standards and Qatar has also done similar measures to satisfy FIFA Organizing Committee.
The successful hosting of FIFA 2022, has projected and elevated Qatar in the global community, especially in the region. Direct and indirect, tangible and intangible impact of such a mega event will elevate Qatar’s stature and benefit its reparation in the days to come.
However, China was behind the success story as there were 10 ways in which China quietly worked behind the scenes at the Qatar World Cup:-
- World cup buildings got green electricity from a next-generation power station that harvests only solar energy, built by the Power Construction Corporation of China.
- People were taken where they need to go in a fleet of 888 fully electric buses, made by Yutong Bus, a Chinese firm that has quietly become, as far as I can tell, the world’s biggest bus maker.
- The main stadium was built by China Railway Construction Corporation: a firm that pops up in Africa and Europe and around the planet, known for its extraordinary ability to create infrastructure in difficult environments.
- What’s a sporting event without souvenir merchandise? It’s estimated that almost 70 percent of World Cup-related goods, from footballs to flags to jerseys to whistles, came from a single location in China, a southeastern city called Yiwu.
- A purpose-built extra-large reservoir provided clean drinking water for sports people and fans. It was constructed by the Gezhouba Group, from Wuhan.
- The stadium-building operations needed huge amounts of heavy equipment, from massive earth movers to cranes – nearly 100 of these were supplied by China’s Sany Heavy Industry, one of the world’s biggest construction firms.
- The most innovative venue was Qatar’s Stadium 974, which can be disassembled and reassembled anywhere. Designed by a Spanish architect, the 974 building blocks were made by China International Marine Containers.
- Notice all the LED floodlights everywhere? They came from the Unilumin Group of China.
- Most people say air conditioners are a must for survival in that environment – and China’s Midea Co supplied 2,500 air cons for the event.
- Last but not least, this was the most expensive sporting event in world history and needed a lot of support from businesses.
- Nineteen China firms signed up to sponsor the event.
Definitely, credit goes to China too.
The Chinese maritime theory of linking and networking the five seas in the Middle East
What mattered most to China regarding its three joint summits at the end of December 2022 with Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries and the region, was the deepening of Chinese influence and maritime cooperation, especially with regard to the maritime side, and the emphasis of Chinese think tanks and research on the need for the success of the idea (connecting or networking the five seas in the region), namely are:
(The Mediterranean, Black, Caspian, Persian Gulf and Red Sea)
And that is with all that it entails politically, economically and socially to unify the efforts of the countries of these seas and achieve their interests, and thus confront the American and Israeli project that aims to fragment the region.
In this context, the Chinese White Papers document on defense, issued by the Politburo of the ruling Communist Party of China in 2013, stressed the need to develop the “Chinese naval fleet” in order to “defend the near sea and protect the distant seas”. China’s establishment of a Chinese military base outside its borders for the first time in the state of Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, as well as the militarization of the Pakistani port of Gwadar, contributes to the growth of China’s military presence near important sea lanes in the region and the Arabian Gulf, especially in the Gulf of Aden and the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab, and nearby From the Arabian Gulf region.
The Chinese-Saudi-Gulf summit comes with the expansion of China’s involvement in the Middle East region economically and diplomatically, and China’s attempt to deepen security cooperation.
Likewise, with China and its intellectual and research centers officially announcing in August 2019, regarding China’s intention to participate in a Gulf maritime security alliance, the beginning of Chinese thinking about a deeper level of military participation in the Middle East.
Chinese analysts believe that the alliance between China, Russia, the countries of the region, the Gulf, and Saudi Arabia in the face of the United States of America is getting stronger and more solid due to the impact of a “cold war” between the West and China, especially with the confirmation of Chinese Foreign Minister “Wang Yi” after the success of his tour in the Middle East. Clear signs that China intends to shift to play a pivotal role in the affairs of the region.
We cannot fail to emphasize the “Chinese approach to the Palestinian cause”, and its desire to play a pivotal role in that issue, and it is clear that China is launching something like a counter-diplomatic attack to penetrate the ranks of the allied countries of the United States of America in the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf, in addition to China’s attempt to form political alliances. New ones to restrict US alliances in China’s regional and geopolitical strategic scope, such as the Okus nuclear defense agreement between Washington, Australia and Britain, and the Quad Quadruple agreement between the United States of America, India, Australia and Japan, to form a kind of bipolarity between China and Russia in the face of the United States of America. We find that after the Corona pandemic, the world officially entered the second Cold War, this time between the West and China.
Accordingly, the future US policy in the Middle East is linked to what will be the Chinese behavior in the region. With China’s attempt to rush to play new security roles, and seek hegemony in the Middle East and North Africa region.
Likewise, China’s desire to strengthen the security and military aspect of its relations with the countries of the Arab Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the Middle East, by strengthening military cooperation and joint military exercises, and cooperation in combating terrorism, through comprehensive measures to address its roots. In addition to the Chinese desire to cooperate with countries in the region to confront what is known as non-traditional security threats, such as supporting the region’s efforts to combat piracy, continuing to send warships to the Gulf of Aden and the coast of Somalia to maintain international maritime security, and cooperation in the field of cybersecurity.
Therefore, the importance of these three joint Chinese-Gulf-Saudi summits is to greatly enhance China’s partnerships, economically, politically and commercially, with the countries of the region, especially in the Gulf region. Therefore, China today is emerging as a central player through direct investments, partnerships, trade and development.
Perhaps in the future, China will intervene militarily, or seek to have a security footprint in the region, as it did in the Horn of Africa through its military base in Djibouti.
Also, given the American influence in the Arab Gulf region, Beijing may change its security policies in the region, if Washington tries to obstruct the flow of oil to China, especially in the event that Chinese energy security or vital shipping lanes used by China are threatened, China may have to expand Its military naval presence in the Indian Ocean near the Persian Gulf.
Accordingly, the declared clear Chinese strategy has become to transfer the arena of competition with the United States of America to the Middle East and Africa, in order to avoid strategic competition with Washington and its allies in its immediate regional neighborhood. By analogy, the expansion of Chinese influence in the Middle East region is a challenge to the existing American hegemony.
Jinnah, Iqbal, and Pakistan’s Historical Opposition to Israel
There is a belief that Pakistan is solely opposed to Israel due to the latter’s post-independence atrocities against Palestine, which are attributed to the sizeable military mismatch between both Palestine and Israel – however this is not a complete picture. The reality is that Pakistan’s founders laid the groundwork for the nation’s pro-Palestine stance long before Pakistan or Israel gained independence. The founders were unequivocally opposed to a Jewish homeland fashioned at the expense of the Arabs. Due to such a robust foundation, one still sees the phrase “This passport is valid for all countries of the world except Israel” written quite unapologetically on the Pakistani passport. The founders adopted this posture due to them witnessing Britain’s exploitation of Arab Muslims, Britain’s reneging on promises to the Arabs, favoritism towards the Jews, and the global powers’ support of Zionism on Palestinian soil.
Two of Pakistan’s founding fathers and undoubtedly the most integral ones were Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Muhammad Iqbal. Pakistanis herald Mr. Jinnah as the father of the nation who overcame not only British imperialist designs, but also a Hindu-dominated Congress in India that was vehemently opposed to dividing the subcontinent. Mr. Iqbal, although he passed away before the independence of Pakistan, is credited as being the spiritual father of the nation. Popularly known as the Poet of the East, he uplifted Muslims of the subcontinent with his poetry and oration and dreamt of an independent Muslim homeland. Both Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Iqbal were pivotal parts of the All India Muslim League (AIML). The AIML was the primary political party safeguarding Muslim rights in British India, but during the 1920s the organization began taking a keen interest in global Muslim affairs as well.
Post-World War I
During World War I, the Ottoman Caliphate, which housed Palestine, was to be abolished and many of the territories of the once great empire were divided between the UK and France (see Sykes-Picot Agreement).
The British also reneged on certain promises after their triumph in WWI was assured. One of these was to the Emir of Mecca. To the Emir, they promised if the Arabs abetted Britain and France against the Ottomans, they would support the Arabs in self-rule (which the Emir envisioned as a pan-Arabic state from Aleppo in Syria to Aden in Yemen). One of the territories that the UK colonized was Palestine and thus began the age of Mandatory Palestine (1920-1948).
The Arabs and Muslims were betrayed, and in their stead, the Jews were supported. This was indicative by the Balfour Declaration in 1918 that promised British support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. It was a correspondence between UK’s Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour to Lionel Walter Rothschild, a leader of the British Jewish community. The Balfour Declaration, conflated with Mandatory Palestine, made Muslims around the world cognizant of the profound implications of these events. As history would later reveal, the first seeds towards a Jewish homeland had just been planted.
The Muslim world was visibly dismayed by such machinations especially after undergoing the trauma of the Caliphate’s loss. Things continued to unfold tragically during the Arab Revolt in Palestine (1936-1939) that engulfed the region in violence. Seeing the British adopt ruthless measures to quell the Arab opposition, there was further Muslim uproar in India. In response, Mr. Jinnah in his presidential address to the AIML in 1937 stated, “Great Britain has dishonored her proclamation to the Arabs – which had guaranteed to them complete independence of the Arab homelands…After having utilized them by giving them false promises, they installed themselves as the mandatory power with that infamous Balfour Declaration…fair-minded people will agree when I say that Great Britain will be digging its grave if she fails to honor her original proclamation…”
The AIML leadership continually passed resolutions in support of the Palestinians, protested in the streets, and sent their delegations to display solidarity with the Arabs. Mr. Jinnah, known to be unrelenting, continued also to verbally berate the harsh and illegal treatment of the Palestinians. He asserted, “You know the Arabs have been treated shamelessly—men who, fighting for the freedom of their country, have been described as gangsters, and subjected to all forms of repression. For defending their homelands, they are being put down at the point of the bayonet, and with the help of martial laws. But no nation, no people who are worth living as a nation, can achieve anything great without making great sacrifice such as the Arabs of Palestine are making.”
In July 1937, the Peel Commission endeavoured to unearth the causes of unrest in Mandatory Palestine. The commission produced a report that recommended partitioning Palestine. This tragic recommendation for the Arabs, affixed with the immigration of Jews to Palestine exponentially rising during the third, fourth, and fifth aliyahs, traumatized the global Muslim psyche. In British Palestine, between 100,000-300,000, Jews immigrated to Palestine – a monumental demographic shift. The Jews also had for years bought and occupied Palestinian land marking a territorial shift in their favour as well.
The AIML protested against the British mandate and its anti-Arab policies, citing them as violating religious and human rights – thus warranting its abolition – but such proclamations fell on deaf ears. Miss Farquharson of the National League of England requested Mr. Iqbal’s views on the Peel Commission’s recommendations. Mr. Iqbal replied, “We must not forget that Palestine does not belong to England. She is holding it under a mandate from the League of Nations, which Muslim Asia is now learning to regard as an Anglo-French institution invented for the purpose of dividing the territories of weaker Muslim peoples. Nor does Palestine belong to the Jews who abandoned it of their own free will long before its possession by the Arabs.” The last sentence of the preceding unveils Mr. Iqbal’s view that Palestine was solely a Muslim issue – this emotion resonated with the Muslim masses of India and beyond. This sentiment is further highlighted by Mr. Iqbal’s statement in 1937 in an AIML setting, “The problem, studied in its historical perspective, is purely a Muslim problem…Palestine ceased to be a Jewish problem long before the entry of Caliph Umar into Jerusalem more than 1300 years ago. Their dispersion, as Professor Hockings has pointed out, was perfectly voluntary and their scriptures were for the most part written outside Palestine. Nor was it ever a Christian problem. Modern historical research has doubted even the existence of Peter, the Hermit. Even if we assume that the Crusades were an attempt to make Palestine a Christian problem, the attempt was defeated by the victories of Salah-ud-Din. I, therefore, regard Palestine as a purely Muslim problem.”
He espoused parallel thoughts in his poems as well, which were perhaps the most inspiring to the Muslims of India. His poem Sham-o-Falesteen (Syria and Palestine) poignantly proclaims:
Heaven’s blessing on those brazen Frenchmen shine!
Aleppo’s rare glass brims with their red wine.
—If the Jew claims the soil of Palestine,
Why not the Arab Spain?
Some new design must have inflamed our English potentates;
This is no story of oranges, honey or dates.
The second couplet is the most telling i.e. if Jews had a claim on Arab land because they were present there two thousand years ago, then the Arab Muslims certainly had a claim on Spain where they ruled for 800 years.
World War II
In 1938, Mr. Iqbal passed away before the onset of World War II but his message on Palestine was immortalized in his poems, statements, and speeches. The AIML continued to honor his legacy by not only pursuing the creation of Pakistan but also facilitating Palestine resolutely. When the war broke out, the British, characterizing shrewd but indignant behavior, cozied up to the AIML for their support in WWII. This was primarily because the Hindu-dominated Congress’ support was not forthcoming.
During the war, many pro-Palestinian actions were undertaken. For example on the AIML’s call, Palestine Day was observed on the 26th of August 1938 across the subcontinent. In 1939, Mr. Jinnah sent senior AIML members Ch. Khaliquzzaman and Abdur Rehman Siddiqui to meet with the Grand Mufti of Palestine to assist with the Palestinian issue. In July 1939, the British government prepared and issued a white paper unilaterally. The White Paper of 1939 called for the establishment of a Jewish home within an independent Palestinian state in the next 10 years and rejected the Peel Commission’s recommendations. In simpler words, it recommended a one-state solution for the Arabs and Jews. It also ordered that Jewish immigration be limited and would depend on Arab consent. Many Arab leaders thought such recommendations were untenable and rejected the proposal, as did the Jews. The latter became militant and incepted a violent campaign against the British.
Mr. Jinnah too was critical of the white paper – he criticized its recommendations and reiterated that the original promises made to the Arabs in WWI along with their demands should be honored. He wrote to Viceroy Linlithgow that the British “…should try and meet all reasonable national demands of the Arabs in Palestine“ as this was one of the prerequisites for AIML’s cooperation in the British war effort in India during 1939-40. Mr. Jinnah had also threatened “to call out the Muslim Ministries in the Provinces“ on the issue of British injustices towards Palestinians.
Mr. Jinnah also pledged his support to the Supreme Arab Council of Palestine. He ramped up the pressure domestically and reaffirmed to the British how important Palestine was spiritually for the Muslims. Furthermore, he created a “Palestine Fund” to raise and dispatch money for Palestinian families who lost their relatives in the struggle for freedom. Despite his constant struggle towards the creation of Pakistan, he remained adamant about the Palestinian cause as well.
Post-WWII: Creation of Pakistan and Israel
The post-war scenario looked bleak for the Palestinians. For the Indian Muslims too it was a difficult time due to the intensifying question of partition. Despite this critical juncture (around 1946) and the Indian Muslims requiring all their energy, Mr. Jinnah and the AIML did not vacillate vis-à-vis the Palestinian issue. On 20th April 1946, The Anglo-American Committee report was published – it recommended that 100,000 Jewish immigrants persecuted by Nazis be allowed to immigrate to Palestine immediately (among other things). Upon hearing such, Mr. Jinnah remarked that this was the “grossest betrayal of the promises made to the Arabs” and he was distraught at how the great powers had only leveraged the territory of Palestine to accommodate the Jews at the Arabs’ expense.
The Grand Mufti of Palestine Muhammad Amin-el-Husseni himself recognized Mr. Jinnah’s unyielding struggle towards the Palestinian cause several times. On one such occasion in 1946, the Grand Mufti wrote to Mr. Jinnah, “Muslims of the world would remember how the League under leadership of Jinnah favored and cared for the affairs of the Muslim countries like Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Western Trablus, Indonesia and all other countries of North Africa.”
In 1946, the US, which had replaced the UK as the dominant global power, and its dalliance with Israel began to blossom further – this was evidenced by the US President’s policy of supporting a Jewish state in Palestine.
On 14th August 1947, Mr. Jinnah’s long and tedious struggle to create an independent nation for the Muslim Indians was finally successful. Although a momentous occasion for the AIML and new Pakistanis, the Palestinians were not as lucky as they became anguished due to the UN’s deliberation on how to partition Palestine. When the partition plan was accepted by the UN in November 1947, Mr. Jinnah, then the Governor General of Pakistan, wrote to US President Truman and asserted, “The decision is ultra vires of the United Nations charter and basically wrong and invalid in law… The very people for whose benefit this decision is taken—the Jews, who have already suffered terribly from Nazi persecution—will I greatly fear, suffer most if this unjust course is pursued…”
Talking to Robert Simson of the BBC, he expressed that the decision was “unjust and cruel” and pledged to aid the cause “of the Arabs in Palestine in every possible way.” In the aftermath of the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine that aimed to divide the territory into an Arab state, a Jewish state, and a Special International Regime for Jerusalem and Bethlehem, war broke out internally as well as between the nations of the Arab League and Israel. The result was almost a complete Israeli victory with the new state not only controlling their area proposed by the UN but also occupying around 60% of the area proposed to the Palestinians. Israel also took control of West Jerusalem, which was meant to be an international zone. The state of Israel was born on 14th May 1948.
History, the greatest of writers, inscribed poetically how Pakistan and Israel both came to be within the space of 9 months – perhaps the only two nations to be created in the name of religion. Both nations are marked with territorial disputes as well, which remain unresolved and pose a threat on a global scale. Mr. Jinnah passed soon after on 11th September 1948.
A few months ago if someone asked me if Pakistan would ever recognize Israel regardless of the strong Israel-US nexus, my answer would be a no. However, in recent months the elites of Pakistan have trapped the country in an almost-unwinnable situation after Imran Khan’s ouster. Pakistan is desperate for money, for its loans to be waived, and for inflation to come down. Terrorist attacks have also begun rising. Therefore, Israel, already on a high after the Abraham Accords, might see this as an opportunity to aid or pressurize Pakistan to recognize Israel, sell their nuclear weapons, or both. The murmurings of such Machiavellian machinations have been ongoing in the country’s power corridors as well as on social media for a while. In fact, when the relatively stable government of Imran Khan was governing, there were internal and exogenous pressures on him to recognize Israel. Now that a vapid and corrupt government marred with greater economic and political schisms has replaced his, those same burdens stand buttressed.
If Pakistan does become desperate or corrupt enough to recognize Israel, it would be to its detriment in the long run. Conversely, to “befriend” and perhaps denuclearize the only Muslim nuclear state with one of the strongest armies in the world would be a massive victory for Israel. Netanyahu himself is on record for stating that after Iran, Pakistan is the largest specter to the state due to its possession of a massive nuclear arsenal.
Pakistanis, as pro-Palestine as they are, are in a despairing situation, which will turn murkier still, I fear. The implication is that maybe the citizens (not all but some) could be convinced of the absurd move to recognize Israel or worse. I am completely opposed to this as the Palestine issue has always remained a red line for Pakistan – this much we must not obfuscate – and for the politicians and citizens to abandon this red line would be catastrophic, maybe not economically, but morally and spiritually.
We must remember that in British India, times were tougher for the Muslims than what Pakistan is facing currently but the founders did not compromise on their scruples even with their backs against the wall. For example, Mr. Jinnah, known even by his rivals as incorruptible, was made several enticing offers from Gandhi, Viceroy Mountbatten, and others to become the first PM of a united India if his demand for Pakistan was renounced – but he never accepted. Mr. Iqbal, as unwavering himself, expressed his fiery passion for Palestine in a letter to Mr. Jinnah, “The Palestine question is very much agitating the minds of the Muslims… Personally I would not mind going to jail on an issue which affects both Islam and India. The formation of a Western base on the very gates of the East is a menace to both.”
Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Iqbal’s examples signify the indefatigable commitment towards Pakistan and Palestine that Pakistanis must exemplify now. Therefore, the country must follow in the steadfast footsteps of the founders and refrain from recognizing Israel – for recognizing Israel is to forsake Palestine and to forsake Palestine is to forsake Pakistan.
Serbia must reject the ultimatum regarding Kosovo
The President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic on January 20th had a meeting with the Western negotiating team about the solution...
A turning moment in Ukraine Crisis
Germany’s decision to send tanks to Ukraine is a major moment in the Ukraine Crisis. It will have a far-reaching...
Free-Market Capitalism and Climate Crisis
Free market capitalism is an economic system that has brought about tremendous economic growth and prosperity in many countries around...
The Dilemma of Science Diplomacy: Between Advancement of Humanity and The Source of Rivalry
In the past decades, science and technology have gained more ground in foreign affairs decision making processes. The emergence of...
Context and Practice of International Politics: Experience in 2022 and Expectations from 2023
The dramatic events of 2022, centred on the military-political conflict between Russia and the West over the Ukrainian issue, are...
Blue Economy Offers Opportunities for Sustainable Growth in Tunisia
With support from the World Bank, in June 2022, Tunisia launched its first report on the status of the blue...
Global growth forecast to slow to 1.9% in 2023
Senior UN economists warned on Wednesday that intersecting crises are likely to add further damage to the global economy, with...
International Law4 days ago
Undemocratic United Nations and Global Peace
East Asia4 days ago
Nepal-China Relations and Belt and Road Initiative
Eastern Europe3 days ago
Why there is New Escalation in Ukraine War?
World News4 days ago
High-level CIA visit to Kyiv comes at critical juncture in war
Finance4 days ago
Everything you Need to Know about Military Strength and Conditioning Specialist Jobs
Africa3 days ago
Sergey Lavrov Embarks on Geopolitical Lecturing Tour to Africa
World News4 days ago
Washington draws Israel and South Korea into Ukraine conflict
Finance4 days ago
Potanin: Russia should not respond to sanctions by confiscating Western assets