Connect with us

Middle East

Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin: Between Israel and Hamas

Published

on

In recent weeks and months there has been a cacophony of Salafi protest that has swept Gaza against the ruling Hamas government related to treatment of prisoners, corruption, and ability to practice Islam as they see fit.

One of the groups speaking out has been Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin fi Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis, a jihadi organization that is sympathetic to al-Qaeda’s worldview. By glomming onto a mainstream Salafi cause, MSM is attempting to co-opt individuals to gain a stronger footing within Gaza to challenge Hamas (albeit only at the political and not military level yet), whom they view as an enemy similar, though, on a lesser level than Israel.

Background

Following a cross-border attack on Israel carried out by one Egyptian and one Saudi fighter, the organization’s formation was first declared on 19 June 2012, which was announced in a video released from the Sinai Peninsula, featuring seven fighters. The two attackers read their martyrdom wills in the video as well.

In the first part of the video, the speaker in the center reads out a statement and begins by invoking Qur’an 61:4, ‘Verily does God love those who fight in his path in a row as though they were a firm edifice,’ followed by references to standard global jihadist themes such as the necessity of implementing the Shari’a on Earth and reviving the glory of the Ummah.

The Majlis also appeals to fellow Muslims in countries like Lebanon, Jordan, as well as the ‘Syrian Muslim people- the mujahid [people] brutalized under the control of the idolatrous, criminal Nusayri [derogatory term for ‘Alawite’] regime.’

The flag used is identical to the one pioneered by al-Qa’ida’s Iraqi branch known as the Islamic State of Iraq, and the group praises ‘Sheikh Osama Bin Laden’ in its founding statement. Yet, while the al-Qa’ida affiliation thus illustrated is not in doubt, the group’s primary focus to attack Israel has been evident from the beginning.

This is apparent in the reference to the obligation of ‘the people of Tawhid [monotheism]’ to heed the ‘screams of al-Aqsa and the moans of prisoners under the grip of the enemy Jewish cowards.’ The founding statement includes in its conclusion a call for God to defeat ‘the Jews and the kuffar.’

In a video from October of last year, the Majlis likewise vowed to fight the Jews as enemies of God. In the wake of an April 2013 rocket attack on Eilat, the group released a video, part of which featured scenes of Jews praying at the Western Wall, denounced by the Majlis as the ‘Judaization of al-Aqsa.’ The video then continues with the recurring theme of treatment of Muslim prisoners by Israel.

MSM and Hamas

The focus on Israel is also made clear by the fact that the organization maintains a presence among Salafist jihadists located in the Gaza Strip. In light of Hamas’ detention and torture of jihadist individuals, the Majlis has on more than one occasion raised the issue of Hamas’ conduct towards Salafist militants.

For example, a senior Salafist in Gaza affiliated with the Majlis recently affirmed: ‘We will continue the jihad regardless of the stance of Egypt or Hamas,’ adding that the Majlis has ‘precise knowledge on the complete cooperation between Egypt and Hamas in the war against the Salafists.’

In a similar vein, the Majlis recently released a statement calling for the release of all Salafist detainees held prisoner by the Hamas government: ‘Everyone who has a free voice and noble pen, and everyone who has a living conscience and faith should raise his voice to pressure the dismissed government to put a stop to its pursuit against the rights of its mujahideen.’

Criticism of Hamas has been a recurring theme in Salafist discourse. A very noteworthy example is a Salafist-Jihadist video (NB not from an al-Qa’ida affiliate) from about a year ago that purports to document evidence on numerous counts of Hamas’ perpetrating- in the words of the video title- ‘massacres…in Gaza against the Salafist mujahideen.

For example, at 17:40 onwards, the video offers a purportedly intercepted radio transmission from the leadership of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades giving orders to destroy houses and a mosque frequented by Salafists with missiles.

Like the affirmation to continue jihad despite perceived Egypt-Hamas cooperation against Salafist militants, the latest call by the Majlis for Hamas to release Salafist detainees comes following the killing by Israel of a Majlis militant called Haitham Ziyad al-Meshaal, now commemorated as a ‘martyr’ in a video released by the organization.

The day before Haitham was assassinated, relatives of imprisoned Salafist militants in Gaza held a demonstration calling on Hamas’ security forces to release their detained kinsfolk. The al-Qa’ida flag’s presence may indicate that some of the imprisoned fighters in question are members of the Majlis.

It turns out that Haitham, who was targeted as a suspect behind the rocket attacks on Eilat, had once been a member of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades but according to the Majlis, left out of disillusionment with Hamas’ participation in ‘the game of democracy’ (a reference to the 2006 legislative elections that were judged to be free) and its ‘removal of the divine Shari’a.’

One should compare this sentiment with a statement from the group that condemned Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and some Salafist parties (e.g. Egypt’s an-Nour) for entering into the ‘mud of democracy.’ Here is a photo of Haitham from his funeral in Gaza– his coffin wrapped in the al-Qa’ida flag. His dislike of the concept of democracy is corroborated by his testimony in the video celebrating his martyrdom.

Unsurprisingly, Hamas condemned Israel’s targeting of Haitham, but many in jihadist circles did not fail to notice Hamas’ double standard behind the condemnation.

For instance, the jihadist outlet Ibn Taymiyyah Media released a statement noting that the Salafist jihadists in Gaza have been caught between the ‘hammer of Jewish aircraft and the anvil of Hamas and its security apparatus,’ noting the ongoing imprisonment and disappearances of Salafist militants.

In the meantime, however, Hamas, which has a vested interest in portraying itself as the true spearhead of ‘resistance’ against Israel, remains undeterred from cracking down on Salafists it perceives as its rivals, having just announced the arrest of several ‘extremist’ Salafist militants in Gaza on charges of stealing missiles.

The accusation of stealing weaponry- a familiar charge on Hamas’ part- is strongly denied by the Salafists, including those affiliated with the Majlis, which in October of last year released a video to refute the allegation. The video purportedly shows how they themselves manufacture projectiles to fire against Israel.

The global jihadist ideology of the Majlis and its animosity towards Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood notwithstanding, it should not be thought that the group is planning on armed confrontation with Hamas or the Egyptian government anytime soon.

On the contrary, when there was an attack last year on Egyptian border guards at the Rafah crossing into Gaza, the Majlis was quick to issue a denial of responsibility, while condemning the Egyptian army’s stance against jihadist fighters.

Conclusion

In short, the group will continue to attempt to carry out attacks on Israel, while avoiding an open fight against Egypt or Hamas. Even so, Salafist resentment about treatment under Hamas’ hands could lead to a more general shift in the Salafist trend in Gaza towards the open al-Qa’ida affiliation of the Majlis. Indeed, the banners on display at that demonstration in Gaza on Monday by the relatives of imprisoned Salafists may be a strong indication that such a turn is already underway.

To an extent, it would seem Hamas heeds internal Salafist pressure to enforce Islamic law more rigidly, as illustrated by the recent initiative for gender segregation in schools. Yet in the eyes of the Salafist militants, these Islamization moves are merely cosmetic and do not compensate for imprisoning and torturing Salafist brethren and so ultimately cannot off-put attempts by the Majlis to co-opt Salafist opinion in Gaza towards its orientation.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University.

Continue Reading
Comments

Middle East

Has Assad succeeded in overcoming the Syrian crisis?

Mohamad Zreik

Published

on

A series of revolutions swept through the Arab region. The first torch was from Tunisia when protester Mohamed Bouazizi burned himself in opposition to the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. This wave of revolts led to the overthrow of many Arab regimes and leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and other Arab countries. There has been a state of destruction, displacement and economic collapse in the countries affected by the revolutions, a lot of killing, torture and political division, as well as the penetration of terrorist groups in the Arab world.

The revolution began in the form of peaceful protests, but soon developed using violence between the Syrian army and opposition groups. Over time, the Syrian opposition was divided into a peaceful opposition aimed at overthrowing the Assad regime through diplomatic means and the armed opposition, which was divided into several factions: the Free Syrian Army, Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, as well as other armed factions.

This difficult situation brought the Syrian regime into a stage of internal popular and military pressure, which led to a request for military assistance from Russia. Russia responded to Assad’s request and defended the Syrian regime in earnest. Russia, which had good relations with the Libyan regime, did not veto the UN Security Council in favor of the Gaddafi regime. In the Syrian crisis, however, Russia and China have vetoed the UN Security Council in favor of the Assad regime, and they defended the Syrian regime in international forums.

Russia, which has historical ties with the Syrian regime, regards Syria as an extension of its strategic interests in the Middle East. Evidence of this is the presence of Russia’s military base in Syria, which is Russia’s only military base in the Middle East. Iran also stood by the Syrian regime in its war, and there was constant coordination between the Syrian and Iranian leaderships. On the other hand, the United States, Saudi Arabia and Turkey demanded that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad step down and replace the existing regime with a new regime. The United States has repeatedly threatened military intervention to strike the Syrian regime, but the American threat has always been matched by a Russian willingness to retaliate, creating a balance of power on the Syrian battlefield.

Russia’s active support of the Syrian regime and its allies’ support led to Assad’s steadfastness, despite widespread international dissatisfaction with this outcome. Syria’s political position has not yet changed, but the Syrian-Russian-Chinese-Iranian alliance has been strengthened. Many military analysts believe that what happened in Syria cannot be repeated with other countries. The most important reason is Syria’s strategic geographic position and the need for a regime like Assad to govern Syria for the time being.

The Assad regime has not collapsed, but there has been an internal and international resentment that did not exist in the past. This is expected to happen because of the nature of the Syrian regime’s alliances and the division of the region between an eastern and a Western axis. But the Assad regime has been able to withstand and maintain its position in the face of the severe crisis in Syria.

The Syrian regime must work hard to involve the Syrian opposition in government and form a government that includes all strata of Syrian society so as not to feel a large segment of the Syrian people injustice, and must increase the margin of freedom in the country. These steps should change the perception that prevailed towards the Syrian regime, and lead to its acceptance internally and internationally in the next stage.

Continue Reading

Middle East

Landing in Riyadh: Geopolitics work in Putin’s favour

Dr. James M. Dorsey

Published

on

When Russian President Vladimir Putin lands in Riyadh this week for the second time in 12 years, his call for endorsement of his proposal to replace the US defense umbrella in the Gulf with a multilateral security architecture is likely to rank high on his agenda.

So is Mr. Putin’s push for Saudi Arabia to finalize the acquisition of Russia’s S-400 anti-missile defense system in the wake of the failure of US weaponry to intercept drones and missiles that last month struck key Saudi oil installations.

“We are ready to help Saudi Arabia protect their people. They need to make clever decisions…by deciding to buy the most advanced S-400 air-defence systems. These kinds of systems are capable of defending any kind of infrastructure in Saudi Arabia from any kind of attack,” Mr. Putin said immediately after the attacks.

Mr Putin’s push for a multilateral security approach is helped by changing realities in the Gulf as a result of President Donald J. Trump’s repeated recent demonstrations of his unreliability as an ally.

Doubts about Mr. Trump have been fuelled by his reluctance to respond more forcefully to perceived Iranian provocations, including the downing of a US drone in June and the September attacks on the Saudi facilities as well as his distancing himself from Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu following last month’s elections, and most recently, the president’s leaving the Kurds to their own devices as they confront a Turkish invasion in Syria.

Framed in transactional terms in which Saudi Arabia pays for a service, Mr. Trump’s decision this week to send up to 3,000 troops and additional air defences to the kingdom is likely to do little to enhance confidence in his reliability.

By comparison, Mr. Putin, with the backing of Chinese president Xi Jinping, seems a much more reliable partner even if Riyadh differs with Moscow and Beijing on key issues, including Iran, Syria and Turkey.

“While Russia is a reliable ally, the US is not. Many in the Middle East may not approve of Moscow supporting Bashar al-Assad’s regime, but they respect Vladimir Putin for sticking by Russia’s beleaguered ally in Syria,” said Middle East scholar and commentator Mark N. Katz.

In a twist of irony, Mr. Trump’s unreliability coupled with an Iran’s strategy of gradual escalation in response to the president’s imposition of harsh economic sanctions in a bid to force the Islamic republic to the negotiating table appear to have moderated what was perceived as a largely disastrous assertive and robust go-it alone Saudi foreign and defense policy posture in recent years.

While everyone would benefit from a dialling down of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Mr. Trump’s overall performance as the guarantor of security in the Gulf could in the longer term pave the way for a more multilateral approach to the region’s security architecture.

In the latest sign of Saudi willingness to step back from the brink, Saudi Arabia is holding back channel talks for the first time in two years with Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. The talks began after both sides declared partial ceasefires in the more than four year-long Yemeni war.

The talks potentially open the door to a broader Russian-sponsored deal in the context of some understanding about non-aggression between the kingdom and Iran, in which Saudi Arabia would re-establish diplomatic relations with Syria in exchange for the Islamic republic dropping its support for the Houthis.

Restoring diplomatic relations and reversing the Arab League’s suspension of Syrian membership because of the civil war would constitute a victory for Mr. Al-Assad’s main backers, Russia and Iran. It would grant greater legitimacy to a leader viewed by significant segments of the international community as a pariah.

A Saudi-Iranian swap of Syria for Yemen could also facilitate Saudi financial contributions to the reconstruction of war-ravaged Syria. Saudi Arabia was conspicuously absent at last month’s Rebuild Syria Expo in Damascus.

Mr. Putin is likely to further leverage his enhanced credibility as well as Saudi-Russian cooperation in curtailing oil production to boost prices to persuade Saudi Arabia to follow through on promises to invest in Russia.

Saudi Arabia had agreed to take a stake in Russia’s Novatek Arctic-2 liquefied natural gas complex, acquire Sibur, Russia’s largest petrochemical facility, and invest an additional US$6 billion in future projects.

Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak predicted that “about 30 agreements and contracts will be signed during President Putin’s visit to Saudi Arabia. We are working on it. These are investment projects, and the sum in question is billions of dollars.”

In anticipation of Mr. Putin’s visit, Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), said it was opening its first overseas office in Riyadh.

RDIF and the kingdom’s counterpart, the Public Investment Fund (PIF), are believed to be looking at some US$2.5 billion in investment in technology, medicine, infrastructure, transport and industrial production.

The Russian fund is also discussing with Aramco, the Saudi state-owned oil company, US$3 billion in investments in oil services and oil and gas conversion projects.

Saudi interest in economic cooperation with Russia goes beyond economics. Ensuring that world powers have an increasing stake in the kingdom’s security is one pillar of a more multilateral regional approach

Said Russian Middle East expert Alexey Khlebnikov: “Clearly, the recent attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities have changed many security calculations throughout the region.”

Continue Reading

Middle East

No peace for Kurds: Rojava still under attack

Silvia Fornaroli

Published

on

The Amazon is still on fire. The “lungs of the Earth” are hardly breathing while the flames are threatening people and nature reserves. As long as we do not see with our own eyes the burnt trees, the endangered species and the indigenous tribes fighting to save their dying forest, we seem incapable to understand the actual consequences.

Thousands of miles away from this environmental catastrophe, a different kind of tragedy is waiting to happen. Rojava-Northern Syria Federation — the self-declared autonomous region that Kurdish people managed to carve out in northeastern Syria during the Civil war — is burning again.

On September 24, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a controversial speech to the United Nations General Assembly and proposed to create a “safe zone” in the north of Syria, in order to resettle up to 2 million Syrian refugees. He is hoping to establish a peace corridor with a depth of 32 kilometers and a length of 480 kilometers, which would easily turn the area into the world’s largest refugee camp. Despite the seemingly humanitarian purposes, this might represent the umpteenth attempt to destroy the Kurdish dream of an independent democratic enclave.

It is undeniably clear, in fact, how Turkey could take advantage of the situation: Erdoğan’s spokesman Ibrahim Kalin has already claimed that Ankara’s aim is also to clear the borders from “terrorist elements.”

The People’s Protection Units and the Women’s Protection Units (YPG/YPJ), which — along with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) — played a key role in the fought against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), are the official army of Rojava but currently designated as terrorist organizations. These armed groups, in fact, are considered as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the far-left militant and political organization founded in 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan and  often involved in armed clashes with Turkish security forces.

Kurdish people are about to be left alone once again and the recent decisions of the White House trigger alarm in the whole Middle East.

On October 7, president Donald Trump announced that the United States  — so far the main financer, trainer and supporter of Kurds — would start pulling troops out of those territories, although it would not constitute a full withdrawal.

Pentagon spokesman Jonathan Hoffman said that “The Department of Defense made clear to Turkey — as did the president — that we do not endorse a Turkish operation in Northern Syria,” and that “The US Armed Forces will not support, or be involved in any such operation.”

Mazlum Kobanê, the commander in chief of the SDF, announced that they will protect Syrian’s borders and fight back against Ankara’s army. Since the majority of Kurdish cities are located in this area, it is not difficult to understand how potentially devasting this ongoing operation could be.

Turkish assault is going to begin from the city of Gire Spi/Tell Abyad, once controlled by the so-called Caliphate and captured in 2015 by the YPG during the Tell Abyad offensive. The cities of Qamishli, Derek/Al Malikiya, Tell Tamer and Kobanê/Ayn al Arab are next to become target of air strikes and artillery fire as well.

It is no coincidence that shortly after the siege of Kobanê, Kurdish forces directed their efforts towards Tell Abyad, being such a strategic site for ISIL militias. The city, in fact, was better known in the West as the “Jihadi Highway”, a de-facto corridor for foreign fighters. In the chaos caused by the fighting, jihadists would surely try to regain strength and Turkish move is serving the cause.

At the Al-Hol camp — a huge detention female camp near Al-Hasakah — numerous riots have occurred in the past few weeks, and the managers of the structure believe that the women held in the prison — former jihadi brides — might be the vehicle for renewed forms of radicalization.

In view of the fact that US officials confirmed that they will not intervene nor will they seize control of those prisons, Kurdish forces called Washington’s move “a stab in the back”. Meanwhile in Raqqa, ISIL militants are still carrying out suicide bombing attacks against SDF positions.

Shervan Derwish, official spokesman of the Mambij Military Council, has expressed his concern with a very touching message on Twitter.

The YPG and YPJhave fought in many historical battles and their solitary resistance during the last Turkish Afrin offensive in January 2018 became a symbol of their resilience.

On the other hand, Turkey’s army will be backed by their well-known rebel allies:  “The Turkish military, together with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), will cross the Turkish-Syrian border shortly, “wrote Fahrettin Altun — Turkey’s communications director — in a Washington Post column. Numerous military groups are active in the region and, although their nature is still debated, there are evidence of many connections with jihadi-inspired organizations.

Working in cooperation with the SDF, Rojava’s cantons are ready to resist and defend their independence, but Trump’s decision sounds like a betrayal.

If forests are burning, so will be democracy in Syria. The Rojava project is in imminent danger, and this time there will be no mountains for the Kurds to seek refuge in. Here in the West we are blessed not to directly witness the destruction of both tragedies, but it is still up to us whether to look those flames in the eye or remember them as the unique environments they actually were.

In loving memory of Mehmet Aksoy, who dedicated his life to the Kurdish cause.

Continue Reading

Latest

Trending

Copyright © 2019 Modern Diplomacy