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Prospects for the Development of RF’s Policy in Central Asia

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The results of the official visit of RF President V.Putin to Tajikistan that took place on October 4-5 suggest there is a probability of increased tension in the Central Asian region within the nearest 9-12 months.

Moscow’s attention to Tajikistan should be discussed in the context of building up its presence in Central Asia (CA) within the framework of the attempt to create Eurasian geopolitical project. This project is expected to restore Kremlin’s geopolitical influence on the post-Soviet space under new political and economic conditions.

Availability of sufficient energy resources in the region allows some countries to claim to attempt conducting their own foreign policy. Russia’s loss of control over these countries will pose direct threat to both RF’s geopolitical model in the region and its monopoly/control over regular energy carriers transportation routes.

Today, Russia has opportunities for exercising full-scale influence only in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. However, one may say that Kazakhstan falls under the same influence because pro-Russia moods among local elites and their favouring preservation of Nazarbayev’s regime allows Moscow to overcome the country’s energy independence not least of all by means of involving Astana in the Customs Union. However, due to geographical location, economic potential and political regime Dushanbe still remains the most controlled Russia’s partner in the region helping to efficiently achieve its foreign policy objectives.

Regional Tactical Standpoint. Today, Moscow has faced the issues of developing its geopolitical projects on the territory of Central Asia. Key problems come from official Tashkent (Uzbekistan) which had already suspended its membership in EurAsEu, as well as in CSTO – in 1999 and 2012. As for the latter, Tashkent has not ratified a single significant document. According to our estimations, Uzbekistan’s distancing from CSTO is first of all related to expectations of profitable proposals regarding hosting US military bases on the country’s territory, as well as to the attempts to avoid entering Russia’s geopolitical arena and preserve opportunities for foreign policy manoeuvres. Moreover, Karimov’s regime has been lately under pressure, in particular in respect to businesses related to his daughter Gulnara, and opposition forces in exile declare their plans to organize civil disobedience in Uzbekistan aimed at overthrowing the antidemocratic regime. Similar situation forces Karimov to manoeuvre between Washington and Moscow and remain neutral, at the same time staying interesting and promising for both parties.

Probability of republicans rising to power after the next presidential election in the US will enhance American present in the region in future – especially in the context of conflict with Iran. Moreover, Uzbekistan is the most favourable base for the localization of a part of military forces removed from the territory of Afghanistan in case immediate return and deployment in this country is needed. The US is also expected to relocate to Uzbekistan a part of the armed forces remaining after withdrawing the coalition’s forces in Afghanistan in 2014.

Thus, Russia may face enhanced competition in CA on the part of the US and China within a short-term period. Such changes in the foreign policy situation require more drastic actions from Kremlin aimed at strengthening its influence in the region.

Military and Political Standpoint. According to the signed agreements, Russia has prolonged its military presence in Tajikistan for 30 years. Ministers of Defence signed a treaty replacing the previous one that came into force in May of 1993 and is going to terminate in 2014. Duration of the new treaty is 49 years.

The treaty is of great military and political importance since it stipulates that Russia will keep under control one of the largest exterritorial military groups in Central Asia. Firstly, this will allow Moscow to control security within the region after complete withdrawal of coalition’s military forces from Afghanistan. We believe that withdrawal of ISAF troops from Afghanistan will trigger rise of radical forces on the borders of Central Asian republics and will pose a threat to stability of these countries’ regimes. This process will be probably accompanied by increasing drug trafficking from this country. Therefore, Kremlin in its strategic model sees Tajikistan first of all as a border containing radical Islamic forces from the territory of Afghanistan. Secondly, 2013 will see presidential election in the country participation in which of the current president E.Rachmon may raise a question about legitimacy of the procedure and destabilize the situation in the country according to the “colour revolution” scenario. Thirdly, this will give Moscow a chance to achieve parity under conditions of probable deployment of American military bases on the territory of Uzbekistan.

Moreover, 201 Russian Military Base (RMB) and financial aid in the amount of USD 5 million will allow more effective prevention of drug trafficking towards Russia in which – as of today – some representatives of Tajikistan army and border troops are involved which is proved by recent event in Gorno-Badakhshan (GBAR). The same events showed that Tadjik authorities in fact have no control over about 45% of their territory, and there is a probability of another round of separatism and extremism in Gorno-Badakhshan. Back in 2010, confrontation tendencies here were enhanced after the breach of agreement between official Dushanbe and the groups controlling the Rasht Valley which the authorities failed to take under control. According to the operational report prepared by Da Vinci AG analytic group in February 2011, Tajikistan is the most vulnerable state in Central Asia for the implementation of “Arab spring” scenario. Therefore, Russian military presence will guarantee security to E.Rachmon’s regime and enhance stability of the regime and domestic policy situation in the country. This is also important considering the personal conflict between E.Rachmon and I.Karimov which, in our opinion, may turn into a military conflict in case of implementation of water and energy supply projects by Tajikistan which may cause water deficiency within the republic. Therefore, RMB 201 may influence the decision-making process in Uzbekistan regarding planning of acts of violence against Dushanbe.

All this strengthens RF’s position in the region, ensures stable implementation of integration projects for it, as well as enhances the role of CSTO as regional security organization.

Situation Forecast. We believe that Moscow’s medium-term tactics lies in the use of contradictions of Dushanbe for the purpose of strengthening its position in the region. Moscow will seek to keep influence on Tajikistan by means of providing military assistance, security guarantees and economic support in the form of liberalization of labour migration for Tadjiks and abolition of export duties on light oils. Plans to increase labour migration flow from Tajikistan aimed at reducing tension in this country caused by unemployment will probably be accompanied by tightening of migration policy in relation to migrant workers – including from Ukraine and Moldova. Introduction of new migration rules is quite advantageous for RF. 75% of migrants from Central Asia have families on their native land and send them money. Thus, by employing foreigners on its own territory Moscow reduces tension in Central Asian countries where male unemployment can stimulate growth of extremism. Moreover, 99% of them go to Russia seeking some earnings and do not plan on staying on its territory unlike representatives of European post-Soviet republics.

According to our estimations, Kremlin is interested in the creation of confrontation between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (and possibly Kyrgyzstan). For this purpose, Moscow takes measures to support implementation of infrastructure projects which pose threat to Uzbekistan’s security. It concerns construction of Rogun HPS and Kambar-Atin HPS-1. In case construction of dams on these two sites is completed Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan will get an opportunity to regulate flows of trans-border rivers Naryn in Kirgizia and Vahksh in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, thus creating water deficiency there. Receiving control over water resources by means of investment projects with the participation of Russian companies RusHydro and RAO UES will allow Kremlin to get bargaining chips in the process of negotiations with Uzbekistan and offset its regional influence as a supplier of energy resources.

We suppose that there is quite little probability of implementation of this project by Moscow. Such implementation is rather risky considering the fact that the dam which is going to become the world’s largest is situated at the point of tectonic fault and high seismic activity. In view of the aforesaid, investments in the amount of about USD 3 billion managed by Russian companies are imposed to high financial and reputation risks and seem to be unreasoned from the economic point of view. However, results of V.Putin’s visit in October show that Russia for the first time got involved in Tadjik-Kyrgyz water-energy project in which it had been persistently staying neutral for several years. We believe that this is a part of a multi-move game in which Moscow provokes escalation of tension between Dushanbe and Tashkent and between Tashkent and Bishkek, and then will become mediator in the regulation process taking up issues of peaceful regulation of regional conflicts.

Moreover, as 2014 is approaching I.Karimov’s regime will seek foreign support and security guarantees on its southern borders. Despite the fact that the length of borders with Afghanistan for Uzbekistan is significantly less than for Tajikistan, infiltration of radical Islam into its territory, intrusion of armed troops into its territory from Afghanistan aimed at destabilization of the situation within the country and spread of influence of Uzbek sub-ethnic groups and clans of Afghanistan on Uzbekistan are quite likely. At the same time, Tashkent has no resources to maintain its positions on the southern border with Afghanistan and 100% of control over its own part of Ferghana Valley where chances are high that the activity will revive, nor to prevent revitalization of opposition forces. In view of the above, Moscow probably hopes that under such conditions Tashkent will not be able to show active resistance to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and will agree to trade-off alternatives of settling the issues, including within the framework of pro-Russian geopolitical projects.

However, we believe that the situation is not likely to take such turn. Moscow has 9-12 more months until the situation with the construction of hydro-energy sites brings Dushanbe to understanding of the fact that Kremlin uses it in its geopolitical strategy. There was a similar situation in the past when Russian companies refused to complete the construction of the very same Rogun HPS which caused cooling down of relations with Tajikistan. This may result in significant strengthening of China’s positions due to investment infusion in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and construction of transport communications in Ferghana Valley.

In our opinion, Russia’s policy in the region will result in the fact that Tashkent will use a manoeuvre aimed at imitation of return under Russia’s wing. In such case, Kremlin will face an issue of fulfilling obligations to Dushanbe because the strategic plan suggests that the importance of Uzbekistan for Kremlin is more significant. Such games will hardly bring a happy end to Moscow because weakness of national economies of most Central Asian countries facilitates growth of radicalism and reduction of stability, and variety of tribes and clans complicates consolidation of power and implementation of efficient domestic policy which allows to predict further development of the situation in some of them according to Libyan scenario. Moreover, RF uses contradictions of CA countries under conditions of non-conflict infiltration of PRC into this region. Therefore, Russia’s influence in the region may be significantly reduced in case of change of power in one of the countries: Uzbekistan or Tajikistan which will strengthen positions of China and the US.

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SARS –an Unusual National Security Foe: Success of Central Asia Countries in Stemming COVID-19

Sayfiddin Juraev

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Authors: Sayfiddin Juraev and Gregory Gleason*

As the features of the virus which causes the corona pandemic are emerging with greater clarity, we are beginning to understand the dangers more fully. One of the things we are beginning to appreciate is that the SARS virus is a very unusual foe.  The virus is directly endangering the lives of people directly through the severe acute respiratory effects that it produces, but it also has endangered the way societies function around the world.   The disruption of international trade and traffic has an immediate effect which we all have observed.  Only now are we beginning to see the emergence of the long-term effects on how countries interact with one another and how they protect their own national interests.  The SARS virus is a danger to human security and national security alike.

The form of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome known as SARS-CoV-2 operates according to its own rules. This SARS is universal and non-discriminatory.  It affects everyone. It does not discriminate between good and bad, rich and poor, north and south or east and west.  This dangerous and highly contagious SARS virus, spreading the disease known as COVID-19,isa common threat to all.

It is important that we find ways to prevent this form of the SARS corona virus from magnifying the effects of economic disruption and social upheaval and from further dividing people and setting us against one another.  One step in overcoming this challenge is to recognize that this virus is an unusual enemy.  Successfully combating this unusual enemy requires that we understand the ways it functions and the ways it can be stopped.

Drawing upon the experience of countries that have done well in the first stages of this pandemic is valuable.  The experience of the states of Central Asia offers useful insights into strategies to combat this pandemic. 

The damage caused by the spread of COVID-19 in the Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—is currently at the low end of the scale in comparison with more economically advanced countries.  For example, UK, Italy, Spain, and France currently record the numbers of fatalities attributed to COVID-19 in the tens of thousands.  In contrast, the reported fatality figures in the Central Asian countries are much lower.  As of June 1, 2020, the World Health Organization reported deaths attributed to COVID-19 as: Kazakhstan—38; Kyrgyzstan—16; Tajikistan—47; Uzbekistan—14.  Turkmenistan reported no deaths. 

These figures represent the “reported” data.  No international organization has the authority to independently collect primary health data in all the world’s countries, nor could it without violating basic principles of national sovereignty.  But if these reported WHO data are even approximately accurate, the governments of all the Central Asian states deserve high marks for their ability to stem the “brushfire” spread of the SARS virus and gain time to more effectively address the fundamental questions raised by the pandemic both home and abroad. 

What Accounts for Successful Containment in Central Asia? 

As the initial cases of COVID-19 appeared in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and later in Tajikistan, the governments swiftly responded, instituting emergency measures, empowering law enforcement and medical authorities to implement a broad range of counter-infection mitigation measures to protect public health. Cross-border travel restrictions were imposed. Lockdowns and sheltering-in-place restrictions were imposed in most major cities and curfews were enforced.  Routine commercial air flights were cancelled or significantly reduced in international airports and many domestic airports. New levels of visa restrictions were implemented in all the Central Asian countries. The initial infection containment measures were highly successful in curtailing the early spread of Covid-19duet to the will and capacity of the governments of these states in implementing and enforcing the containment measures urged by medical authorities. 

The problems faced by the Central Asian states were much the same as those faced by countries around the world.  As in all cases, the success of the governments in responding to the pandemic depends upon addressing five key stages: 1) identification and assessment; 2) containment; 3) mitigation; 4) management of immediate consequences; 5) long-term economic and social consequences. The first stage of response to the pandemic—the immediate medical response stage—involves recognizing and acknowledging the scope of the hazard to public health and empowering medical authorities and law enforcement and public security services to take the steps necessary to get infected individuals under medical care as quickly as possible.  Containment means identifying and then isolating those people or those processes which can potentially transmit the infection.

Full information about the transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 was not available at the beginning of the pandemic. Consequently, many decisions were made solely based on assumptions using the experience from other cases of virus-based influenza. A full picture of transmissibility of the SARS-CoV-2 has not emerged even at this point, but the evidence suggests two primary routes of transmission. One route involves airborne transmission in minor droplets of water transferred in expiration of breath of infected persons. The second route appears to involve fomite transmission on surfaces of objects where the virus has been deposited.

A government policy of containment involves identifying those people who have come into contact with those transmitting COVID-19 and isolating them to ensure that they do not transmit the virus to others.  Identification and isolation involve “contact tracing”, a form of investigation conducted with local authorities to propose, or even impose isolation measures on those who have been affected. Contact tracing and the imposition of isolation is a highly labor-intensive and highly intrusive government process that must be conducted on objective bases but can only be successful if it is conducted quickly and effectively.  Government authorities in the Central Asian states were quick to undertake these steps and, accordingly, were successful in containing the spread of COVID-19 in the initial stages of the pandemic. 

Despite initial success, the nature of COVID-19 disease also suggests significant challenges ahead for the Central Asian states as well as for others.  If the transmission of the disease is basically enabled by proximity, then distancing and containment will work in individual cases. But the ideas of containment and mitigation which underlie the professional guidance of medical authorities are based on the experience of highly localized cases of successful treatment procedures.  Physicians know that to stem the spread of an infectious disease they need to isolate an infected patient.  If individual isolation fails, then it is assumed the perimeter should be extended and the room should be isolated.  If that fails, then the entire ward should be isolated.  If that fails, then the wing of the building, or the building itself or the entire region of the city should be isolated.  The idea of a “widening perimeter” is the principle that has now been applied to entire countries. Can such a principle work effectively on a global basis? 

The principle of infection isolation is not something that was devised to apply at once to the entire globe.  In any collective effort the weak link always endangers the protection of the whole.Ifspecific, geographically defined territorial areas can be isolated the infection can be contained within that area.  But as the perimeter grows larger and larger, the task of containment grows increasingly more challenging.  As the perimeter widens to a certain quantitative point, the challenge becomes qualitatively different.

SARS—A Different Kind of Foe

The scope of the “widening perimeter” challenge encourages us to look more closely at the dynamics of the disease and the way the disease interacts in international affairs.  We do not currently have a complete picture of how the virus operates and therefore we do not have exhaustive knowledge about how to stop it. Medical specialists acknowledge that the urgency of the pandemic forced them in the early part of 2020 to make judgments in circumstances where they had only insufficient data. Based on the advice of medical authorities at that time, policy-makers wanted to know how the virus could be defeated and when it would be expected to retreat.  These were obviously the policy-makers’ primary concerns at the outbreak of the pandemic.  But asking the questions in this way may have sent many policy-makers in a direction that led them to standard combat tactics.  This may have complicated or even interfered with the achievement of their goals.

Combat tactics are designed to overcome a foe who is a purposive enemy.  SARS is a different kind of foe. Some microbiologists argue that the corona virus is not alive, at least in the traditional sense of that term.  The corona virus does not reproduce itself; it simply replicates itself by relying upon other living cells from which it derives an advantage.  From the perspective of some microbiologists, the virus is not a “living thing” but only an “acting thing” which by its nature is not attempting to achieve a purpose but is merely programmed to exploit an advantage.  If this view is accurate, the corona virus is not “plotting” against human beings. It is not a “devious” opponent; it is indeed deadly, but not devious. If the corona virus is driven by the pre-programmed goal of continuation through replication, then the strategy to defeat it should be focused specifically on the behavior of the opponent, not on presumptions. Deprive the virus of the conditions for its opportunities for replication, and it has been defeated. The rule is simple: focus not on the virus but on the conditions which enable it.

If the corona virus statistically takes advantage of circumstances which allow it to replicate and multiply, then it is merely existing in a niche of opportunity.  As long as that opportunity exists, the deleterious effects of the virus will remain.  The tactics to “combat” this virus, therefore, are not those usually used in combat situations.  If it is not alive, the idea of “killing” the virus is a metaphor at best, because this virus does not exhibit the conventional attributes of living organisms.  If that is true, the goal should not be to combat the virus through killing it but rather to disrupt or “destabilize” and thereby neutralize the virus to defeat it.  Tactics should be focused specifically on a narrow goal—deprive this preprogrammed protein of the conditions of which it takes advantage. 

Tactics used by the governments of the Central Asian countries in the initial stages of this pandemic were effective because they focused on physical distancing. This was crucial for flattening the epidemic curve.  Central Asian governments responded to the challenge by imposing strict lockdowns and even surveillance measures on citizens. For democracies, the implementation of such strict measures, even if only temporarily, places pressures on democratic institutions which, in turn, risk undermining public trust. Some analysts view the corona pandemic as a global crisis that presents particularly unique challenges for democracies. In contrast, the outcome of the response of the Central Asian government deserves high marks.  A “brushfire” spread of panic and disorder was prevented.   

SARS, the “Widening Perimeter” and International Cooperation

The current form of the SARS virus may attenuate entirely or may in the future end up in returning in waves and only gradually recede in importance.  The unprecedented costs SARS has already exacted in terms of those who have suffered and those who have died are compounded by the costs of those whose lives have been severely disrupted socially or economically.  In the time ahead these human, economic and social costs are likely to be multiplied by the national security costs in terms of the increased international tensions and the diminished capacity to conduct international affairs in traditional ways. 

The corona virus pandemic requires us to think of solutions that may be outside of the more traditional ways of thinking.  To begin with, defeating this unusual foe will require two things which on the surface may seem to be opposed to one another—first, only capable and effective national governments will be able to succeed in addressing the immediate challenges of counter-pandemic containment and, second, only international cooperation will succeed in addressing the global aspects of the spread of disease. 

Globalization itself bears much of the responsibility for this infectious disease.  If it were not for the high-tech linkages of air, rail, and shipping connections linking the entire globe, there could not be such rapid transmission of this new and dangerous virus.  But if globalization is the cause, global cooperation may also be the only viable solution to the problems it has created.  Many of the problems produced by this corona virus pandemic will be achieved through the close connections of science, information, communication, and international cooperation.  Only a new form ofglobalization—what we might call “improved globalization”—can make this possible.     

* Gregory Gleason is professor of security studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.  The Marshall Center is a partnership between the German Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense.  This article does not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense. 

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Why Central Asian Jihadists are Inspired by the US-Taliban Agreement?

Uran Botobekov

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Abu Yusuf Muhajir, the leader of Katibat Imam al-Bukhari group (second left)

Central Asian Jihadists Congratulate Taliban and Threaten Five ‘Stans’

Al-Qaeda-backed Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups were highly encouraged by the US-Taliban agreement which was signed in February 2020, aiming to bring peace to Afghanistan. Some Uzbek groups such asKatibat Imam al-Bukhari (KIB), Katibat Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), and Tajik militants of Jamaat Ansarullah (JA), and Uighur fighters of Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) from China’s Xinjiang region, have already expressed their clear opinion about this particular deal through their respective Telegram accounts. Some of the groups congratulated the agreement, while others dedicated emotional eulogies to the Taliban.

The KIB which is formed primarily from Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz militants from Central Asia’s Ferghana Valley, was one of the first organizations to congratulate the Taliban, denominating as a “the great victory of the Islamic Ummah”. On February 29, 2020, Abu Yusuf Muhajir, the leader of KIB’s Syrian wing, in his congratulatory letter said: “The US and NATO forces, who imagine themselves to be the rulers of the entire world and the divine judges of human destinies, and claim divinity on earth have stunned the world with their humiliation, disgrace, and failure of the crusade.”

The KIB leader proceeds by saying that “the Americans were forced to sign an agreement with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which they considered a helpless crowd and below their dignity, but they [the Taliban] survived all difficulties with the support of Allah and gained strength.”

Then Abu Yusuf praises the Taliban’s former Amir, Mullah Mohammed Omar, “who did not flinch at all when America, intending to extinguish the beam of Allah, had attacked Afghanistan.” The Uzbek jihadist leader quotes Mullah Omar’s words: “Allah has promised us victory, and Bush [US President George W. Bush] has promised to defeat us, so we, slaves of Allah, shall see which of the two promises will be fulfilled.”

“Despite the fact that the whole world helped Kafirs-invaders, today they experience the bitterness of defeat, because Allah was against them” he continues. Further Abu Yusuf Muhajir continues to extol the Taliban: “Neither the attacks of the infidels nor the arrests of the Mujahideen [holy warriors] could force the Taliban to abandon the path of Sharia.[UB1]  If the Taliban complied with the slightest condition of infidels [he means US condition for the Taliban to extradite Osama bin Laden], they could remain in power. But the Taliban’s leaders and glorious Mujahideen did not bow their heads to the Kafirs.”

At the end, he congratulated the Islamic Ummah for the Taliban’s ‘victory’ and attached to his letter a congratulatory poem, “My Dear Taliban.” The author glorifies the Taliban with such phrases:

“You became a hospitable Ansar [local fighters] for Muhajireen[foreign fighters];

You broke the Russians yesterday, and  defeated NATO and the US today;

Your song “La illahaillallah” as spiritual wealth;

May Allah give You a blessed Nusrat [victory].”

 It should be noted that KIB’s chief terrorist Abu Yusuf Muhajir is distinguished by his relentless oratory, reciting eloquently Surah and Ayahs of the Quran during Juma Khutbah [preaching].

Also, the ideologists and militants of KTJ in Syria, which swore allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2015, enthusiastically praised the Taliban’s “successes”. Today, KTJ’s Uzbek jihadists are fighting alongside the former al-Qaeda affiliate Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the largest Sunni jihadist group in Idlib, against the Bashar al-Assad’s forces. One of KTJ’s propagandists on Telegram posted a short message that “today is a great day for entire Ummah because, after the 18-year war in Afghanistan, America humiliatingly acknowledged its defeat from the Lions of Islam. This victory came at the behest of Allah, who subordinated the chief Shaitan to Mujahideen.”

Jihadists of Katibat Imam al-Bukhari before the attack, Idlib, Syria.

On March 15, 2020, KTJ’s jihadists, appreciating the Taliban’s “successes”, threatened the Central Asian states through their account on Telegram channel named “Mujahideen of Sham”. Uzbek militants furiously reacted to the words of Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov, who during the signing ceremony of the US-Taliban agreement in Doha stated that Uzbekistan would not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. KTJ mocks Uzbek’s top diplomat by calling him Tahgut [Quranic term: who rebels against Allah and transgresses his will] and threatens by stating “soon the Shaitan regimes of Central Asia will burn in the flames of Jihad ignited in Afghanistan and defeated America considering itself omnipotent.” KTJ jihadists lionize the Taliban’s deputy leader, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who signed a peace treaty with the US. “In 2010, Baradar was in Karachi prison as a terrorist, and in 2020 he is already sitting in Doha, signing an agreement on the surrender of America, that is an amazing victory given by Almighty Allah”, says the end of the message.

The Uighur TIP on its radio Voice of Islam, published on its Muhsinlar.net website on March 7, 2020, praised the Taliban’s victory and described the Afghan government as traitor.

Taliban is Perceived as ‘Godfather’ of Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi Groups

Thus, the US-Taliban “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan”, designed to put an end to the 18-year war, sharply raised the morale of Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups. They did not hide their cheery emotions on social media,  and even further posted gushing praises to the Taliban and widely expressed ‘Takbir’ [“Allah is greater”, used in prayer, as well as to express victory, celebration or distress].

The reason for the delight of Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups is apparent as many of them, such as the KIB, TIP, IJU, KTJ and IMU, have long-drawn and tight ties with both the Taliban and al Qaeda. They have a common goal in aiming to establish an Islamic government in Afghanistan, Central Asia and Chinese region Xinjian, which would be governed by Sharia law, under the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence. 

Many Uzbek, Tajik, Kyrgyz and Uighur extremists,persecuted by government forces in their homeland, were forced to flee and found refuge in Afghanistan during the Taliban’s rule from 1996 until 2001. The ideological views of the Central Asian Muhajireen were formed and crystallized under the influence of al Qaeda and the Taliban, which portrayed itself as an exemplary Ansar [local fighters]. It was this that predetermined the further fate of the Taliban when a U.S.-led invasion toppled its regime for providing refuge to al Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden. Then the Central Asian jihadists so deeply integrated into the ranks of al Qaeda, which today has become the Taliban’s Achilles’ heel in its relations with Washington.

The main point of the Doha agreement is the Taliban’s obligation to sever ties with al Qaeda and other Central Asian terrorist groups and disallow them to threaten the security of the US and its allies using Afghan soil. However, the agreement lacks specific mechanisms, timelines and evidence of breaking the Taliban’s ties with al Qaeda.

Judging by their reactions, the Central Asian jihadists are not at all concerned about the Taliban’s commitment to break ties with al Qaeda. For them, the withdrawal of the US military from Afghanistan, the Taliban’s return to power and the establishment of Islamic Emirate based on Sharia law were a long-awaited treasured dream that could come true anytime from now. They are sure that after 18 years of joint jihad against “the Western crusaders” and when the sacred goal is just around the corner, the Taliban will not leave them.

Since July 2018, the UN Security Council has published several reports by monitoring teams responsible for assessing the status of al Qaeda, ISIS and other terrorist organizations. These reports document the ongoing and close relationship of Central Asian terrorist groups with both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. For instance, according to a new report released by the UN Security Council in 2020, “in Afghanistan continuing activity by the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement [former name of TIP], Jamaat Ansarullah, KTJ, IJU, KIB and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Approximately 400 foreign terrorist fighters from China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan now plan to continue hostilities in conflict zones, transfer trained fighters to various countries to carry out terrorist acts and disseminate propaganda via the Internet.”

Regarding the ideological views on jihad and Sharia policy, the KIB is the closest group to the Taliban among the Salafi-Jihadi movements of the post-Soviet area. The Uzbek KIB, which publicly swore allegiance [Bayat] to the Taliban in 2014, has openly identified itself as an integral part of the Taliban. The group officially refers itself “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan — Katibat Imam al Bukhari” and has the same emblem as the Taliban. KIB operates in both Afghanistan and Syria. The leader of the KIB’s Syrian wing is the aforementioned Abu Yusuf Muhajir, who congratulated the Taliban in poetic form. 

 KIB was sent to Syria from Afghanistan by the Taliban and Sirajuddin Haqqani, one of the Taliban’s top deputies and leader of the powerful al Qaeda-linked Haqqani Network. According to the UN Security Council, “the leader of the Afghan wing of KIB, which mainly operates in the northern Afghan province of Faryab, is Jumaboi Aka, a former member of IMU.” The US State Department designated KIB to the list of global terrorist organizations affiliated with al Qaeda on March 22, 2018. The UN Security Council particularly concerned that “KIB leaders view Afghanistan as a new staging ground to project attacks against neighboring Central Asia countries.”

It is a well-known that the al Qaeda-affiliated TIP and the Taliban have a long and trusted relationship based on the general principles of Jihad. The UN Security Council confirms that “the ETIM/TIP’s leadership and Uighur militants remain present in Afghanistan.” The TIP’s emir, Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, who is a steadfast brother in arms of Ayman al-Zawahiri and Haibatullah Akhunzada, periodically claims his unfailing allegiance to both al Qaeda and the Taliban. The TIP’s top leader, who was even appointed a member of al Qaeda’s elite Shura Council in 2005, has ardently criticized ISIS as an ‘illegitimate’ Caliphate and tried to maintain the unity of Sunni Salafi-Jihadi groups under the leadership of the Taliban. Abdul Haqlater followed the example of his ideological patron, Osama bin Laden, who had personally sworn bayat to Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s leader.

Al Qaeda-affiliated jihadist groups IJU, KTJ and IMU, which are mainly comprised of Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyz, also fight under the auspices of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The UN Security Councilstated that “IMU is now integrated into Taliban forces operating in the Provinces of Faryab and Zabul”, while “IJU, led by Ilimbek Mamatov, is operating primarily in the Afghan Provinces of Badakhshan, Sari Pul and Takhar.” Almost all of the Central Asian terrorist groups in Afghanistan via Telegram channel reported that they had participated in Taliban’s “Al-Fath Jihadi Operations” last year.

The statement of Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhunzada after the Doha agreement, posted on the Taliban’s website, saying “the termination of occupation of Afghanistan…is the collective victory of the entire Muslim and Mujahid nation”, became a compass for Uzbek and Uighur militants. Thus, the UN reports show clearly the ongoing and close relationship between the Taliban and Central Asian terrorist groups. Therefore, it is clearly seen why there is a common thrill of the US-Taliban peace agreement which they labelled as “Victory”.

What the US-Taliban deal means for Central Asia?

Now that the US has legitimized the Taliban by concluding a “peace” deal with them, five Central Asian governments will be forced to build bridges with the Taliban. Prior to this, only Uzbekistan had informal contacts with the Taliban, organizing an Afghanistan peace conference in March 2018 in Tashkent.

Post-Soviet nations know that the Taliban will control Afghanistan in the future. For them, the main security challenge remains al Qaeda-linked Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups and the remnants of the Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) operating in Afghanistan, who dream of building an Islamic Emirate in the Ferghana Valley of Central Asia.

The US-Taliban deal has already inspired Uzbek and Uighur militant groups fighting in Afghanistan and Syria. Their propaganda, as we witnessed above, claims that the Taliban vanquished the Americans and already forces them out of Afghanistan. KIB and IJU used the US-Taliban deal to recruit new militants from Central Asia. On April 2, 2020, Uzbek Jihadists media center Khorasan Ovozi (Voice of Khorasan) on the Telegram channel posted that “the Mujahideen managed to break the invincible US army, tomorrow we will come to you, but today you can make hijra [migration] to Khorasan and join our ranks.”

The Taliban factor also could provide inspiration and a morale boost to underground radical Islamists inside Central Asia and encourage them to raise arms against secular regimes. If in the future the Taliban comes to power and establishes Sharia rule in Afghanistan, this could increase the activity of the Islamic opposition in the Five “Stans”.

There are no illusions that the Taliban will so easily and quickly abandoned al Qaeda and Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups, who are closely aligned with the Bayat, which means the sacred Quranic Oath for all of them. Moreover, the Taliban’s structure is rather fragmented and networked, among which there are many local armed leaders who respect the relationship with Muhajireen. Therefore, it should be expected that their relationship will develop in an secretive manner until the US leaves the country.

Therefore, Central Asian pro-Moscow authoritarian regimes must seriously prepare for a new redistribution of power and resources in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US troops, which could be accompanied by hostilities and felt far beyond Afghanistan’s borders and for several years to come. The “peace” agreement strengthened the Taliban’s already strong position, who demonstrates its clear desire by forcing to seize power and not to share with anyone. After the deal, they intensified the attack on government forces.

If the US will not retain control to keep the Taliban on a shorter leash, then soon the main actors in the conflict may return to the battlefield and Afghanistan may again relive its four decades of civil war story. As the bitter experience of Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq has shown, al Qaeda, ISIS and other Central Asian terrorist groups take root only in war-torn soil.   

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Central Asia

Russia-China relations: Engagement abilities in managing their differences in Central Asia

David Ceasar Wani

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Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow and Beijing have converted their relationship from being Cold War rivals to become realistic partners with a common goal of pushing back at a Western-dominated international system. Their relationship is strategic and opportunist but noticeable by progressively well-matched economic, political, and security interests. Sharing a geopolitical worldview of multipolarity, they mutually have firm desires to contain Western power and seek to accelerate what they see as the weakening of the United States. With a collective desire to shift the focus of global power from the Euro-Atlantic space to the East, they aim to redraft at least some of the rules of global governance, signifying that their partnership is becoming progressively strategic. Yet the Chinese-Russian relationship is complex, with lasting uncertainty on both sides which is the common phenomenon in world politics. Despite the grand drives for cooperation uttered by the two countries’ leaders, attaining applicable results often escapes them, predominantly in the Russian Far East and the Arctic, where understanding the overabundance of trade, investment, and infrastructure deals announced since 2014 has been challenging. Regardless of the difficulties faced by both countries the level of engagement in these stages has tested Russia’s and China’s abilities to manage their differences and interpret the rhetoric of corporation into solid gains.

 Russia China Bilateral Ties

China Russia relations, also known as Sino-Russian relations and this refers to international relations between the people’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation. Diplomatic relations between China and Russia dramatically improved after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Russian Federation in 1991. American scholar Joseph Nye argues: With the collapse of the Soviet Union, that de facto US-China alliance ended, and a China-Russia rapprochement began. In 1992, the two countries declared that they were pursuing a “constructive partnership”; in 1996, they progressed toward a “strategic partnership”; and in 2001, they signed a treaty of “friendship and cooperation.

All through at the end of the Cold War, few would have foreseen a full-bodied Russian-Chinese relationship in the twenty-first century, the two countries have had a long, complex, and touchy history dating back to the 1800s when Russia’s eastward expansion across Siberia and the Russian Far East led to China conceding over 1.5 million square kilometers of territory to imperial Russia. Shocked by war and uprising in the twentieth century, both countries became brief allies after the Communist Party takeover in Beijing in 1949, as Moscow dispatched technical aid, financial assistance, and political advisers to China. At the time, Moscow was firmly the leader of the global socialist movement and saw itself as by far the stronger partner in the Sino-Soviet relationship. However, the two countries divided ideologically during the Nikita Khrushchev era, becoming Cold War opponents by the 1960s with a highly armed and disputed border that pushed4,380 kilometers. A series of border clashes in 1969 left scores of mostly Chinese soldiers dead.

Russia and China on a multilateral basis

On a multilateral basis, China and Russia began harmonizing their positions in the United Nations (UN) and other international bodies in the 1990s. In 1997, for example, they presented to the United Nations General Assembly a “Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New World Order,” and the was an early signal of their shared antipathy of Western dominance in the international system and their desire to rebuild it to their benefit. They both promote the United Nations as a key pillar of the international system, because of the authority and influence that their status as permanent Security Council members provides. They similarly have worked together in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the East Asia Summit, G20 group of prominent economies, and the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) to support their interests. In 2003, they both pushed back at the UN against the Iraq war, and they criticized (although neither vetoed) the West’s military intervention in Libya. Today, both frequently highlight the instability that Muammar Qaddafi’s overthrow brought to the region.

Conversely, since then, Moscow and Beijing have worked together to challenge principles of the U.S. led international system to which they share an aversion. They have collaborated to protect fellow authoritarian states from human rights criticisms and outside efforts to change their political trajectories. They branded Western democracy promotion as an example of destructive, unhelpful, and intolerable interference by strong powers in the internal affairs of sovereign states. They also look to each other for models for ensuring regime stability and domestic governance. Beijing, for example, has passed legislation similar to Russia to limit the activities of non-governmental organizations and limit their ability to accept foreign funding. Moscow similarly is trying to join aspects of China’s internet firewall to gain greater control over information flows on the Russian-language internet. Moscow’s new laws banning virtual private networks (VPNs) appear to be following the Chinese model of fastening down on VPNs and other internet proxy services that allow users access to websites that are restricted by the state. They likewise have collaborated in numerous international settings to increase the power of states over the internet, challenging the free flow and access of information, and seek to reduce the power of the West over decisions concerning global governance. However the Russian Chinese political, economic, and international ties Developments have led Beijing and Moscow to promote their “strategic partnership,” claims that have only strengthened since Putin’s “pivot to Asia” in 2013 and Russia’s break with the West after the Ukraine crisis the following year. Both countries see the other as a useful counterbalance to U.S. influence. Besides, with its traditional sources of capital now restricted due to sanctions, Russia sees China as a provider of funds to support its struggling economy. China, meanwhile, benefits from Moscow’s efforts to prevent Western military and economic power internationally, conceding leadership to Russia in opposing Western policies abroad, while benefiting by receiving minimal blame. Yet when Russia and China have come together in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and the Arctic, their interests and realities on the ground have tested their ability to manage differences and sustain this strategic alignment.

Central Asia race

Central Asia is witnessing a key rebalancing of power with Russia declining and China emerging as one of the region’s most influential players. China’s rise in Central Asia is due to its wide-ranging vision for regional connectivity, an appetite for Central Asian energy resources, and generous reserves, which it distributes to Central Asia through commercial investments, loans, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and several other entities. Unlike the West, China makes no demands for political reform from Central Asian governments. Unlike Russia, Beijing does not use political pressure to keep the region in its general orientation. The lack of an obvious political agenda other than regional stability, which Beijing believes can be guaranteed through economic development, makes China particularly attractive to local governments.

Although China’s presence is mounting across all of post-Soviet Eurasia, its increasing geopolitical and geo-economics influence is most outstanding in Central Asia, which is where China has learned how to manage Russian concerns over its growing regional influence. Through the BRI predictable to increase Chinese influence throughout Eurasia, including Russia, sustaining positive dynamics with Moscow in Central Asia will remain one of the most important tests of Chinese political and economic diplomacy; so far, Beijing appears up to that test. China is smart in managing Russia because Beijing engages with Central Asia primarily on economic issues; it has made no explicit push into political or military concerns. While Beijing’s soft power is growing in Central Asia, it still cannot compete with Russia’s media presence in the region or the fact that Russian universities, particularly those in Siberia, remain more widespread than Chinese ones, although the number of Central Asian students studying in Chinese universities often with heavy earnings from the Chinese government is on the rise. From 2005 to 2015, the number of Kazakhs studying in China increased from 781 to 13,198, while the Chinese government now offers twenty-three academic scholarships to Kyrgyz citizens wishing to study at Chinese higher education institutions.

Conclusion

in conclusion ,Russia and China have become increasingly close partners on the global scene, motivated to work together both to pushback at what they consider the United States’ pursuit of repression and to change a Western-dominated international system that they observe as disadvantageous to them. They have resented Western efforts to promote human rights and good governance, seeing the West’s push to create more open political or economic systems as part of a comprehensive and corresponding attempt by the United States and Europe to promote regime change for geopolitical advantage. These collective views have pushed the strengthening of their bilateral relations, efforts that have only enhanced since the start of the Ukraine conflict in 2014. The utmost hazard to Western interests from the increasing strategic partnership between Russia and China does not come from any of any country in the region. But it instead emanates from the two countries’ common efforts to adjust the international system to their advantage. Furthermore, in this regard, Washington should support economic cooperation. On the other hand, the degree to which the Sino-Russian alliance may become anti-American and anti-Western in the future depends on how deeply the two Eurasian powers feel that the United States threatens their interests. While it values friendly relations with both countries.

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