The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) held a meeting of heads of Armed Forces Headquarters of the countries which discussed the terms and elaborated the specific plan of sending troops to Mali to protect the country’s territorial integrity.
On June 29, ECOWAS summit press release was published revealing the Community’s decision to “immediately” send a “technical assessment group” to Mali to make preliminary preparations for the arrival of “ECOWAS Mission to Mali” planned for the nearest future.
Creation of the unrecognized self-proclaimed state of Azawad in the region of Sahel contributed to increasing risks of spreading instability in the neighbouring countries.
Armed groups of young people are arriving in Gao from Burkina-Faso, thus increasing the number of foreign recruiters. The troop they formed now has about 300 members. Today, the group of foreign combatants from neighbouring countries also includes immigrants from Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire. In fact, it means that the conflict goes beyond the state of Azawad and the conflict between Tuareg tribes and Mali’s authorities, and therefore, may be rescaled into a regional one in case of aggravation thereof. Training camps of Islamic groups Ansar ad-Din and MUJAO demonstrate good military education and religious background which increases the risks of turning of military operations into terrorist attacks similar to those in Iraq and the countries surrounding Mali, and causes religion to influence political processes.
Such mobilization, in our opinion, has little to do with the aspiration to form a unified state by all the 7 large Tuareg confederations. Tuareg’s policy in the North of Mali is shaped mainly by two large confederated tribes of Ifoghas and Idnan with their long historical presence in the North-East of Mali. Representatives of the hierarchical governance of these tribes show the most powerful influence in MNLA. This movement’s success in Mali resulted in support thereto by representatives of other tribes and families which found it to be the first organization that was really worth support.
However, we believe that the activities of radical organizations cause motivation of participation of many supporters of Azawad’s independence in the political process to turn more religion-oriented. Thus, organization Ansar ad-Din follows the policy of keeping fixed borders in Mali and elimination of Sharia norms throughout the whole territory thereof. This ideology is obviously supported from abroad since the group’s leader Iyagh Ag Ghaly created the group after his return from the KSA where he had worked in the capacity of the Consul of Mali. Such rotation allows the extremist forces to gradually strengthen their position all over the region inhabited by Tuareg (especially Ifoghas tribes) and prepare a firm base for their activities in southern areas of Algeria.
We confirm our prognosis revealed on September 9, 2011 in the Da Vinci AG Breaking Report under the title Outlook of the Situation in Libya and the Regions after Kaddafi’s Regime Collapse regarding high risks of destabilization of the situation in Niger.
Notwithstanding the fact that the new state of Azawad is not likely to be recognized by the world community such outlook will hardly influence the stability therein. The necessary goods may be smuggled. At the same time, de facto lack of economic institutions and national statehood structure prevents possible conflicts for influence between Tuareg tribes.
The key problem in the negotiation process is lack of powerful political forces on the continent able to influence Tuareg tribes. Forced settlement of the issue will not bring the desired outcome and will facilitate increase of military and political, social and economic risks in the neighbouring countries. At the same time, delaying the settlement of the conflict imposes a significant threat for the region’s stability and suggests high probability of radical groups expanding their activities in the neighbouring countries.
- According to our estimations, the optimal way of settling the issue is elimination of the radical compound in Azawad. According to MNLA press-secretary Ham Ag Sid Ahmed, “Tuaregs want not to be taken as “terrorists from other regions, representatives of completely different culture while the Tuareg culture is based on tolerance, dignity and respect”. This is proven by the fact that Tuaregs have driven Islamists out of Tin- Bouktou. Then MNLA leaders attempted to settle the issue with the help of political means. However, negotiations between them and Ansar ad-Din leader Iyagh Ag Ghaly produced no result because Salafists insisted on turning Azawad into an Islamic republic and introduction of Sharia norms within the region. Therefore, we predict that the recipe of success in settling the situation is stimulation of split between Tuareg tribes and radical groups close to AQIM and Ansar ad-Din. In this case, the scenario suggesting support to Ansar ad-Din as an ally in the struggle against MNLA, in our opinion, is extremely dangerous and unpredictable. MNLA General Secretary Bilal Ag Cherif – like Iyagh Ag Ghaly – represent the same tribe of Ifoghas which points out at the probable future change in MNLA policy that will face the issue of recognizing the state of Azawad. As a result, MNLA may suffer a split, and a large fraction may separate supporting the scenario according to which the authorities will be forced to form a federation on the territory of Mali with the Islamic autonomy of Azawad. Achieving this task will result in the spread of violence to the South of the country influenced by the increase of significance of the religious factor for the confederation of Ifoghas tribes. This means that in future MNLA leaders may share their power over the tribes with the representatives and allies of Ansar ad-Din.
- Bamako’s inability to form legitimate government strengthens MNLA’s position creating political vacuum within the country and encouraging Tuareg tribes to support powerful groups of the radical forces. Financial and military and technical support of the Malian regular army in exchange for the democratic procedure of electing new leadership in the country is a more efficient scenario than sending ESF troops.
We believe that the most efficient scenario of the conflict settlement is:
А) legitimization of the transitional government and ensuring representation therein of members of Captain A. Sanogo’ group.
B) Declaring official Bamako’s readiness to commence negotiations on granting broad autonomy to Azawad or federalization in case of liquidation of terrorist cells therein. Such step will also allow to reduce tension in the neighbouring Niger.
C) Enhancing protection of Mali’s northern borders with Algeria and Burkina-Faso aimed at blocking smuggling channels including drug trafficking from the South America. Reinforcement of border control will allow to slacken the position of groups close to AQIM by cutting off financing and to facilitate establishing a dialogue with Tuareg representatives from Bamako. Liquidation of financial channels of Ansar ad-Din will allow to return some of the militants members thereof to the MNLA troops they left.
We believe that in the event of military operations undertaken by ESF they will face direct confrontation only with MNLA forces. This will strengthen the position of juhadists due to changing the power balance. In such case, the latter will get more room for manoeuvres and the possibility to undertake attacks in the country’s central and southern regions.
External intervention will facilitate consolidation of tribes supporting the creation of Azawad and enhancing inter-tribe confrontation within the country and the frontier areas, as well as intensify sentiments of the religious part of the population in respect to jihad. Such intervention may be resorted to in some other countries within the region as a trigger for activation of fundamentalism (e.g., in the North of Nigeria).
To Silence the Guns, Africa Should Tap its Diaspora
For the year 2020, the African Union, chaired by South Africa, will pursue as its principal aim the silencing of the guns. It has its work cut out, as the continent also braces itself for combating the COVID-19 outbreak. The number of terrorist attacks in Africa has grown from some 400 annual attacks in 2007 to over 2,000by 2016, with well over 13,182 killings. In the most recent report by the Global Terrorism Index, two of the countries which saw highest increases in terrorist attacks were in Africa; Egypt and Somalia, with deaths increasing by 123per cent and 93 per cent respectively from 2017. The continent’s gun-wielding forces, therefore, come in various forms, as terrorist groups have mushroomed all over the continent, and are increasingly unpredictable and internationalised; with African groups being allied to jihadist groups from the Middle East, whilst also recruiting locally, using ethnicity as a benchmark. Whilst effective, this approach works mainly because of its moorings with the local context. Consider Burkina Faso for example, where “the combination of poverty, a lack of public services, security forces’ inefficiency and neighbouring countries’ instability has contributed to the growing radicalisation of civil populations,” according to a recent study by Mahamoudou Savadogo, who adds that the brutality and geographic reach of tactics used by the terrorists in turn increases the likelihood of support by local communities in locales where the government has an absence or, when present, approaches them with suspicion, curbs liberties and civil rights as well as developmental assistance.
Economics and terrorism have well-documented interaction. The latest Global Terrorism Index (GTI) report notes that the global economic impact of terrorism was US$33 billion in 2018. Some context is needed here. For example, compared to other forms of violence, terrorism is a small percentage of the total global cost of violence, which was equal to 14.1 trillion dollars in purchasing power parity terms. However, it should be noted that these numbers are on the conservative side, and do not account for the indirect impacts on business, investment and the costs associated with security agencies in countering terrorism. As the same report acknowledges, “terrorism also has wide-ranging economic consequences that have the potential to spread quickly through the global economy with significant social ramifications.” In the global context, Africa is also among the more disproportionately affected regions.
Countries facing terrorist activity are found to have lower economic growth through lower investment on physical and human capital, higher cost of capital, and lower non-military consumption. Perhaps the most direct manner through which terrorism affects economic outcomes is in its discouragement of foreign tourism. Overall, terrorism has been found to decrease foreign direct investment flows by exerting a significant impact on the allocation of productive capital and reducing the expected returns to investment, and at the same time terrorism encroaches on bilateral trade flows by raising trading costs and hardening borders. This is particularly worrisome for Africa, in light of its goal of accelerated intra-continental trade through the Continental Free Trade Agreement, whose other face is free movement of people.
The economic time-lag effects of terrorism can vary depending on the conflict status of a country. Observers have noted that terrorism has an economically and statistically significant negative impact on tourism. For example, an empirical study of the Caribbean after September 11 attacks – which had an effect on tourism to the Caribbean due to its regional proximity to the US and the use of the US as a stop-over by many Caribbean-bound tourists – the relationships between terrorism and low tourism tended to be at their strongest in for two years following the incident. In the case of Nigeria, in 2019 the cost of terrorism in terms of lost GDP per year is estimated at 0.82% as the government had to appropriate funds to combating terrorism, the reduced tourism potential notwithstanding.
The correlation of inequality and terrorism within and across countries has led to appeals for international aid from within the continent itself. This appears to have universal consensus and goes with common-sense assumptions. However, such consensus may be unwarranted as such a path may not be linear.
In a 2018 study focused on the role of aid in offsetting terrorism in the 1984–2008 period with 78 countries by African Governance and Development Institute’s Professor Simplice Asongu and colleagues found that foreign aid cannot be used as a policy tool to effectively address a negative effect of terrorism on FDI. This is echoed by a 2017-publishedanalysis of 38 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia for the 2006–2014 period by Godwin Okafor and Jenifer Piesse who found foreign aid was insignificantly related to decreasing terrorism. In my own 2017 study, I noted Djibouti and Uganda to be the sole exceptions, whilst there were mixed results from Kenya.
The diaspora and expatriates (themselves a consequence of the instability in the continent)on the other hand remain an untapped channel for combating terrorism in the continent as well as offsetting the flight of capital in the wake of perceived vulnerability.
A study which focused on Sub-Saharan Africa found that terrorism incidences and remittances were positively correlated, with each incidence of terrorism coinciding with remittance receipts of between US$250, 000 and US$1, 000, 000.In a roundabout fashion, terrorism may lead to an increase in financial inflows, with remittances rivalling and, in some cases, surpassing FDI and foreign aid in many countries in the developing world as a source of foreign income which could in turn decrease the socio-economic causes of terrorism. As the continent grapples with the problem of terrorism, the solutions to its economic causes increasingly appear to lie within the continent itself, as well as its diaspora, which had been the AU’s theme for 2019, who could be more actively institutionalised.
Terrorism stands to be a destructive force for the AU’s significant but precarious gains, including accelerated intracontinental trade, people movement, and gains in FDI. In turn, silencing the guns will, therefore, hinge on economic policymaking and confidence-building and renewed social contracts between the governments and their populaces. If nothing, ensuring this (through its various arms, including the African Peer Review Mechanism), is the raison d’être of the AU, especially in the crises-ridden days presently underway.
The Mandera triangle crisis: Somalia and Kenya diplomatic face-off
While the COVID-19 was morphing from an epidemic into a catastrophic global pandemic, captivating the global news, a diplomatic confrontation is unfolding in the horn of Africa between Somalia and Kenya.
On 2 March, fighting between the Somali National Army (SNA) and the regional Jubaland paramilitary forces erupted in the border town of Beled Hawo killing 21 combatants on both sides and civilians. The fighting in Beled Hawo spilled across into Kenya’s territory as the SNA pursued the retreading Jubaland paramilitaries into the Kenyan border town of Mandera. On 4 March, Kenya accused Somalia of ‘‘unwarranted attack’’ on its territory as the two East African nations traded accusations of internal political interference.
To understand the crisis in the Mandera triangle – a converging point of Somalia’s, Kenya’s and Ethiopia’s borders and the towns of Beled Hawo, Mandera and Suuf on each side of the borders, respectively – one has to grasp the intricacies of the horn’s new geopolitical reconfigurations, Villa Somalia’s long-term political agenda and Kenya’s geopolitical anxieties and concerns of Ethiopia’s increasing influence in Somalia.
Somalia’s governance model confusion
After nearly 30 years-long intra-tribal and warlords-based civil war, now, Somalia seems to be descending into a looming intra-federal states and central government military confrontations. The recent fighting in Beled Hawa between the SNA and a regional paramilitaries signal the commencement of a new civil war in the country – unless quickly resolved.
At the root of this violence lie confusions on which governance model suites Somalia best and its interests. Federal member states (FMS) like Jubaland and Puntland, coupled with their political and ideological difference with the Federal government of Somalia (FGS), envision a loosely connected federal system where federal member states have more powers as the central federal state a la a Swiss confederacy model. Contrary to this, the current administration of President Mohamed Abdullahi ‘‘Farmajo’’, with its nationalist and centralist tendencies conceives a ‘strong’ Somali state with a relatively autonomous and subordinate regional states.
The current governance model crisis in Somalia is also compounded by the slow constitutional review process which would have stipulated clearly the division of powers between the FGS and its constituent FMS.
Furthermore, the Somali governance model crisis also took a geopolitical dimension: neighbouring countries and Gulf States have been courting federal member states hence by-passing the central government. The Current administration’s siding with Qatar and a strong diplomatic relation with Turkey has worried Gulf powers. This has created a situation where FMS with the implicit support of Gulf powers and neighbouring countries challenge the central government.
Villa Somalia’s political end-game
Since the election of President Mohamed Abdullahi ‘‘Farmajo’’ in 2017, a more assertive and centralist policies laden with Somali nationalism rhetoric has been observed in Mogadishu. In a speech while on a visit to Kenya delivered in the Somali embassy in Nairobi, the president lamented that Somalis are tired of political chaos, disintegration and accused some leaders of the federal member states of being unpatriotic and treasonous.
In its effort for recentralisation the central federal government had influenced the regional elections in Konfur Galbeed state and Galmugud state and got elected in both states leaders who were allied to the central federal government.
Furthermore, the ascent to power by Abiy Ahmed in 2018 in Ethiopia seems to have favoured the current administration in Mogadishu. In Abiy Ahmed, President Farmajo had found an ally who made sure that Ethiopia only engages with the FGS in Mogadishu. This has created the perception in the Somali public that Ethiopia has ceased interfering in Somali politics. The new-found close relations between Somalia and Ethiopia had worried Kenya which sees the bordering Jubaland state of Somalia as a buffer zone against the terror group Al-Shabab and as its sphere of influence. Prof. Peter Kagwanja observed that with Abiy Ahmed in power in Ethiopia and President Farmajo’s centralist and Somali nationalist tendencies, a new Somali-Oromo ‘‘cushitic allience’’ is emerging in the horn that will put in risk Kenya’s geopolitical interest.
More crucially, with elections in the corner in Somalia in 2020/21, Mogadishu is flexing its powers over what it considers rogue federal member states. After two days of fighting in Dhusamareeb, the capital of Galmudug state, the leaders of the armed sufi group Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jamaa (ASWJ) surrendered and were detained by the Somali army on 29 February.
Then, the central federal government turned its gaze on Jubaland state and its leader Ahmed Mohamed Islam ‘‘Madobe’’, a close ally of Kenya. Madobe got himself re-elected as the president of Jubaland state last year in an election the FGS refused to recognize. In a show of support his inauguration was attended by some Kenyan members of parliament spear-headed by Majority leader Adan Duale Barre. Amid an exchange of internal political interference accusations between Kenya and Somalia, the first shots were fired in Beled Hawo, Somalia and spread into Mandera, Kenya. Furthermore, Abdirashid Janan, a fugitive Jubaland warlord with an arrest warrant from the Federal government resided and mobilised his Jubaland paramilitaries from Mandera, Kenya with the displeasure of Mogadishu.
Time for de-escalation, dialogue and cooperation
Diplomatic relations between Kenya and Somalia have reached their lowest point this year. Amid an increase in terror attacks by Al-Shabab in both Somalia and Kenya’s North-Eastern region, both nations have to de-escalate diplomatic tensions and cooperate closely in security matters.
On 9 March, President Uhuru Kenyatta sent his interior minister Fred Matiangi to Mogadishu in an effort to de-escalate tensions with Somalia. This is a step in the right direction. The interior minister also travelled to Addis Ababa in a bid to iron out conflicting geopolitical interests with Ethiopia.
Finally, Somalia needs to have a constitutional review process before the elections on how to peacefully and efficiently institute and implement its federal system. While the Somali state in the Weberian sense, has a right to violence and coercion within its territory, nevertheless, regional states like Puntland and Jubaland are armed to the teeth and a violent confrontation would be a recipe for a new civil war. With Al-Shabab still terrorizing Somalis, Villa Somalia has to mobilize its meagre military resources against the terror group and employ internal diplomacy channels to engage and reconcile with regional states. Dialogue is paramount for Somali politics at this moment.
Meet this Year’s African Change-makers
This year’s 115 most promising artists, activists, academics, executives and political leaders under the age of 40 today join the World Economic Forum’s community of Young Global Leaders. They are pushing boundaries, achieving firsts, innovating and breaking traditional rules to improve the world.
The Forum of Young Global Leaders was founded in 2004 by Klaus Schwab, Founder and Chairman of the World Economic Forum, to create a world where leaders take responsibility for a sustainable future, while meeting increasingly complex and interrelated challenges. Today, the Forum counts 1,300 members and alumni, representing more than 115 countries. Notable members include Yao Chen, actress, Amal Clooney, lawyer, Hilary Cottam, author, Wanuri Kahiu, Filmmaker, Carlos Alvarado Quesada, President of Costa Rica, Jack Ma, Founder of Alibaba,and Jimmy Wales, Founder of Wikipedia.
YGLs are active in today’s most exciting and dynamic fields and work with a focus on impact. In the past year, they have collaborated together to accelerate refugee entrepreneurship to unlock local talent and inject an estimated GDP of $56 million from Kenya’s Kakuma camp into the global economy. They have worked to solve waste management challenges by focusing on improving treatment capacity in Indian plants, and more broadly, they have equipped young generations with the tools to effectively influence politics and policy.
This year, over half the new members are women, and nearly half of Young Global Leaders are from emerging economies. They represent a diverse group with an ability to enhance understanding and promote action.
Members of the new class will take part in a five-year programme that includes executive education courses, group expeditions and opportunities to collaborate and test ideas with a trusted network of peers. This will also be an opportunity for them to identify ways in which their ground-breaking work can advance new models of innovation and make a difference in their communities.
African YGLs will benefit from the Dangote Fellowship, made possible by the Aliko Dangote Foundation (ADF). The aim of the fellowship is to increase the quality and quantity of young African leaders across the continent by supporting the engagement of African YGLs in the community, such as those from small enterprises or the non-business sector. The Fellowship helps YGLs from Africa attend YGL and Forum events.
“By championing these promising and accomplished leaders we hope to create positive ripple effects that benefit entire communities. In response to a startling decline in trust in leadership over the past decade, these Young Global Leaders inspire the world through their dynamism, passion and integrity,” said Mariah Levin, Head of the Forum of Young Global Leaders at the World Economic Forum.
Yetnebersh Nigussie, Ethiopian Lawyers with Disabilities Association, President and Co-Founder
Faraja Nyalandu, Shule Direct, Founder and Executive Director
Food and Beverage
Shani Senbetta, Kidame Mart, Founder and Chief Executive Officer
Paula Ingabire, Minister of Information Communication Technology and Innovation of Rwanda
Kojo Oppong Nkrumah, Government of Ghana, Minister of Information
Health and Healthcare
Chinny Ogunro, Africa Health Holdings, Managing Director
Fredros Okumu, Ifakara Health Institute, IHI, Director of Science
Aurélie Adam Soule, Government of the Republic of Benin Minister of Digital Economy and Communications
Tunde Kehinde, Lidya Founder
Media Entertainment and Information
Larry Madowo, BBC World News Africa Business Editor
Mayur Patel, Kwesé iflix, Chief Executive Officer
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