Connect with us

Africa

Increasing tension in the DRC and the army’s declining role in the stabilization process in Africa

Published

on

Operational situation. Congolese rebel group called the March 23 Movement (M23) declared their readiness to “free” the whole territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo after seizure of its capital city of Kinshasa.

This was announced by the group’s representative Lieutenant Colonel Vianney Kazarama. After seizing the country’s largest Eastern city of Goma located on the border with Rwanda on November 20, the rebels declared their intention to take control of the city of Bukaka, and then advance towards the capital city.

President Joseph Kabila refuses to hold negotiations with the rebels. However, he went to Uganda to meet its President Yoweri Museveni and Rwandan President Paul Kagame whom he accuses of supporting M23.

Military operations in the region of Congolese city of Goma started immediately after UN and US imposed penalty on 38-year-old M23 leader and ex-Colonel of the Congolese Army Sultani Makengi. He is accused of murders, kidnapping and military use of children as soldiers.

Escalating violence in the DRC was the result of choosing wrong, in our opinion, tactics for settling the conflict between the tribes of Hutu and Tutsi.

According to 2008 ad-hoc report of Da Vinci AG analytical group demilitarization of units of General Nkunda and FDLR soldiers will not settle the current issues as the presence of rival tribes itself on the territory of Congo where neither is represented in the government de facto creates equal conditions for them – thus allowing settling the conflict by means of guerrilla war and ethnic cleansing. This forecast turned out to be correct since arrest of General Nkunda in 2009 on the territory of Rwanda resulted only in disintegration of CNDP and strengthening of the fraction led by Bosco Ntaganda’s (the “Terminator”) who now controls rebel armed forces. The attempt of integration of Nkunda’s soldiers into the DRC’s armed forces failed and was followed by the creation of the M23 group which de facto replaced other previous units representing Tutsi’s interests.

V.Kazarama’s statements iterate L.Nkunda’s rhetoric in 2008. At that time, he too turned from the outgivings regarding control of the province of Kivu to threats to take control of the whole territory of the DRC. Just as four years ago we still believe that such outgivings are mostly demonstration of power rather than rebels’ plans. M23 – as well as forces led by General Nkunda – is supported only by representatives of the Tutsi and cannot count on support of most of Congolese population. Especially considering the fact that the Tutsi represent minority even in Rwanda of which they hold control and Burunda.

Moreover, M23’s main unit is now located 1600 km away from Kinshasa (2706 km road distance) which makes marching towards the capital city rather difficult, especially taking into account that it means leaving the Tutsi’s compact habitation. M23 group – according to different estimates – consists of around 5500 soldiers which rules out the possibility of simultaneous movement towards Kinshasa and maintaining full control of Kivu. This, in our opinion, reduces the possibility of capital seizure and at the same time increases chances for further localization of rebels’ operations in the province of Kivu.

Therefore, according to our estimations, M23 is seeking to use the current situation to take complete control of the province of Kivu and locate its troops on the territory providing possibility of granting autonomy thereto in future. It is obvious that the conflict will be supported by relative passivity on the part of President Kabila – an ethnic Lubo who time and again actually stood for ethnic Hutu dominating in the ethnic composition.

We believe that the optimal way of settling the issue would be transferring the conflict into political mainstream, as well as forming M23 and FDLR as political forces. In this case creation of political alternative to the Congolese Rally for Democracy actively supported by Rwanda and Burundi will have strategic significance which will result in political contradictions within the ethnic Tutsi group and decreasing the external influence on the part of official Bujumbura and Kigali. Further politicization of this process will allow balancing the interests of the tribes via holding local election, change of governors and bringing representatives thereof to the cabinet. Implementation of this scenario will be facilitated by election of members of the Senate and provincial governors scheduled for June 2013.

Otherwise the relations between the tribes will remain at the phase of confrontation between the Hutu military groups and the Tutsi rebels. Such infiltration will cause not only military confrontation within Congo but also instability within the regions bordering with Rwanda and Burundi for which the conflict in the DRC means the opportunity to avoid transferring the confrontation to their own territory.

At the same time, the tactic of arresting leaders of rebel movement turns out to be inefficient as here an ethnic conflict is concerned which is actively supported from abroad and goes beyond the DRC’s geographic borders involving neighbouring countries. After Nkunda’s arrest significant decentralization among rebels took place which are now to a great extent influenced by several leaders: Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero, Bosco Ntaganda and V.Kazarama. In our opinion, before Nkunda’s arrest rebel leadership was more centralized, and provided there was a sole leader Joseph Kabila could hold effective negotiations and implement a conflict regulation plan.

The issue of national defence policy as a cause of destabilization of the situation in Africa. Weakening of national armies in African countries significantly increases the risk of destabilization of the situation within the region. Regular army units traditionally constitute the basis for statehood and guarantee stability of inter-tribe relations on the continent. Development of the situation in Congo in November 2012 and in Mali in July 2012 shows that weak state support of national armed forced facilitates increasing confrontation and decentralization processes in the countries suffering from ethnic contradictions. Thus, in both mentioned countries destabilization of the situation was the response to the militants’ discontentment with the living and material conditions. Therefore, the army’s declining role in the society, as well as its social and economic importance and prestige increases the possibility of aggravating the current ethnic conflicts.

Hence, scenarios of integration of rebels in regular armies will be vain in case of maintaining the current amount of financing, supply and national military policy.

At the same time, no forces today can confront soldiers on the territory of these countries. Thus, regular troops more and more prefer to avoid confrontations. For example, 2100 government soldiers and 700 policemen came and laid down their arms in Goma upon request of the rebels.

According to our estimations, the nearest future might see similar scenarios of revitalization of ethnic confrontation – when national armed forces will find themselves unable to restrain the spread of violence – in a number of other countries on the continent.

Corruption in the regular army also facilitates material and technical support to rebels which is proven, in particular, by discharge of Major General of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Gabriel Amisi who is suspected in the creation of a network of weapon and ammunition trade to  poachers and rebels, including members of the March 23 Movement.

Under such conditions United Nations Peacekeeping Mission (MONUC) not only lose the opportunity of efficient conflict prevention but also grow extremely vulnerable in front of rebel groups. This is confirmed by Kazarama’s statement, “We warn DRC MONUC that bombed our units instead of remaining neutral – attacked must stop immediately. M23 group so far never attacked units of UN peacekeeping forces. However, this may change soon”. We believe that attacks on peacekeeping forces under M23’s direct instruction are most improbable, however, such attacks may be launched by separate rebel fractions. In our opinion, today’s situation somewhat differs from the events of 2008 as M23 members include ex-representatives of regular armed forces which qualifies them different from those acting under command of General Nkunda.

Continue Reading
Comments

Africa

Persistent Conflict and Instability Hamper the Recovery of the Central African Republic

MD Staff

Published

on

According to the first issue of the Central African Republic (CAR) Economic Update published today by the World Bank, the deterioration in security conditions and the humanitarian situation is dampening hopes for a robust economic recovery in the Central African Republic. After peaking at 4.8% in 2015, the growth rate slowed to 4.5% in 2016 and 4.3% in 2017. Despite the optimism prevailing since the 2016 presidential election and the government’s promising fiscal consolidation policy, the CAR remains a fragile state that could draw lessons from the successful experience of other fragile states in order to sustain its peacebuilding and recovery efforts.

Titled “Breaking the Cycle of Conflict and Instability,” the World Bank’s publication provides an in-depth analysis of the factors creating fragility and proposes a number of avenues to achieve economic recovery. It identifies three essential prerequisites to break the cycle of instability and conflict: restoring security, combating impunity by guaranteeing compensation for the harm suffered by the victims, and promoting equitable and inclusive economic and social development.

Without a doubt, the persistent insecurity is the biggest obstacle to poverty reduction, as each new violent confrontation between armed groups leads to additional displacement, destroys private property, and complicates the work of humanitarian organizations,” said Jean-Christophe Carret, World Bank Country Director for the Central African Republic. “The protracted security crisis in the CAR is taking a toll on the capacity of the state to provide essential public services and goods in the areas of health, education, and water.

The report recommends that lessons be learned from other post-conflict countries such as Ghana, Liberia, and Rwanda, which have managed to put prolonged periods of instability behind them.

“The experience of these countries underscores the importance of promoting the development of civil society in order to consolidate democratic progress, strengthen public accountability, and enhance transparency while implementing a pragmatic set of policy and institutional initiatives to achieve gradual but steady improvement in the quality of the public service,” said Souleymane Coulibaly, World Bank Lead Economist for the Central African Republic and publishing coordinator for Economic Updates.

The new Economic Updates series for the Central African Republic will review economic trends in the country on a biannual basis in order to help the government and its development partners identify new opportunities and tackle persistent challenges.

Continue Reading

Africa

Mauritania Conference : AU Reopen Western Sahara File

Published

on

Since the kingdom of Morocco left the OAU in 1984, the Kingdom’s participation with the African states has been seen by its enterprise involvement in several fields like oil imports and humanitarian aid. At the end of the 90s, under the King Mohammed VI rule, Morocco’s African alignments accept a new measurement whereby, continental banking, commercial and economic exchanges took the significant stage in Morocco’s re-engagement with the African States. The main objective for this collaboration and mutual African team banding was to build up a solid South-South strategy cooperation, tapping into Morocco’s longstanding historical, cultural, geopolitical and economic band with the African continent.

On the beginning of July, the 31st Ordinary Session of the African Union(AU) meeting, which took place in Nouakchott, the capital of Mauritania which is expectedly going to discuss a report on the Moroccan Sahara Issue.

Depending on the African Union calendar released, this meeting will hold the presentation of three main reports, including a report on the Moroccan Sahara Issue, conferred by Moussa Faki Mohamed, Chairman of the AU Commission.

Basically, this is the first time that the Western Sahara dispute has been conferred with the calendar of an African Union conference since the Kingdom’s return to the African organization last year, after it had left the country three decades ago because of the same issue, which necessitates the kingdom of Morocco would face any challenge to its national case as its priority .

On Thursday, Moussa Faki Mohamed, head of the African Union Commission in Morocco, met with King Mohammed VI, Prime Minister Saad Eddin Othmani and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Nasser Bourita, along with some of the King’s advisors to discuss the Sahara Dispute which is a report in AU.

The communiqué issued by the African Union on Vicky’s visit to Morocco did not refer to the Sahara issue with Moroccan officials. The communiqué issued on Friday made reference to the role of the Kingdom in the Union Foundation, as well as issues of major concern.

The Moroccan government refuses the inclusion of the Sahara report in the AU calendar and esteems the report to be an exclusive competence of the United Nations, especially in the presence of a total of parties opposed to the Moroccan proposal, led by the separatist Polisario Front, supported and financed by Algeria and some other countries.

Additionally, to offering a report on the Moroccan Sahara Issue, it is anticipated that the 31st AU Meeting, on 1 and 2 July, will show a report on the tools and implementation of the institutional reform decision of the African Union by Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda. Additional report on the Africa-Africa Free Trade Area will be handled by Mohamed Essovo, President of the Republic of Niger. Moussa Faki will come up with another report on the African Common Position on the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries beyond 2020.

This African Union Agenda also includes the presentation of the subject of the year on “Victory in the struggle against corruption: a sustainable path towards African transformation”, to be seen by Mohamed Boukhari, President of the Republic of Nigeria, to be pursued by a debate by the Conference. The concluded sessions will argue the discussion of the activities of the Peace and Security Council on Africa, in which Morocco won a seat months ago.

The calendar of the African Meeting contains a report on the implementation of the African Union’s main roadmap for practical ways to silence guns in Africa in 2020, the adoption of the AU’s 2019 budget and the ratification of appointments in the Federation’s institutions.

Morocco’s acquisition to the African Union will undisputed change the policy of how the Pan-African organization stands the Western Sahara file. Despite Morocco’s diplomatic orientation to refine solving the Sahara dispute in a pragmatic way, its policy will sustain the same as for the acceptance of the SADR is concerned. The kingdom of Morocco is likely to endure its changeless policy to delegitimize any declare or allege of the Polisario in its search for being an independent state. It will also try to undermine the political impact of the Polisario leadership and its keen supporters, South Africa and Algeria.

At the same time, to disband the SADR from the African Union will be a weak mission, as the latter can only discourage other countries whose governments were agreed towards unconstitutional layers. Several African states refuse to disband the SADR. Regardless of Morocco’s intense African policy calendar and huge commercial economic projects, there stay countries who still cover the Polisario leadership. For instance, the case of Nigeria, which get advantage from Morocco’s economic bonus, continuing exercises its position to support the Polisario in their faith for independence.

Currently, the Kingdom of Morocco has used its diplomatic and economic might to return its empty seat at the African Union, it has to bestow that it is a capable partner whose membership will favor the African Union, therefore, solving and resolving the deadlock of an African colonial dispute. In contrast, the SADR can also urge for a resolution by sustaining powerful AU member states endorsement, especially, South Africa and Algeria, to guarantee the Kingdom of Morocco brings up some sort of a win-win barraging agreement.

Continue Reading

Africa

New Somali Business Fund Creates Jobs

MD Staff

Published

on

Unemployment is chronic across Somalia. The SBCF is expected to generate more than 2,000 jobs, most of which will go to young people. Photo: Hassan Hirsi/World Bank

Sahal, a dairy farmer, is CEO of Bovine Industry, an urban dairy farm in central Mogadishu. The company cross-breeds Somali cattle with Jersey cattle to produce higher-quality milk.

“Mogadishu is the only capital in the world where you can’t buy fresh milk,” Sahal said. “How can a country that exports the most livestock in the world not have fresh milk?”

Despite the clear need for fresh milk, it has been difficult for Sahal and other small and medium enterprises (SMEs) like his to access capital to grow their businesses. That was before the November launch of the Somali Business Catalytic Fund (SBCF), which aims to spur economic growth in country by supporting SMEs and entrepreneurs.

With support from the SBCF, Sahal was able to fit his backyard business with grazing grass and fences. The demand for fresh milk is soaring, with an average waiting list of three months for a single liter. Soon, Sahal will be able to increase his herd of 15 cows, producing more milk and allowing him to employ more people. He believes that development should be based on grassroots needs, and simple supply/demand analyses.

“Farmers have the knowledge to pasteurize milk, produce yogurt and expand the Somali dairy sector,” he said. “We just need the machinery and capital to make it happen.”

SBCF, the Bank’s flagship job creation initiative in Somalia, targets businesses that focus on innovative processes, products and markets new to the region. It is also intended to stimulate the business and technical services industry to build sector expertise in agriculture, livestock and energy, among others. So far, the SBCF has selected 101SMEs across the Somali peninsula – South Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland — to receive financial and technical support. The selected firms are expected to generate more than 2,000 jobs.

“Poverty reduction in Somalia must be private sector-led. We have relied on traditional aid since the early 1990s, and handouts have not been a sustainable method to reduce poverty,” said Sahal. “I believe that access to capital is crucial for both job creation and dignified poverty reduction.”

Asli Health Care Company, based in Hargeisa, has also benefited from the SBCF. The company’s manager, Nemo Yusuf, founded the company after she and her partners studied imports to Somaliland. Through a market study, she and her partners studies the viability of producing beauty products and creating jobs in the process.

“We observed an excess of imports of personal healthcare and beauty products from China and the Middle East, most of which could be produced domestically,” she said. “Our study confirmed that we could produce and sell shampoo, soaps and detergents competitively,” she said. “A reality that is too familiar with Somalis is that we import most products, when we should be producing them.”

Through the SBCF, Yusef was able to purchase high-speed manufacturing equipment, allowing her to produce shampoo bottles that limit waste from importing more plastic.

Her company is also supported through the SME Facility (SMEF). SMEF provides technical assistance and business development services to assist Somali entrepreneurs to launch, manage, and grow successful businesses. Asli and her partners were trained in budget planning, finance, and human resources training, which is helping their business become more effective. SBCF and SMEF fall under the Somali Core Economic Institutions and Opportunities (SCORE) Program, which is funded by the World Bank’s Multi-Partner Fund (MPF).

Armed with this knowledge, Yusuf and her partners have expanded their business. They created a sachet-packet shampoo line as a new product.

“There is a demand for one-time use 10 milliliter sachets, especially among young people and those who cannot afford full bottles,” Yusuf said. “We are in the process of manufacturing our own bottles to drive prices even lower.”

Challenges in Hargeisa are similar to those in Mogadishu, where Yusuf said “accessing capital is probably the main constraint to private sector growth.” There are also challenges such as the availability of skilled labor, supply-chain issues related to infrastructure, affordable energy and economic policies that support private sector competitiveness are also prominent.

Yusuf can see the results in Hargeisa, where the large market could be used to create jobs for young people as well as keep currency in the market and limit inflation.

“Our company is managed entirely by fellow citizens,” she said. “We have employed an additional 17 people to support the expansion of our company, of which most are young people. A third of our employees are women.”

World Bank

Continue Reading

Latest

Trending

Copyright © 2018 Modern Diplomacy