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Evolving Situation in Mali in the Context of Operation Serval

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Conducting special military operation known as Operation Serval by Mali, French and ECOWAS military forces is likely to have limited effect and will not facilitate the country’s reintegration.

Analysis of the actions taken within the framework of the counter-terrorist operation shows that this conflict is likely to trigger dilution of radical elements in Mali rather than elimination thereof. At the same time, AQIM is seeking to expand the area of unrest causing the threat of destabilization in the neighbouring countries, especially in Niger and Mauritania.

January 2013 saw increased confrontation of the three forces that held under control the country’s northern regions. Ansar ad-Din decided on softening its line and refusal to establish sharia law on the territory of Mali, thus distancing itself from AQIM salafists. Change of AQIM leaders brought pressure on Ansar ad-Din aimed at stopping cigarette trade on the territories under its control which caused dissatisfaction of the latter. At the same time, Ansar ad-Din representatives made more frequent meetings with the representatives of the local tribes trying to assure them they have no intention to interfere with the traditional Islamic regime. Apparently, Ansar ad-Din is seeking to stop confrontation with the local tribes and win MNLA’s support. This would strengthen Ansar ad-Din’s position and weaken that of AQIM and MUJWA. We believe that seizure of the town of Konna by MUJWA troops could be an attempt to expand the area of influence within the regions inhabited by black population at the time when Ansar ad-Din’s position grew stronger. Therefore, the Operation Serval started under favourable circumstances when the three groups had a confrontation with each other, and, according to our estimations, consolidation thereof in the short-term prospective is quite unlikely to be reached. At the same time, participation of foreign forces in this Operation causes additional risks described by us in our operational report Prospects for Participation of ECOWAS Forces in Settling the Situation in Mali (07. 2012).

We believe that militants will show hardest resistance at the Niger River, in the towns of Gao, Timbuktu, and then in Kidal. At the same time, we expect that militants will change their tactics and resort to street fights which will increase the risks for the French and international forces and civilian population, as well as make terrorist attacks on AQIM with the participation of suicide murderers coming from the Middle East. Under such circumstances, the terrorist attacks will be much less intensive than in Afghanistan and Iraq. The nature of combatting and the scenario are likely to resemble those in Somali rather than Afghanistan and will be aimed at maintaining control over the smuggling channels within the region, as well as collecting ransom for kidnapping. The main threat is posed by AQIM and MUJWA groups. While AQIM will be focused on formation of secret cells and continuing underground activities, MUJWA is likely to attempt a break-through to the neighbouring countries and at the same time to try to maintain its position in Gao as a transhipment point for cocaine traffickers.

In view of the aforesaid, the groups will need to hold the troops of the governmental and foreign forces at the border between Mopti and Sevare as long as possible, thus preserving tension near Bamako.

Therefore, the following may be brought under attack:

–          French military helicopters during conducting operations in settlements;

–          French military servants;

–          Governmental institutions and infrastructure facilities in Bamako;

–          Representative offices and assets of foreign companies in Mali, foreigners.

Further advancement towards the North and destroying technical equipment and command posts of militants will increase the risk of their dilution among the locals and transition to the sabotage and guerrilla tactics. Geographical conditions allow them to cache weapon and ammunition for long-term storage. As Ansar ad-Din members are mainly representatives of local tribes their further infiltration into civilian population will be much simpler which will enable them to go on with further military mobilization after the French troops leave the region.

Presently, MUJWA holds control over the country’s north-eastern border areas in Gao Region. We believe that there is a probability of crossing the border with Niger and a force-march towards Niger’s capital city Niamey (time required – 6 hours 20 minutes, 445 km). The manoeuvre does not envisage forcing (crossing) the Niger River which makes local screening rather complicated. In Niamey, MUJWA may receive support from radical elements among representatives of the Hausa tribe. There is a much less probable risk of attacking the territory of Burkina-Faso. We believe that these risks are one of the key reasons why ESOWAS delays sending its troops.

In the event that successful advancement of the governmental and French forces towards the North continues, militants may create conditions for directing refugee flow towards the southern regions which will allow their infiltration and exit from the action area.

Main problems will be related to liquidation of Ansar ad-Din which holds control over the country’s northern regions – Kidal. This territory lies on a plateau which allows militants to avoid search activities. Moreover, Ansar ad-Din’s representatives are ethnic Tuaregs which simplifies their dilution among the local population. Militants’ transfer to the territory of Algeria and back is still highly probable. This channel will impair struggling with the expected growth in the number of victims of kidnapping (including foreign citizens) and their search on the territory of Mali.

We consider it quite probable that AQIM will attack governmental institutions and infrastructure facilities in the capital city and the country’s southern regions. We believe there is a need to enhance guard at two hydroelectric power plants situated on the Niger River: Sotuba Hydroelectric Power Plant (with the capacity of 5.2 mW) and Selingue Hydroelectric Power Plant situated in Kulikoro (with the capacity of 44 mW and a 25-meter-high dam). The attacks may result in flooding the capital’s southern area and triggering a refugee flow towards the North which will make carrying on counter-terrorist activities more difficult. There is also an increasing probability of terrorist attacks with hostage taking at Mali industrial sites – Anglogold-Ashanti mines in Sadiola and Yatela, as well as Randgold Resources mines in Morila.

Reintegration of Mali’s northern regions into a united state is unlikely to take place in the medium-term prospective.

  • Firstly, in this particular case we witness a scenario of ethnic transformation under the pressure caused by refugee flows. As a result, if refugees from the northern regions do not return home they will make place for those groups of the population who are most loyal to militants. And this will facilitate their deployment in future.
  • Secondly, we do not rule out the possibility of revitalization of radical imams in the northern areas who are close to AQIM and may contribute to formation of the extremist main body from the locals.
  • Thirdly, restoring efficient governance on the northern territories requires creation of bases of logistic support to the activities of the governmental forces within the region, as well as efficient activities of the special services aimed at liquidation of elements of terrorism, smuggling channels and arms depots.

Therefore, resuming control over the towns in the North of the country does not mean that Bamako will automatically take control over the situation within the region.

According to our assessment, a significant problem today is weakening of MNLA’s positions and the risk of its allying with Ansar ad-Din. However, if this organization gets a chance to obtain legitimate political power and be represented in the parliament its leaders may start negotiations with Bamako. We believe that MNLA leaders must be integrated into the local governance system of the northern territories and get representation in the parliament and, perhaps, special ministry of development of the country’s northern areas.

We believe that the key condition for stabilizing the situation in Mali is strengthening of Mali Army and integration of MNLA armed troops into Mali Army or local defence forces. For this purpose, Mali Army requires complete reformation and retraining within the framework of the counter-terrorist operation, as well as easing restrictions for weapon supply in the country. This, in its turn, requires reinstatement of constitutional order in the country, holding democratic elections with the participation of Tuaregs’ representatives and bringing to power a legitimate government.

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Africa

Does the Regime change in Algeria and Sudan signals the advent of “Arab Spring 2.0”?

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With the ouster of Abdelaziz Bouteflika as the president of Algeria and removal of Omar al-Bashir, as the president of Sudan – some scholars are arguing that the world is about to witness a new phase of change or the “Arab Spring 2.0” that might impact the political stability in the whole Middle East region. On April 2, 2019, months-long public protests forced the exit of president Bouteflika, and on April 11, 2019, Sudan’s president al-Bashir was ousted from power by the military. The fall of longstanding regimes in Algeria and Sudan has generated anxiety among the other authoritarian regimes in the region – fearing how the protests and sudden regime change in two important member countries of “Arab League” would impact the wider Arab-world or the Middle East region.

The original “Arab Spring” was a series of mass level anti-government protests and uprising that first started in Tunisia in December 2010. Later on, the uprising in Tunisia ignited protests against the authoritarian regimes in many Arab countries. Effective use social media platforms and large-scale participation of the youth – with men and women playing equal part was one of the the salient features of original “Arab Spring”. Similarly, in Algeria and in Sudan – youth – both men and women have effectively used social media in spreading the message and motivating people to come out for participating in the protests. Particularly, women have played a pivotal role in bringing the people to the streets. The key role of women protestors in the ouster of Bouteflika and al-Bashir is a massively exciting and stimulating moment which could open a window of opportunity for women to play more active role in the domestic politics of Arab countries. Moreover, youth’s persistent demand for the change of entire political leadership in Algeria and in Sudan might trigger a chain reaction in the neighbouring Arab countries to unleash the “Arab Spring 2.0”. However, this factor could also push the authoritarian regimes of the region; Saudi Arabia or Egypt or Iran – to take more strict or punitive measures against any kind of political protests to ensure that no more leaders would be forced to leave the office.

The original or first “Arab Spring” was met with a heavy-handed response and a massive crackdown against the protests was started in many Arab countries which resulted in the arrests and prisons of large numbers of protestors. After almost a decade, the tendency to suppress the opposition through oppressive means is still a key tool of various authoritarian regimes in the Arab/Middle East countries – whether it is Saudi Arabia showing an intent to reform but contradicting its claims by killing the journalists like Jamal Khashoggi and by arresting women rights activists like Samar Badawi, or Egypt which continues to arrest journalists and civil society activists like Esraa Abdelfattahh or Ibrahim Al-Husseini or Iran which is crushing the opposing voices and protests with the methods of repression.

Nearly a decade after the first “Arab Spring”, a whole new generation is coming of age in the Arab/Middle East countries. With the memories of protests and uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain and Syria are still fresh in their minds a key question is facing them; will the mass civil society uprising that toppled the oppressive and authoritarian regimes of Bouteflika and al-Bashir inspire this new generation in the Arab/Middle East countries to stage similar popular uprisings against the authoritarian rulers in their own countries? Looking at the chaos and instability in Libya, Syria and Yemen that followed by the Arab Spring, the majority answer to this question might be negative.

Although the people of Algeria and Sudan deserve huge appreciation but the events and happenings in both countries indicate that the regime change has only resulted in the change of faces and there has been no headway made to bring the real democracy. In Algeria, Abdelkadar Bensalah a longtime ally of Bouteflika and the Senate speaker has been brought in to oversee an interim government for 90 days, and in Sudan – Vice President Lieutenant General Awad ibn Auf seized the power with a promise to hold the elections after two years. On Saturday 13 April, bending to public pressure Gen. ibn Auf reversed his decision to head the Sudan military council and named Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan as his successor but the military stated that it will stay in power for two years.

Governments and people in the Arab-world have learned the lessons from the first “Arab Spring” and they are looking at the recent developments through the lens of firstuprising to shape their policy and response. Accordingly, it is more likely that the developments in Algeria and Sudan may not spark a similar kind of chain reaction which was triggered bythe popular uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt or Libya. A key reason whythe developments in Algeria and Sudan might have less impact in the Middle East region is that the majority of international community which supported the first “Arab Spring” in a misperceived sense of “democratic triumphalism”, is now much more cautious in its response towards the current uprisings. A careful response of international community shows that they have also learned the lessons from the events of Syria, Libya, Yemen and Egypt. Moreover, international community encouraged the uprisings in Egypt and Libya because both countries were important centers of power in the Middle East and North Africa. Historically, Egypt has remained a traditional centre of power in the Middle East and Libya being a leading Arab country and an important member of African Union has remained a regional power in North Africa. Although, the people have forced the regime change in both countries but these changes are controlled or “pacted transitions” which are brokered by the real power holders of both countries therefore the chances for a second phase of Arab uprising are very low.

From an external perspective, key international actors are carefully observing and monitoring the changes and developments caused by the fall of Bouteflika and al-Bashir regimes. France and Italy are concerned that the exit of Bouteflika might generate instability in the whole region of North Africa. A key reason for their anxiety is the fear that a prolonged political instability in Algeria might bring a rise in the “cross-Mediterranean” migration to Europe. The ouster of al-Bashir could engender some instability in “Horn of Africa”. This is true in the sense that Sudan is part of region which is equally important for Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and also for Iran and Israel.

Russia is also keeping a close eye on what is happening Algeria and Sudan as it might have some short-term geopolitical consequences for Moscow which is very keen to develop military and political ties with both countries. In 2006, Russian president Vladimir Putin visited Algeria. During Putin’s visit Russia signed major arms deal with Algeria. In July 2018, Russian ambassador to Algeria revealed that Algeria purchases almost 50 per cent of Russia’s total arms sales to Africa. On March 19, 2019, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed Russia’s concerns over the mass protests in Algeria, declaring the situation as an attempt to undermine the political stability of Algeria. Similarly, on 16 March, 2019, Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia and Special Presidential Envoy for the Middle East and Africa, Mikhail Bogdanov during his visit to Sudan stressed Russia’s confidence in Al-Bashir’s leadership and stated that Russia has strong desire to strengthen its economic, political and military ties with Sudan.

Although the longstanding regimes have been removed from Algeria and Sudan but the situation both countries is still critical and precarious. The protestors are still out in the streets of Algiers and Khartoum fearing that the people in the new administrations are longtime allies of both Bouteflika and al-Bashir. The interim administration in both countries insist that they do not wish to stay in power for long time and the future of the countries will be decided by the people. But at the same, the military leaders of both countries have warned the people that they will not allow anyone to undermine the national security. This shows that the real power is still in the hands of the influential military leadership of both countries and they still holds the key to broke any agreement that will decide the future political setup in Algeria and Sudan.

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Libya: Will the U.N. Appeal for a halt to the March on Tripoli be heard?

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With the administrative-political situation in Libya badly stalemated and a meeting for negotiations to be held 14-16 April unlikely to make progress, on Thursday 4 April 2019, General Khalifa Hafter, one of the key players in the drama decided to start a “March on Tripoli” and to take overall power by force.

Most of the significant buildings in Libyan cities were built by Italians during the Fascist  period when Libya was an Italian colony.  Thus, General Hafter has patterned himself on Mussolini’s 1922 “March on Rome”.  In 1922, the diplomats of most States looked away when Mussolini marched or the diplomats  took it as a domestic affair.

liby01In 2019, the “March on Tripoli” has drawn more international attention and concern.  The U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres met with Hafter a few hours before the March began.  Guterres was in Libya  to facilitate the 14-16 April meeting on which his Special Representative Ghassan Salomé  has been working for some time in the hope of drawing a road map for long-delayed elections.  On Friday 5 April, the U.N. Security Council held a closed-door emergency meeting.  The Security Council called for a halt to the March on Tripoli and the deescalation of the growing armed conflict.

The Security Council recognized the real possibilities of broader armed conflict and its consequences on the civilian population.  In the recent past the Libyan armed factions have violated the laws of war and have a sad record of abuses against civilians.

We will now have to see if Khalifa Hafter is more open to international appeals than was Benito Mussolini.   My impression is that the goal of holding overall power is stronger than the respect of international law. However, even a successful “March on Tripoli” will not create the conditions for an administration of a culturally and geographically-diverse country. New and appropriate constitutional structures must be developed.

There cannot be a return to the earlier Italian colonial structures, nor to the forms of government at independence developed by King Idris al Sanussi which depended largely on his role as a religious leader using religious orders, nor the complicated pattern of “direct democracy” developed by Muammar  al Qadhafi. The Association of World Citizens has proposed the possibility of  con-federal structures.

The post 2011 Libyan society faces large and complex issues.  Resolving the institutional, economic and political issues is urgent and cannot be settled by elections alone. There are three distinct regions which must have some degree of autonomy: Tripolitania and Cyrenaica both bordering the Mediterranean and Fezzan in the southern Sahara. Within each of the three regions there are differing and often rival tribal societies which are in practice more kinship lines than organized tribes. [1] There are differing economic interests and there are differing ideologies ranging from “Arab Socialism” to the Islamist ideology of the Islamic State which has spread from its Syrian-Iraqi base.

The situation is critical, and the next few days may be crucial for the future of the country.

 [1] See J. Davis. Libyan Politics, Tribes and Revolution (London: I.B. Tauris, 1987)

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Russia and Angola: Stuck Between Diplomatic Rhetoric and Business Reality

Kester Kenn Klomegah

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Russian President Vladimir Putin held talks at the Kremlin with President of Angola leader João Lourenço on strengthening cooperation in trade, the economy and culture, as well as current international and regional matters.

“Angola is a reliable and old partner. We need to consider what we need to do, without delay, to stimulate our trade and economic ties. There are interesting fields of activity, such as the diamond industry, fisheries and space exploration. There are also cultural spheres, such as education and the training of personnel,” Putin told the Angolan President at the meeting.

On his part, the Angolan leader João Lourenço added: “We have come to Russia on an official visit to strengthen our ties and cooperation and, if possible, to promote interaction between our countries. Russia is doing splendidly in the spheres of mineral resources, education, healthcare and defence. But we would like to know about Russia’s potential in other fields so we can promote cooperation in these areas of the Angolan economy.”

He informed further that his opening speech at the Angola-Russia Forum in Moscow was designed to attract the interest of Russian business people to investing in the Angolan economy, and finally added “many countries are doing this, and we are confident that Russia can help with economic diversification.”

Putin and Lourenço signed a joint communique after their consultations. The number of bilateral documents signed included the intergovernmental agreements on the peaceful exploration and use of space, and on fishery and aquaculture, as well as documents on cooperation in diamond mining and processing.

Consultations continue on draft agreements on cooperation in the peaceful use of outer space and nuclear energy, commercial shipping, mutual protection of classified information, simplified access to Angola’s ports for Russian warships, as well as agreements involving Russia’s Justice Ministry, Ministry of Industry and Trade and Communications Ministry, according to the Kremlin Press Service.

Before their final departure from the Kremlin, João Lourenço presented Vladimir Putin with a high Angolan award – the Order of Agostinho Neto, the first President of Angola – as a sign of gratitude for the years of support for the Republic of Angola.

Agostinho Neto Order is the highest distinction of the Angolan State with a single degree, granted to nationals and foreigners, in particular Heads of State and Government, political leaders and other heavyweight individuals.

Earlier at the Angolan-Russian Forum, the Angolan leader said that political and diplomatic relations with Russia were “excellent and privileged” but asked for more Russian private investment.

In his objective assessment about economic engagement by foreign players, only few Russian companies are comparatively operating in the Angolan market and limited solely to the exploration and production of diamonds, to the financial system and to the construction of hydroelectric dams.

“Angola wants to change that scenario through public-private partnerships or by creating Angolan-Russian companies with a focus on the manufacturing industry, agro-industry, fishing, energy, tourism, geology and mining, among other sectors,” he added.

Lourenço, however, recalled the long-lasting tradition of “friendship and solidarity” between the two countries, which have remained firm and strong despite the great changes the world has seen in the last decades. Angola counts with Russia’s solidarity and support at a time when it must guarantee economic cooperation and sustainable development, the president said.

Russia-Angolan interaction in the Kremlin has attracted attention of a former Russian diplomat. “Angola is a priority area of Russia’s cooperation in Africa. To begin with, that was the case since the time when Angola fought for its independence. Secondly, this is due to Angola’s huge economic potential,” explained Sergei Nenashev, who served as Russia’s Ambassador to Angola from 2007-2012.

“Now the country lives off oil, gas and, partially, diamonds. On the other hand, Angola has vast resources. Today, Russia and Angola maintain ties in all areas of interstate relations, including culture, education, personnel training, military-technical, financial and economic cooperation.” the former Ambassador told the Kommersant daily newspaper.

Russians like historical references. As expected, the local Russian media were awashed with articles highlighting Russia’s historical contributions to the independence of Angola, the development and strengthening of friendly relations with the country during the Soviet era. That Russia has promoted political dialogue, including the exchange of visits at the high levels, as well as trade and economic cooperation and cultural relations between the two countries.

Media reports offered a number of examples of many areas of cooperation. But Russian companies, at least over the past ten years, have made little results or impact on development of the country. Alrosa is involved in diamond mining in Angola’s largest Catoka deposit. Global Resources is involved in geological prospecting. Rosneft has won a tender for working in Angola. Russia and Angolan companies are cooperating on high technology.

Itar-Tass reported that Russian truck-maker Kamaz may organize assembly of trucks in Angola and Russian Railways may participate in upgrading the rail infrastructure in this country. Russian Railways (RZD) in restoring and upgrading the railroad infrastructure are among looking-forward cooperation projects.

But, Professors Vladimir Shubin and Alexandra Archangelskaya from the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute for African Studies, have argued that “both Russia and Angola still need to be more strategic in aligning their interests, and more proactive in carving out efficient bilateral instruments and mechanisms in order to promote economic exchanges and reap the benefits of a fully-fledged partnership.”

Cooperation between Angola and Russia date back to 1976, when the two countries signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. But official figures are still staggering, trade between the two countries stood at US$500 million in 2016, 15 times higher than that of 2012 (US$25 million).

Angola has diamonds, oil, gold, copper and a rich wildlife, forest and fossil fuels. Since independence, oil and diamonds have been the most important economic resource. It’s a member of the Southern African Development Community, an inter-governmental organization that has made its goal to further socio-economic cooperation and integration as well as political and security cooperation among 16 Southern African States.

The Republic of Angola is a country in south-central Africa, the seventh largest by territorial size and bordered by Namibia to the south, Democratic Republic of Congo to the north and Zambia to the east, and on the west the South Atlantic Ocean.

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