Conducting special military operation known as Operation Serval by Mali, French and ECOWAS military forces is likely to have limited effect and will not facilitate the country’s reintegration.
Analysis of the actions taken within the framework of the counter-terrorist operation shows that this conflict is likely to trigger dilution of radical elements in Mali rather than elimination thereof. At the same time, AQIM is seeking to expand the area of unrest causing the threat of destabilization in the neighbouring countries, especially in Niger and Mauritania.
January 2013 saw increased confrontation of the three forces that held under control the country’s northern regions. Ansar ad-Din decided on softening its line and refusal to establish sharia law on the territory of Mali, thus distancing itself from AQIM salafists. Change of AQIM leaders brought pressure on Ansar ad-Din aimed at stopping cigarette trade on the territories under its control which caused dissatisfaction of the latter. At the same time, Ansar ad-Din representatives made more frequent meetings with the representatives of the local tribes trying to assure them they have no intention to interfere with the traditional Islamic regime. Apparently, Ansar ad-Din is seeking to stop confrontation with the local tribes and win MNLA’s support. This would strengthen Ansar ad-Din’s position and weaken that of AQIM and MUJWA. We believe that seizure of the town of Konna by MUJWA troops could be an attempt to expand the area of influence within the regions inhabited by black population at the time when Ansar ad-Din’s position grew stronger. Therefore, the Operation Serval started under favourable circumstances when the three groups had a confrontation with each other, and, according to our estimations, consolidation thereof in the short-term prospective is quite unlikely to be reached. At the same time, participation of foreign forces in this Operation causes additional risks described by us in our operational report Prospects for Participation of ECOWAS Forces in Settling the Situation in Mali (07. 2012).
We believe that militants will show hardest resistance at the Niger River, in the towns of Gao, Timbuktu, and then in Kidal. At the same time, we expect that militants will change their tactics and resort to street fights which will increase the risks for the French and international forces and civilian population, as well as make terrorist attacks on AQIM with the participation of suicide murderers coming from the Middle East. Under such circumstances, the terrorist attacks will be much less intensive than in Afghanistan and Iraq. The nature of combatting and the scenario are likely to resemble those in Somali rather than Afghanistan and will be aimed at maintaining control over the smuggling channels within the region, as well as collecting ransom for kidnapping. The main threat is posed by AQIM and MUJWA groups. While AQIM will be focused on formation of secret cells and continuing underground activities, MUJWA is likely to attempt a break-through to the neighbouring countries and at the same time to try to maintain its position in Gao as a transhipment point for cocaine traffickers.
In view of the aforesaid, the groups will need to hold the troops of the governmental and foreign forces at the border between Mopti and Sevare as long as possible, thus preserving tension near Bamako.
Therefore, the following may be brought under attack:
– French military helicopters during conducting operations in settlements;
– French military servants;
– Governmental institutions and infrastructure facilities in Bamako;
– Representative offices and assets of foreign companies in Mali, foreigners.
Further advancement towards the North and destroying technical equipment and command posts of militants will increase the risk of their dilution among the locals and transition to the sabotage and guerrilla tactics. Geographical conditions allow them to cache weapon and ammunition for long-term storage. As Ansar ad-Din members are mainly representatives of local tribes their further infiltration into civilian population will be much simpler which will enable them to go on with further military mobilization after the French troops leave the region.
Presently, MUJWA holds control over the country’s north-eastern border areas in Gao Region. We believe that there is a probability of crossing the border with Niger and a force-march towards Niger’s capital city Niamey (time required – 6 hours 20 minutes, 445 km). The manoeuvre does not envisage forcing (crossing) the Niger River which makes local screening rather complicated. In Niamey, MUJWA may receive support from radical elements among representatives of the Hausa tribe. There is a much less probable risk of attacking the territory of Burkina-Faso. We believe that these risks are one of the key reasons why ESOWAS delays sending its troops.
In the event that successful advancement of the governmental and French forces towards the North continues, militants may create conditions for directing refugee flow towards the southern regions which will allow their infiltration and exit from the action area.
Main problems will be related to liquidation of Ansar ad-Din which holds control over the country’s northern regions – Kidal. This territory lies on a plateau which allows militants to avoid search activities. Moreover, Ansar ad-Din’s representatives are ethnic Tuaregs which simplifies their dilution among the local population. Militants’ transfer to the territory of Algeria and back is still highly probable. This channel will impair struggling with the expected growth in the number of victims of kidnapping (including foreign citizens) and their search on the territory of Mali.
We consider it quite probable that AQIM will attack governmental institutions and infrastructure facilities in the capital city and the country’s southern regions. We believe there is a need to enhance guard at two hydroelectric power plants situated on the Niger River: Sotuba Hydroelectric Power Plant (with the capacity of 5.2 mW) and Selingue Hydroelectric Power Plant situated in Kulikoro (with the capacity of 44 mW and a 25-meter-high dam). The attacks may result in flooding the capital’s southern area and triggering a refugee flow towards the North which will make carrying on counter-terrorist activities more difficult. There is also an increasing probability of terrorist attacks with hostage taking at Mali industrial sites – Anglogold-Ashanti mines in Sadiola and Yatela, as well as Randgold Resources mines in Morila.
Reintegration of Mali’s northern regions into a united state is unlikely to take place in the medium-term prospective.
- Firstly, in this particular case we witness a scenario of ethnic transformation under the pressure caused by refugee flows. As a result, if refugees from the northern regions do not return home they will make place for those groups of the population who are most loyal to militants. And this will facilitate their deployment in future.
- Secondly, we do not rule out the possibility of revitalization of radical imams in the northern areas who are close to AQIM and may contribute to formation of the extremist main body from the locals.
- Thirdly, restoring efficient governance on the northern territories requires creation of bases of logistic support to the activities of the governmental forces within the region, as well as efficient activities of the special services aimed at liquidation of elements of terrorism, smuggling channels and arms depots.
Therefore, resuming control over the towns in the North of the country does not mean that Bamako will automatically take control over the situation within the region.
According to our assessment, a significant problem today is weakening of MNLA’s positions and the risk of its allying with Ansar ad-Din. However, if this organization gets a chance to obtain legitimate political power and be represented in the parliament its leaders may start negotiations with Bamako. We believe that MNLA leaders must be integrated into the local governance system of the northern territories and get representation in the parliament and, perhaps, special ministry of development of the country’s northern areas.
We believe that the key condition for stabilizing the situation in Mali is strengthening of Mali Army and integration of MNLA armed troops into Mali Army or local defence forces. For this purpose, Mali Army requires complete reformation and retraining within the framework of the counter-terrorist operation, as well as easing restrictions for weapon supply in the country. This, in its turn, requires reinstatement of constitutional order in the country, holding democratic elections with the participation of Tuaregs’ representatives and bringing to power a legitimate government.
Nigeria’s Youth Face Growing Challenges
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. It has approximately 210 million population. Nigeria has the third-largest youth population in the world, after China and India, with more than 90 million of its youth population under the age of eighteen. While this is considered as a huge human resource, the youth also face unprecedented challenges including growing unemployment and insecurity resulting from ethnic conflicts.
As Nigeria is persistently engulfed with so many challenges and problems, it requires systematic well-defined approach in order to overcome them and make way for peaceful and promising future for the youth. Retaining well-trained professionals has been identified as one of the goals of the government. The current situation still makes the future bleak for majority of them. Some say there is hope on the horizon, only if economic policies generate needed employment, youth policies backed by adequate funds by Federal Government of Nigeria.
In September, Kester Kenn Klomegah met with the former candidate of the Social Democratic Party (2019) for House of Representatives and now the President of the Middle Belt Youth Council, Hon. Emmanuel Zopmal, for an interview during which he talked about current situation, the challenges and the way forward. Here are the interview excerpts:
Q: Why the youth are showing increasing signs of frustration these few years especially those in middle belt of the Federal Republic of Nigeria?
A: That is very interesting. I would say that frustration, in any way, is part of human life. It could come at any time. There are conditions that make someone to be under frustration. In this instance, harsh situation or condition one faces in life without sign of overcoming it. This makes a person frustrated. It usually comes with worry over certain particular situation.
In the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Middle Belt is a region that has been under immense pressure from politics and economy. Then the socio-cultural condition has also influenced our lives. The worse now is the high insecurity existing in the country. These factors are, indeed, contributing to the frustration perception we’re talking about here. You can imagine a society of people facing these forms of structural violence for these several years and there is no sign of overcoming these situations.
Q: In your objective assessment, what has contributed to the growing unemployment in the country, considered as the Giant of Africa?
A: Unemployment is an economic index. It can be relative in nature. People are employed in formal or informal economy. The extent to which people need to live an average life with an appreciable level of income that can provide for basic needs should be the major concern of unemployment index. Unemployment perception varies as well. For example, there are two categories, those in the public sector and those in private.
Growing unemployment index can be attributed to mismanagement of the economy. Economy of every country determines how the country is structured, administered and managed for the benefit of the broad majority of the population. Without this, a country will definitely face high unemployment rate.
Secondly, the system of education plays a role here, the most important aspects that contribute to unemployment perception index. Innovative education produces a high quality of graduates who can create jobs. The standard of education should not be conservative. Research and public policy on education help to get out of this problem often referred to as unemployment.
Frankly speaking, it is difficult to understand why Nigeria claims the Giant of Africa. Perhaps, this claim is only by its huge population. Besides that, Nigeria is not a Giant of Africa.
Q: What are your views about the policies of the Federal administration in addressing problems of the youth, especially young graduates?
A: If the government focuses on research and policy, it will help in addressing the problems of youth. Anyway, one cannot actually measure what are the real problems of the youth, especially young graduates. As earlier mentioned, programs such as innovative education will help graduates to overcome employment challenges. Of course, innovation comes through talent or through research. This development can bring changes in the status quo. People will have access to new ways of doing things that help their lives.
Q: Does the current constitution adequately guarantee youth’s welfare? What are the pitfalls in the implementation of aspects of the Constitution that connect or relate with youth?
A: Unfortunately, I look at welfare as benevolence. It makes the younger generation too dependent and unproductive since government provides their welfare. Youth empowerment should simply be a question of policy not constitution. Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution only provided policy, the issue of youth is not mentioned. It talks only about welfare of the “citizens” in the country. In my candid view, capacity of education and skillset of the youth should be the welfare package of our government.
Q: As former candidate of the Social Democratic Party (2019) for House of Representatives, do you still press for youth issues?
A: In the African context, I am still among the youth. Youth is my major constituency. As a former presidential candidate of the National Youth Council of Nigeria (2015), I had my youth policy programs as the key manifesto. I will continue to press for youth’s political participation, contemporary educational standard, skillset, and empowerment.
Q: And now as the President of the Middle Belt Youth Council, what do you consider as the main challenges and the way forward for the youth in Federal Republic of Nigeria?
A: At the moment, the future of our youth must be secured by curbing the ravaging insecurity in the country. With the current rampant insecurity, we cannot move forward. Secondly, the attitude of growing nepotism by government officials in public offices, this culture is bad for our youth. It has to be checked in order not to transfer it to the youth. Government has to take the youth as its national priority. Deliberate policy programs in technological advancement will open up the new horizon for the youth. The youth have to be fully engaged in meaningful activities.
South Sudan: Progress on peace agreement ‘limps along’
Although the transitional government in South Sudan continues to function, with state governors now appointed, among other developments, progress on the 2018 peace agreement “limps along”, the top UN official in the country told a virtual meeting of the Security Council on Wednesday.
David Shearer, head of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), updated ambassadors on the country’s ongoing political and security situations, which are unfolding amid the COVID-19 pandemic and an upturn in inter-communal violence in Jonglei and other states.
“COVID-19 has slowed implementation of the peace agreement, including meeting key benchmarks, but the pandemic is not entirely to blame”, he said, speaking from the capital, Juba.
“We are seeing a reversion to ‘business as usual’ where progress on the peace agreement itself limps along.”
The peace agreement was the latest deal in efforts to end political infighting and violent conflict in South Sudan, the world’s youngest nation.
The country gained independence from Sudan in 2011 but descended into chaos roughly two-and-a-half years later following an impasse between President Salva Kiir and his former deputy, Riek Machar.
Progress ‘painfully slow’
Today, South Sudan now has five vice presidents who head clusters of ministries where activities are progressing well, according to Mr. Shearer.
“Elsewhere, however, progress has been painfully slow”, he reported. “Cabinet meetings occur irregularly, and the South Sudanese want to see the President and vice presidents meeting and working collectively.”
Meanwhile, there has been “almost no movement” on security sector reform, while the Transitional National Legislative Assembly has yet to be reconstituted, which is delaying progress on the Constitution.
Mr. Shearer said these continuing delays risk pushing elections out well beyond the timeline prescribed under the agreement, which will only add to the people’s growing disillusionment.
Inter-communal tensions remain high
The UN mission chief also briefed on the violence among Nuer, Murle and Dinka communities in Jonglei State over the past six months, which has left 600 people dead and homes torched, with women and children kidnapped. The situation has since calmed though tensions remain high. Mr. Shearer said a recent meeting among senior leaders, organized by UNMISS, was encouraging.
However, the mission was thwarted in attempts to deploy peacekeepers following attacks launched by the National Salvation Front armed group in areas of Central Equatoria state, which were met by heavy government fire.
“For the past three weeks, the usual mechanisms through which UNMISS coordinates its movement have seriously deteriorated. COVID-19 can be partly blamed but the influence of hardliners in the security forces is the principal obstacle,” he said.
Later in the meeting, South Sudanese activist and feminist, Nyachangkuoth Rambang Tai, shared her concerns about the ongoing inter-communal violence and the need for greater women’s participation in governance and peacebuilding.
She called on the international community to urgently support local civil society organizations, particularly those led by women.
“Another way to help address the cycle of violence is to ensure transitional justice is made a priority. We cannot except citizens who lost their loved ones, or whose loved ones have been killed, to forgive and move on without healing and accountability. This is unrealistic and will only encourage conflict,” said Ms. Tai, the Gender and Social Justice Manager with Assistance Missions for Africa.
Violence impacts humanitarians
Mr. Shearer outlined how South Sudan is faring in the wake of recent floods affecting some 500,000 citizens.
On Wednesday, the World Food Programme (WFP) reported that it is reaching vulnerable families with urgently needed assistance.
Aid workers have been striving to help communities impacted by the flood waters, as well as the violence, and now the pandemic. Sometimes they pay a heavy price, as Mr. Shearer pointed out.
“This year, seven aid workers have tragically lost their lives and another 144 have been evacuated because of sub-national violence”, he said.
“This meant an upturn in violence stemming from splintering between and within groups. The difference this year is that external political actors are fuelling these local conflicts with military advice and with heavy weapons.”
Millions in need
COVID-19 has only added to the ongoing suffering in South Sudan. The UN Humanitarian Coordinator reported that during the annual hunger season a few months back, some 6.5 million people, or more than half the population, faced severe food insecurity.
“Overall this year, 7.5 million people now need humanitarian assistance –and that’s close to levels in 2017 when we warned of famine”, Mark Lowcock told the Council. He added that some 1.3 million under-fives are forecasted to be malnourished: the highest figure in four years.
The UN relief chief urged ambassadors to fund a $1.9 billion response plan to meet the ever-growing needs.
Changes at POC sites
With the transitional government in place and a ceasefire holding, the UN Mission in South Sudan is looking at how to better support peace efforts and protect civilians.
More than 180,000 people are still living in Protection of Civilian (POC) sites at five UNMISS bases across the country, and Mr. Shearer said the conditions which led to their establishment no longer exist.
As a result, UNMISS has gradually withdrawn its troops and police from “static duties” at the Bor and Wau POC sites, following consultations with the Government and others, including displaced persons.
“The spike in subnational violence is occurring in remote areas, not near our POC sites. Therefore, we have to deploy our forces to provide protection where there is greatest need,” he said, emphasizing the need for the UN force to be robust, nimble and proactive.
Mr. Shearer explained that following the gradual withdrawal of UN peacekeepers, the POC sites will be under the control of the Government.
He stressed that no one will be pushed out or asked to leave when this transition occurs, while humanitarian services will continue.
Why Young African Scholars Must Engage the Law and Politics of Africa through New Perspectives
The Year of Africa was a powerful phase, a transitional moment that saw Africa in liberated black and white images. In one, a woman wearing sunglasses and sitting astride a motorcycle scooter communicated freedom and a promise of a bold future.In another, a smiling, young woman in a polka dot dress wore Independence in a sash, followed by a happy crowd. In yet another, a grinning man borne on the shoulders of two other men in a throbbing crowd, carried a placard that read: COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE 1961. It was the year that saw seventeen African states begin a journey of black statehood. Those images were metaphors of liberty in a continent that had been kept away from deciding the course of its own destiny. 1960 was a beginning and the end of the African struggle.
It was the beginning of the African struggle because Africans in the independent states were transitioning from struggling against colonialism to contending against the political realities of their post-independent states. And it was the end, because those Africans didn’t have to contend against colonialism any more. In the true picture of things, it was a transition from the political control of people who sought the wealth of the continent to a struggle with murderous regimes, and the sad realization of the true damage that colonialism had wreaked in the political arrangement of the people.In Nigeria, it was the beginning of the weaponization of ethnicity and of resentful distrust in state politics.
Africa in the 1960s was a dramatic spectacle of violence, new beginnings and the creation of histories that has informed the present. Independence movements aspired towards liberated African states. The consciousness of colonial restraints inspired actions that marked the trajectory of the continent’s destiny. The political history of Africa’s becoming is a timeline of seesaw moments. Dictators have risen and have fallen in the hubris of forgetfulness thatthe powers that saw to their rise could see to their fall. The legal systems, processes, institutions and the politics of Africa were forged in the turbulence of African history.
Today it is easy to say that Africa has made progress in its strides towards social and political evolution, but the past is a mirror of solutions to present problems. This is why it has become imperative for newer approaches to emerge in the study of law and politics in the context of Africa. Founded in 2020 by me, the Carnelian Journal of Law and Politics is Africa’s response to the need for new insights on law and politics in the African context. This new journal gives young African researchers the opportunity to contribute top quality perspectives to the discourse on the law and politics of Africa. This is important as newer voices are needed to give an inter-generational balance to the debate on African law and politics. And this is why the journal has emerged to bridge the scholarly gap.
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