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Triangulating India-Iran-Pakistan’s Balance of Equation

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Hypothesis of narrative of power of the three countries is manifestly simple in the regional setting but more one ponders about the complexities, more frustration grips once any side endeavors to relegate its conflict vulnerabilities to workable equation with the neighbors. Like Pierre Courtade’s dialogue, Pakistani ‘right’ sounds Indian ‘wrong’,

Iranian ‘wrong’ may be Indian ‘right’ and Indian ‘wrong’  may be Pakistani ‘right’ as one moves along and around the pivots of the triangle. Discussing Iran-India in isolation would be a parochial approach. Their foreign policy undercurrents and strategic objectives invariably crisscross, of necessity, to India, Pakistan, Iran, China and beyond.

India is relatively huge land mass. Its geo-strategic significance is established not only as a South Asian country but also as a power with massive expanding ability to influence sea-lanes in Indian Ocean and thus South East Asia and Middle Eastern countries by implications. Approaches to the Pacific, land operations in Himalayan Range, southern plains and the desert with China and Pakistan are also located within its prowess. India has a firm foot in Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia, notably Kazakhstan for energy proxy, Tajikistan and Mongolia where it now maintains military facilities that afford her better strategic orientation against the adjoining countries, Pakistan and China from the North West. Its economy leapt forward in mid 90s era and speculations abound that the center of gravity of the ‘riches’ would shift to BRICS[2] from the West, some placing it exclusively between China and India. However, geo-political environments which, would remain a major threat to its expansive ambitions and adoption of the global role that some world powers would like it to embrace, not necessarily to India’s advantage, acutely eclipse India’s future prosperity.

The simmering Kashmir dispute with Pakistan and its corollaries like Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek and now Rivers Water Distribution can catapult the prevailing ‘no war no peace’ scenario, should any side lose patience. Impending war among the two would perhaps be unprecedented by the (de)merit of its horrific mutual destruction because both sides have counted each other’s teeth very accurately. Indian military might is impressive while Pakistan, a much smaller country, maintains an efficient system of forces with credible nuclear deterrence. Despite being riveted by internal turmoil, it has shown remarkable astuteness to keep ready its ‘steeds of war’ to deter any of the perceived threats. It has remained laced with crises since inception but at the same time, it has fine-finished its ability to survive the crises as well. Whenever Pakistan was found ignorant of internal and external build up of storms, and its leadership failed to rise to the occasion, it paid an exorbitant price. India imposed such ‘price’ on it, at least once before during the final phases of cutting Pakistan to size. Obviously, the reference is to the debacle of erstwhile East Pakistan.

India’s territorial dispute with China could develop into a formal conflict if it fits the design of capturing geo-political space by either power. Sujit Dutta comments euphemistically but with visible concern, downplaying the stand off as ‘competition’ only, “China and India straddle a common geopolitical space across the Himalayas and South and Southeast Asia. This makes for strategic and geopolitical competition.”[3] The remarks, from the point of view of International Relations are simply in the domain of liberalism, but the followers of ‘Realist’ approaches would side line such comments in the light of ground realities. The ensuing dilemma from these realities has forced a compulsion on the Indian hierarchy to maintain a potent military system to react to or eliminate these threats, which the war evaluations prove, it cannot. It sounds like war mongering. However, it is very heartening that powers to the disputes have come to recognize the base line wisdom and that is, wars alone cannot resolve the conflicts[4] though the ‘guns’ have been branded as the final argument of the kings historically. David Scott concludes in his essay, “Finally… some competition between India and China is likely to continue within regional organizations, in the diplomatic arena, within their military and economic strategies; and with it their elements of mutual balancing, and above all hedging. However, neither state will want to antagonize the other too much, both will want to maintain their own long term grand strategies of peaceful rise and economic modernization…”.[5] Nevertheless, Indian forces have to maintain a superb state of readiness to cater for the worst contingencies but that unfortunately means sinking billions of taxpayers’ dollars every year that could be well spent productively elsewhere instead of rattling the sabers. Any attempt to lower the guards by sliding back from the build up of war arsenals may be even more risky within the riddle of maintaining a ‘balance of power’, and the resultant encroachment upon India’s luster as a huge customer of the modern weaponry with its ability to pay in dollars instantly.

The sound and burgeoning economy tends to intensify the territorial lust of any state, if also cajoled by its civil society, to adopt a role that transcends the geographical borders. In other words, the virus of lebensraum, catching up with the appetite for seeking expansion or recognition of their influence among the comity of nations can afflict any prosperous nation. India, in a bid to survive the crunch of fading oil and gas reserves is likely to be vulnerable to committing military adventurism by mid 21st Century, what Japan did against Pearl Harbor, to sustain its military as well as economic might. This is particularly worrisome and the possibilities, if not probabilities, heighten when some leading powers are already showing the symptom of morality collapse under such desire and have come to deal with certain theaters in Eurasia in a manner that is not finding due legitimacy despite their ardent desire to paint them as such.

India now is a regional power but its markers on the world map reach far and wide. The role it yearns as a world power, particularly on the high seas and in the space does not find adequate means but even the pipe dreams can materialize if the leadership perseveres in attaining the objectives. Knowing the ambitious sides of Indian build up, other than its traditional rivals, China and Pakistan, two powers, Australia and Indonesia can throw their tentacles up as a preemption strategy. Gary Smith visibly circumvents Australia’s Indian fears through the entire length of his essay but he puts across indirectly, which some times sounds more valid than direct. He comments, “The uranium trade plays directly into two of the major regional and global problems: the traditional concern of military security/insecurity…”[6]. About Australia, it is not only the war of caricatures now. Australia has Herculean tasks ahead to keep engaged not only China and India simultaneously but also China and America as well when the ‘national interests’ pull is divergent between them. Some of their taught syllabi advocate, “Australia’s strategic relationship with America has always been fundamentally different from the old strategic relationship with Britain, in that the British relationship was a matter of identity, and the US relationship was based on interests.”[7] More the Australian relationship would deepen with US and India, more ominous strain it would cast on China and other subsystems that are well poised to meet the challenge, thus making it a complex tangle.

From the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), however, India has managed an effective image profile, obfuscating that she focuses on the development of trade relations and fostering peace though it also implicates power game as well as its power projection. Staging a counter deception perhaps, Australia and Indonesia particularly, have pretended to look the other way but not remaining lax about her naval and nuclear expansion. Should India be stuck across the waterways by drawing their disapproval if not full-blown rivalry, it would make Indian tasks insurmountable. In other words, India would be a victim of backlash of its own build up. Seeing Europe somewhat critical of US ‘go alone’ ventures and cis-trans-Atlantic alliance’s ride becoming bumpy, certain quarters are already advocating a new axis between India, America, Israel and Australia (IAIA).[8] Japan and New Zealand could be fifth and sixth candidates but it would be hard to keep Japan in America’s fold if at any stage its relations smoothen out with China or Russia over the disputed ocean spaces. New Zealand would be better advised by its friends to stay away from the conundrum. Briefly said, India has the wherewithal to emerge as a power with global role but not without heavy baggage of severe frustrations. Conversely, Indian diplomacy, an important instrument of foreign policy, in regional setting, more so about Pakistan and Iran, is vibrant from Indian perspective but within the globalize environments, it has some severe critics, even at home who rate it a victim of sheer ambivalence. Harsh V. Pant (not as harsh as Sikri is towards Pakistan) and Rajiv Sikri belong to realists and traditionalists school of thought respectively. The former laments India’s ambivalence towards US, advocating to take bold leaps in foreign policy conduct, the latter bitterly criticizes such mode of falling in the lap of US, perhaps at the expense of not clearing mine fields for its diplomacy in ‘near abroad’. Ian Hall comments about Sikri, “The region, he thinks, displays remarkable commonality of cultural practices; its divisions, in other words, stem not so much from cultural distinction but political decision.”[9] Here the hint appears to division of the Subcontinent in August 1947 that became the bedrock of disputes and hostilities. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad had observed over six decades ago (1946), “The factors that laid the foundation of Islam in Indian society and created a powerful following have become victim of politics of partition.”[10] Thus, according to such generalizations, territorial disputes between India and Pakistan and to a certain extent include China as well; are of lesser consequences than the psychological barriers of hearts and minds among them, gaining height with the lapse of each year. Muslims have endured a level of genocide at the time of partition and its horror still lurks on the horizon. Concluding a chapter on ‘Black Death’ that devastated Europe in mid fourteenth century, Cathie Carmichael comments, “Every Jew, Muslim, atheist or Christian who died at this time as a result of being targeted for his or her faith or ethnicity was an individual with his or her own unique martyrdom”[11]. One would expect from the leaders who steer the destinies of the masses to obviate such tragedies, occurring to the minorities in the Subcontinent, though history is witness that states seldom learn from past determinants of genocide. In fact, the most enduring bond, a sage said, among the brothers has been the ‘sword’.

Iran with its potent hydrocarbon reserves has significant weight in the domain of geopolitics. It maintains a long coastal line on Arabian Sea as well as Persian Gulf that act as trade lanes for huge stocks of oil and gas and thus gain geo-strategic significance. It is essentially a Middle Eastern country, but at the same time, a Caspian littoral and also contiguous to Central as well as South Asia. Before Soviets ‘phantasmagoria’, it shared borders with the Soviet Union.[12] India and Iran have had the history of looking in opposite directions. During the royal era when Iran was embedded deep in the Western, read American, alliance, it leaned more towards Pakistan because of similarities in their geo-strategic priorities. India, on the other hand, inclined towards Soviet Union and pursuing course of non-aligned bloc at the same time, was not Iran’s choice obviously, when India’s energy thirst had also not exacerbated yet.

On the fall of Shah of Iran, the succeeding theocracy attempted to grasp the ‘leadership’ role among Muslim ‘Ummah’ and hence India-Iran relations remained cool. Iranian support for Kashmir cause was an impediment. The growth of US-Iran polarization and ensuing sanctions through ‘Iran, Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA 1996)’ forced Iran to break American cordon by looking towards China, India and Russia for its strategic assets safeguards and to parry off Israeli and Western wrath that she feared by implications. Neutral observers blame Iran for some self-inflicted wounds in the international arena. “While right to tap nuclear energy as a source and shrewd option to explore alternatives for her enormous but fast dwindling oil and gas reserves can not be denied, it is also encumbered as a responsible member to allay international fears and move along the wind rather than flexing muscles in confrontational manner.”[13] For Iran, India was yet another lucrative window for breaking the US noose, which now imports 14% of its energy needs from Iran. In return, India-Iran sounded comfortable with each other when Iran ebbed down its Kashmir rhetoric. Their relations could plummet on conclusion of US-India and Indo-Israel dialogues of strategic collusion but the mutual fears were downplayed by Iran as a geopolitical expediency. However, Indian reluctance to render her support on nuclear issue at IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)  to Iran and by abstaining from the November 2010 UN vote that condemned Iran on question of Human Rights, have made the job of diplomats of both the countries too perplexing to mend the fences.

As if, it was not enough. Indian ambivalence to join in contemplated Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project has also exposed vulnerabilities of their souring relations. The Iranian leadership has come to see India clearly fixated by US and Israel, an assumption perhaps not very valid to stand the test of expert scrutiny. Indian rejection of US tenders worth $11 Billions equipment deal[14] last April proves that India generally could not be spoon fed by her allies and would jealously guard its ability to steer foreign policy course without strings, compatible to its national interests. Here, the likes of Rajiv Sikri have won. The decision must have taken wind out of US incentives of the times while granting India concessions on acquiring advanced nuclear technology and fuel from the nuclear club. US might have been relishing ever since the scenario of launching India as a counterweight to China in the Indian Ocean as well as Pacific and the potentials of India being a huge modern weaponry market that US would love to secure. The shock’s apparent casualty was the US ambassador to New Delhi; Mr. Timothy Roemer who resigned for ‘personal’ as well as ‘professional’ reasons. Yet another surprise is that India is turning to Europe and not even to its traditional supplier, Russia though Russia protested discreetly, as some reports suggest, by withdrawing its bid for supply of weapons to India. The shift aspect, relevant to the topic, would have far-reaching consequences by lending India an added maneuver space to keep Iran engaged successfully and perhaps Pakistan also, including on Kashmir issue. Iran and Pakistan are glued together by the sort that dries up in a day and revitalizes the next day when Indo-centric concerns are always dominant factors to count. The two countries interact frankly and informally. Iran has some grievances against Pakistan; the main perhaps its tilt to Middle Eastern actors and US with whom Iran has direct or indirect territorial or ideological stand off but finds hard to ditch Pakistan at the same time. Iranian President, Mr. Ahmadinejad’s recent claim (08 June 2011) to have known a US plot that aims at denuclearization of Pakistan is a sincere revelation that validates such a predominant conviction, already prevailing among the entire Muslim ‘Ummah’. In the regional context, US mean now a full team, comprising US, India, Israel, Russia and NATO collaborators versus Pakistan as their thrust lines converge in strategic dimension, a paradigm hard to admit by them but a reality nevertheless. India has the ability to nourish its Middle Eastern diplomacy by driving a wedge among Iran and others further deep to conduct chicanery of its exterior maneuvers.

There may be another twist in the Indian perception that Iran is failing to register and that is its impending demographic explosion and corresponding aggravating energy thirst. Robert Kaplan comments, “India — soon to become the world’s fourth-largest energy consumer, after the United States, China, and Japan — is dependent on oil for roughly 33 percent of its energy needs, 65 percent of which it imports. And 90 percent of its oil imports could soon come from the Persian Gulf. India must satisfy a population that will, by 2030, be the largest of any country in the world.”[15] Indian energy imports from other Middle East countries, measure up to about 45% of its total needs as compared to 14% from Iran (some sources figures vary). When Iran’s nuclear venture is suspected among the Middle East countries and its role seen clearly as a force trying to unhinge the ruling hierarchies of its neighbors in the wake of recent uprising in North Africa and Middle East, India has the option to weigh gains and losses. By playing cool, India reaps the advantage of ensuring that its energy lifeline remains green and large numbers of its expatriates’ remittances from the Middle East fill her coffers.

For Sudha Ramachandran, however, India needs to focus still at Iran when she writes, “With Pakistan refusing India overland access to Afghanistan, Iran is key to India’s land access to there and beyond to Central Asia…. Besides, at times Delhi is concerned over the resurgence of Taliban; can India afford to lose an important ally in Iran on Afghan issue?”[16] The statement clearly affords an insight to possible magnitude of ‘cooperation’ between India and some Taliban faction(s) through Iranian influence in Afghanistan. It also reveals the level of advocacy to accord, alternative access route through Iran to Afghanistan and Central Asia, a high priority tag as compared to remaining warmed up with Middle East for the sake of energy and expatriates’ remittances even though they are sizeable. However, Sudha Ramachandran prescription has limited scope as she envisions the immediate crucial spaces and ignores the global obligations India has to meet. Indian’s Iran embrace could resist US as well as Israel with whom it collaborates strategically, but for the Middle Eastern countries and Europe combined, she would find dent to her image unmanageable because of Iran once its own nuclear posturing and refusal to sign Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is yet not out of the woods. Her arguments would have been even weightier, had she not, wittingly or unwittingly, downplayed Indo-Iranian forces operational level collusion. “Some experts see this as part of broad strategic cooperation between two powers in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea…India had reportedly hoped the Declaration (Indo-Iran of January 2003) would pave the way for Indian sales to Iran of upgrades of Iran’s  Russian-made conventional weapons systems”. The same report further dilates at another place, “It is perhaps because of Indo-Iranian cooperation in stabilizing Afghanistan that Tajikistan—a Persian speaking Central Asian state bordering Afghanistan — allows Indian combat aircrafts to use its Farkhor air base.  There are reports that India will soon also be allowed to use Tajikistan’s Aini air base as well.”[17] Iranian influence made the difference for India.

Pakistan and perhaps China as well as Central Asians view Indo-Iranian collaboration in Afghanistan as unnatural or rather too lavish in full view of their antagonists, if not hostile neighbors. Iran has to understand that India needs Iran and it would gravitate on its energy bait relentlessly, giving Iran an impression at the same time that she stands by it despite US disapproval. IAIA axis, when allies would maintain forces preponderance for the Gulf energy security against Iranian wish in the Gulf by force if necessary, shall rupture Indo-Iranian ‘close’ relationship mirage in a nasty way. “But for a non-Jew to challenge that American and Israeli interests are identical is to invite the charge of anti-Semitism, which has been the kiss of death politically since the holocaust.”[18] India is safely in the same bracket now. Iran would not gulp down Israeli threat behind Indian smoke screen on its borders with Afghanistan. Under these circumstances when US-Israel-India draw more closer because of their wider convergence of global priorities, Iran would have no option but to restrict Indian access to its seaport of Chah Bahar that India is helping it to develop, cutting at the same time Indian roots in Tajikistan as well as Afghanistan. Pakistan would remain comfortable anyway, because of its loyal ‘Pathan’ belt on its western borders with Afghanistan that could not be subverted ever since partition. However, some powers with heavy stakes are keen to ignite this strategic asset called ethnic ‘pukhtoons’ against Pakistan by bribing and equipping an odd tribal segment in adjoining Afghan border areas through moles that portray perfect ‘turban and beard’ combination. Such a degree of ‘loyalty’ consolation for Pakistan through historic incidence however, has to be nurtured and sustained laboriously for which Pakistan is putting little effort and eroding its own reservoir of strength under aliens’ pressure.

It is an interesting paradox, when India did incessant finger pointing to Pakistan for indulging in illegal nuclear proliferation (Dr. A Q Khan episode), Indian scientists were helping Iran on possible enrichment techniques. According to Wall Street Journal, in September 2004 determination, two Indian nuclear scientists were sanctioned against under the INA (Iran Non-proliferation Act), Dr.Chaudhary Surendar and Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad.  The two formerly headed the Nuclear Power Corp of India and allegedly passed to Iran heavy-water nuclear technology.[19] At least four or five other Indian chemical and engineering companies faced sanctions or threat of sanctions in 2005 by US on similar transfer violations to Iran in nuclear and missile technology field under INA. Grant Pakistan that when it faced an avalanche of Indian propaganda, hardly any one in Pakistan blew trumpet of Indian complicity with Iran, out of sheer laziness of its diplomatic corps or its urge to build bridges of understanding with India!

It remains clear that Pakistani leadership, embroiled in survival war with opposing political parties has not been able to cash on such/similar profitable themes to gain a diplomacy edge internationally as does India, whenever situation presents her an opportunity. Killing of Osama bin Laden was still wrapped in a mystery but India clinched Pakistan by throat to label it as the harbinger of global terrorism on the same day, 02 May 2011. The allegation came like a bolt from India and even US who are very weak in simple arithmetic and are not impressed by five times more Pakistani forces personnel and civilians falling martyrs than theirs all combined, spilling blood for US war on terror.  Such an ill timed and possibly, a deliberate barrage, if spared for a while, could permit the two countries moving closer for chalking out an agenda of reconciliation. The cool of cricket diplomacy, which Indian Prime Minister achieved so assiduously, vanished overnight. Demolishing the bridges among the states has been the easiest narrative historically than building ones. Ephemeral gestures of reconciliation India makes occasionally have fast become the fuel for added fury, which, India and Pakistan can ill afford to suffer for a long time. Recent inconclusive talks on Sir Creek and Siachen issues in May 2011 were least followed by the Pakistani public, with foregone assumption that it was a mere gimmickry, aimed at securing credibility reservoir from ‘peace-seeking-Western world’ and a ploy to further isolate Pakistan.

 

On Pakistan domestic front, mega corruption scandal breaks cover almost every fortnight, forcing its top leadership to go out of breath to defend it. Within weeks when judiciary comes in to play its role, instead of recovering from the shame, they embark on the monstrous campaign to defy the highest courts because the corruption tales in Pakistan explored by the media are more or less always true. It is not the bad governance only but some opposition parties are also corrupt to the roots and ‘cooperate’ with the Government after securing big share in  the deals. In all probability, while Pakistan Army, Judiciary and Media are reassuring icons, the country has the potentials to wriggle out of the crises.

Indo-Iranian collaboration on trade and military cooperation in the presence of serious Indo-Pak territorial irritants and perceptional gulf would remain a concern, not only for Pakistan but for China as well. Coupled with it, Indian image as a factor for inducing instability in Pakistan from its Eastern as well as Western borders, perhaps as counter stroke to ‘Jihadis’ operations in Kashmir is extremely disturbing, when the pointers also prove US nod to India if not active support from Afghan territory. Tiff between US-Pakistan on the magnitude of war on terror and ‘do more’ syndrome haunts every Pakistani because it is unrealistic as well as impracticable. Intelligentsia in Pakistan clearly perceives that prolongation of the war on terror in Afghanistan is a mere farce to defile it or at least force Pakistan to give up its nuclear arsenals that it possesses as a solitary Muslim power. The scenario is horrible to conceive but there is graceful diplomatic maneuver space available if both the countries heed to the reason rather than making recourse to the ruses contrived by some war mongering think-tank, known for their prejudice and bias.

For India, to assume the status of 21st Century economic giant, its energy thirst would not satiate unless it resolves its dispute with Pakistan. Its strategic significance far exceeds than that of Iran when it would need every drop of oil and gas, possibly from Iran as well as Central Asia. Until Pakistan acts as an energy bridge and Damocles sword of internal and external threats are not taken off Pakistan, Indian economic boom would face severe eclipse. India may well argue that Pakistan’s internal problems are of its own making or their resolution at least its own prerogative but the fact remains that there is so much of arms twisting and intrusion in its internal affairs that even US officials had the tongue in cheeks to openly admit, yes, our operators are there  in Pakistan. Raymond Davis saga renders all speculations on the contrary to rest. Within the wider game, India needs to reassess its ambitions by recalling that as a poor but relatively ethics based country, it enjoyed far more respect even in bipolar world of Cold War era. With economic boom and lager stocks of guns, missiles and munitions, logically, its reach and recognition would have taken longer strides but it has not. All its direct neighbors except Bhutan, a protectorate, maintain uneasy relationship with India, is a coincidence worth reckoning. Is it the lack of will to mend fences with the neighbors or too much of a flare for courting distant actors who would see India supplementing their own designs at the cost of wreaking miseries to Indian masses?

The technology that is pushing globalization to the zenith, is also making the inter states relations transparent. Cloak and dagger policies, no matter who the executioners are, would seldom remain covert in the coming years; wikileaks may be a small demonstration only. The dichotomy in acts and facts, when the big powers in 21st Century were to be more benign towards the planet if not the humanity, is exaggerating. The irony is that the most powerful states that have grown beyond measures in annihilating capabilities are showing strong tendencies of eliminating the reconciliatory approaches, whatever the pretexts, in reverse ratio that bodes catastrophic for breathing space of the developing countries. China, Iran, India and Pakistan are high on the graph periphery that could be sucked in by the centripetal character of the tornado of violence in pursuit of ‘narrow or aliens’ objectives. While India and China have history of recovering from the brink, Pakistan and Iran are more vulnerable and would need to stand guard to preempt such follies.

Some conclusions are pertinent to draw:

  • India as a power in military spectrum has immense emerging influence not only in the Subcontinent but also as far as China and Australia to the East and to Gulf of Aden to the West. While India would welcome seamless cooperation from the countries within this space, they would need equal, if not more, Indian cooperation as well in the process of its improved power potentials from regional to extra regional capability. Iran, Indonesia, Australia, China and Pakistan, if not on board with India, can inflict severe dent to the perceived Indian hegemony.
  • India-Iran relations figure out prominently in the sphere of trade and at forces operational levels. Conceiving any military alliance with Iran as of today, does not fit in the Indian wider considerations. However, its cordial relations with Iran might prevent Iran to be studded on, as some Pentagon officials call it, the ‘string of pearls’ or ‘pearls necklace’ but ‘noose for India’, engineered by China. In other words, the Iranian seaports in Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, being vital for energy security, shall emerge as a subject from covert to overt diplomacy when China and India would bid for their naval use or lien in the event of any collapse of energy security environments. Iran in this context would not oblige India but China instead, not because India does not mean any importance to her but in energy security setting, Iran would see India more as a US ally and China, its all weathers choice. To woo Iranian favor for energy supplies, India has to walk on the tight rope and maintain balance with US, Israel and other Middle Eastern countries that would turn it as suspect if diplomacy cards were not played judiciously.
  • Kashmir is the mother of all disputes and mistrust between India and Pakistan. After having fought three short wars and Kargil misadventure, Pakistan has to remain committed to its viable resolution, according to the wishes of People of Kashmir. Lingering Kashmir dispute is dangerous more for India than for Pakistan, particularly when the Subcontinent, Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus, Russia and at some stage China as well, can integrate on European Union (EU) pattern that would herald tremendous peace, tranquility and hence prosperity. After India-Pakistan possible patch up, no reason remains in the fold why Pakistan should not become Energy Bridge for India as well as South East Asia. Iran, Caspian littorals and other Central Asians would be in the line by choice.
  • Indian Government needs to ensure effective public awareness so that the ruling as well as opposition parties support India-Pakistan reconciliatory overtures and ditching the dialogue does not become electioneering agenda. It fuels anti Pakistan sentiments and India has it in abundance. Too much of vitriol is pumped into masses to demonize Pakistan that is usually resorted to hype the war phobia before launching full-fledged offensives. India has the prerogative to do so if she foresees hostilities in short term. If not, she should commit herself to douse the flames.
  • Tension with Iran developed because of extra regional considerations and Indian obligation to support its allies. The alliances surfaced because India was not comfortable with neighbors including China. Chinese conduct in the international arena has remained pragmatic, fostering peace. Indo-China disputes are there but not so complicated that these cannot be resolved. After all they have been, ‘Hindi-Cheanee bhai bhai’ that translates ‘people of India and China are brothers to each other’. It only needs a stock of pragmatism from Indian side and well-intentioned diplomacy away from the distant alliances specter while on Chinese side India would find it in plenty. Friendly dance together is possible. Any side that makes the first move would enjoy moral ascendancy. It thus becomes imperative that India takes wind out of international meddling in this part of the world that is thriving on Indo-China ‘competition’. Inward coalescing of Russia, China, Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia, South Asia, South East Asia, further on to Australia makes a fantastic dream for free trading space. History has it that some grand accomplishments were perceived as dreams to start with. All actors need to take cue from EU, which has amongst them, not only brute memories but some lingered on as well.
  • Iran has to adopt a flexible approach toward the regional as well as world issues. Its anti US and anti Israel jargons hit no one else but Iran. Obliteration of Israel is her fantasy, far removed from reality. She must reconcile with impracticable ideal by sponsoring peace and harmony. Reconciled Iran would not only be more prosperous and ardently sought for power but also the one that makes its friends’ task much easier in give and take deals. “Discreet pragmatism would enable her to prove an assumption wrong, what Fred Halliday said about Iran, ‘condemned to react, unable to influence’.”[20] Conversely, Israel has emerged as a trusted ally of the US and now of India as well. Instead of setting up snares for the surrounding as well as distant countries including Iran and Pakistan, Israel is best advised to knock out two issues. It must grant Palestine a statehood that is ultimately to the benefit of Israel and return the 1967-captured territories to its neighbors. Instead of taking pleasure in demeaning US President, Barak Obama on Palestinians issue, it must regret its obstinacy for not picking up the advice of its most trusted benefactor, America. On the other hand, one sees a remarkable change that Muslims are prepared to work with Israel if these two obstacles were removed. India, as an allied country should exert its influence on Israel for helping Palestinians whose supporter, India remained for long time during Cold War era. Any success in this direction would render its standing tall with Arabs.
  • Pakistan has tremendous heap of homework to accomplish and there is light/hope on the long end side. It needs to reassess the circumstances that have pushed it to the precipice of internal turmoil and portrayed it as the subject of international conspiracies despite its rich dossier of decades’ long loyalties against the utopian ideology. It must pursue a policy within the ambit of recognized international relations, free of the gridlocks clamped by the powers that embrace it today and kick it out the next day. Resolution of imminent conflict scenarios by applying soft power while maintaining impeccable military deterrence would be the best option. Spare no effort that fosters honorable peace with the immediate neighbors, cordial relations with Muslim countries and equitable ties with all major powers.



[1] . Tony Judt, “ Post War: A History of Europe Since 1945”,  (Vintage Books London, 2010) p. 197

[2] . BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

[3] . Sujit Dutta, “China’s Emerging Power and Military Role: Implications for South Asia’, in Jonathan Pollack and Richard Yang, eds., “In China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development”, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1998), p. 92.

[4]. Indian Minister of Home Affairs, Shri P. Chidambaram appears inclined however, to support ‘war’ option to resolve issues with Pakistan as he hurled an open threat on June 8, 2011. Being an optimist, I still see lesser graveside of his thunder that aimed possibly at an opposition BJP leader who had expressed shock a day earlier over the scale of Indian forces atrocities committed in Kashmir.

[5] . David Scott ‘Sino-Indian Security Predicaments for the Twenty-First Century’,  ‘Asian Security’ (Journal), 2008, 4:3, p.265

[6] . Gary Smith ‘Australia and the rise of India’, Australian Journal of International Affairs,2010, 64: 5,  p.570

[7] .  ‘Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence’ (a Course Guide-2011), School of International, Political and Strategic Studies, ANU College, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre of Asia & the Pacific,  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sdsc/gssd, (accessed on 10 May 2011).

[8] .  The alphabets (IAIA), if pronounced one by one, sound Urdu, meaning incidentally as, ‘welcome, welcome’.

[9].  Ian Hall, “The other exception? India as a rising power”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2010, 64: 5, p. 606

[10].  Shorish Kashmiri, ‘Richness and Depth of Vision’, an interview with Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in “Chattan”, (Matbooaat-e Chattan Lahore n.d. April 1946).

[11].   Cathie Carmichael, “Genocide before the Holocaust”,  (New Haven & London: Yale University

Press, 2009) p.160

[12] . If one sees Iranian northern boundaries and its claim over the Caspian Sea status as unresolved, Iran is well within its right to claim sharing Caspian borders with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Russia, as well as Azerbaijan.

[13]. Brig (Retired) Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khan Niazi (Makni), “The New Great Game: Oil and Gas Politics in Central Eurasia”, (Raider Publishing International, New York. London and Swansea, 2008), p.192.

[14] .  “India rejects U.S. tender”, ‘The News International’, Pakistan, 28 April 2011.

[15] . Robert Kaplan, ‘Center Stage for the 21st Century: Rivalry in the Indian Ocean, ‘Foreign Affairs’, April 2009(accessed at RealClearPolitics website on 22 April 2011.

[16] . Sudha Ramachandran, “India-Iran relations at nadir”, Asia Times ( www.atimes.com) , December 4, 2010.

[17] . K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzma, “India-Iran Relations and U.S. Interests”, ‘CRS Report for Congress’, Order Code RS 22486, August 2, 2006, ( http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/70294.pdf, (accessed on 18 May 2011)  p. 6

[18] . Theodore P. Wright, “ Indo-Israel Relations and the Concept of National Interest in Multi Ethnic/Religious States” in ‘FPRC Journal-5’, (accessed at Foreign Policy Research Centre, New Delhi website on 20 April, 2011)

[19].  John Larkin and Jay Solomon, “India’s Ties With Iran Pose Challenge for U.S.,” ‘Wall Street Journal’, March 28, 2005

[20] . Dr. Makni,  op cit,  p. 193

Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khan is a retired Brig Gen from Pakistan Army, served 32 years. A veteran of ‘1971 Indo-Pak War’ has been instructor in officers’ Pakistan Military Academy, commanded Divisional as well as Corps Artillery. Holds first class Masters degree in International Relations and PhD degree, acquired in 2002-2007 from University of Peshawar, Pakistan. Authored a book, writes frequently in national and international media. Has attended several seminars and conferences within the country and abroad on invitation. Travelled to Switzerland (twice), UK, US, UAE, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Germany (twice). Cambodia and Thailand. Email: dr.makni49@yahoo.com

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What, in fact, is India’s stand on Kashmir?

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Women walking past Indian security forces in Srinagar, summer capital of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Nimisha Jaiswal/IRIN

At the UNGA, India’s first secretary Sneha Dubey said the entire Union Territories of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh “were, are and will always be an integral and inalienable part of India. She added, “Pakistan’s attempts to internationalise the Kashmir issue have gained no traction from the international community and the Member States, who maintain that Kashmir is a bilateral matter between the two countries (Pakistan is ‘arsonist’ disguising itself as ‘fire-fighter’: India at UNGA, the Hindu September 25, 2021).

It is difficult to make head or tail of India’s stand on Kashmir. India considers the whole of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir as its integral part. Yet, at the same time, admits it to be a bilateral matter still to be resolved between India and Pakistan.

What bars Pakistan from agitating the Kashmir dispute at international forums?

India presumes that the Simla accord debars Pakistan from “internationalizing” the Kashmir dispute. That’s not so. Avtar Singh Bhasin (India and Pakistan: Neighbours at Odd) is of the view that though Pakistan lost the war in East Pakistan, it won at Simla.

Bhasin says, `At the end, Bhutto the “dramatist” carried the day at Simla. The Agreement signed in Simla did no more than call for `respecting the Line of Control emerging from the ceasefire of 17 December 1971. As the Foreign Secretary TN Kaul [of India] said at briefing of the heads of foreign mission in New Delhi on 4 July 1972, the recognition of the new ceasefire line ended the United Nations’ Military Observers’ Group on India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) role in Kashmir, created specifically  for the supervision of the UN sponsored ceasefire line of 1949, since that line existed no more. Having said that India once again faltered for not asking the UN to withdraw its team from Kashmir, or withdrawing its own recognition to it and its privileges (Document No. 0712 in Bhasin’s India-Pakistan Relations 1947-207).

Following Simla Accord (1972), India, in frustration, stopped reporting ceasefire skirmishes to the UN. But, Pakistan has been consistently reporting all such violations to the UN. India feigns it does not recognise the UNMOGIP. But, then it provides logistic support to the UMOGIP on its side of the LOC.

India keeps harassing the UNMOGIP vehicles occasionally. Not long ago, three members of the UNMOGIP had a close call along the LoC in Azad Jammu and Kashmir after Indian troops shot at and injured two locals who were briefing them on the situation after ceasefire violations.

India even asked UNMOGIP to vacate 1/AB, Purina Lila Road, Connaught Place, from where it has been functioning since 1949.

Bhasin says (p.257-259), `The Pakistan Radio broadcasts and…commentators took special pains to highlight …the fact: (i) That India have accepted Kashmir to be a disputed territory and Pakistan a party to the dispute. (ii) That the UNSC resolutions had not been nullified and contrarily (iii) Kashmir remained the core issue between the two countries and that there could not be permanent peace without a just solution based on the principle of self-determination for the people of Kashmir. And Pakistan was right in its assessment. It lost the war won the peace. At the end India was left askance at its own wisdom’.

Obviously, if the UNSC resolutions are intact, then Pakistan has the right to raise the Kashmir dispute at international forums.

India’s shifting stands on Kashmir

At heart, the wily Jawaharlal Lal Nehru never cared a fig for the disputed state’s constituent assembly, Indian parliament or the UN. This truth is interspersed in Avtar Singh Basin’s 10-volume documentary study (2012) of India-Pakistan Relations 1947-2007.  It contains 3649 official documents, accessed from archives of India’s external-affairs ministry.  These papers gave new perspectives on Nehru’s vacillating state of perfidious mind concerning the Kashmir dispute. In his 2018 book (published after six years of his earlier work), India, Pakistan: Neighbours at Odds (Bloomsbury India, New Delhi, 2018), Bhasin discusses Nehru’s perfidy on Kashmir in Chapter 5 titled Kashmir, India’s Constitution and Nehru’s Vacillation (pages 51-64). The book is based on Selected Works of Jawaharlal (SWJ) Nehru and author’s own compendium of documents on India-Pak relations. Let us lay bare a few of Nehru’s somersaults

Nehru disowns Kashmir assembly’s “accession”, owns Security Council resolutions

Initially, Nehru banked on so-called Instrument of Accession and its authentication by `Constituent Assembly. Yet, in a volte-face he reiterated in New Delhi on November3, 1951 that `we have made it perfectly clear before the Security Council that the Kashmir Constituent Assembly does not [insofar] as we are concerned come in the way of a decision by the Security Council, or the United Nations’(SWJ: Volume 4: page 292, Bhasin p.228). Again, at a press conference on June 11, 1951, he was asked `if the proposed constituent assembly of Kashmir “decides in favour of acceding to Pakistan, what will be the position?”’ he reiterated,  `We have made it perfectly clear that the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir was not meant to decide finally any such question , and it is not in the way of any decision which may ultimate flow from the Security Council proceedings’ (SWJ: Volume 15:, Part II, page 394. Bhasin page 56). He re-emphasised his view once again at a press conference in New Delhi On November 3, 1951.

Nehru does not label Pakistan an aggressor at the UN

And then labels it so in Parliament

He never labeled Pakistan an aggressor at the UN. Yet, he told parliament on March 1, 1954 `that “aggression” took place in Kashmir six and a half years ago with dire consequences. Nevertheless the United States have thus far not condemned it and we are asked not to press this point in the interest of peace (Bhasin pp. 55-56).

Nehru disowns the Security Council as just a non-binding mediator

On July 24 1952, Nehru said, `Unless the Security Council functioned under some other Sections of the Charter, it cannot take a decision which is binding upon us unless we agree to it. They are functioning as mediators and a mediator means getting people to agree (SWJ, Volume 19, page 241. Bhasin page 56).

Security Council re-owned

Bhasin points out (page 57 op. cit.) `At the same press conference on 24 July, 1952 when asked what the necessity of plebiscite was now that he had got the Constituent Assembly [approval], he replied “Maybe theoretically you may be right. But we have given them [UN] an assurance and we stand by it (SWJ: Volume 19, pp. 240-241. Bhasin, p. 57, Bhasin pages 256-257).

Concluding remarks

Pakistan’s recourse to the UN is India’s Achilles Heel. So it is as India’s stand on disputed Kashmir is a rigmarole of inconsistent myths.

To avoid internationalization of the Kashmir issue, India’s own former foreign secretary Jagat Singh Mehta offered proposals (rebranded by Pervez Musharraf’s) to soften the LOC in exchange for non-internationalisation of the Kashmir dispute for 10 years. Mehta presented his ideas in an article, ‘Resolving Kashmir in the International Context of the 1990s’.

India had no consistent stand on Kashmir. There was a time when Sardar Patel presented Kashmir to Pakistan in exchange for Hyderabad and Junagadh. Reportedly, the offer was declined as Pakistan’s prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan thought it could retain not only Kashmir but also Junagadh and Hyderabad. Jawaharlal Nehru approached the United Nations’ for mediation. He kept harping his commitment to the plebiscite.

It is eerie that the whole architecture of India’s stand on Kashmir is erected on the mythical `instrument of accession’ and its endorsement by the disputed state’s assembly, Accession documents are un-registered with the UN. The Simla Accord text makes crystal clear reference to the UN charter.

Let India know that a state that flouts international treaties is a rogue state: pacta sunt servanda, treaties are to be observed and are binding on parties. Self-determination is not only a political but also a legal right in disputed lands. Sans talks with Pakistan, and UN or third-party mediation, what else is India’s recipe for imprisoned Kashmiris? A nuclear Armageddon or divine intervention?

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Afghanistan may face famine because of anti-Taliban sanctions

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Food and blankets are handed out to people in need in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, by © WFP/Arete

Afghanistan may face a food crisis under the Taliban (outlawed in Russia) rule because this movement is under sanctions of both individual states and the United Nations, Andrei Kortunov, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council, told TASS on Monday.

“A food crisis and famine in Afghanistan are not ruled out. Indeed, Afghanistan is now on life support, with assistance mostly coming from international development institutes, as well as from the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States, i.e. from Western sources and institutes close to the West,” he said. “The Taliban is under international sanctions, not only unilateral US and EU sanctions, but also under UN sanctions. That is why, in formal terms, the Taliban coming to power may mean that these sanctions could be expanded to the entire country, and it will entail serious food problems. Food deliveries from the World Food Program and other international organizations may be at risk.”

According to the expert, statistics from recent years show that annual assistance to Afghanistan amounts to about five billion US dollars, but this sum is not enough to satisfy the needs of the country’s population. “It is believed that a minimal sum needed by Afghanistan to maintain basic social institutions to avoid hunger in certain regions stands at one billion US dollars a month, i.e. 12 billion a year,” Kortunov noted. “Some say that twice as much is needed, taking into account that population growth in Afghanistan is among the world’s highest and life expectancy is among the lowest. And around half of Afghan children under five are undernourished.”

He noted that despite the fact that the issue of further food supplies to Afghanistan is not settled, some countries, for instance, China, continue to help Afghanistan but a consolidated position of the international community is needed to prevent a food and humanitarian crisis. “A common position of the international community is needed and it should be committed to paper in corresponding resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, which should provide for reservations concerning food assistance in any case,” he added.

However, in his words, the key question is who will control the distribution of humanitarian and food assistance inside the country. “There were such precedents when countries and regimes under sanctions were granted reservations and received food assistance. But a logical question arises about who will control the distribution of this assistance. This has always been a stumbling block for programs of assistance to Syria, as the West claimed that if everything is left to Damascus’ discretion, assistance will be distributed in the interests of [President Bashar] Assad and his inner circle rather than in the interests of the Syrian people. It is not ruled out that the same position will be taken in respect of the Taliban,” Kortunov went on to say. “It means that the international community will be ready to provide food assistance but on condition that unimpeded access will be granted to the areas in need and everything will not be handed over to the Taliban who will decide about whom to help.”

After the US announced the end of its operation in Afghanistan and the beginning of its troop withdrawal, the Taliban launched an offensive against Afghan government forces. On August 15, Taliban militants swept into Kabul without encountering any resistance, establishing full control over the country’s capital within a few hours. Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani said he had stepped down to prevent any bloodshed and subsequently fled the country. US troops left Afghanistan on August 31.

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The failure of the great games in Afghanistan from the 19th century to the present day

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Whenever great powers have tried to make Afghanistan a colony, they have always been defeated. British imperialism and its “civilising mission” towards backward (and therefore terrorist) populations – a mission equal to that of the time when Great Britain established itself as the first drug pusher to the Chinese Empire with the two opium wars of 1839-1842; 1856-1860: an action that was terrorist at the best.

The Russian Empire and its exporting the orthodox faith and the values of the Tsar towards the barbaric (and therefore terrorist) Afghans. The Soviet Union and its attempt to impose secularisation on Muslim (and therefore terrorist) Afghans in the period 1979-1991. The United States of America that thought it could create parties, democracy, Coke, miniskirts, as well as gambling and pleasure houses by bombing the Afghan terrorists tout-court.

In this article I will try to explain why Afghanistan won 4-0, and in 1919 – thanks to its rulers’ wise skills – was one of the only six actual independent Asian States (Japan, Nepal, Thailand and Yemen), so that at least the barroom experts – who, by their nature, believe that History is just a fairy tale like that of Cinderella and stepmother with evil sisters – reflect on the nonsense we read and hear every day in the press and in the media.

In his book I luoghi della Storia (Rizzoli, Milan 2000), former Ambassador Sergio Romano wrote on page 196: “The Afghans spent a good part of the nineteenth century playing a diplomatic and military game with the great powers – the so-called “Great Game” – the main rule of which was to use the Russians against the Brits and the Brits against the Russians”.

In the days when geopolitics was a forbidden subject and the word was forbidden, in the history textbooks of secondary schools it seemed that the United States of America and the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had fallen from the sky as large as they were on the atlases. I still remember that in the dialogues between professors and high school students, it was stated that the two powers could not be called colonial, since they had something messianic and redeeming in themselves (therefore anti-terrorist).

It was only thanks to western movies that the young people of the time understood how the thirteen Lutheran colonies had extended westwards into lands that we were led to believe had been inhabited by savage villains to be exterminated (hence terrorists) and by uncivilised Spaniards, as Catholics, to be defeated. Moreover, we did not dare to study Russia’s expansion eastwards and southwards, at the risk that the high school students – unprepared, pure and enthusiastic – would understand that the homeland of socialism had no different assumptions from all other imperialisms.

Sometimes the students heard about the great game or, in Russian, the tournament of shadows (turniry teney). What was the great game? Today it is mostly remembered as the epic of freedom of the unconquered Afghans, but in reality its solution meant the alliance between Russia and Great Britain, which lasted at least until the eve of the Cold War. A key position that is sometimes too overlooked, and not only in scientific and classical textbooks, but also in many essays by self-proclaimed experts.

British aversion to the Russian Empire – apart from the “necessary” anti-Napoleonic alliances in the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth and Seventh Coalitions – dated back to the 17th century and worsened considerably in the 19th century. Although Russian exports of grain, natural fibres and other agricultural crops were made to Great Britain – because the Russian landowners were well disposed to good relations with the Brits in order to better market those products abroad – there were no political improvements. The opposition came more from Great Britain than from Russia.

Tsar Nicholas I (1796-1825-55) – in the late 1830s, during his trip to Great Britain in 1842, and later in 1850-52, i.e. just before the Crimean War (1853-56) – often tried to bring about normalisation, but due to British suspicions and doubts (the Russians were considered to be terrorists) this did not occur.

What worried the Foreign Office – created in March 1782 – was Russia’s fast march eastwards, southwards and south-westwards. Great Britain could feel Russian breath on it from the three sides of India. The Russian goals with regard to Turkey, the successes in Trancaucasia and the Persian goals, not to mention the colonisation of Central Asia, initiated by the aforementioned Tsar Nicholas I, and conducted vigorously by his successor Alexander II (1818-1855-81), were – for Her Britannic Majesty’s diplomats and generals – a blatant and threatening intimidation of India’s “pearl”.

In the north-west of the Indian subcontinent the British possessions bordered on the Thar desert and on Sindh (the Indus River delta) which constituted a Muslim State under leaders residing at Haidarābād, conquered by the Brits in 1843. To the north-east of Sindh, the Punjab region had been amalgamated into a strong State by Maharaja Ranjit Singh Ji (1780-1801-39) who, as a simple Governor of Lahore (Lâhau) on behalf of the Afghan Emir, Zaman Shah Durrani (1770-93-1800-†44), had succeeded not only in becoming independent, but also in extending his power over Kashmir and Pīshāwar, creating the Sikh Empire in 1801, which was overthrown by Great Britain during the I (1845-46) and II (1848-49) Anglo-Sikh wars; the region became what is known as the Pakistani Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (the North-West Frontier Province).

Given the British expansion into the neighbouring States of Afghanistan and Persia, Russia’s influence was trying to creep in; hence the Brits were paying close attention to what was happening on the border of the great Northern “neighbour”.

Russia had long been aiming to make its way to India through Western Turkestan, but that steppe region was inhabited by the Kyrgyz in the north-east and the Turks (Turkmen) in the south-west.

After unsuccessful attempts at peaceful penetration, the Russian Governor of Orenburg, Gen. Vasilij Alekseevič Perovskij (1794-1857), prepared an expedition against Chiva: it involved crossing about a thousand kilometres of desert and was thought to be easier to make during the winter. The expedition left from Orenburg in November 1839, but the cold killed so many men and camels that the Commander had to give up the venture and turn back (spring 1840). For a long time, the Russians did not attempt any more military infiltrations there.

In Persia, instead, Russian influence was strongly felt: Tsar Alexander II pushed the Shah, Naser al-Din Qajar (1831-48-96), to undertake an enterprise against the city of Herāt (which dominated the passage from Persia and Western Turkestan into India): it had detached itself from Afghanistan and had been a separate State since 1824. The Persian expedition began in the autumn of 1837: Herāt resisted strenuously, so much so that in the summer of 1838 the Shah had to renounce the siege and accept Britain’s mediation for peace with the sovereign of that city. That diplomatic move was therefore also detrimental to the influence of St. Petersburg. Even the first relations established by Russia with the Emir of Afghanistan did not lead to any result.

In those years, Russia was busy quelling the insurrections of the mountain populations in the Caucasus, where the exploits of the alleged Italian sheikh, Mansur Ushurma (Giambattista Boetti, 1743-98), in the service of the Chechen cause, still echoed.

Through two treaties concluded with Persia (1828) and Turkey (1829), Russia had become the master of the region; however, it found an obstinate resistance from the local populations that still persists today.

The First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42) was one of the most important military conflicts of the great game and one of the worst British defeats in the region. The Brits had started an expedition to Afghanistan to overthrow Emir Dost Mohammad (1793-1826-39, 42-63), the first of the Barakzai dynasty, and replace him with the last of the Durrani dynasty, Ayub Shah (17??-1819-23, †37), who had been dethroned in 1823, but he renounced. Not wanting to cross the Sikh country in order not to arouse mistrust among the Sikhs, the British entered Baluchistan, occupied the capital (Qalat), then penetrated into Afghanistan and advanced without encountering serious resistance as far as Kabul, where on August 7, 1839 they installed their own puppet, Shuja Shah (1785-1842), formerly Emir from 1803 to 1809.

Dost Mohammad was caught and sent to Calcutta. A the beginning of 1841, however, one of his sons – Sher Ali – aroused the Afghans’ rebellion. The military commander, Gen. William George Keith Elphinstone (b. 1782), got permission to leave with 4,500 soldiers and 12,000 non-combatants to return to India. In the mountain passes near Kabul, however, the expedition was taken by surprise and annihilated (January 1842). The commander died as prisoner of the Afghans (on April 23).

The Brits obviously wanted revenge: they sent other troops that, in September of the same year, reconquered Kabul: this time the Brits – intimidated – did not deem it advisable to remain there. Convinced they had reaffirmed a certain prestige, they withdrew and, since the Emir they protected had died on April 5, 1842, they agreed – helplessly – to Dost Mohammad’s return to the throne. He conquered Herāt forever for Afghanistan.

Russia did not just stand by and watch and asserted its power in the Far East. In the years 1854-58 – despite its engagement in the Crimean war: the first real act of the great game, as Britain had to defend the Ottoman Empire from Sarmatian aspirations of conquest – it had established, with a series of expeditions, its jurisdiction over the province of Amur, through the Treaty of Aigun – labelled as the unequal treaty as it was imposed on China – on May 28, 1858. Shortly afterwards the fleet arrived at Tien-Tsin (Tianjin), forced China into another treaty on June 26-27, thus obtaining the opening of ports for trade, and the permanence of a Russian embassy in Peking. Moreover, in Central Asia, Russia renewed its attempts to advance against the khanates of Buchara and Kokand (Qo’qon), and had once again led the Shah of Persia, Mozaffar ad-Din Qajar (1853-96-1907), to try again the enterprise of Herāt (1856), which had caused again the British intervention (Anglo-Persian War, 1856-57) that ended with Persia’s recognition of the independence of the aforementioned city. The Anglo-Russian rivalry thus continued to be one of the essential problems of Central Asia, for the additional reason that Russia gradually expanded into West Turkestan, Buchara and Chiva between 1867 and 1873.

After the Russian conquests in West Turkestan, Dost Mohammad’ son and successor, Sher Ali (1825-63-66, 68-79), came under the influence of the neighbouring power, which was trying to penetrate the area to the detriment of Britain. On July 22, 1878 St Petersburg sent a mission. The Emir repelled a similar British mission at the Khyber Pass in September 1878, thus triggering the start of the war. The Brits soon opened hostilities, invading the country with 40,000 soldiers

 from three different points.

The Emir went into exile in Mazār-i-Sharīf, leaving his son Mohammad Yaqub (1849-79-80, †1914) as heir. He signed the Treaty of Gandamak on May 26, 1879 to prevent a British invasion of the rest of the country.

Once the British First Resident, the Italian Pierre Louis Napoleon Cavagnari (b. 1841) went to Kabul, he was assassinated there on September 3, 1879. British troops organised a second expedition and occupied the capital. They did not trust the Emir and raised a nephew of Dost Mohammed, Abdur Rahman (1840/44-80-1901), to power on May 31, 1880. He pledged to have no political relations except with Britain.

The former Emir, Mohammad Yaqub, took up arms and severely defeated the Brits at Maiwand on July 27, 1880, with the help of the Afghan heroine Malalai Anaa (1861-80), who rallied the Pashtun troops against the attackers. On September 1 of the same year Mohammad Yaqub was defeated and put to flight by Gen. Frederick Roberts (1832-1914) in the Battle of Kandahâr, which ended the Second Anglo-Afghan War.

This brought Afghanistan permanently under British influence, which was secured by the construction of a railway from the Indus River to the Afghan city of Kandahâr. Since the railway passed through Beluchistan, it was definitively annexed to British India. In 1880, Russia began the construction of the Transcaspian Railway, which alarmed the Brits who extended the section of their “railroad” to Herāt.

It was only with the accession to the throne of Imānullāh (1892-1919-29, †60), on February 28, 1919 (Shah from 1926), that Afghanistan took its foreign policy away from Great Britain through the Third Anglo-Afghan War (6 May-8 August 1919), by which the Afghans finally threw the Brits out of the picture (Treaty of Râwalpindî of August 8, 1919, amended on November 22, 1921).

As early as 1907, the Russian government had declared it considered Afghanistan to be outside its sphere of influence, and pledged not to send any agents there, as well as to consult the British government about its relations with that country.

Indeed, Britain soon gave up direct control of the country, given the fierce fighting spirit of its people, who had humiliated it many times, and contented itself with guarding and keeping the north-west Indian border under control.

In reality, the great game has never ended. As Spartacus Alfredo Puttini stated (La Russia di Putin sulla scacchiera, in “Eurasia”, A. IX, No. 1, January-March 2012, pp. 129-147), upon his coming to power Vladimir Putin found himself grappling with a difficult legacy. Gorbachev’s policy of katastroika had dealt a lethal blow to the Soviet and later Russian colossus.

Within a few years, Russia had embarked on a unilateral disarmament that led, at first, to its withdrawal from Afghanistan and then from Central and Eastern Europe. While the State was heading for collapse and the economy was being disrupted, it was the very periphery of the Soviet Union that was catching fire due to separatist movements promptly subsidised by those who – in the great game – replaced the Brits. Massive US aid to the heroic anti-Soviet patriots, who were later branded as terrorists.

In a short time the real collapse occurred and the ‘new’ Russia found itself geopolitically shrunken and morally and materially prostrated by the great looting made by the pro-Western oligarchs in the shadow of the Yeltsin Presidency.

To the west, the country had returned to the borders of the 17th century; to the south, it had lost Southern Caucasus and valuable Central Asia, where the new great game was soon to begin. In other words, the process of disruption would not stop, and would infect the Russian Federation itself: Chechnya had engaged in a furious war of secession that threatened to spread like wildfire to the whole of Northern Caucasus and, in the long run, called into question the very survival of the Russian State divided into autonomous entities.

This was followed by the phenomenon of “orangism” in 2003-2005 (Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan): the various caricatures of oxymoronic “liberal” revolutions aimed at moving certain governments away from Russia’s influence.

Ultimately, the central power had been undermined on all sides by the policy of Yeltsin and his clan, aimed at granting extensive autonomy to the regions of the Federation. Public property, the glue of State authority and the instrument of its concrete activity to guide and orient the nation, had been sold off. Over time, Putin put things right, and the rest is condensed into the restoration choices of the plebiscitary vote in his favour.

In the end Afghanistan also saw the US failure, which I have examined in previous articles.

The Asian sense of freedom is summed up in the expulsion of foreign aggressors from their own homelands and territories. Someone should start to understand this.

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