Recent developments along the India-Pakistan border have grabbed the attention of the world have caused a steady build up of fear and uncertainty in both countries. The 18 September attack on an Indian army base in Kashmir and subsequent unravelling of diplomatic and military tension between the two nation has the caused a steady build up of tension and fear in the corridors of power in New Delhi, Islamabad and Rawalpindi.
With Pakistan denying the surgical strikes and India refusing to prove them wrong and providing proof, the conflict has been kept controlled. If there is any hope to keep the conflict controlled, and prevent it from full-scale war, Nawaz Sharif must be able to a fine line between coaxing India and satisfying his military. Pakistan must realize the futility and irrationality of protecting militants and terrorist groups, and for its betterment seek to dismantle its traditional, use of militants to conducting its foreign policy.
In the aftermath of the attack on the Indian army base by Pakistan-backed militants, India has adopted a multi-pronged retaliatory response by unleashing diplomatic hell on Pakistan at United Nations and by conducting surgical strikes on terrorist camps along the border. At the UN, asking it to abandon its dreams on Kashmir and ‘introspect on Balochistan’ instead. External Affairs Minister, Sushma Swaraj, lead the tirade against Pakistan stating that the world knew where terrorism and it was time for the world to isolate those nations which nurture, peddle and export terrorism. Not surprisingly, Pakistan responded to Swaraj’s ‘litany of lies’ and accused India of diverting attention from its ‘atrocities in Kashmir’.
By reaching out to fellow SAARC nation countries, New Delhi has successfully ensured the postponement of the summit in Islamabad by withdrawing from the summit and having Afghanistan, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka follow suit. All countries have stated their inability to attend the summit given the security environment that is not conducive to regional cooperation. On a bilateral front, India has had discussions over withdrawing Pakistan’s Most Favoured Nation Status (MFN) status and changing its stance on the Indus Water Treaty. While it has chosen not to act on those aspects of the relationship as of now, it has sent Pakistan a strong message: it will not hesitate in enforcing all forms of pressure in the future.
Ten days after the attack, India launched pre-emptive surgical strikes against terror camps along the LoC that had “positioned themselves at launch pads” ready to infiltrate and carry out attacks in Kashmir. By stating the pre-emptive nature of the strike and the fact that it does not plan to conduct any more such strikes, India ensured that the strike was not seen as an offensive attack on Pakistan territory, a move which may have escalated the conflict rapidly. Pakistan has denied the strike and has flown in foreign and domestic journalists to the LoC to prove their point. What does this mean? With India saying it conducted strikes and Pakistan saying it didn’t, where does it leave the two countries and what are the repercussions?
First, it allows the Pakistan narrative to flourish domestically. It has caused Pakistanis to further doubt India’s integrity and has raised questions as to why the Indian government has not provided greater details of the nature of the strikes and/or evidence that they happened. This suits Islamabad and Rawalpindi as they are no longer forced to respond to something ‘India made up’. Second, it allows the conflict to remain as is, and avoid further escalation of military confrontation. The truth about the strikes is known only to a select few in each country and by not providing proof of the strikes, both countries have jointly kept the conflict in control for the time being.
As the calls for providing evidence of the strikes in India gets louder, the government may be pushed into a tighter corner and forced to provide irrefutable evidence. While any evidence India provides will be refuted by Islamabad, it may provoke the sleeping dragon in Rawalpindi. The army may be forced to react to save face, if it is proved that the Indian army entered Pakistan territory. Any sort of military retaliation from Pakistan will force the right-wing nationalistic, ‘tough-on-Pakistan’ Narendra Modi government into a retaliatory war.
However, in an unprecedented move, the Nawaz Sharif government has warned the military about Pakistan’s increasing isolation. In a report by DAWN, the civilian government has sought agreement with the military on certain matters of the state, including non-interference of the military in law-enforcement cases against militant groups. Nawaz Sharif has also directed for fresh attempts to be made to wrap up the Pathankot and the Mumbai 26/11 cases and has also made a case for cracking down on the Haqqani Network, highlighting the increasing United States pressure that has already caused a deterioration in relations.
This is a silver lining on what has been a grey, foreboding cloud. While it remains unlikely that the military will buckle down it is vital for Pakistan’s civilian government to make an attempt to loosen the military’s grip on certain conditions laid down by India and the US. Cracking on terror groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani Network will not only demonstrate the power of the civilian government, but it will earn Raheel Sharif and his men, new found respect amongst the people of Pakistan. The military’s counterinsurgency operation Zarb-e-Azb, which has been in effect since 2013 has been in full swing cracking down on terror camps in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. While the military’s communicating wing, has played a highly successful campaign in highlight the Pakistan military’s determination and resolve to root out militants and terrorists that threaten the country, the absence of any action against the Haqqani Network and JeM is jarring and obvious. Although Pakistan cannot overtly demonstrate that it is listening to what India is saying, showing India and the world, some goodwill will help Pakistan redeem itself in the world’s eyes. Not to mention, it will do Pakistan a whole of good domestically.
Both India and Pakistan would do well to remember that their problems will be far better resolved, if they are able to work in tandem, seeking solely diplomatic solutions. India must remind itself of its ultimate goal vis-à-vis Pakistan. New Delhi’s aim is not the military destruction of Pakistan, but to exert enough pressure that it abandons its use of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. It must humbly recognize that surgical strikes are not strategic game changers in the conflict, but psychological maneuvers that are directed to coerce Pakistan to give up its policy of supporting militants. If history has taught us anything it is that, Pakistan is so quintessentially bipolar in his governance that it is highly optimistic to assume that the military will let civilian government dictate terms to it. It is therefore unlikely that given the present situation, Pakistan will bow down and ‘give in’. Pakistan military intelligence agencies have been providing militant groups with support for many, many years. Their alliances with militant leaders such as Sirajuddin Haqqani, Masood Azhar and Hafiz Saeed have been sacrosanct. If the military allows civilian law enforcement agencies to act against such militant groups, the backlash will brutal and dangerous on their part.
That being said, in the spirit of discussing an optimal and ideal situation to get out of the current mess, if the civilian government in Pakistan is able to put enough pressure on the military to give into certain demands, Nawaz Sharif will be relieved having saved the country from conflict and diplomatic humiliation, however the credit will go to Raheel Sharif. The army chief will end his tenure on a high, his popularity soaring having been true to his word of rooting out militancy in Pakistan and saving the country from international isolation. In India while the army will continue to be praised for its heroism, all our aware od the political bidding behind the strikes. The Narendra Modi government will be able to pat itself on the back for successfully exercised strategic restraint against Pakistan and having shed any sort of domestic doubt that they are a government that are “too soft” on Pakistan.
Pakistan must realize that it cannot draw out and postpone the inevitable. It must seriously take down all terror and militant infrastructure in the country and disregard terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. For far too long, the military has propagated the belief that it is doing everything it can to take down terror infrastructure in the country. While the United States has pressurized it to do more, by blocking subsidized sale of military equipment and repeatedly reminding it of its promises, Pakistan must give up its game for its own good. Irrespective of what it wants from India vis-à-vis Kashmir, it must realize that only by sincerely committing to absolving terror from its territory can it find its redemption.
Then and only then, can both India and Pakistan begin to rehash their problems.
Into the Sea: Nepal in International Waters
A visit to the only dry port of Nepal will immediately captivate busy scenes with hundreds of trucks, some railway carriages and huge Maersk containers at play. Trains from the Port of Kolkata in India carry tons of Nepal’s exports every week. Every year, Nepal is fined millions of rupees for overstaying its containers at the designated dock in Haldiya Port of Kolkata. Nepal pays for spaces inside Indian ships to carry out its exports via the sea. This is the closest Nepal has come in exploiting economic opportunities through sea waters. Prime Minister KP Oli went one step further and presented an idea of steering Nepal’s own fleets in the vast international sea space. While his idea of Nepal affording its own ship was mocked; on the contrary, he was right. The idea is practical but herculean.
To start with, Nepal has a landlocked right to use international waters via a third country for economic purposes only. Law of the Sea conferences held during the 80’s, guarantees Nepal’s right to use the exclusive economic zone all around the globe. Article 69 of the Law of the Sea convention states that Nepal could both use sea as a trading route and exploit the exclusive economic zone of its sea facing neighbors. Nepal’s closest neighbor, India has a wide exclusive economic zone which consists of 7500 km long coastline. The article also allows landlocked nations to use docking facilities of the nearest coastal nation to run its fleets. An exclusive economic zone in sea waters is designated after a coastal nation’s eleven mile parallel water boundary ends; which is also a part of the coastal nations territory. Simply put, Nepali fleets can dock at India’s port, sail eleven miles further into international waters-carry out fishing and other activities, sail back to the Indian coast and transfer its catches back to Nepal.
Before ships can carry the triangular flag into sea waters, Nepal will need treaties in place to use coastal nation’s water to take off and build shipment facilities. Law of the Sea convention clearly mentions that the right to use another nation’s coast will depend solely on the will of the hosting coastal nation. Does Nepal have the political will to communicate and forge a comprehensive sea transit agreement with its coastal neighbors? Nepal’s chance of securing fleets in and around the Indian Ocean will depend on whether it can convince nations like India of mutual benefits and cancel any apprehension regarding its security that might be compromised via Nepal’s sea activity. The convention itself is one among the most controversial international agreements where deteriorating marine ecosystems, sovereignty issues and maritime crimes are at its core. Majority of global and environmental problems persist in the high seas; ranging from territorial acquisitions to resource drilling offences. Nepal is welcome into the high seas, but does it comprehend the sensitivity that clouts sea horizons? Nepal needs a diplomatic strategy, but lacking experience, Nepal will need to develop institutional capacities to materialize the oceanic dream. Secondly, the cost of operating such a national project will be dreadfully expensive. Does the Nepali treasury boast finances for a leapfrogging adventure?
How is it possible?
The good news is that many landlocked nations operate in international waters. Switzerland, as an example might not assure the Nepali case, but Ethiopia exercising its sea rights via Djibouti’s port could be inspiring. Before Nepal can start ordering its fleets, it will need to design its own political and diplomatic strategy. Nepal’s best rationale would lie in working together with its neighbors. The South Asian network of nations could finally come into use. Along with Nepal, Bhutan is another landlocked nation where possible alliances await. If India’s coasts are unapproachable, Nepal and Bhutan could vie for Bangladeshi coastlines to experience sea trading. Maldivian and Pakistani waters are geographically and economically inaccessible but Sri Lanka lies deep down the South Asian continent. If Nepal and Bhutan can satisfy Sri Lankan interests, the landlocked union could not only skim through thousands of nautical miles around the Bay of Bengal without entering Indian water space; but also neutralize the hegemonic status of India in the region. If such a multinational agreement can be sought; SAARC- the passive regional body will not only gain political prowess but other areas of regional development will also kickstart.
Most importantly, a transit route (such as the Rohanpur-Singhdabad transit route) from Bangladesh to Nepal and Bhutan will need to be constructed well before ships start running in the Indian Ocean. In doing so, Nepal will not only tranquilize Nepal-Bhutan relations but also exercise leadership role in South Asia. A regional agreement will flourish trade but will also make landlocked Nepal’s agenda of sailing through other regions of international sea strong and plausible. A landlocked union with Bhutan will trim the costs than that of which Nepal will be spending alone. Such regional compliance would also encourage international financial institutions to fund Nepal’s sea project. Apart from political leverages, Nepal’s economy would scale new heights with decreasing price of paramount goods and services. Flourishing exports and increased tourism opportunities would be Nepal’s grandiloquence. Nepal’s main challenge lies in assuring its neighbors on how its idea would be mutually beneficial. Nepal’s work starts here. Nepal needs to put together a cunning diplomatic show.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hug Diplomacy Fails
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s enthusiasm is only to capture power; the same, however, cannot be said of foreign policy administration, especially in dealing with our immediate neighbors, and China. The best examples of his policy paralysis are the way in which demonetization and GSTs are implemented, or his sudden visit to Pakistan in December 2015. He is always in election mode. During the first two years, he was in the humor of a general election victory. Thereafter, he has spent much of his energy in establishing himself as the sole savior of the BJP in state elections, and this year he will turn his attention to the 2019 general elections.
Two years ago, without doing any homework or planning, Modi travelled to Pakistan from Afghanistan to greet his counterpart, the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, to wish him well on his birthday. He hugged Sharif and spent only two hours with him to try to sort out the 70 year outstanding divergence between India and Pakistan.
Modi strategically hugs fellow world leaders. He has no strategic perception. He believes only in the power of his personal charisma in dealing with foreign policy matters. This strategy has failed considerably with China and with our other immediate neighbors, but he neither intends to accept these mistakes, nor is he interested in learning from them. More importantly, an alternative diplomatic strategy is necessary to maintain our international position; through prudent policy articulations. Let us examine the impact of his hug diplomacy.
During the 2013/14 general elections campaign he attacked the Congress-led UPA government on multiple fronts, including towards former Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh’s policy on Pakistan. He proposed that the BJP government would have more guts to better deal with Pakistan. Under his administration, we lost numerous soldiers in fighting with Pakistan terrorists, experienced a 100-day shutdown in Kashmir, blindly allowed a Pakistan team to inspect our Pathankot Air Force Station, and generally continued down a visionless path in foreign policy. These indicate that Modi’s defensive and offensive strokes against Pakistan have failed completely, including the most politicized ‘surgical strike’ that did not contain the terrorists from Pakistan. Today, the Modi government is searching for policy directions in handling Pakistan, but sat in a corner like a lame duck.
In the beginning, when he took office, Modi perhaps believed that ‘everything is possible’ in international affairs simply by virtue of occupying the prime minister seat. Further, he thought that all his visits abroad would bring a breakthrough. His hugs with counterparts, various costume changes, and the serving of tea, indicate that our prime minister is using soft power approaches. These approaches were used by our first Prime Minister Nehru whilst India did not have a strong military or economy. However, India is not today what it was in the 1950/60s. Presently, hugging and changing costumes will not necessarily keep India influential in international relations, especially at a time when the world is undergoing multi-polar disorder. However, he is in continuous denial that his paths are wrong, especially in dealing with our neighbors.
What is the BJP led-NDA government policy on Pakistan? Does this government have any policy for Pakistan? Since 2014,Modi has not permitted the Minister of External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj, to contribute to any foreign policy articulations. As long as Sushma fulfills the duty of Ministry of Indian Overseas Affairs she will receive praise from the prime minister’s office.
During 2015 he met Sharif at his residence in Islamabad to give him a hug. This happened exactly two years ago. Further, this is a very serious question that the Media and Modi-supporting TV channels forgot to raise. Instead, without hesitation, they praised him for touching the sky, and described the moment as a diplomatic initiative for a breakthrough with our neighbor Pakistan. The Media will realize this mistake when their traditional viewers switch over to other channels to get centrist news.
What are the outcomes of Modi hugging Sharif at his residence? The results are terrible. India’s relation with Pakistan touches the lowest ever level in a history of 70 years. The Mumbai terror attack mastermind Hafiz Saeed was released from house arrest and has started a political party to contest the general elections in Pakistan next year. This government does not have the guts to put pressure on Pakistan to provide the evidence – as requested by the Pakistan’s Court – essential to keeping the trial alive against Saeed. Modi has often preached that his government succeeded in isolating Pakistan in the international domain. The reality would be as much India diplomatically isolating Pakistan from the international community as the vacuum has been comfortably filled by China without any difficulty. These are the achievements that Modi’s hugs have brought to India.
The stability of Afghanistan is in India’s long-term strategic interest. India’s ‘aid diplomacy’ to Afghanistan in various fields has been increasing day after day, including infrastructure development and the training of Afghan security forces. Yet, India’s influence in Afghanistan is in disarray. Former Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai said, “India should have its own policy on Afghanistan”. However, Modi’s policy makers in New Delhi are expecting the US President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to maintain India’s active and significant role in Afghanistan.
India showed its displeasure during the constitutional crisis in Nepal, in halting energy supply to Kathmandu. This forced the land-locked country to obtain easy support from Beijing. Nepal was once the buffer state between India and China; it is now sitting on China’s lap and steering India. Modi’s mute approach to the Rohingya crisis speculates India’s major power ambition. This is a serious setback to India’s diplomacy: it is now pushing Myanmar to get support from China, along with our neighbor Bangladesh, in resolving the crisis with Rohingya refugees.
The first democratically elected government under Mohamed Nasheed was toppled unconstitutionally in Maldives. Since India has failed to raise any substantial voice against this atrocity, China has jumped onto the scene. New Delhi ought to have designed a policy to resolve the political crisis, but India, the world’s largest democracy, has watched this incident as a movie in the Indian Ocean Theatre. The highlight was the decision of our Prime Minister to skip a visit to the Maldives whilst on his tour of the Indian Ocean islands.
In Sri Lanka, China is designing its future battlefield against India. As the war against LTTE was over, Colombo started travelling in a two-way track, with India and China. Beijing’s love affair, apparently with Colombo, but with an eye on New Delhi, is no secret. Since Modi has allowed these developments without exercising any diplomatic resistance, he has given China a comfortable seat inside Sri Lanka. China has now realised that her weaved network against India can be strengthened easily in the Indian Ocean, because New Delhi only displays silent concern. After Modi took office, India – China relations have remained static. The border talks are on stand still. Beijing holds on to extend a technical hold on Masood Azhar, a UN designated terrorist. The dragon pulls our immediate neighbors to her side. These developments indicate that our foreign policy articulations are not supported by any clear strategic trajectory.
Modi’s diplomacy is like an air balloon which, once torn, cannot be refilled; a new balloon is needed. Hugging a leader does not lead to any commitment in foreign affairs. Personal charisma does not work as a foreign policy tool in dealing with a world power. For this reason, Modi cannot understand the setback he is facing with China, Pakistan, and our other neighbors. In comparison, Vajpayee’s or Dr. Manmohan Singh’s combined simple charisma as leaders or economists with appropriate home-work in the past; has caused tremendous results in foreign policy, including expected results in Indo-US nuclear negotiations. This is completely missing in Modi’s administration.
Hence, the newly elected Congress Party President Rahul Gandhi has said, “Modi’s hug diplomacy fails”. It was a valuable comment that the ruling elite should consider as a meaningful insight. Alternative approaches are vital to regain our neighbors’ trust, as opposed to China’s. However, Prime Minister Modi’s this year of work will be focused on the 2019 general elections, compromising the proper attention due to India’s international diplomacy.
First published in Congress Sandesh
Potential Consequences of Nuclear Politics in South Asia
Established in 1948, Indian atomic energy commission turned towards United Kingdom for their first help in the making of Apsara. Subsequently, with a similar vision, the CIRUS reactor was supplied by Canada, where, the heavy water came from the United States.
India, over the years, has built a nuclear program that has led to the making of a number of reactors. India’s 1974 “Peaceful nuclear explosion” implies to their hegemonic ambitions as India has the capacity to produce around 300-400 nuclear weapons. The continuous upgradation of weapons by India could lead her as a hegemon nuclear power that can deeply unsettle Pakistan and China.
Calling into question India’s stated intentions, when it comes to nuclear tests, the plutonium for its 1974 and 1998 tests was diverted from its “civilian” nuclear facilities. After 1974, India continued to claim its explosion was “peaceful” and advocated global nuclear disarmament, even as it rejected proposals by Pakistan to denuclearize South Asia.
From Pokhran-I to Operation Shakti, India has traditionally relied on plutonium and thermonuclear technology. In 1992, the then Chairman of Department of Indian Atomic Energy acknowledged that India had succeeded in the past for achieving the target of highly enriched uranium, while the centrifuge program was facing critical and technical hindrances. Also, it was admitted by the former Chairman of AEC, Raja Ramanna that India was working to produce more efficient centrifuges which were used for military purposes. At the peak of all these developments, it is important to note that thermonuclear weapons have far more destructive power than a nuclear bomb.
India may also be considering using its civil power reactors to increase its stock of weapon-grade plutonium. Robert Einhorn, the State Department’s former top nonproliferation official told the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference in March that the officials in the Bush administration had the ambition to sign a nuclear deal with India, to “work together to counter China- to be a counterweight to an emerging China.” He further expressed his views that the nuclear deal had unfortunate repercussions, because other nations concluded that Washington was playing favorites with India.
India is the only country in the region having uranium reserves that are higher than what other countries in the region hold. India has already received roughly 4,914 tons of uranium from France, Russia, and Kazakhstan, and it has agreements with Canada, Mongolia, Argentina, and Namibia for additional shipments. It also signed a uranium deal with Australia that has sparked considerable controversy at home.
This massive production of uranium annually can support its nuclear submarine program and current weapons grade plutonium production rate indirectly. These uranium reserves are enough for approx. 6-10 bombs per year.
Adding a twist to the existing fissile material build-up process, the Indo-US strategic partnership supplemented it. Under this dangerous bargain, it would continue to not only allow India to increase its fissile material but also the capacity to increase the build-up of nuclear weapon material.
Hence, the strategic stability in South Asia has been negatively impacted since the initial stages due to the hegemonic designs which India pursued with the start of CIRUS reactor. With the passage of time, the Indo-US nuclear deal and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver have already added more repercussions and now the discriminatory move to try to facilitate Indian NSG membership will further erode the strategic stability in South Asia.
Indian NSG membership and its potential exemption has adverse implications on non-proliferation regime. This has allowed India to expand its military program. As a result of 2008 exemption it has signed a number of agreement in nuclear domain with different countries. Interestingly, Mansoor Ahmed states that India has the capacity to utilize the uranium it is importing from these countries to produce more bombs. The aforementioned reasons sum up India’s keenness to obtain NSG’s membership. This U.S.-backed move to make India a member of the NSG will be good neither for Pakistan nor for China, and it would set off nuclear instability in the region.
While looking at the dynamics of left alone Pakistan since late 1990’s, starting from Indo-US strategic partnership to now this geoploliticising of NSG. Consequently, this shall allow India to use all this a means of making the most optimum use of all its natural uranium stocks for weaponization. To offset the stakes, it might be prudent to have a close check on the international architects of India’s nuclear build-up. The alleged misuse of U.S. and Canadian controlled items by India must be enough to refrain from any cooperation if it is not abiding by group’s guidelines and commodity control list.
Furthermore, the more discriminatory the international nuclear order becomes, the less would be the effectiveness of deterrence and strategic balance in the region. The NSG will have to identify that India’s 1974 nuclear explosive test was the reason that nuclear supplier states established the NSG. It must also emphasize upon its commitment to uphold the principles of the nonproliferation.
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