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The TAPI Pipeline: The Politics of Energy Balancing

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There is a new energy rush among many Greater Caspian states, one that continues to focus on breaking free of the heavy Russian influence while also diversifying their supply chains.

However, in the continual game of energy politics, many geopolitical and geostrategic foes have been born. One such nation, Turkmenistan, is spearheading an energy initiative that will both diversify and expand its customer base while at the same time release itself from Russian authority.

In addition to being a landlocked country and a former Soviet Republic, the nation is also the richest Caspian state in natural gas and untapped energy resources. Yet the nation has also struggled throughout the past in diversifying its export transportations. This issue stems back into the 1980s and 90s when Russia attempted to exert its influence throughout Central Asia by occupying Afghanistan. During this time Russian gas giant Gazprom refused to sign an energy deal with Unocal – a previous petroleum explorer and marketer based in California – over a Trans-Afghanistan pipeline, due to U.S. support for the mujahideen, a move it believed was aimed at undermining Russian influence in the region. Moreover, Gazprom’s chief executive at the time, Rem Vyakhirev, declared that Russia would not allow Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan to export its oil and gas through non-Russian pipelines. This was aimed as a move that would eradicate any form of Russian influence or energy developments throughout Central Asia in the near or far future.

While projects like the aforementioned Trans-Afghan pipeline failed to develop and efforts to build the Trans-Caspian pipeline are continually stalled due to political contestations, on December 13, 2015, a deal outlining the details to build the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (TAPI) pipeline was signed. This ratification hopes to allow the destination countries to break free of those political and economic chains that have restricted Turkmen gas from diversifying its transport routes and becoming independent of Russian influence. Nevertheless, this may come with a price of its own.

The timeline to begin operations is set for the year 2019 and will hold a cost of over $10 billion USD, from which Turkmenistan is the leading sponsor. The TAPI pipeline will have the ability to transport an estimated 33 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year. But with all the hype and allure of generating energy independence, diversifying exports, and expanding each destination country’s energy infrastructure, there has also been a lack of foreign investments as well as various geopolitical ramifications tied to these attempts at building another pipeline.

The TAPI pipeline is alive today due to Turkmengaz’s 85 percent stake in the project—leaving the remaining 15 percent stakes split equally among the destination countries. Turkmengaz is the national gas company of Turkmenistan and the largest gas company in Central Asia. Its lead investment depicts Turkmenistan’s prioritization to generate energy diversification and independence, which the nation believes are necessary to keep pace with its domestic productions that are slowly surpassing its current export capacities. Before 2011, Russia was Turkmenistan’s main market for imports of natural gas. However since 2011, China has become the recipient of the bulk of Turkmen natural gas exports. This was made possible by the willingness of China to create the necessary environment. Since these expansions, two-thirds (45 bcm) of natural gas has been transported annually to China, with the rest being split between Iran (9 bcm), Russia (9 bcm), and Kazakhstan (0.5 bcm).

This new China pivot presents two geopolitical problems. First, this shift away from Russia may aggravate regional tensions as Moscow may observe this move as one that once again attempts to undermine its influence across the Greater Caspian and Central Asian regions. Second, even if the TAPI pipeline allows the sponsor nations to escape the grip of one of the largest Caspian powers—Russia—they may find themselves shackled to the dominance of Beijing, a move that would only replace one great power with another. China is already closing its economic grip on the project, seeking to assist in financing Pakistan’s 5 percent stake through its $46 billion USD investment project known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Furthermore, Afghanistan, which already has limited financial resources and a security situation that presents multiple dilemmas, must raise 3 percent of its own financing before the Asian Development Bank will provide the rest.

Undoubtedly, the single most important consideration during the development and construction phase will be to stabilize the security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition, territorial conflicts and boundary disputes stemming from Pakistan and India over Kashmir must be quelled in order to attract more outside investors and improve the overall security situation. Russia and Iran may observe the TAPI pipeline as a hindrance to their own economies and may surreptitiously exacerbate the security issues stemming heavily from Afghanistan and Pakistan. This may lead the two nations to indirectly economically and politically suppress the effort to build what some are calling “The New Silk Road”, perhaps rendering the TAPI pipeline nothing but a pipe dream.

Despite the various historical tensions, conflicts, and uncertain security equation throughout the destination countries, the success of the TAPI pipeline may be more possible than it seems. This is because Turkmenistan’s president Gurbanguly Berdimukhammedov, has actively pushed each country’s leader to move the project forward, offering them a direct, unobstructed investment in another pipeline project originating at the world’s second-largest natural gas field—the Galkynysh natural gas field in southern Turkmenistan. It would be against any of the destination countries’ best economic interests to muddy the waters of an opportunity this large. Moreover, the political will of each nation and the economic prospects for the region could be balanced against the long and still powerful grip of Russian energy controls. In short, the TAPI pipeline is not just a quick-fix solution to energy independence. Rather, it is a calculated, coherent, and long-term energy focused strategic vision for the Greater Caspian state of Turkmenistan and the Central Asian states of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.

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Central Asia

ILO Reports Important Progress on Child Labour and Forced Labour in Uzbek Cotton Fields

MD Staff

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A new International Labour Organization report to the World Bank finds that the systematic use of child labour in Uzbekistan’s cotton harvest has come to an end, and that concrete measures to stop the use of forced labour have been taken.

The report Third-party monitoring of measures against child labour and forced labour during the 2017 cotton harvest in Uzbekistan is based on more than 3,000 unaccompanied and unannounced interviews with a representative sample of the country’s 2.6 million cotton pickers. It shows that the country is making significant reforms on fundamental labour rights in the cotton fields.

“The 2017 cotton harvest took place in the context of increased transparency and dialogue. This has encompassed all groups of civil society, including critical voices of individual activists. This is an encouraging sign for the future. However, there is still a lag between the sheer amount of new decrees and reforms being issued by the central government and the capacity to absorb and implement these changes at provincial and district levels,” says Beate Andrees, Chief of the ILO’s Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work Branch.

The ILO has been monitoring the cotton harvest for child labour since 2013. In 2015, it began monitoring the harvest for forced labour and child labour as part of an agreement with the World Bank.

Interviews carried out by the monitors took place in all provinces of the country and included cotton pickers and other groups which are directly or indirectly involved in the harvest such as local authorities, education and medical personnel. In addition, a telephone poll of 1,000 randomly selected persons was conducted. Before the harvest, the ILO experts organized training for some 6,300 people directly involved with the recruitment of cotton pickers.

The results confirm that the large majority of the 2.6 million cotton pickers engaged voluntarily in the annual harvest in 2017 and that there is a high level of awareness in the country about the unacceptability of both child and forced labour. The report confirms earlier findings that the systematic use of child labour in the cotton harvest has ended though continued vigilance is required to ensure that children are in school.

Instructions have been given by the Uzbek national authorities to local administrations to ensure that all recruitment of cotton pickers is on a voluntary basis. In September 2017, an order was given withdrawing certain risk groups (students, education and medical personnel) from the harvest at its early stage.

Moreover, cotton pickers’ wages have been increased in line with recommendations by the ILO and the World Bank. The ILO recommends that the government continues to increase wages and also addresses working conditions more broadly to further attract voluntary pickers.

Last September, Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev spoke before the United Nations General Assembly in New York where he pledged to end forced labour in his country and underscored his government’s engagement with the ILO. In November 2017, at the Global Conference on the Sustained Eradication of Child Labour in Argentina, Uzbekistan also pledged to engage with independent civil society groups on the issue.

The ILO Third-Party Monitoring (TPM) project in Uzbekistan will now focus on the remaining challenges, particularly the need for further awareness raising and capacity building, which varies between provinces and districts. It will ensure that all those involved in recruitment will have the information and tools needed to ensure that cotton pickers are engaged in conformity with international labour standards.

The monitoring and results from a pilot project in the area of South Karkalpakstan also show that cotton picking economically empowers women in rural areas. The cotton harvest provides many women with a unique opportunity to earn an extra cash income which they control and can use to improve the situation of their families.

The ILO TPM Project is funded by a multi-donor trust fund with major contributions by the European Union, United States and Switzerland.

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Kazakhstan Launches Online Platform for Monitoring and Reporting Greenhouse Gases

MD Staff

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An online platform for monitoring, reporting and verifying emission sources and greenhouse gases (GHG) was officially launched today by the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the World Bank.

The platform is an essential element of the National Emissions Trading System of Kazakhstan, which was launched in 2013 as the country’s main instrument to regulate domestic CO2 emissions and to drive the development of low-carbon technologies. Today, the National Emissions Trading System of Kazakhstan covers all major companies in the energy, oil and gas sectors, mining, metallurgical, chemical and processing industries.

Since 2014, the World Bank Trust Fund Partnership for Market Readiness has provided technical assistance to Kazakhstan in supporting the implementation of the National Emissions Trading System of Kazakhstan and related climate change mitigation policies.

“Kazakhstan’s emissions trading system is the first of its kind in the Central Asia region,” said Ato Brown, World Bank Country Manager for Kazakhstan. “With support from the Partnership for Market Readiness, the country has made a great effort to develop policy options for mid- and long-term emissions pathways and to develop an action plan on GHG emissions reductions by 2030. The World Bank will continue to support the Government during the crucial stages of policy implementation.”

The platform enables Kazakhstan’s major emitters to transmit and record data on GHGs emissions, as well as trade online. The National Allocation Plan, adopted in January 2018, sets an emission cap for 129 companies for the period 2018-2020. Per the national allocation plan, quotas have been allocated until 2020.

“The electronic platform undoubtedly proves the evolution of the Kazakhstan emission control system, which will allow the monitoring, reporting and verification system to be upgraded to a much higher level,” said Sergei Tsoy, Deputy General Director of JSC Zhasyl Damu.

GHG data is confirmed by accredited bodies for verification and validation and transferred to the Cadastre using an electronic digital signature. To date, there are seven verification companies accredited in Kazakhstan, with five more in the process of accreditation.

The platform was developed by JSC Zhasyl Damu with the support of France’s Technical Center on Air Pollution and Greenhouse Gases. The system is administered by JSC Zhasyl-Damu, while the beneficiaries are the Climate Change Department and the Committee for Environmental Regulation and Control of the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Background

Kazakhstan is one of the largest emitters of GHG in Europe and Central Asia with total annual national emissions of 300.9 MtCO2e in 2015. The energy sector accounts for 82% of total GHG emissions, followed by agriculture (9.6%) and industrial processes (6.4%). More than 80% of produced electricity in Kazakhstan is coal-fired, followed by natural gas (7%) and hydro power (8%).

Kazakhstan proposed as its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) an economy-wide reduction of GHG emissions of 15% from 1990 emissions levels by 2030. Kazakhstan ratified the Paris Agreement in November 2016 and committed itself to the fulfilment of the proposed target as its first INDC. The objective will contribute to sustainable economic development as well as to the achievement of the long-term global goal of keeping global temperatures below 2 degrees Celsius. 

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Religious buildings in Kazakhstan to be labeled 16+

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New restrictions on religious activities are emerging in Kazakhstan. Will they help to fight extremism?

According to the Government bill introducing amendments to the laws on religious activities and associations, adolescents should be forbidden from attending mosques, churches and synagogues if they are not accompanied by one of the parents and don’t have written consent of another parent.

Schools and the media are going to be forbidden from talking about the belief systems of various religions as well.

By implementing these and other measures, Astana intends to combat religious extremism. However, the crackdown on religion has already set the country four years back: in 2017 the Republic of Kazakhstan returned on the list of countries where the religious situation arouses concern of the US State Department Commission on International Religious Freedom. Kazakhstan last appeared on the list along with Afghanistan, India, Indonesia and Laos in 2013.

Is the proposed bill really going to help to contain the spread of radical Islam, and to what extent does it conform with international human rights standards?

The Concept of State Policy towards Religion, adopted in 2017, shows that the authorities strive to expel religion from public space altogether and promote an ideology of “secularism”. Their thinking is understandable: with no contact between members of differentreligions, there will be no inter-religious conflicts.

However, according to the European experience, prohibitive policy does not bring the expected results. In a multicultural society, the lack of information about the beliefs of other religions only increases tensions. Silencing the matter of religion and obstructing religious education reduces the ability to critically evaluate the extremist ideologies,while increasing the opportunityto spread false information aimed to promote inter-religious discord.

In addition, various summer camps, excursion and pilgrimage activities organized by religious communities are going to be banned if the bill is adopted. It includes those traditional religious confessions that the Government routinely thanks for promoting the inter-civilizational dialogue, youth development and the maintenance of stability, peace and prosperity in the society. A large number of children and teenagers will be deprived of their usual social circles and leisure activities.

As a result of such unconstitutional state interference and bureaucratic obstacles, children and teenagers will be denied the right to practice the religion of their family even when outside educational, medical and other state institutions. Not to mention that parents will be entitledby law to restrict the right of their children under the age of 16 to choose their faith.

Moreover, according to the proposed legislation, if a minor is found in a prayer room“illegally”, the responsibility will fall on the religious organization in question. Consequently, the clergy will need to alienate and discourage the younger generations from attending their own churches, so as not to get fined and fall within the scope of the restrictions on the religious activities!

At the same time, actual extremist organizations will go underground and get more freedom than their peaceful competitors. Obviously, the unruly youth will turn not to those imams, priests or rabbis unable to go beyond the restrictive framework of formal prohibitions. They will go to the “real” preachers who offer communion, new religious experience, something to devote yourself to, a sense of self-worth (even if as suicide bombers).

It is in the interests of all religious leaders, and indeed the whole world, to prevent such a terrible scenario from happening and to return Kazakhstan on the path of civilizational dialogue and inter-confessional cooperation. Otherwise, any participation in the VI Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions in the Astana Palace of Peace and Reconciliation can be seen as not only dishonorable and hypocritical, but also unsafe.

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