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Is the Islamic Caliphate State (Dawlat al-Khilafah al-Islamiyah) Islamic?

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The Islamic Caliphate State is the fourth stage in the development of an Islamic Jihadi terrorist group. Historically, there was the Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (the uniqueness and Jihad group), established by Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, Jordanian citizen with a Palestinian identity.

Al-Zarqawi promised once he achieve these goals, he would establish an “Islamic Emirate.” In June 2006, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi was killed, and Abu Ayub al-Masri (Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir), an Egyptian citizen, took his place and established the Dawlat al-Islam fil-Iraq (the Islamic State in Iraq=ISI). Its military leader was Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi. In April 2010, both al-Masri and al-Baghdadi were killed, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took the leadership of the Islamic State in Iraq.

In April 2013 al-Baghdadi decided to withdraw from al-Qaeda and to expand his organization’s name from the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) to the Islamic State in Iraq and greater Syria (al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fil-Iraq wal-Sham=Da’esh, ISIS). On June 29th 2014, al-Baghdadi has coroneted himself as Caliph Ibrahim, Amir al-Mu’minin, being a descendent of Prophet Muhammad. He also declared the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate State (ICS), with the aim to topple down Arab-Islamic regimes, as the first stage. From that date on, there is no longer ISIS or ISIL or DAESH, but ICS. Those who continue to define it with these names, prove the inability to understand the situation and the complexities posed by this organization.

Who or what is ICS?

It is a Salafi-Takfiri organization characterized by an un-selective Jihad terrorist operations with the aim of bringing back the 7th century Islamic rule of the Fourth Califs (al-Khulafa’ al-Rashidun) as the ideal Islamic rule to humanity. At the end of 2015, it has become the largest and strongest Islamic Organizations with more than fifty Islamic groupings operating under its leadership, a proto-state that has representations in at least thirty states in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. It has become the most important and influential non-state player in the entire international relations, and its political influence is perhaps more dangerous than its operational, being an attractive model of imitation for the Muslim believers.

Western political leaders, the media and the cultural-academic elite do not understand the situation. Every time there is a Jihad attack, they respond in the same routine way: Islam is the religion of peace, and Muslims are in fact not extremists. This reality is confusing and embarrassing: how does one determine this when the subject itself says he is Islamic and all his declarations, behavior, ideology and acts are Islamic? Something is really deeply odd, let alone confusing and embarrassing, relating to this issue when it comes to Islam. Western leaders are determined never to connect the dots and never to declare the obvious.

Construct and organization

ICS is an Islamic Salafī-Takfīrī organization that takes its ideology from Islam and acts exactly according to Islamic teachings. It is Islamic in its character, ideology, and objectives. Its political system and its governmental branches are purely Islamic. The flag, the anthem, and the rulings are all in accordance to Islamic teaching. They abide by Islamic commandments and they use a religious Islamic counseling. ICS has state symbols: a flag; passport; maps of political objectives; coin, and all other parameters of states. Most important is the educational system based on the Madrasah Islamic framework. It runs the political economic and social governmental machinery exactly according to the Islamic teachings.

Its uppermost religious-political institute is Majlis al-Shûra lil-Mujāhidīn, the religious Counseling Council that dictates their activity. It confirms, after studying the Islamic Scriptures, the horrific executions and slaughtering of the infidels, confirm by Fatawā, Islamic religious rulings. There is Majlis al-Sharī’ah, the Constitutional Council that deals with the constitutional, security, finance, and general administration aspects. There is also al-Majlis al-‘Askari, the Military Council, the central body of the military activity and operations.

Beheadings and massacres

Two verses from the Qur’an call to behead the Kuffār whenever and wherever they are. Sûrat Muhammad, 47:4, declares: “So when you clash with the infidels smite their necks until you overpower them… until war shall have come to an end.” Sûrat al-Anfāl, 8:12, declares: “I shall fill the hearts of the infidels with terror. So strike off their heads on their necks and every fingertips.” ICS also follows the Qur’anic teachings that terrorizing Islamic enemies brings success to the Muslims, since Allah commands acts of terror against the infidels. Sûrat al-‘Imrān, 3:151, declares: “We shall strike terror into the hearts of the infidels… Hell is their residence…” Sûrat al-Anfāl, 8:12, declares: I shall fill the hearts of the infidels with terror…” Sûrat al-Anfāl, 8:60, declares: “Prepare against them whatever arms and cavalry you can muster, that you may strike terror in the enemies of Allah and your own…” Sûrat al-Hashr, 59:2, declares: “Allah came upon the people of the Book, and filled their hearts with terror.”

ICS also follows Muhammad’s example who ordered the execution by beheading of seven hundred men of the Jewish Banu Qurayza tribe in Medina. There are also many other examples of Muhammad’s orders to behead the enemy of Islam, appear in his biography by Ibn Ishāq, The life of Muhammad. Crucifixion is another part of beheadings. ICS members love chopping the heads off while their victims are crucified. By that they follow the Qur’an (Sûrat al Mā’idah, 5:33). Muslims are to fight the infidels, as Allah heals the hearts of the believers (Sûrat al-Taubah, 9:14–6).

Khalid Ibn al-Walid is one of the uppermost heroes and models of ICS. During the first internal war, the Ridda, in 632–3, he beheaded, burned and massacred all those tribes, men, women, children and the elderly, who left Islam after Muhammad’s death. For his utmost cruelty, he received an honorary name: Sayf al-Islām, the sword of Islam. In 633 he massacred and beheaded tens of thousands of Persian prisoners in the battle of the Red River, in Southern Persia. It was him who declared at the battle of Yarmuk, year 636: “we are a people who drink blood, and we know that there is no blood more delicious than the Byzantine blood.” Following that, one of ICS members, named Khalid (!) has eaten the heart of a Syrian soldier.

There are more. The Umayyad dynasty have massacred and beheaded all the clan of Ali’s family, including little babies. The Umayyad themselves where all massacred by Abbas Dynasty in 750. The Ottoman Empire used the most horrific inhuman acts of massacres and beheadings in the occupation of Constantinople and Athens. They operate the first modern genocide of the Armenians and the Greeks. What the Muslims done to the Buddhists in India is one of the darkest chapters in human history.

ICS follows these examples by herding and marching off hundreds and thousands of male hostages each time, where they shoot them in the head and throw them into the river one by one; or when they put them on lines and in trenches the victims dig, and shoot them by machine guns. However, what the Islamic Caliphate State members love extremely most is all kind of beheadings, with small knives, and then cheerfully show the heads, play football with the heads, or pile them in the main streets and roundabouts. They also educate their youth, ordering small kids to learn the profession of beheading or shooting. It is all done while quoting verses from the Qur’an that justify the massacre and shouting “Allāhu Akbar” against the infidels.

The Islamic hostility to the Cross is an unwavering fact of life, one that is very much indicative of Islam’s innate hostility to Christianity. It has started with Muhammad’s repugnance to the Cross who called it piece of idolatry; it has continued with the “Pact of Umar” which forbade the display of the Crosses, and it has culminated to a new peak with the ICS members slaughtering men on the cross. In their “communiques to the West” ICS leaders have declared: “We will conquer Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women… we will cast terror into the hearts of the cross worshippers.” In Libya, one of Islamic Caliphate State leaders has declared: “We will fight you until Jesus descends, breaks the cross, and kills the pig.”

ICS members are excellent narrators. The main idea is to legitimize beheadings, slavery, and gang-rape by reference to Islamic history and theology, being a powerful narrative of Jihād Fī-Sabīlillāh. Moreover, beheadings are done by the use of the most important Islamic weapon, the sword, with the symbolism of blood ritual. On February 3, 2015, ICS has released a video claiming to show horrifying burning of the captured Jordanian pilot, Maaz al-Kassasbeh. The video is entitled, “Healing the Believers Chests,” a slogan taken from the Qur’an (Sûrat al-Taubah, 9:14). The basis for this is Muhammad’s declaration from the Hadith (Sahīh Bukhārī, 1:11:626).

The problem is not with Muslims, as they clearly and utterly declare their objectives and how to obtain them. They don’t hide behind, and they reveal their world mindset openly. The problem is exactly with the West that does not wish even to discuss the situation concerning Islam and Muslims. It is not a sign of tolerance when one deliberately silences himself against reality; is it rational when one artificially differentiates between Islam as a peaceful religion and “extremists” who high-jacked Islam? Doesn’t it show that we have lost our freedoms purposely and consciously and that we are in a deep state of intimidation in front of the villain?

Slavery and rape

The enslavement of infidel women for sexual purposes is central aspect of Islamic civilization, from the Qur’an, the highest scriptural authority, to Muhammad, the ultimate role model for all Muslims. It constitutes a central part in Islamic history as much as to current events in “Islamic Tribal Anarchic Winter,” mistakenly called “Arab Spring.” Islamic sex slavery is religiously sanctioned by the Sharī’ah. The mainstream of Islamic jurisprudence has justified and supported this practice on the basis of Islam’s canonical sources, including Muhammad’s own example and teaching.

The Sharī’ah, permits the enslavement, selling, and rape of infidel women captured during Jihad wars, being legitimately gained booty, “what your right hand possess” (Sûrat al-Nisā’, 4:3). Sex-rape of captive women was very common during Islamic history and it was performed frequently, as these slave-concubines were considered equivalent to animals. The grammar use of the word “Ma” in this context relate to things or animals, not to human beings. Muslim exegetes agree that once a true Islamic State is established, those living in Dār al-Harb have no rights to their life or their wealth. Therefore, Muslims are allowed to go to these nations and take their wealth and to keep their women as slaves.

As it is against Islam to rape Muslim women, it is permitted, even encouraged to rape all others captured. In the battle of Hunain, the Muslims were reluctant to have intercourse with the female captives in the presence of their husbands who were infidels. So Allah sent down the Qur’anic verse (Sûrat al-Nisā’, 4:24). This verse relieved the Muslims of this restraint by giving them permission to have sex with captive women, at all conditions, even if the women were already married. Abd-al-Hamid Siddiqui, the translator of Sahīh Muslim (8:3433), commented on this tradition, saying: When women are taken captive, their previous marriages are automatically annulled. Sexual intercourse with these women is lawful. The women of the Banu Mustaliq were sold into slavery following their rape. They were “excellent Arab women, and we desired them” (Sahīh Muslim, 8:3371). The prophet of Islam, his companions, and the Muslims used war to collect women for personal sexual use and for slave trading.

An article published in Foreign Policy in September 2014, begins with: “Of the many terrifying stories emerging from Islamic State-occupied Iraq and Syria, the violence directed toward women is perhaps the most difficult to contemplate.” This perhaps sums up the entire issue. It is arguable whether it is more horrifying than beheadings and mutilations in public with sadistic pictures of the victims posted online. It is arguable whether it is more intimidating than herding thousands of infidels and cold-bloodedly shooting them just for the fun of it, while shouting “Allāhu Akbar.” It is arguable whether it is more abhorring than forcing religious minorities to convert to Islam, while showing crucified men. Still, the reality of women, tortured, raped, sold to slavery of very short miserable life is humiliating.

Although sexual violence, enslavement, and rape were the most generic atrocity committed during wars in history, common to all cultures and civilizations, ICS wholly based its activities on Islamic law. These women being desired spoils of war are treated not only like animals, but their short living miserable life is worth less than animals, when the slavery marketplace is full of fresh flesh.

Islamic law makes crystal clear that conquered infidel sex slaves are one of the rewards for those waging Jihad. It is in the Sharī’ah, whom Muslims are ordered to totally emulate, and it is a common fixture of Islamic history. Majid Khadduri explained the idea of “spoils:”

The term spoil (Ghanīma) is applied specifically to property acquired by force from non-Muslims. It includes, however, not only property (movable and immovable) but also persons, whether in the capacity of asra (prisoners of war) or sabi (women and children), If the slave were a woman, the master was permitted to have sexual connection with her as a concubine.

In the fourth edition of the magazine Dabiq, ICS promotes sex slavery as an Islamic practice that conforms to the teaching and example of Muhammad and his companions, and in fact Islamic history. Slavery and young girls’ sex-trade is common now in its occupied territories. It is recorded that the price of each Captured Yazidi girl is $12. An investigation done by Clarion Project reveals that forty-two Yazidi girls were sold by the ICS in Syria for 2000 dollars. At the end of 2014 the slave market in Iraq was by age: A woman aged thirty to forty cost $63; girls aged ten to twenty were priced at $126; girls from one to nine were sold for $168. As ICS members take new towns also in Syria, the market of sex-slavery girls is routine and commonplace.

The horrific thing is that ICS has openly established, organized, and institutionalized a state-sanctioned system of sexual slavery. It is not intended to be a temporary war-time tactics, but a peace-time Islamic institution. It is to recall that contrary to historical evidence, this is not the “usual” women-rape and abuse perpetrated during wars all along history. This is exactly the Islamic tradition to take booty from the vanquished, and it is a deliberate tactic to demolish and degrade the enemy, the infidels, through organized slavery and women rape.

Members of ICS regularly declare that according to Islam they are allowed to rape the Kuffār. This is ‘Ibādah, a way of worshipping Allah. The systematic rape of women and girls has become deeply enmeshed in the organization and the radical theology of the Islamic State. Yazidi women and girls who escaped the Islamic State, and the examination of the group’s official communications, illuminate how the practice has been enshrined in the group’s core tenets. It has developed a detailed bureaucracy of sex slavery and trade slavery. This is a “theology of rape,” an integral part of the doctrine and practice of all along the Islamic history and reproduced in the ICS. One has also to recall, there is no male rapist in Islam but seducing woman, whose penalty is death by stoning.

Sheikh Yasir al-‘Ajlawni states that Muslims fighting to topple the regime of the infidel, Bashar Assad in Syria are permitted to capture and have sex with all non-Sunni women, including Shia Muslims, Alawites, Christians, Druze, and Yazidis. The same approach comes from Boko Haram, the Nigerian Islamic organization that performs horrific atrocities like the ICS. Its leader also believes that Allah permits the Mujāhidīn to enjoy free sex slavery, after abducting three hundred “infidel” schoolgirls to be sold in the sex slave market.

One can also relates to the issues of crime and punishment to examine the similarities between ICS and the law of Islam, according to the Sharī’ah. The punishment for blasphemy (insulting Allah, Muhammad, and the religion of Islam) is death. The punishment of adultery (if marries) is death by stoning, and if not married 100 lashes. The punishment of slender and drinking alcohol is 80 lashes. The Punishment of stealing is amputation of hand. The punishment of banditry (theft) is amputation of hand and foot. The punishment of murder in banditry is death by crucifixion.  

Summary

One can conclude the issue in one sentence: ICS is the top model of Islam and Islamic teachings. So ingrained in violence in the religion that Islam has never really stopped being at war either with other religions or with itself. Muhammad inspired the Muslims to battle the infidels promising all desires in this world and the Hereafter, and threatened them with Hell if they did not. Muslims were laying siege to towns; massacring its men, raping and enslaving their women; enslaving and converting their children; and taking the property of others. Fighting, violence booty, women enslavement, and rape is the main of Arab-Islamic political culture through history. This is exactly how ICS acts and behaves.

The refusal of Western political leaders, the media, and the cultural elite to open their eyes to reality and protect Western nations from ICS is one of the biggest betrayal. Boko Haram leader also believes that Allah permits the Mujāhidin to slaughter and behead all the infidels, and to enjoy free sex slavery.

Indeed, the Islamic Caliphate State is Islamic. It follows Islam and acts according to Islam. To say it is not Islam is exactly to say the Nazi ideology was not Germany, or the Shinto was not Japanese, or that Islam does not exist as a political religion. ICS is the great winner in contemporary international relations, and the free world contributes the lion’s share to this success by denying its connection to Islam and by not willing to fight it seriously.

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How security decisions go wrong?

Sajad Abedi

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Photo by Ryan Young on Unsplash

Information warfare is primarily a construct of a ‘war mindset’. However, the development of information operations from it has meant that the concepts have been transferred from military to civilian affairs. The contemporary involvement between the media, the military, and the media in the contemporary world of the ‘War on Terrorism’ has meant the distinction between war and peace is difficult to make. However, below the application of deception in the military context is described but it must be added that the dividing line is blurred.

The correct control of security often depends on decisions under uncertainty. Using quantified information about risk, one may hope to achieve more precise control by making better decisions.

Security is both a normative and descriptive problem. We would like to normatively how to make correct decisions about security, but also descriptively understand follow where security decisions may go wrong. According to Schneider, security risk is both a subjective feeling and an objective reality, and sometimes those two views are different so that we fail acting correctly. Assuming that people act on perceived rather than actual risks, we will sometimes do things we should avoid, and sometimes fail to act like we should. In security, people may both feel secure when they are not, and feel insecure when they are actually secure. With the recent attempts in security that aim to quantifying security properties, also known as security metrics, I am interested in how to achieve correct metrics that can help a decision-maker control security. But would successful quantification be the end of the story?

The aim of this note is to explore the potential difference between correct and actual security decisions when people are supposed to decide and act based on quantified information about risky options. If there is a gap between correct and actual decisions, how can we begin to model and characterize it? How large is it, and where can someone maybe exploit it? What can be done to fix and close it? As a specific example, this note considers the impact of using risk as security metric for decision-making in security. The motivation to use risk is two-fold. First, risk is a well-established concept that has been applied in numerous ways to understand information security and often assumed as a good metric. Second, I believe that it is currently the only well-developed reasonable candidate that aims to involve two necessary aspects when it comes to the control of operational security: asset value and threat uncertainty. Good information security is often seen as risk management, which will depend on methods to assess those risks correctly. However, this work examines potential threats and shortcomings concerning the usability of correctly quantified risk for security decisions.

I consider a system that a decision-maker needs to protect in an environment with uncertain threats. Furthermore, I also assume that the decision-maker wants to maximize some kind of security utility (the utility of security controls available) when making decisions regarding to different security controls. These different parts of the model vary greatly between different scenarios and little can be done to model detailed security decisions in general. Still, we think that this is an appropriate framework to understand the need of security metrics. One way, maybe often the standard way, to view security as a decision problem is that threats arise in the system and environment, and that the decision-maker needs to take care of those threats with available information, using some appropriate cost-benefit tradeoff. However, this common view overlooks threats with faults that are made by the decision-maker. I believe that many security failures should be seen in the light of limits (or potential faults) of the decision-maker when she, with best intentions, attempts to achieve security goals (maximizing security utility) by deciding between different security options.

I loosely think of correct decisions as maximization of utility, in a way to be specified later.

Information security is increasingly seen as not only fulfillment of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability, but as protecting against a number of threats having by doing correct economic tradeoffs. A growing research into the economics of information security during the last decade aims to understand security problems in terms of economic factors and incentives among agents making decisions about security, typically assumed to aim at maximizing their utility. Such analysis is made by treating economic factors as equally important in explaining security problems as properties inherent in the systems that are to be protected. It is thus natural to view the control of security as a sequence of decisions that have to be made as new information appears about an uncertain threat environment. Seen in the light of this and that obtaining security information usually in it is cost, I think that any usage of security metrics must be related to allowing more rational decisions with respect to security. It is in this way I consider security metrics and decisions in the following.

The basic way to understand any decision-making situation is to consider which kind of information the decision-maker will have available to form the basis of judgments. For people, both the available information, but also potentially the way in which it is framed (presented), may affect how well decisions will be made to ensure goals. One of the common requirements on security metrics is that they should be able to guide decisions and actions to reach security goals. However, it is an open question how to make a security metric usable and ensuring such usage will be correct (with respect to achieving goals) comes with challenges. The idea to use quantified risk as a metric for decisions can be split up into two steps. First do objective risk analysis using both assessment of system vulnerabilities and available threats in order to measure security risk. Second, present these results in a usable way so that the decision-maker can make correct and rational decisions.

While both of these steps present considerable challenges to using good security metrics, I consider why decisions using quantified security risk as a metric may go wrong in the second step. Lacking information about security properties of a system clearly limits the security decisions, but I fear that introducing metrics do not necessarily improve them;this may be due to 1) that information is incorrect or imprecise, or 2) that usage will be incorrect. This work takes the second view and we argue that even with perfect risk assessment, it may not be obvious that security decisions will always improve. I am thus seeking properties in risky decision problems that actually predict the overall goal – maximizing utility – to be, or not to be, fulfilled. More specifically, we need to find properties in quantifications that may put decision-making at risk of going wrong.

The way to understand where security decisions go wrong is by using how people are predicted to act on perceived rather than actual risk. I thus need to use both normative and descriptive models of decision-making under risk. For normative decisions, I use the well-established economic principle of maximizing expected utility. But for the descriptive part, I note that decision faults on risky decisions not only happen in various situations, but have remarkably been shown to happen systematically describe by models from behavioral economics.

I have considered when quantified risk is being used by people making security decisions. An exploration of the parameter space in two simple problems showed that results from behavioral economics may have impact on the usability of quantitative risk methods. The results visualized do not lend themselves to easy and intuitive explanations, but I view my results as a first systematic step towards understanding security problems with quantitative information.

There have been many proposals to quantify risk for information security, mostly in order to allow better security decisions. But a blind belief in quantification itself seems unwise, even if it is made correctly. Behavioral economics shows systematic deviations of weighting when people act on explicit risk. This is likely to threaten security and its goals as security is increasingly seen as the management of economical trade-offs. I think that these findings can be used partially to predict or understand wrong security decisions depending on risk information. Furthermore, this motivates the study how strategic agents may manipulate, or attack, the perception of a risky decision.

Even though any descriptive model of human decision-making is approximate at best, I still believe this work gives a well-articulated argument regarding threats with using explicit risk as security metric. My approach may also be understood in terms of standard system specification and threat models: economic rationality in this case is the specification, and the threat depends on bias for risk information. I also studied a way of correcting the problem with reframing for two simple security decision scenarios, but only got partial predictive support for fixing problems this way. Furthermore, I have not found such numerical examinations in behavioral economics to date.

Further work on this topic needs to empirically confirm or reject these predictions and study to which degree they occur (even though previous work clearly makes the hypothesis clearly plausible at least to some degree) in a security context. Furthermore, I think that similar issues may also arise with several forms of quantified information for security decisions.

These questions may also be extended to consider several self-interested parties. in game-theoretical situations. Another topic is using different utility functions, and where it may be normative to be economically risk-aversive rather than risk-neutral. With respect to the problems outlined, rational decision-making is a natural way to understand and motivate the control of security and requirements on security metrics. But when selecting the format of information, a problem is also partially about usability. Usability faults often turn into security problems, which is also likely for quantified risk. In the end the challenge is to provide users with usable security information, and even more broadly investigate what kind of support is required for decisions. This is clearly a topic for further research since introducing quantified risk is not without problems. Using knowledge from economics and psychology seems necessary to understand the correct control of security.

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Cyberspace: A Manmade Sphere for Wars

Anahit Parzyan

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Internet can be considered as one of the greatest achievements of humanity of the last century, which connected the entire world. It created a new space for connections, information and communications, as well as cooperation. Thus, it created also a new platform for conflicts which involved not only individuals but also states. The invention of the twentieth century, the internet, has become another sphere for international relations, and a new space for defensive and offensive policies for regulating and balancing those affairs. The space called cyberspace has become a platform for interactions not only between individuals, but also between states. The interactions on their side were not only developed in a positive manner, but were also transformed into attacks, which pose a real threat to the security of states. Thus, the following questions arise:

Can cyberspace be considered a new sphere for war? Can conflicts and offensive and defensive operations in cyberspace be considered a real war?

The aim of this article is to specify offensive and defensive actions occurring in cyberspace and to explain the differences and similarities between them and the classical approach to war present in other spheres: land, water, air, and space. Despite the overgrowth of offensive interactions in cyberspace and defensive strategies for enriching the cyber arsenal of states, military specialists have concerns over the reality of cyberwars in general. Parallels are drawn to show the similarities and differences between definitions and perceptions of war, and whether concepts from the classical approach can be transferred to describe wars in the cyber sphere.  This research puts cyberwars in line with other wars, thus analyzing their peculiarities, whilst Cyberspace is seen as another sphere for war and international relations in addition to the existing spheres of land, water, air, and space

Internet’s Two Sides of the Coin: From Good to Threat

The Internet that we use today, is based on the Transmission Control Protocol or just Internet Protocol commenced in 1973. The network became operational in January 1983. For the first two decades of its existence, it was the preserve of a technological, academic, and research elite. From the early 1990s, it began to percolate into mainstream society and is widely regarded as a General-Purpose Technology (GPT) without which modern society could not function.

Only half a century ago it was difficult to imagine that human interactions would be developed in a manmade sphere, totally virtual and artificial. It must have been impossible to imagine that it would penetrate our lives so closely that it would cover everyday life, from communication and information sharing to purchasing products and regulating temperature at home.

Now internet has connected the entire world breaking the land borders which lined geographically differentiating the places people live. It substituted land borders with digital ones, making it possible to connect the entire world into one sphere.

With the start of the World Wide Web in 1993, the greatest accretion of communication came into existence. Since then, information being secret for a limited groups or organizations that were historically used for military purposes as an intellectual advantage, soon became available for masses.

Moreover, equal access to information for all, one of the ultimate achievements of humanity and one of the supreme advantages of the internet, has started to provide information not only for good will, having also provoked irregular warfare.

These chaotic interactions, which Garnett called “fourth generation warfare” (4GW), through networks would become a wave of social reactions and pressure that would provide an opportunity for an asymmetric warfare. The tendency is obviously dangerous since not only states possess these “digital” weapons but also non-state actors including terrorist networks. Basically, the Internet allows anyone to join digitally and to be a force or power that could have a significant impact on states’ policies.

The sphere were those actions take place with the usage or within the system of information and communication technologies is broadly named cyberspace and the actions that take place in this sphere get their terminology accordingly; cyber-attacks, cyberwar, etc… Though states have various definitions of a cyberspace and with the scope it covers, it is meant to be a non-physical Information and telecommunication technologies environment (ICT).The term cybersecurity has been emerging from the US since the mid-1990s, which later have become widely used in other countries and international organizations such as United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD), North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe(CE), BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and many others.

A cyber-attack is not an end in itself, but a powerful means to a wide variety of ends, from propaganda to espionage, from denial of services to the destruction of critical infrastructure.

From the prism of threat, they may cause, cyberattacks can be implemented using methods, such as malicious programs, that can penetrate systems of specific or not specified group of people or entities causing dysfunctions of computer operations, stealing personal information, phishing stealing passwords of the user as well as infecting computer systems to slow down specific processes, etc.  In current internet-run infrastructure a single penetration can be fatal for a society and become a threat for a state. A penetration into the command-control system of critical infrastructures, for example, can cut the supply of energy, change the chemical construction of water thus making it poisoned, etc. and the anonymity can stand as an advantage as cyberattacks are still not attributable through international humanitarian law. Moreover, in a cyber conflict, the terrestrial distance between adversaries can be irrelevant so cyber weapon can reach its target much beyond its borders.

The advance of technology made it possible to give room for clashes between States and non-states actors involved in operations in cyberspace. These clashes have become a real threat for international security. As compared with kinetic weapons that are relatively expensive to obtain, as well as possible to detect their origin, malicious programs are available to download or buy and even create if there is a good specialist of it: even a teenager can formulate it.

Therefore, it is becoming nearly impossible to patrol all the purchase and supply chain of the cyber arsenal. Malicious viruses or programs can penetrate various computer systems of public and private usage and cause dysfunctions, changing the primary command-control systems, slowing their base speed of operation and causing very costly problems for state security.

Per media reports, the group which rampaged through and besieged part of Mumbai in November 2008 made use of readily available cellular and satellite phones, as well as overhead imagery from Google Earth, to coordinate and plan their attack.

However, this invention is an issue of arguments among scientist from the prism of war definition.

Theoretical Dilemma of cyberwars and cyber reality

Despite different conflicts occurring in cyberspace between state and non- state actors, state-sponsored operations, and developments in international relations, military specialists argue about the exact definition of cyberspace, whether to evaluate it as real war or not, and as whether to count operations in cyberspace as a real war between parties involved.

Various conflicts in cyberspace including attacks of regular and irregular origin performing symmetric or asymmetric tactic, do not correspond with the classical approach of the war including only some or one or even missing any aspect of the war characterization. Despite of the current actions and bilateral, multilateral etc., agreements signed by states and international organizations, associations on the cybersecurity issues and despite of the threats the world overcomes or will overcome in cyberspace, theorists have certain disbelieves while defining or accepting cyberspace as a new sphere for wars as well as cyberwars as already occurring facts.

The issue is that there had not been a single verifiable case of cyber terrorism nor has there been any human casualty caused by cyber-attacks, giving grounds for disbelief.

Thomas Rid a specialist of war, is among those scientists and experts who see debates about cyber wars exaggerated, moreover, he expresses mistrusts related to cyberspace as a new space for war in a classical approach of war definition. He believes that “Cyber war has never happened in the past, it is not occurring on the present and it is highly unlikely that will disturb the future.”

The fact that computer and internet assisted attacked may penetrate the operating systems of targets stealing data or causing dysfunction of potentiality of operations Rid, however, in this respect differentiates between sabotage operations and direct physical harm.

Rid refers to Carl von Clausewitz, a nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist, who defines war according to three criteria, “First, all acts of war are violent or potentially violent. Second, an act of war is always instrumental: physical violence or the threat of force is a means to compel the enemy to accept the attacker’s will. Finally, to qualify as an act of war, an attack must have political goal or intention.”

Theoretical description of war through centuries might have changed its primary strategies and instruments, while his goal is always the same. Within this respect, it is important to observe this definition on a broad way: Of course, computer warm or virus cannot kill directly a person, like it could have a sword, but it can cut the energy supply of a hospital causing a chain of violence, or it can penetrate the command control of the Airplane system and change the direction of the plane or to cause and a catastrophe.

In contrary to classical approach of war, the reality of cyber war is supported by those who believe that cyber wars have already occurred, are occurring and will, possibly, continue to occur in future, thus cyber strategies must be implemented.

In July 2016, Allies reaffirmed NATO’s defensive mandate and recognized cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land and at sea.

Former U.S. President Obama speaking about cybersecurity mentioned:

“America’s economic prosperity, national security, and our individual liberties depend on our commitment to securing cyberspace and maintaining an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet. Our critical infrastructure continues to be at risk from threats in cyberspace, and our economy is harmed by the theft of our intellectual property.  Although the threats are serious and they constantly evolve, I believe that if we address them effectively, we can ensure that the Internet remains an engine for economic growth and a platform for the free exchange of ideas”.

Thomas Reed, a former staffer on the US National Security Council argues that Cyber wars are even new. They occurred in past, in Cold War Era, and had devastating results. As an example, he mentions about the first ever cyber-attack- a massive pipeline explosion in the Soviet Union in June 1982, counting as the most violent cyber-attack ever. “According to Reed, a covert US operation used rigged software to engineer a massive explosion in the Urengoy-Surgut-Chelyabinsk pipeline, which connected Siberian natural gas fields to Europe. Reed claims that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) managed to insert malicious code into the software that controlled the pipeline’s pumps and valves. The rigger valves supposedly resulted in an explosion that the US Air Force rated at three kilotons, equivalent to the force of a small nuclear device.”

Although, neither there is a factual evidence of accident being a cyber-attack confirmed or supported by the official U.S, nor there are any Soviet media reports from 1983 also confirming that Reed’s mentioned explosion took place. Though Soviet Union media regularly reported about accidents and pipeline explosions at the time. In case of cyber-attacks, it is not an easy task to investigate fully and in a short period of time. Forensic examination is needed which presupposes experts and conditions for objective examination. Under the condition of Cold war, the parties would hardly agree to do such an investigation which will reveal secrets about their technical capabilities and the real cause of the explosion. Incase Reed’s claims are true, then the massive violence it could have done would theoretically rank cyber weapons among extremely dangerous means and cyber wars would have been defined accordingly.

Another example that speaks about possible cyberattack that will “suit” to the description of war can be considered the 2008th cyberattacks on Georgian most prominent websites, including those of the country’s national bank and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In August 2008, in the period of the military conflict over South Ossetia, Georgian Government blamed the Kremlin, but Russia denied sponsoring the attackers, and later NATO investigation found no conclusive “proof” of who had carried them out. The fact that the “proof” is not found can illustrate two possible judgments: first, the attacker is technically equipped well enough so it is hard to distinguish him, second: the attack was not carried out by a potential suspect. However, the situation can be judged by the following viewpoint: you are innocent unless your guilt is proved. And because the anonymity is a priority in cyber wars, so it is highly efficient especially for states to use it in hybrid war strategies.

In cyberspace the sides, that are involved in the attacks or counterattacks can be distinguished only in two ways: first, by their own wish (which may occur rarely, or even impossible to happen especially when attacks are carried out by States rather than other subjects) or, according to the evidence. The last one is directly connected with the technical capabilities of an attacker as well as technical competences of an attacked side to be able to detect.

According to Oleg Demidov, a Cybersecurity expert at the Russian Centre for Policy studies (PIR Center), the overview of the NATO experts suspecting Russia in attacking Estonian infrastructure in 2007, Georgian government and private sector networks in 2008, and U.S. financial institutions and private companies in 2014 Spring, as not fundamental, because there was no practical evidence of the proof of the attacker, or lack of technical capabilities to be able to define the source of the attacker.

In his contribution “Global Internet Governance and International Security in The Field of ICT Use”, Demidov stresses high possibility and risk of an international conflict between nuclear-weapon states. As he mentioned;

 “In the event of lighting-fats cyber-attack that imitates the ‘signature’ of Russian perpetrators (for example, Cyrillic code fragments and other linguistic patters) and targets the infrastructure of NATO countries using servers in Russian territory, there is a risk of NATO military retaliation against Russia. In accordance with NATO doctrine, retaliatory measures may include the use of kinetic weapons and the involvement of all NATO members in a retaliatory strike”.

These two cyber incidents- the Georgian cyber-attacks and Estonian cyberattacks, are regarded by the U.S. and other Western nations as causes for great attention and much reflection.

Estonian cyber incidents were followed by the establishment of cyber strategies for national and system level for EU members and partners.

Particularly, in 2008, a year after the attacks, NATO set up the Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) in Tallinn. The military-defense usage of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is one of the main purposes of the center. The center is technically equipped well enough to protect its members by providing technical support and human resource to protect internet infrastructure.

Another well-known and destructive cyber program that processed a worldwide discussion over the reality of cyber wars is the “Operation Olympic Games”, a large operation, that included the “development, testing, and use of malware against specific targets to collect information about the Iranian Nuclear program, as well as to sabotage it and slow it down as much as possible. It included such malware as Stuxnet, Duqu, Flame, and Guass (all of them targeting special operation for espionage and sabotage), active in between 2007-2013.The US presidential administration and Israeli secret services have been named as perpetrators.

Ex-head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Seyed Hossein Mousavian, in his “The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: memoir confirms Stuxnet as a malicious computer warm developed to target the computer system that control Iran’s huge enrichment plant at Natanz. Moreover, according to Mousavian, Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran’s Representative to the International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA) at that time confirmed that Iran was experiencing espionage at its nuclear plants. According to the IAEA, there was a big decrease in the amount of the operating centrifuges caused by the Stuxnet with a vivid decline to more than 100 – from 4920 in May 2009 to 3772 in August 2010. Despite of the Fact that Ahmadinejad mentioned about the problems directly related to the computer software, installed by the spies to slow down centrifuge’s operation, nevertheless, Mousavian does not think that this could have cause a big problem and an obstacle for enriching the centrifuges.

In fact, Stuxnet did affect the nuclear enrichment system, and did make problems for Iran’s nuclear program. The computer worm was operating inside the system for quite a long time unnoticed, slowing down the operational capabilities of both experts and technical equipment. If we note the fact that it successfully slowed down the system’s operation, then we can conclude that operations reached a certain level much later then they could have without the worm Now that sanctions have hit Iran’s economy and forced it to make concessions, we can conclude that the situation would have been different if Stuxnet had not affected Iranian programs; Iran would have finished its program faster, before sanctions could devastate its economy. But since Iran discovered the problem much later and the whole process was slowly altered by the worm, we can see that Stuxnet led to a longer timeframe for enrichment, and subsequently longer terms for sanctions.

The action brought not only psychological damage, as would be named and labeled by Israel and U.S. specialist, but it brought also to economical, technical(human resources as well as technical capabilities) crises.

According to M. Sahakyan, an Armenian researcher.

“…sanctions were hard and maybe they were the main reason why Iran agreed to the Interim agreement. Though Iranian leaders like to mention that sanctions were not problem, but the Iranian economy had been effectively hit hard by these sanctions. Iranian economy mostly declined when EU member states imposed an oil embargo on Iran. China also reduced its average oil import levels from Iran in a disagreement on Iran’s nuclear program. The depreciation of Iranian Rial, reduction of oil exports and shortages of foreign currency created hard social-economic situation in Iran. So sanctions were hard and maybe they were the main reason why Iran agreed to the Interim agreement.”

It is evident that, not directly but indirectly cyber war may influence politics of a specific State. Today cyber-attacks can target political leadership, military systems, and average citizens anywhere in the world, during peacetime or war, with the added benefit of attacker anonymity.

Stuxnet influenced the Iranians’ centrifuges, causing them to overload an intelligence program. This is a new type of and reason for war. While the basic definition of war presupposes physical violence, Stuxnet presupposes a psychological intent. In addition to the technical harm it did, it also influenced the psychology of those who had encountered the undiscovered cyber worm. Regarding the first, undiscovered phase of the computer worm, imagine a specialist working on the program, who faced long-lasting technical problems, becoming filled with doubt towards their personal professional skills and also doubting the capability of Iran in general to develop its program. This is a new approach in the definition of war, as it dramatically shifts the choice of instruments that can cause harm to a State.

From Wars with Swords to Cyber Wars: State Security is Still a Priority

Nevertheless, the war in cyberspace is real, it has happened in the past, it is happening now and it will certainly happen in future.

The classical approach to war sees physical violence carried out by military operations. Cyberwar presupposes physical violence as well as bringing a new, psychological violence, which may cause no less harm.  Ideas and things important for state security have changed over the centuries, as have the instruments and measurements of security, but the problem of state security is still a priority. Maybe unexpected ships won’t attack from the sea, but cyber-attacks will come.

In past centuries, population size was an important issue for the state in maintaining its governance. It determined the size of the workforce and the size of the army, and the strength of armies was measured by the quantity of troops.

Centuries ago, a human, a good soldier was to aim to harm the opposing side. To conquer the army was to win the war. Afterwards, the period of weapons and technology began, and would enable opposing sides measure their technical and tactical capabilities to win. At that time, to mobilize technical capabilities was to conquer the army. Due to growing population and technological achievements, in addition to the number of troops, now the amount of military equipment is of much importance. A single-pilot jet may cause greater harm than 1000 troops on the same territory. Nowadays unmanned aircraft can jeopardize enemies’ strategic targets in specific cases even without any physical violence, because in a certain situation to harm a strategical unit even without causing physical violence from neither attaching side nor from the attacked still may have fatal result for the states being attacked.

In current stage, the military parades mostly demonstrating technical capability of a certain state, will alarm a possible harm while attack or attacking. Aside from the traditional military spheres like land, sea, and air (added later),an epoch of adding a new sphere, cyberspace, has begun, in which technical capabilities do no less harm than in a traditional war. One of the ultimate advantage of cyberwars is the anonymity of the attacker, which makes it a reasonable choice for state’s foreign policy.

In addition to the traditionally distinguished types of harm for a state security, cyberwar brings the conception of psychological trauma for the sates making it doubt its capabilities on a certain level. In the case of Stuxnet, the attack was “emotional” and technical.

The definition of the emotional damage through cyberwars was used to describe Russia’s so-called internet interference in 2016. “The New Yorker” expresses viewpoints of national-security officials who believed that those series of cyber hackings were directed to destabilize the conception of democracy in the States.

For many national-security officials, the e-mail hacks were part of a larger, and deeply troubling, picture: Putin’s desire to damage American confidence and to undermine the Western alliances—diplomatic, financial, and military—that have shaped the postwar world.

To technically dysfunction a system just causing a technical harm is a small incident, while targeting CI with technically destabilizing them already has grown into a political scandal.

In turn, cyberattack may cause harm on a specific target without involving other sides especially in case of state sponsored attacks, as it remains undiscovered for a while and the stereotypes and cliché of the traditional war definition will empower the attacker to have “excuses” for the attack. Cyberwars will become more dangerous, if not included and named as war and not struggled as traditional wars.

Cyber Arm race has started

Despite of the distrust and interpretation of cyberwars within the framework of classical approach of war, states are accelerating cyber arms race. This development has several political and strategic implications that pose the need to find specifically political answers. What is often forgotten or neglected is the increasing importance of understanding cyberspace as a political domain and cyber politics is needed more than ever before.

While experts are debating over the exact description and definition of cyberwar, States are enriching their State defensive arsenal with cyber equipment and technical staff for better governance in cyberspace, as well as regulations and doctrines that will define the strategy for the defensive and offensive operations for ICT threat.

In November 2011, the Department of Defense of the U.S. issued a report to Congress confirming, that it was ready to add cyberspace to sea, land, air, and space as the latest domain of warfare – the military would, if necessary, use force to protect the nation from cyberattacks. This statement shape the interactions in cyberspace on the same level with other spheres making them equally important and in case of need, changeable and cooperative.

By this, next to the traditional war spheres: ground, sea, air, space, a new battlefield-the cyberspace is differentiated.

With the technological developments, nearly every aspect of our lives is technically run, so it becomes very sensitive to any cyberattack, since any non-functioning in a technical field may cause human harm, economic harm, and be a serious problem for the entire National security.  In this regard, the former Secretary of Homeland Security of the U.S.Jeh Johnson at The White House Cybersecurity Framework Event on February 12, 2014, specifying the seriousness of the cyberattacks on electrical substations specifically, mentioned:

“What the public needs to understand is that today the disruption of a critical public service like an electrical substation need not occur with guns and knives. A cyberattack could cause similar, and in some cases far greater, damage by taking several facilities offline simultaneously, and potentially leaving millions of Americans in the dark”.

The focus was on the electrical substations but it may refer to other sectors too: telecommunication, hospitals, libraries and federal departments courts and prisons. Any entity, that is functioning with technology may be in a real attack risk.

The technological developments of the last century bring the automated industrial control systems as well as most Critical Infrastructure (CI), the list of which may vary from state to state but have similarities, under possible cyber-attack which may be fatal for national defense. The range of facilities on the list of CIsmay include but not limited to nuclear industry, electricity, telecommunication, water supply, transport system on ground, sea and air, governmental buildings and their communication facilities, the financial and banking system, healthcare and defensive facilities etc. In 2017, the USA Department of Homeland security announced about its decision to include also election infrastructures into the list of Critically Important infrastructure for the State.

The cyber- defensive policy of states becomes an urgent issue and States are engaged in implementing special cybersecurity projects on national level to defend the CI of their countries.

Many states, for instance the U.S., Russia, China, Germany, UK, France etc. are enriching their cyber arsenals and developing cyber security system for defensive operations for their countries. Not only states are engaged in national mechanisms but they also are involved in developing global cooperative platforms for better and clean cyber environment of the World. Specifically, it would be interesting to mention U.S. Russia, China cyber triangle and their input of cyberspace as a significant priority for a State development and Security. The countries are involved in various discussions and cooperation agreements to maintain cooperation and peace in cyberspace globally. Despite of ideological differences in cyberspace and the attitudes of maintaining the policy for it, however these three cyber powers found a common ground for mutual understanding and possible fundamental cooperation. United Nations (UN) Governmental Group of Experts is one of the examples of that which is currently the only platform that has united the U.S. Russia, and China with commonly acceptable norms and suggestions. Since the scope of interests in cyberspace includes all groupings of society including governmental and federal entities private and public sectors as well as common citizens on a national level, private supra-powers regulation beyond borders and being responsible for larger audiences, there is an urgent need to focus on cooperation and establishment of fundamental rights in cyberspace as well as mechanism to establish security in this sphere.

Conclusion

Can a cyber-attack pose a serious threat to national security?

With the clear majority of undergone, ongoing and possible cyberattacks and with the current defensive strategy of the states, the cyberwar is nothing than a real threat for states’ national security as well as private sector. It enflames not only regular warfare which can cause as much harm as it is assumed to have by traditional approach of the war, it may also provoke irregular warfare with the privilege of the equal information access and anonymity.  The technological invention of twentieth century may considered to be a disaster along with such scientific invention as atomic energy. It may give a good, but it may harm severely.

The difficulty of cyberwar falls also on the lack of common norms and definitions as well as specifically composed legislation equally acceptable for all states for peaceful and collaborative regulations of problematic issues on this field.

I do believe that cooperation on this issue is of great importance. Joint legislation, understanding and definition of conceptual ideas, common cooperative grounds will bring to a better and secure life, eliminating or declining the possibility of occurring private or non-state organizational subjects to be involved in irregular warfare destabilizing the peaceful cooperation of states and people on internet sphere for a good and productive will.  The classical approach of war definition should be able to include a new sphere of violence before a certain violence occurs rather than defining right after it occurs, as mostly happens in historical approach. Aside from the traditional military spheres like land, sea, and air (added later),an epoch of adding a new sphere, cyberspace, has begun, in which technical capabilities do no less harm than in a traditional war.

Cybersecurity is an urgent, necessary strategy, which will lead to a secure sphere for cooperation, free and secure access to and sharing of information, and, due to its technical capabilities, to a more comfortable and economically developed way of life.

While Cybersecurity is an issue for the whole world, strategies for the development of cybersecurity may vary from state to state, in some cases occurring a national level, while in others limited to certain federal entities.

I believe that Cyberspace is very much like the environment; it is a digital environment, and just as a virus that penetrates a certain country is spread worldwide if not stopped, so is a computer virus. Just as pollution in one part of the world pollutes air or water that we all share, a cyberattack may cause a global problem. Networking, sharing information, and a global security approach are musts for a safe and productive global cyber environment and maintenance of all roads for better digital development for the sake of humanity.

(*) This essay adapted from the article Cyberspace – A Manmade Sphere for Wars, (21-st Century, N.1, 2017, pp.42-58). Used by permission. All rights reserved.

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Intelligence

The Importance of National Media in the World and its Structural Role in Preserving the Country

Sajad Abedi

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The media, information, and their influential role in governments are at the center of attention of all governments, parties and political movements. In recent decades, the role of the media has been enhanced in the field of information on the impact of governments and macro policies of the countries. In the colorful or velvet revolutions in the last decade, this role has become quite distinct and has led scholars to examine the dimensions of media power in recent political developments. Following the end of the Cold War and the formation of a unipolar world, the United States has changed its strategy from the Cold War to a cultural battle and a soft war to dominate the liberal values of its strategy, and by implementing colored or velvet revolutions, in some countries, such as Ukraine, Georgia and Lebanon, their foothold In these countries.

The radical neoconservatives of the United States have seen one of their options in dealing with Iran on the challenging issues of changing the Iranian government, the method of change through “soft power.” Here, we are going to explore the various dimensions of the American effort to realize the soft overthrow in the Islamic Republic of Iran and examine several methods to combat the threats posed by it. Whenever power sought to overthrow a state, if it did not have the military power or saw its cost heavy, it would try to achieve its goal in various ways other than a military attack, sometimes with security methods and sometimes on the method Cultural and propaganda use today due to the remarkable progress of human beings in different sciences and the emergence of a new generation of media, as well as the development of free societies and democracy, as well as the increasing power of governments to confront the military and security threats of the approach of arrogant governments to The overthrow of softness was more than the former Is. The use of new methods in this regard also seems to work as if soft overthrow is a new way of destroying the governments of the opposing powers of arrogance.

The soft war policy, in the United States, is becoming more and more popular every day. In their latest studies and studies, politicians and the American men have also considered the serious approach to soft war in the face of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the “Current Risk Committee”, which makes its members the most prominent political and military elements of the United States. , In its latest decision in October 2005, considering the strength of the Islamic Republic and the failure of dozens of strategies against the Iranian nation over the past years, considered the war as a useless war and called for greater attention from the US government to the software project “Subversion from within “Marc Palmarraz was a leading member of the committee and the influential figure of the foreign policy device Maryka recently opposed the idea of a military offensive against the Islamic Republic of Iran in a conversation with Deborah Solomood, an American military correspondent in the New York Times, saying: “Iran, in terms of territorial scope, population size, quality of manpower, military facilities, The rich natural resources and the privileged geographic location in the Middle East and the Hartland region have become a substitute for the international system that can no longer be overthrown by military invasion. ”

In the report of the Risk Committee, commissioned by Mark Palmer, the overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran was emphasized and advocated by concentrating its activities on the three pillars of inhibition, media outreach and the organization of civil disobedience. Political experts, inspired by the experiences of the editors of this report and the influence of the committee’s decisions on US government policies, believe that this report will be inspired by the general spirit of the future, even if it does not become an executive act. Delta’s plan was one of these projects that US politicians and statesmen used in their latest studies and studies to counteract Iran.

In order to achieve the above objectives, the strategy of pressure from outside and change from within is used. It should be noted that the slogan of creating democracy and civil change in the countries is based on the will and interests of the invading country, and therefore it is completely relative and the awareness and sense of the need of the people of the country is aimed at, leading to political demands or ultimately to change Not political.

Soft substitution is actually social in nature, in which social factors challenge the overthrow of the rule of the ruling political system. In this social-political process, society is the arena of struggle for power and competition between non-governmental organizations and institutions and the state for business Consolidation of social power.

In a soft subversion in a long and continuous process, part of the loyalty of the people of society and the acceptance of the system are transferred to other authority centers, such as non-governmental organizations or ethnic institutions.

In other words, the lack of proper and effective functioning of government functions such as social security, addressing specific patients, urban affairs, inflation, social security, population structure changes, emergence of new groups with new demands, political constraints and facilitators are considered.

Basically, the foreign actor can also manage soft overthrowing where the social contexts necessary for its formation and expansion in the target community are provided. The Subjects are such as political, social and economic disadvantages, with little hope for reform. Establishing and forming non-governmental organizations and organizations that are prone to control and organize a part of society and use various media and psychological tools to influence the minds of people. The attachment and membership of an important part of society to the goals of the above organizations give them the power of recall.

Therefore, the roots of soft overthrow should be sought in general discontent as a result of the ineffectiveness of the political system. This situation has led to the strengthening of non-governmental groups for social recall, in which society is divided into several categories, and the individual provides their financial, mental and social needs from different institutions of government. Whatever the extent of meeting these needs from non-governmental organizations is more than government institutions, the level of loyalty of the people and elites to the ruling system will be reduced. So, from the standpoint of opposition, until the state has a dominant call in society, the methods of subversion will not be usable.

It should be remembered that soft swooping is a social process, so it will at least be reached in the medium term. Therefore, governments with strong and powerful enemies are always subject to enemy action to create the ground for implementing plans to overthrow new methods. In this framework, the enemies are trying to make the election campaign and the maximum participation of the people in the elections very vague, and in contrast to the dual creation of the “People’s System” and the design of a kind of loss-of-game game, any election result would undermine national security. Give Within the framework of such destructive efforts, some prominent candidates are attempting to portray the system as representatives of the system and some as representatives of the people or opponents of the system. This dual destruction with special propaganda and negative subjectivity creates the initial ground for creating psychological and political tensions in society. Accordingly, controlling any deliberate or unconscious actions directed toward this type of duplication and dealing with them can prevent the election from becoming a challenge to national security.

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