During the course of Greek debt negotiations, debate has been dominated by the questions about the impact of this crisis on the Euro zone. Few discussions have focused on the potential economic and political ramifications the crisis may pose for countries in Southeast Europe (SEE).
With the stakes so high, Greece’s ability to strike a deal with its Euro zone creditors is good news for everyone especially for the countries of SEE. The most recent bailout deal of around 80 billion Euros has generated a good amount of optimism although many details remain hazy . Significant hurdles need to be cleared and the risks have not gone away.
Beyond Greece, the threat of economic instability in SEE is real. The economic situation of Greece’s neighbors remains fragile due to the lingering effects of the European financial crisis. The World Bank notes the region suffered a double dip recession over the last five years with an average regional GDP contraction of 5.9 percent in 2009, and another 1.2 percent in 2012 .
SEE’s heavy dependence on European markets resulted in negative trade and associated financial spillover effects. As it struggles to regain its economic stride, SEE continues to experience sluggish growth rates and poor market and investor confidence .
The current economic turmoil in Greece has only highlighted the region’s vulnerabilities and challenges. The macroeconomic imbalances of the region make them particularly vulnerable to Greek economic contagion. Direct and indirect effects from the Greek crisis concern mainly the banking sector, trade, foreign direct investments, and foreign workers´ remittances .
Over the last two decades, Greek banks established a significant number of subsidiaries in SEE countries. Greek banks represent approximately 20 percent of the financial and banking market of SEE. They play an important role in Bulgaria (20 percent), Macedonia (20 percent), Albania (16 percent), Serbia (14 percent), and Romania (12 percent) .
As the Greek crisis unfolded, SEE Central Bank authorities appear to have put in place measures to insulate the Greek owned banks from a possible contagion by ring-facing the local subsidiaries from their parent institutions.
Indeed, in most of the countries, subsidiaries of Greek banks hold no Greek government securities and seem to have sufficient capital and normal liquidity levels. Strong capital-adequacy ratios have been introduced in SEE to protect depositors, and ensure the stability of the financial system.
However, the question is whether a Greek banking collapse at home would affect customers in the SEE and spread contagion in the form of panic withdrawals. It remains uncertain how a Greek bank bankruptcy and recapitalization would affect Greek banks abroad. Even if not directly impacted by recapitalization, this process would likely force their affiliates in SEE to cut back the lending.
Any panic will predictably slow down lending by other European banks with significant exposure to the Greek sovereign debt. The region is more vulnerable than other areas because the banking system is owned up to 80 percent in some of the countries by foreign banks. If the much squeezed credit market in the region is factored in, the situation further appears even gloomier.
However, there could be some potential good news for the banking sector after the third bail-out deal. According to the most recent agreement with the Euro zone creditors, a new trust fund of 50 billion Euros of Greek assets will be set, with half of it to be used for recapitalization of the banks . Theoretically, this should avert the risk of a crash of the banking sector in Greece and have some positive ramifications for subsidiaries in SEE.
When it comes to trade between SEE and Greece, it has declined over the last years, and Greece is not anymore among the main destinations for the SEE`s exports. However, Greece remains the second biggest importer in most countries of SEE.
The economic recession in Greece has had a negative impact on remittances to SEE countries, mainly for Albania, Bulgaria and Serbia . The return of these economic migrants to their origin countries is another risk that put more stringent pressure to the weak economies in the region.
Formerly, Greece was one of the largest investors in SEE. In 2009, Greece´s outward stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region stood at $ 10.5 billion, making up 27 percent of investments . Greek FDI is now less significant in the region.
However, for Greece itself, SEE remains an important market. In fact, if one is to evaluate Greek FDI in general, the stock of FDI per capita in Greece diminished by almost 35 percent from 2009 to 2013 yet the stock of outward investment saw a slight increase, from $3.555 in 2009 to $4.165 in 2013 .
Last but not least, a worrying negative spillover is the political one. Greece’s current situation was no doubt brought about by lax attention to following formal standards and implementing sound fiscal management standards. It is a lesson learned for the EU.
For the SEE, the Greek crisis will likely impact the prospects and the timing of the EU integration of the aspirant countries and may even call into question.
The green light for EU integration of SEE was promised in the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit . It would be ironic if the Greek crisis results in a longer integration process for aspirant countries in this small region.
(*)The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent views of Department of Defense or its Components.
Promoting a More Inclusive and Sustainable Development for China
China can achieve more inclusive and sustainable development with coordinated reforms across a broad range of areas that maximize development impact and address its development challenges, says the World Bank Group’s new Systematic Country Diagnostic for China.
The World Bank Group undertakes a Systematic Country Diagnostic for all its client countries to identify key challenges and opportunities in ending poverty and boosting shared prosperity. The Diagnostic is prepared in close consultation with national authorities and other key stakeholders, and forms the basis for the Country Partnership Framework, which determines the World Bank Group’s activities in a country over a four to six year period.
Towards a More Inclusive and Sustainable Development highlights China’s unprecedented achievements in rapid economic growth and reducing poverty. Rapid growth was made possible by a wide range of reforms, which transformed a largely rural state-dominated and planned closed economy into becoming a more open and market-based urbanized economy.
China’s growth has been slowing to a “new normal” and economic rebalancing is under way. Managing this transition in a sustainable manner will be critical to achieving the country’s development goals, the report indicates. Policies to increase productivity-led growth by promoting innovation, market competition and the private sector would support the achievements of these goals, says the report.
“China’s remarkable progress in reducing extreme poverty has significantly contributed to the decline in global poverty,” said Hoon S. Soh, World Bank Program Leader for economic policies for China, “The World Bank Group will continue to support China’s goals to eliminate extreme poverty and ensure inclusive and sustainable growth.”
Despite the rapid reduction of extreme poverty, China’s remaining poor population remains large in number. The report projects continued strong progress towards eliminating extreme poverty and expects the extreme poverty rate to fall below one percent in 2018, based on the international poverty line of PPP US$1.90 per day. The challenge for China will be to target assistance to the remaining poor while paying attention to those who are vulnerable to falling into poverty; further improvements to the country’s social safety net program will help.
Rapid growth in consumption by the country’s poorer households indicates that they have shared in the country’s growing prosperity. Nevertheless, more can be done to address inequality, even as inequality has been steadily declining since 2008. Reforms of the intergovernmental fiscal system and further reforms in the household registration system could reduce income disparities by closing the rural-urban income gap and ensuring equal access to quality education and health services.
Other recommendations for China include a greater reliance on market mechanisms and mobilizing more private financing to boost green innovation and reduce environmental costs and waste. Reducing air pollution would require China to continue the significant gains in energy efficiency that it has achieved in past decades. It would also require lessening coal consumption while maintaining the rapid expansion of renewable energy, including by reducing the significant curtailment of renewables. Water and soil pollution also pose significant threats to the country’s environment and the health of its citizens.
Reforms of the country’s governance and institutions would underpin China’s transition to more inclusive and sustainable growth. Priorities include strengthening the management of public resources by subnational governments and reforming the government’s cadre management system so that incentives are better aligned with sustainable growth. Such reforms could be complemented by greater bottom-up accountability through enhanced government transparency and information disclosure, expanded engagement with public and private stakeholders, and a more market-oriented regulatory regime.
What an ‘Impossibility Clause’ can make possible
Since the implementation of the JCPOA in January of 2016, and throughout the current period of accelerating investment by foreign enterprises in Iran, many participants have taken for granted that in the event of a “Snapback” or the reimposition of UN, U.S. and EU sanctions under the provisions of the JCPOA, foreigners must perforce exit all investments in Iran and Iran’s major industries would be relegated to the shadows as an unlawful destination for foreign capital.
The operative assumption has been that any such reimposition of sanctions under a Snapback scenario would make it “impossible” for such foreign participants to maintain, lawfully, their investments in the various projects within Iran, investment they have made a huge effort to structure and uphold in the still-new era of significantly relaxed sanctions. In fact, the very idea of the impossibility of maintaining significant investments in Iran under such sanctions has become something of a fixation. To the dismay of Iranian partners in various ventures, their foreign partners tend to focus on securing their own interests, rights, and recompense under a Snapback. An efficient exit strategy is often sought.
In reality, those who are here on the ground in Iran know that, regardless of the whims of the American President or the vicissitudes of foreign capital flows, the continued development and renovation of Iran’s domestic economy, both in terms of absolute production, as well as in terms of sophistication, efficiency, and integration, will continue apace, and therefore, the wiser among the stewards of foreign investment in Iran understand that it is as much a question of ensuring business continuity for their Iranian-Foreign joint venture projects despite changing international sanctions regimes, which have been imposed by the West against Iran for decades.
As a result, the most basic and fundamental considerations for any prospective foreign project participant and its Iranian partner become:
1. How the foreign participant can, through appropriately drafted “Impossibility Clause(s)”, remain invested in the Iranian venture for as long as possible under the threat of renewed or reimposed sanctions, and without incurring unacceptable risk.
2. How the foreign participant can contractually envision the broadest range of adverse sanctions scenarios through a single and efficient impossibility mechanism.
3. How the foreign participant can provide for a gradual approach to any putative withdrawal procedure, as opposed to the simplistic solution of outright termination upon Snapback after a period of suspension.
4. How the foreign participant can, in the event of the extinguishment of impossibility, subsequent relaxation or obtained exemption of sanctions, reasonably provide for the right, or at least the option, for itself to reenter an investment project which it may have exited because of Snapback.
The legal thought process underpinning successful solutions which industry practitioners may be likely to embrace is beyond the scope of this article, but the conceptual summary can be a useful guide for all of us as we come to grips with what can be made possible by “Impossibility Clauses”.
1. Remaining invested, minimizing risk: Of course, it is true that for many projects, a direct investment by the foreign participant though its stake in an Iranian joint venture entity may be the most straightforward means of effecting the transfer of capital that allows the foreign party to have a stake in a project. It also allows for the simplest mechanism by which a foreign party may apply for and successfully obtain an investment license in accordance with the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act.
Nonetheless, such a direct investment may, particularly in the case of European entities which also do business in U.S. jurisdictions or in jurisdictions which have significant links with the U.S. financial system, provide little or no cushion under even the most benign reimposition of any form of secondary sanctions. This is because the direct investment leaves the foreign party little room to maneuver by way of restructuring or otherwise allocating its participatory interest in the project as sanctions change.
For this reason, a more effective solution could include the formation of a foreign special purpose vehicle to act for the project entity. In the case of a joint venture, an SPV incorporated in a jurisdiction less likely to be adversely affected by reimposition of sanctions would allow for a more flexible platform to facilitate intelligent solutions such as exit and re-entry options, trustee or agency relationships, and contingent sale-repurchase strategies to prepare for the worst outcome of a sanctions scenario which may force a foreign party to exit Iranian investment.
2.Knowing unknowns, counting uncountables: Even now, with the most recently issued ultimatum by the American President declaring that the end of the JCPOA as we know it is nigh (to be either amended or abrogated, if Mr. Trump is to be believed), there exists a wide variety of circumstances involving the reimposition of sanctions, ranging from those that would make the maintenance of an interest in a project by a foreign party merely inconvenient to those which would make maintaining such an interest lawfully untenable. These may range from largely toothless, otherwise symbolic targeted secondary sanctions which apply only to the entities of specific countries, as we have continued to see since Trump’s October 2017 decertification, or those which may apply only to certain economic sectors or types of goods or projects, to those which render further financial flows in support of such a project functionally impracticable. Most challenging of all would be the failure of the UN to continue to waive the imposition of sanctions against Iran.
Thus, a single mechanism to classify sanctions in some way as materially adverse changes and evaluate consequences seems a more pragmatic solution than contemplating what may constitute an “impossibility” event, and including it under grounds for termination.
Under a scenario in which the foreign party has made appropriate structuring preparations as suggested, the determining exit remedies depends on compliance with mandatory applicable laws of the project vehicle’s jurisdiction. To put it another way, the most straightforward test of whether the foreign party may have to adjust, or exit from its participation, comes down to whether it can fulfill project obligations while abiding by all applicable regulations that may apply to it. Beyond such a litmus test, imagining or prognosticating about the myriad complexities of a possible Snapback scenario may be fruitless and contractually inefficient.
3.Avoiding the black-and-white trap: Of course, a foreign project participant can easily avail itself of the opportunity to stipulate that under any kind of scenario of project impracticability caused by sanctions, certain or envisioned, termination shall be the one and only prescribed remedy.
But this is likely to disadvantage the foreign party in the context of negotiations over comprehensive project terms with its Iranian counterparty, and it may limit the scope of the project work itself and fail to allow for a more complex investment structure which cannot survive the threat of termination overnight due to a “Snapback” of one kind or another.
Aside from termination, and its precursor remedy, suspension, there should also be the possibility to contemplate a variety of concepts including assignment, agency and delegation, in order to benefit from the vagaries of sanctions regulations and their exemptions. In some cases, project obligations which would be in violation of sanctions for some foreign entities may not be so for others. As has been shown by the agreements between foreign export credit agencies (“ECA”s) such as EKF, BPI and Invitalia, developments at an international level, especially where adequate sovereign support and sufficiently ringfenced banking facilities exist, are being contemplated to facilitate the kind of continuity required for the decades-long projects now underway in Iran. In addition to these ECAs, other parties such as quasi-sovereign corporations, particularly those from less dollarized jurisdictions, can play a role as fallback transferees of the exiting foreigner’s project interest or shares under Snapback. Moreover, it should always be noted that under even the most negative circumstances, the potential for a foreign party to obtain a waiver does exist and can be specified for the benefit of all parties.
4.Saving face, weighing options: Although some foreign entities have a checkered past derived from cutting and running under the threat of or the actual imposition of sanctions against Iran, time has shown that many of the same foreign parties which were forced, or chose, to exit their project ventures are the first ones to have returned since the JCPOA. Such is the compelling nature of Iran as a destination for foreign capital.
Iranian parties to a project know both this history itself and its implications. Foreign participants may wish to keep close to the exits, but foreign companies that have been victimized by their own government’s whims regarding sanctions, and the slippage inherent in exiting and reentering, cannot be understated.
For this reason, foreign project partners may choose to consider the solution of exit and entry “options” for themselves under adverse sanction scenarios, and thus it is important for all parties involved to understand what an “option” precisely means, and how to value such an option.
In financial speak, an option is defined as the right but not the obligation to sell (or buy) an asset in a fixed quantity at a fixed price on (or before) a fixed date in time. In the case in question, the asset is the participatory interest of the foreign party in the Iranian project, and the date is that point in time at when the parties to a project agree that the foreign party must leave due to sanctions (or is able to re-enter due to easing of sanctions).
However, it is not obvious immediately what the fixed price should be for foreign project interest at the time of exit or re-entry, and, most importantly, what may be overlooked is the tremendous value that such an option has. In finance, the greater the underlying uncertainty about an asset, the more valuable any option on that uncertain asset is. Similarly, the longer the life of an option on an asset, the more valuable that option is. In the context of long term investments, any option to exit (or re-enter) should be linked with a significant premium (that is, the worth of the option), and the contract parties should ensure that they successfully negotiate an appropriately fair value for the flexibility the options offer. As an illustrative example, the alternative to any exit put option for the foreign party is a fire-sale in the face of illiquid conditions for its share interest under the menace of reimposed international sanctions, or more problematic still, the inability to exit its share interest altogether, which an option is supposed to protect against.
Absent a foreign investor’s legal immunity to the whims of the UN, OFAC, or other authorities, there is no perfect panacea for fool proofing long-term Iranian projects against the kind of uncertainty which the spectre of sanctions create. But although this threat, to a certain extent, has forestalled the growth in Iran’s industry and economy despite the strengthening of Iran’s relationships with the international community, it is now apparent, moreso than ever before, that foreign parties can be expected to take an increasingly pragmatic approach in efforts to remain engaged with their Iranian projects for as long as possible. They can effectively do so by allowing for the most flexible and broad classification of sanctions-related termination risks, by specifying a menu of contractually stipulated responses to reimposed sanctions (in conjunction with intelligent and pre-emptive project structuring) and by exchanging due consideration with the Iranian party for the invaluable options which allow them to remain confident that they can, if absolutely necessary, exit the project and someday re-enter, at a fair price.
Thus, it seems that the operative watchword for all foreign investors in Iran is continuity: continuity of the progression towards innovation, development and growth, and continuity of the participation of foreign interests in that process, bolstered by intelligent structuring solutions, both legal and financial, for dealing with the complicated reality of international economic sanctions. With a measure of foresight, and a functional, flexible contractual framework, all participants in long-term, large-scale project joint ventures can move closer to the ideal of mitigating most, if not all, of the adverse consequences of sanctions regulations on investment decisions and risk management.
First published in our partner Tehran Times
Creating Quality Jobs Crucial to Boost Productivity, Growth in Indonesia
Indonesia must create good and quality jobs to help increase the country’s productivity and competitiveness for sustained and inclusive growth, says a new Asian Development Bank (ADB) study.
The study, titled Indonesia: Enhancing Productivity through Quality Jobs, takes an in-depth look at the challenges in creating better jobs and raising the country’s labor productivity, as well as the necessary skills needed for a youthful and increasingly better educated workforce to meet the demands of the digital age. The publication was launched today at an event in Jakarta hosted by ADB and the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs.
“Indonesia has a tremendous potential to capitalize on its youthful workforce by addressing the country’s long-term challenges to job creation and inclusive growth,” said Rudy Salahuddin, Deputy Minister for Creative Economy, Entrepreneurship, and SME Competitiveness, Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs.
“Not only does the country need to create a more skilled workforce, but it also needs to adjust to new global patterns of technology and the demand for new skills,” said Bambang Susantono, ADB Vice-President for Knowledge Management and Sustainable Development.
The study provides three key messages on how to create good and quality jobs for Indonesia’s large workforce. First, improved education and skills development are necessary to create enough quality jobs to raise productivity. Second, as urban jobs are expanding faster, supportive public policies for sustainable cities are fundamental in generating quality jobs. Lastly, there should be continued efforts to improve labor market institutions and regulations that promote a wider range of employment options and better income security for workers.
The study identifies policy initiatives focused on creating better jobs in the labor market, raising labor productivity, and facilitating worker adjustment to the challenges of the digital age. These issues are addressed both from the supply side and from the demand side of the labor market. Policymakers should ensure that initiatives aimed at increasing productivity also target the poor, women, older people, and other disadvantaged groups.
Labor market institutions like private businesses, small-scale enterprises, and community groups also play a critical role in helping improve the employability of Indonesians. Combining new work opportunities with new technology, ideas, and organization will raise productivity and contribute to improved living standards.
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