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A Glimpse into the Cold War Alliances with Reference to Pakistan’s Case for Kashmir

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The post-World War II scenario observed many rapid identical changes which included end of wartime bonhomie developed between the United States and the Soviet Union against Axis forces.

The story did not end here and both the parties turn into arch rivalry and the world once again sustained half century long cold war between them. Containment was the policy adoption by the United States against the Soviets and this policy resulted in the formation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe to check the influence of the fast spreading communism and to protect the continent from the sway of the soviets. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) were formed which aimed to perform the same task in Asia as with NATO in Europe. However the regional members of these pacts in Asia were more or less inclined towards security arrangements within their own interest with or without having a concern to communism. This was the sharp difference that changed NATO into long lasting alliance even in post-cold war international system but short lived and failed to achieve the aimed objectives in case of SEATO and CENTO.

There is a long saga that explains, how and why Pakistan from the south Asia joined these security pacts. In the wake of security and survival relations newly emerged state of Pakistan was encased in the fear of aggression from its eastern neighbor. There were several factors supported this thinking in Pakistan’s corridors of security and led policy makers to pursue possible options to mitigate this sense of insecurity and improve defense capabilities. These factors included Indian aggression on Kashmir Hyderabad and Jona Garh (all three princely states which were to be part of either India or Pakistan on settled criteria mainly consent of major population of the state). India compellingly integrated Hyderabad and Jona Garh in Indian Territory and Kashmir became a disputed territory between India and Pakistan remained in cold storage of the United Nations in coming future. This was the scenario that constituted insecurity and uncertainty about survival.

In such situation Pakistan joined alliance with the United States and became member of SEATO and CENTO despite both partners were in a loose convergence of interest as Professor Hans J. Morgenthau a notable realist describes the lack of identity of interests in US-Pakistan alliance relationship as: “The alliance between the United States and Pakistan is one of many contemporary instances of an alliance serving complementary interests. For the United States it servers the primary purpose of expanding the scope of the policy of containment; for Pakistan it serves primarily the purpose of increasing her political, military and economic potential via-s-vis her neighbors”.

In the words of Mr. Bogra ( at that time Prime Minister of Pakistan and one of the architect of security policy to join alliances with the United states) “Our main and only purpose was to safeguard the safety and security of Pakistan and we needed support from like-minded and peace-loving nations. We have never made any secret of the fact that we apprehended a threat to our security from India.” It appears both sides were very much clear about intentions of each other and hence at the time of war with India vices raised by Pakistan were rhetoric as it was very much clear from the day one that these pacts were aimed at any communist aggression. Additionally, Mr. Nehru (Indian Prime Minister) manipulated the situation in the favor of India by deviating Kashmir form the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and attached it with changing security environment of the south Asia with reference to Pakistan’s membership into SEATO and CENTO. Moreover in aftermath of Sino-India border conflict of 1962 India was supplied with huge scale of arms and other military hardware’s which provoked negative sentiment in Pakistan as she had provided the United States with intelligence sharing air bases and joined containment policy as second largest non-communist state of Asia but its strategic concerns against India were not focused by partners.

Interestingly the other members of SEATO and CENTO were also more concerned about their regional security arrangement in comparison to the communist threat. For example Iran was more anxious for Egypt, a potential challenger for regional dominance. Gulf States about Iran and as mentioned earlier Pakistan about India. Furthermore The SEATO was boycotted by French, Pakistan entered into an arms accord with the Soviet Union, member states responded passively to the situation in Vietnam. Thus, these events had made the obvious question about the security alliances of Southeast Asia by the United States such as SEATO and CENTO and weakened them sharply. Moreover the logic of divergent political system among member states work against and the coherence could not sustain among them. This logic was visible and worked in NATO as the members were sharing several identities and alliances was based in recognition of these identities include Democracy, Freedom of Speech and expression , Free Market and Common threat.      

Sharp differences and divergences of interests resulted with short term objectives oriented policies by the Asian members of alliances and second largest non-communist state of Asia left alliances. Although there were conditions imposed by the United States on Pakistan to use military hardware mainly not against India but Pakistan was never ready to sustain arms embargo in 1965 war with India. Indeed these pacts left Pakistan with unilateral following the policy of containment by the Unites States and in response did not assured security and survival of Pakistan. In nutshell the choice to be the part of these pact served in twofold ways. Firstly, this forum provided military hardware to develop a strong army of Pakistan with the potentials to check any threat or act of aggression intended by its eastern neighbor and access into sophisticated technology of the west. However on political front this policy neither made Pakistan strong enough to solve Kashmir with muscles not it provided any political support from the west and the Unites States to pressurize India to solve the issue, in accordance of the UN resolutions. Rather it gave escape goat to Indian Prime Minister to deviate from the promised solution of Issue.

 

First published in Monthly the Jahngir World Times

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Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hug Diplomacy Fails

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Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s enthusiasm is only to capture power; the same, however, cannot be said of foreign policy administration, especially in dealing with our immediate neighbors, and China. The best examples of his policy paralysis are the way in which demonetization and GSTs are implemented, or his sudden visit to Pakistan in December 2015. He is always in election mode. During the first two years, he was in the humor of a general election victory. Thereafter, he has spent much of his energy in establishing himself as the sole savior of the BJP in state elections, and this year he will turn his attention to the 2019 general elections.

Two years ago, without doing any homework or planning, Modi travelled to Pakistan from Afghanistan to greet his counterpart, the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, to wish him well on his birthday. He hugged Sharif and spent only two hours with him to try to sort out the 70 year outstanding divergence between India and Pakistan.

Modi strategically hugs fellow world leaders. He has no strategic perception. He believes only in the power of his personal charisma in dealing with foreign policy matters. This strategy has failed considerably with China and with our other immediate neighbors, but he neither intends to accept these mistakes, nor is he interested in learning from them. More importantly, an alternative diplomatic strategy is necessary to maintain our international position; through prudent policy articulations. Let us examine the impact of his hug diplomacy.

During the 2013/14 general elections campaign he attacked the Congress-led UPA government on multiple fronts, including towards former Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh’s policy on Pakistan. He proposed that the BJP government would have more guts to better deal with Pakistan. Under his administration, we lost numerous soldiers in fighting with Pakistan terrorists, experienced a 100-day shutdown in Kashmir, blindly allowed a Pakistan team to inspect our Pathankot Air Force Station, and generally continued down a visionless path in foreign policy. These indicate that Modi’s defensive and offensive strokes against Pakistan have failed completely, including the most politicized ‘surgical strike’ that did not contain the terrorists from Pakistan. Today, the Modi government is searching for policy directions in handling Pakistan, but sat in a corner like a lame duck.

In the beginning, when he took office, Modi perhaps believed that ‘everything is possible’ in international affairs simply by virtue of occupying the prime minister seat. Further, he thought that all his visits abroad would bring a breakthrough. His hugs with counterparts, various costume changes, and the serving of tea, indicate that our prime minister is using soft power approaches. These approaches were used by our first Prime Minister Nehru whilst India did not have a strong military or economy. However, India is not today what it was in the 1950/60s. Presently, hugging and changing costumes will not necessarily keep India influential in international relations, especially at a time when the world is undergoing multi-polar disorder. However, he is in continuous denial that his paths are wrong, especially in dealing with our neighbors.

What is the BJP led-NDA government policy on Pakistan? Does this government have any policy for Pakistan? Since 2014,Modi has not permitted the Minister of External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj, to contribute to any foreign policy articulations. As long as Sushma fulfills the duty of Ministry of Indian Overseas Affairs she will receive praise from the prime minister’s office.

During 2015 he met Sharif at his residence in Islamabad to give him a hug. This happened exactly two years ago. Further, this is a very serious question that the Media and Modi-supporting TV channels forgot to raise. Instead, without hesitation, they praised him for touching the sky, and described the moment as a diplomatic initiative for a breakthrough with our neighbor Pakistan. The Media will realize this mistake when their traditional viewers switch over to other channels to get centrist news.

What are the outcomes of Modi hugging Sharif at his residence? The results are terrible. India’s relation with Pakistan touches the lowest ever level in a history of 70 years. The Mumbai terror attack mastermind Hafiz Saeed was released from house arrest and has started a political party to contest the general elections in Pakistan next year. This government does not have the guts to put pressure on Pakistan to provide the evidence – as requested by the Pakistan’s Court – essential to keeping the trial alive against Saeed. Modi has often preached that his government succeeded in isolating Pakistan in the international domain. The reality would be as much India diplomatically isolating Pakistan from the international community as the vacuum has been comfortably filled by China without any difficulty. These are the achievements that Modi’s hugs have brought to India.

The stability of Afghanistan is in India’s long-term strategic interest. India’s ‘aid diplomacy’ to Afghanistan in various fields has been increasing day after day, including infrastructure development and the training of Afghan security forces. Yet, India’s influence in Afghanistan is in disarray. Former Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai said, “India should have its own policy on Afghanistan”. However, Modi’s policy makers in New Delhi are expecting the US President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to maintain India’s active and significant role in Afghanistan.

India showed its displeasure during the constitutional crisis in Nepal, in halting energy supply to Kathmandu. This forced the land-locked country to obtain easy support from Beijing. Nepal was once the buffer state between India and China; it is now sitting on China’s lap and steering India. Modi’s mute approach to the Rohingya crisis speculates India’s major power ambition. This is a serious setback to India’s diplomacy: it is now pushing Myanmar to get support from China, along with our neighbor Bangladesh, in resolving the crisis with Rohingya refugees.

The first democratically elected government under Mohamed Nasheed was toppled unconstitutionally in Maldives. Since India has failed to raise any substantial voice against this atrocity, China has jumped onto the scene. New Delhi ought to have designed a policy to resolve the political crisis, but India, the world’s largest democracy, has watched this incident as a movie in the Indian Ocean Theatre. The highlight was the decision of our Prime Minister to skip a visit to the Maldives whilst on his tour of the Indian Ocean islands.

In Sri Lanka, China is designing its future battlefield against India. As the war against LTTE was over, Colombo started travelling in a two-way track, with India and China. Beijing’s love affair, apparently with Colombo, but with an eye on New Delhi, is no secret. Since Modi has allowed these developments without exercising any diplomatic resistance, he has given China a comfortable seat inside Sri Lanka. China has now realised that her weaved network against India can be strengthened easily in the Indian Ocean, because New Delhi only displays silent concern. After Modi took office, India – China relations have remained static. The border talks are on stand still. Beijing holds on to extend a technical hold on Masood Azhar, a UN designated terrorist. The dragon pulls our immediate neighbors to her side. These developments indicate that our foreign policy articulations are not supported by any clear strategic trajectory.

Modi’s diplomacy is like an air balloon which, once torn, cannot be refilled; a new balloon is needed. Hugging a leader does not lead to any commitment in foreign affairs. Personal charisma does not work as a foreign policy tool in dealing with a world power. For this reason, Modi cannot understand the setback he is facing with China, Pakistan, and our other neighbors. In comparison, Vajpayee’s or Dr. Manmohan Singh’s combined simple charisma as leaders or economists with appropriate home-work in the past; has caused tremendous results in foreign policy, including expected results in Indo-US nuclear negotiations. This is completely missing in Modi’s administration.

Hence, the newly elected Congress Party President Rahul Gandhi has said, “Modi’s hug diplomacy fails”. It was a valuable comment that the ruling elite should consider as a meaningful insight. Alternative approaches are vital to regain our neighbors’ trust, as opposed to China’s. However, Prime Minister Modi’s this year of work will be focused on the 2019 general elections, compromising the proper attention due to India’s international diplomacy.

First published in Congress Sandesh

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Potential Consequences of Nuclear Politics in South Asia

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Established in 1948, Indian atomic energy commission turned towards United Kingdom for their first help in the making of Apsara. Subsequently, with a similar vision, the CIRUS reactor was supplied by Canada, where, the heavy water came from the United States.

India, over the years, has built a nuclear program that has led to the making of a number of reactors. India’s 1974 “Peaceful nuclear explosion” implies to their hegemonic ambitions as India has the capacity to produce around 300-400 nuclear weapons. The continuous upgradation of weapons by India could lead her as a hegemon nuclear power that can deeply unsettle Pakistan and China.

Calling into question India’s stated intentions, when it comes to nuclear tests, the plutonium for its 1974 and 1998 tests was diverted from its “civilian” nuclear facilities. After 1974, India continued to claim its explosion was “peaceful” and advocated global nuclear disarmament, even as it rejected proposals by Pakistan to denuclearize South Asia.

From Pokhran-I to Operation Shakti, India has traditionally relied on plutonium and thermonuclear technology. In 1992, the then Chairman of Department of Indian Atomic Energy  acknowledged that India had succeeded in the past for achieving the target of highly enriched uranium, while the centrifuge program was facing critical and technical hindrances. Also, it was admitted by the former Chairman of AEC, Raja Ramanna that India was working to produce more efficient centrifuges which were used for military purposes.  At the peak of all these developments, it is important to note that thermonuclear weapons have far more destructive power than a nuclear bomb.

India may also be considering using its civil power reactors to increase its stock of weapon-grade plutonium. Robert Einhorn, the State Department’s former top nonproliferation official told the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference in March that the officials in the Bush administration had the ambition to sign a nuclear deal with India, to “work together to counter China- to be a counterweight to an emerging China.” He further expressed his views that the nuclear deal had unfortunate repercussions, because other nations concluded that Washington was playing favorites with India.

India is the only country in the region having uranium reserves that are higher than what other countries in the region hold. India has already received roughly 4,914 tons of uranium from France, Russia, and Kazakhstan, and it has agreements with Canada, Mongolia, Argentina, and Namibia for additional shipments. It also signed a uranium deal with Australia that has sparked considerable controversy at home.

This massive production of uranium annually can support its nuclear submarine program and current weapons grade plutonium production rate indirectly. These uranium reserves are enough for approx. 6-10 bombs per year.

Adding a twist to the existing fissile material build-up process, the Indo-US strategic partnership supplemented it. Under this dangerous bargain, it would continue to not only allow India to increase its fissile material but also the capacity to increase the build-up of nuclear weapon material.

Hence, the strategic stability in South Asia has been negatively impacted since the initial stages due to the hegemonic designs which India pursued with the start of CIRUS reactor. With the passage of time, the Indo-US nuclear deal and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver have already added more repercussions and now the discriminatory move to try to facilitate Indian NSG membership will further erode the strategic stability in South Asia.

Indian NSG membership and its potential exemption has adverse implications on non-proliferation regime. This has allowed India to expand its military program. As a result of 2008 exemption it has signed a number of agreement in nuclear domain with different countries. Interestingly, Mansoor Ahmed states that India has the capacity to utilize the uranium it is importing from these countries to produce more bombs.  The aforementioned reasons sum up India’s keenness to obtain NSG’s membership. This U.S.-backed move to make India a member of the NSG will be good neither for Pakistan nor for China, and it would set off nuclear instability in the region.

While looking at the dynamics of left alone Pakistan since late 1990’s, starting from Indo-US strategic partnership to now this geoploliticising of NSG. Consequently, this shall allow India to use all this a means of making the most optimum use of all its natural uranium stocks for weaponization. To offset the stakes, it might be prudent to have a close check on the international architects of India’s nuclear build-up. The alleged misuse of U.S. and Canadian controlled items by India must be enough to refrain from any cooperation if it is not abiding by group’s guidelines and commodity control list.

Furthermore, the more discriminatory the international nuclear order becomes, the less would be the effectiveness of deterrence and strategic balance in the region. The NSG will have to identify that India’s 1974 nuclear explosive test was the reason that nuclear supplier states established the NSG. It must also emphasize upon its commitment to uphold the principles of the nonproliferation.

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Who’s going to rescue Male?

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In the last three and a half years of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration, China has been allowed to easily interfere with the internal affairs of India’s close neighbors’. This demonstrates India’s reluctance to stand with its neighbors’as they face grave domestic challenges which require India’s assistance. The best example is the recent refugee crisis in Rakhine, western province of Myanmar, and the fleeing of the Rohingya Muslims to India and Bangladesh. Modi’s government only observes the issue from the perspective of security, and therefore seeks to send the refugees back to Myanmar; it does not attempt to resolve the crisis. India is supposed to take the lead in resolving the Rohingya refugee crisis. However, its insular, defensive strategy has given the Chinese the opportunity to take a foothold; Modi is failing to address the situation. India is a country aspiring to become a major power but it is presently losing ground daily in the international power system. These raises serious doubt among the great powers and among those countries that desire and expect the rise of India.

The present Maldives crisis provides India with a chance to reclaim the trust of its neighbors. The first democratically elected President, Mohamed Nasheed, was arrested for terrorism charges in 2015 and sentenced to 13 years. In consequence of his health problems, he exiled in London now staying in Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, the Maldives’ Supreme Court has ordered (on 1 February 2018) the release of the former president Nasheed and the other twelve members of the opposition party. If President Yameen’s government complies with the court order, there is a good chance that it would lose its majority to the opposition party. Hence, Yameen refused to comply with the verdict of the court and declared a state of emergency. The Supreme Court has since taken a ‘U’ turn and revoked its judgment regarding the release of prisoners. Thus, Male is facing a great crisis.

In this article, I would like to argue that, since the Male crisis is occurring in the Indian Ocean Theater, it is for New Delhi to exercise its responsibility and resolve the crisis.

The Male Crisis

Modi skipped a visit to Male during his state visit in 2015 to the Indian Ocean countries. This was a policy mistake of the Modi’s government. Hence, “India’s leverage in the Maldives is less than it has ever been” (The Hindu). He should have visited at that time, to register a strong message in Male that ‘India will stand with them shoulder to shoulder to restore democracy’. This would have been a tough message to Yameen, to respect the law. Now, however, in the vacuum of the government’s mistake, Yameen is spreading his wings towards India’s adversaries – China and Pakistan. If it is allowed – this would be a serious security threat for India. China should not be allowed to dictate terms in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). So, by resolving the situation, Modi can rectify his past errors.

If India is to emerge from the containment strategy of China, then it should act with strategic assertiveness whilst simultaneously inviting both government and the opposition of Maldives’ to negotiating table, to recover the rule of law in Maldives, and allow elections to be conducted in September 2018.

India should now act sensibly by considering the request from ‘Nasheed the opposition camp’ for India’s support; they ask India “to send an envoy, backed by India’s military”. Nasheed believes that India alone can restore the democracy to the Island. Moreover, India cannot run from this emergency by citing “its long-standing claim not to interfere in other states’ affairs” (The Independent). The Indian Ocean is India’s backyard. India should not expect the West to come to the rescue of Male or allow China to interfere. The world knows that China is Yameen’s close ally. It also knows that the Male military has trained in Islamabad and that ammunition has been produced in Male with the support of Pakistan.

The traditional responses of India – such as “we are watching closely and are disturbed” – will not work this time nor gain any diplomatic advantage. This is the time for India to step in and prove that the Indian Ocean is indeed India’s Ocean, especially with increasing Chinese assertiveness therein. India should consider the sincere request of former president Nasheed, the condemnation of the West, and the support of the wider world.

China’s mouthpiece, The Global Times, advises that – ‘India must not interfere in Male’ as it has no justification. India is surrounded by more rogue states. If India does not interfere in resolving the Male crisis, then law breakers closer to home will presume that India’s desire to get along with China provides them with more impunity for breaking the law domestically. India’s relations with China have no space with Male crisis. Hence, India has the duty to reinstate democracy in the island nation of Maldives and proclaim to the world that India’s aspiration to become a major power has not faded. Modi should not forget that India is now a country with a “credible minimum nuclear deterrent”. Our “ballistic missile arsenal can deliver warheads on targets more than 5,000-km away – a range that encompasses China’s eastern centers”. India also possesses and we have the “air, sea, and land-based launching platforms” (CRS Report, 2017). India’s past leadership gave substantial power to Modi so that he would use it in situations of necessity like this, to safeguard India’s image on the Indo-Pacific stage.

Conclusion

What are the available solutions and who is going to rescue Male? The answer is very clear: India holds this responsibility.

First, whilst dealing in this matter, New Delhi should avoid crafting useless statements like “we are disturbed by watching the Male crisis”. This will not provide any positive results. India should being tough with the Yameen government; it should ring a bell about former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s realism of “1988’s Operation Cactus” to thwart the coup attempt to save the Maumoon Abdul Gayoom’s government in Male. Through this communication Yameen will have a chance to presume India’s strategic trajectory. Although China, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are the close allies of Yameen, India should not back down on this matter. To shy away from this challenge is akin to a suicide attempt for the Modi government. No one would accept this leadership if it took this course.

Second, India should communicate its stance with the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) countries, to stand together and to mount pressure on the Maldives. This would send a signal to Beijing that it ought to avoid any interference in the issue, and sternly warn Yameen, forcing him to reconsider his position.

Third, New Delhi could meanwhile obtain the backup of the US, EU, and Australia, to make a powerful statement of India’s intention to restore peace and order in Maldives.

Fourth, India should stand tall in this matter and tell the world that it is its duty and responsibility to earn and preserve the trust of other nations. This trust is now under serious threat, following the actions of the ruling elite in New Delhi. This trust was built brick by brick by India’s leaders in the last seven decades. To keep this trust with its ally alive, India should act wisely to maintain its interest in the Indian Ocean.

Fifth and finally, if Modi fails to defend India’s interest in the Indian Ocean, he should take moral responsibility. India’s neighbor is facing a very serious issue. It is also vulnerable to the influence of China in the Maldives, which increases whenever New Delhi stands still. If there is no keen watchfulness with China, there will be serious long-term consequences. This can be seen in Sri Lanka today.

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