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Eurasian Heart of Gold

Samantha Brletich

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What is the impact of Kumtor on Kyrgyzstan’s Gold Mining Sector?

Nationalization talks have started again in Kyrgyzstan about the ownership of Kumtor Gold Mine. Kumtor Gold Mine, operated and jointly owned by Canadian Centerra Gold via Kumtor Operating Company (KOC) and the Kyrgyz government, has always been a point of tension in the country. Marred by protests, both anti-Kyrgyz government and anti-Centerra, environmental controversy, and being the center of internal Kyrgyz political and social struggles, Kumtor remains Kyrgyzstan’s largest and the most profitable investment project and the country’s main economic asset.

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The Kumtor Gold Mine, the largest gold mine in Kyrgyzstan located in the Issyk Kul Province, is located 350 kilometers southeast from the capital of Bishkek and 80 km south of Issyk-Kul Lake. The mining operation is open-pit which uses surface mining to extract rocks and minerals. The mine has been in operation since 1997; the lifespan of the mine has been extended to 2023.

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The mine which is currently 100% owned by Canadian Centerra Gold (operated through Kumtor Operating Company or KOC) is a joint-stock company (JSC) which Kyrgyzstan via Kyrgyzaltyn owns “33% of the common shares or 77,401,766” and “as of March 1, 2012, Kyrgyzstan’s interests are estimated at $1.546 billion.”[i] Kumtor currently employs 2,617 Kyrgyz citizens (95% are full-time) out of 3,190 total employees. Kumtor accounts for 20% of Kyrgyzstan’s industrial sector and output and accounts for 8% of its GDP. With current dividends, Kyrgyzstan receives 11.3 million USD per year and KOC pays 108 million USD in taxes to the Kyrgyz government.[ii]

Ata-Meken has submitted a draft law on the nationalization of Kumtor. The last round of talks/negotiations about Kumtor took place 10 December 2014. Calls for nationalization emerged out of the failure to establish a joint-venture of the mine: “due to populism we have lost the chance to set up a joint venture [for Kumtor],” Kyrgyz President Atambayev said in a 1 December 2014 interview.[iii] The currently discussion would have Kyrgyzaltyn swap 33% of its holdings for 50% ownership of the joint venture company operating Kumtor, making ownership 50/50. Alternatively, the Kyrgyz nationalist political parties (Ata-Meken and Respublika) suggest Kyrgyzaltyn own 67% while Centerra holds 33% or Kyrgyzaltyn control 100% of the mine as advocated by Respublika.[iv]

The assertiveness of the Kyrgyz when negotiating mining contracts is due to the feeling that foreign companies operating the mines are not investing in local communities and are not promoting development in the region. This is partly because of past environmental accidents.

In May 1998, a truck toppled releasing 1700-1800 kg of toxic sodium cyanide into the Barskoon River. After the accident, local villagers reported illness (some deaths were reported by never fully linked to the cyanide spill—this is speculative) as the river is used for drinking and for irrigation. After the accident and the lackluster response by both Centerra and the Kyrgyz government, locals blockaded the roads to Kumtor and demanded that the contract be cancelled. This prompted more environmental safeguards such as immediate notification of a spill was to be implemented. Another incident occurred on January 20, 2000 where a KOC truck “carrying 1,500 kilograms of ammonium nitrate, used as an explosive at the mine, crashed, [and] spilling its contents.”[v] Kyrgyz authorities were not immediately notified of the spill.

Because of these accidents, there is concern about the use of land. The Kyrgyz Republic’s “Law on Subsoil” introduced in 1997 “governs relationships arising between the government and individuals and legal entities, and other states while using subsoil” and regulates mineral recovery (extraction), mineral deposits of economic significance, ownership of the subsoil and there within minerals.[vi] The Law states that subsoil is the exclusive property of the Kyrgyz Republic is under protection by the state. This law has been used to regulate mining activities and has been used to justify violations of environmental regulations including operations at Kumtor.

The “Law on Glaciers”—to prevent the degradation of glaciers that supply drinking water to many local villages—was passed by Parliament in April 2014, but was sent back by the President for revisions. The new law would require companies to pay for damages to the glaciers. The glaciers affected would be Davidov, Lysyi and Sarytor as KOC has put rocks on top of glaciers and removed parts of glacial ice violating environmental provisions of the project; Centerra has adjusted their operations to stop the acceleration of water.[vii] Lake Petrov is also in danger.

It is unclear whether or not the environmental laws on glaciers or subsoil are genuine attempts to preserve the environment or are a way for the Kyrgyz government to extract concessions from foreign companies to increase their profits or holdings in a company.

There are also concerns how the mining and the chemical usages to mine the gold will affect the historic freshwater Issyk-Kul Lake. The Issyk-Kul Development Fund became part of the Kumtor operation and KOC/Centerra is required to provide 1% of its gross revenue to socio-economic development of regional sectors aligned with spending is based on government priorities. The fund was started in 2009 and since then 25 million USD was provided to the fund; 4.638 million USD was provided to the fund in 2012 alone. The fund has helped build schools, kindergartens, sports clubs, and irrigation infrastructure which has been impacted by the mining.

To mitigate any significant economic effects of the nationalization of Kumtor, additional gold mining operations exist at Ishtamberdy, Bozymchak and Taldybulak Levoberezhnyi mines. Ishtamberdy is Chinese operated, protested by Kyrgyz locals, and has experienced some controversy including Full Gold Mining JSC threatening to cease operations in September 2013. The mine was to begin production in the second quarter of 2013 creating 600 permanent jobs.[viii]

Bozymchak mine would produce mainly ore and would produce 0.8 to 0.9 tons of gold. Kazakhstan’s Kazakhmys incurred an impairment charge in 2012 of $162 million USD against Bozymchak which reveals a higher operating risk in Kyrgyzstan as the company had to reduce its goodwill.[ix] The first shipment of the concentrate from Bozymchak to Kazakhstan was expected to occur in November 2014.[x] The mine was said to have completed construction in late 2013 providing 600-700 permanent jobs. Taldybulak Levoberezhnyi, an Open Joint Stock Company, is expected to be in operation until 2026: 60% belongs to Altynken (purchased by Chinese Superb Pacific Limited Company in Sept 2011) and 40% belongs to the Kyrgyz government. At the Taldybulak Levoberezhnyi, production was not expected until June 2014 according to AKIPress. In October 2012, locals picketed the headquarters of the mine in Orlovka, Kyrgyzstan. The protesters disputed the “Chinese company’s illegal sacking of Kyrgyz citizens and polluting of the local environment.”[xi]

There are also gold deposits that could be exploited including Makmal and Togolok but they are not as profitable. The Makmal gold mine was once extremely profitable. Operations at Makmal began in 1986 and excavated until 1996 producing 21.47 tons of gold. The mine is in past producer stage and its life has been extended to 2016. Geological reserves after 1996 were estimated at 20 tons of gold. [xii] Mining operations at Togolok will produce 800 jobs and its probable reserves are estimated at 86 tons in the mine deposit and the surrounding area.[xiii]

There are multiple promising gold deposits/sites are Karator, At-Bashy in the Naryn region, containing 5.5 gold reserves and the “Buchuk” gold reserve of 15-20 tons. Shambasei gold resource, a low-risk high-margin project, in Southern Kyrgyzstan has an estimated defined gold reserve of “2.5 million [tons] at 3.4g/t, or 277,000 ounces of gold.”[xiv] Karakazyk in the Chon-Alay district in the Osh region would produce 200-300 kg per year producing 100-120 jobs for the local workforce. These identified sites combined produce less gold and revenue than Kumtor and would provide fewer jobs.[xv]

The nationalization of Kumtor must be mitigated by the countries’ other mineral sectors such as copper, ore, silver, iron and tungsten. To remain economically competitive within the Eurasian Economic Union, Kyrgyzstan must develop sustainable economic and mining practices as the Kyrgyz economy is susceptible to many supply shocks; reliance on Kumtor is too heavy. By developing other sectors of the economy, Kyrgyzstan is shielding itself from a possible economic meltdown. If nationalization were to occur, would the Kyrgyz government be able to support the projects developed by the Issyk-Kul Development Fund? Poor development in the financial sector has led to poor governance of the situation prompting protests that have shut down or suspended operations.

Kumtor protests were rooted in the need to address environmental concerns, contributions to the community, and perceived unequal revenue distribution and fueled by renewed nationalism and the assertiveness of the new post-Bakiev government. South African investors (Talas Gold Company) and Australian investors (Z-Explorer of Manas Resources) have met the same challenges as Canada’s Centerra. If these issues are not resolved, can cause widespread damage to Kyrgyzstan’s gold mining and damage Kyrgyzstan’s reputation as a reliable foreign business partner. Corruption in Kyrgyzstan is also a concern. According to Transparency International 2014 Corruption Perception Index rankings, Kyrgyzstan has a rank of 27 (0 is the most corrupt to 100 which is the least corrupt).

Kyrgyzstan would most likely be unable to run the mine itself: “[KOC] does not earn money on a daily basis. It receives financial support from Centerra for most of the year until it can sell gold and pay back all of its loans.” [xvi] Pay out would not be immediate and the government would have to put the money upfront to benefit the costs. Most of the workers that Kumtor employs would most likely stay unless the nationalization of the mine were to affect their wages and Kyrgyzstan lacks the workforce to replace Centerra’s sector specialists. If nationalized, there would be higher operating costs decreasing revenue. Other companies (or countries) might be interested in developing the mine, but would most likely face the same issues as Centerra Gold leading Kyrgyzstan to become more of a high political risk country.

 


[i] Kumtor Gold. 2013. FAQ: Kyrgyzstan and Centerra. http://www.kumtor.kg/en/about/faq/centerragold-and-kyrgyzstan/ (last accessed 29 December 2014).

[ii] Gullette, David and Asel Kalybekova. 2014. Agreement under pressure, Gold mining and protests in the Kyrgyz Republic. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/10927.pdf (last accessed January 3, 2015). Page. 15.

[iii] Kg.24. 2014. Kyrgyz moves towards Kumtor nationalization. The Times of Central Asia. http://www.eng.24.kg/bigtiraj/173638-news24.html (last accessed 29 December 2014).

[iv] Gullette, David and Asel Kalybekova. 2014. Agreement under pressure, Gold mining and protests in the Kyrgyz Republic. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/10927.pdf (last accessed January 3, 2015). Page. 15.

[v] Norlen, Doug. 2000. The Kumtor Gold Mine: Spewing toxics from on high. Pacific Environment and Resouces Center, September 2000. Bankwatch Web site. http://bankwatch.org/documents/kumtor_toxics_09_02.pdf (last accessed January 4, 2015). Page 2.

[vi] United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on Subsoil. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Web site (UNECE). http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/hlm/prgm /cph/experts/kyrgyzstan/documents/law.on.subsoil.pdf (last accessed January 5, 2015)

[vii] Centerra Gold. 2012. Environmental and Sustainability Report 2012. Kumtor Gold. http://www.kumtor.kg/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Eco2012_en.pdf (last accessed January 3, 2015). Page 28-29.

[viii] The State Agency on Geology and Mineral Resources of the Kyrgyz Republic. 2014. The mines of the Kyrgyz Republic. http://www.geology.kg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=200&Itemid=242&lang=en (last accessed Jan 2, 2015).

[ix] Kazakhmys. 2013. KAZAKHMYS PLC HALF-YEARLY REPORT FOR THE PERIOD ENDED 30 JUNE 2013. KAZAKHMYS WEB SITE. http://www.kase.kz/files/emitters/GB_KZMS/gb_kzms_reliz_220813_en.pdf (last accessed January 3, 2015).

[x]The Times of Central Asia. 2014. Kazakhmys to start shipping concentrate from Bozymchak in Kyrgyzstan in November. http://www.timesca.com/news/9961-kazakhmys-to-start-shipping-concentrate-from-bozymchak-in-kyrgyzstan-in-november (last accessed December 30, 2014).

[xi] Trilling, David. 2012. Kyrgyzstan: Chinese Respond to latest mine attack. Eurasianet.org Web Site. http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66121 (last accessed January 2, 2015).

[xii] Kyrgyzaltyn. 2011. Makmal Gold Mining Combinate. Kyrgyzaltyn Web site. http://www.kyrgyzaltyn.kg/en/filialy/63-kombinat-makmalzoloto (last accessed December 29, 2014).

[xiii] The State Agency on Geology and Mineral Resources of the Kyrgyz Republic. 2014. The mines of the Kyrgyz Republic. http://www.geology.kg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=200&Itemid=242&lang=en (last accessed Jan 2, 2015).

[xiv]Proactive Investors. 2014. Manas Resources updates Shambesai gold resource to latest standard

http://www.proactiveinvestors.com/companies/news/58591/manas-resources-updates-shambesai-gold-resource-to-latest-standard-58591.html (last accessed January 3, 2015).

[xv] The State Agency on Geology and Mineral Resources of the Kyrgyz Republic. 2014. The mines of the Kyrgyz Republic. http://www.geology.kg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=200&Itemid=242&lang=en (last accessed Jan 2, 2015).

[xvi] Gullette, David and Asel Kalybekova. 2014. Agreement under pressure, Gold mining and protests in the Kyrgyz Republic. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/10927.pdf (last accessed January 3, 2015). Page. 10.

Samantha M. Brletich is a researcher and writer specializing in Central Asia and governance, security, terrorism, and development issues. She possesses a Master’s in Peace Operations Policy from George Mason University in Virginia, United States. She works with the virtual think tank Modern Diplomacy specializing in Central Asia and diplomatic trends. Her work has appeared in multiple publications focused on diplomacy and Central Asia respectively. She is currently an employee of the U.S. Federal Government.

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ILO Reports Important Progress on Child Labour and Forced Labour in Uzbek Cotton Fields

MD Staff

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A new International Labour Organization report to the World Bank finds that the systematic use of child labour in Uzbekistan’s cotton harvest has come to an end, and that concrete measures to stop the use of forced labour have been taken.

The report Third-party monitoring of measures against child labour and forced labour during the 2017 cotton harvest in Uzbekistan is based on more than 3,000 unaccompanied and unannounced interviews with a representative sample of the country’s 2.6 million cotton pickers. It shows that the country is making significant reforms on fundamental labour rights in the cotton fields.

“The 2017 cotton harvest took place in the context of increased transparency and dialogue. This has encompassed all groups of civil society, including critical voices of individual activists. This is an encouraging sign for the future. However, there is still a lag between the sheer amount of new decrees and reforms being issued by the central government and the capacity to absorb and implement these changes at provincial and district levels,” says Beate Andrees, Chief of the ILO’s Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work Branch.

The ILO has been monitoring the cotton harvest for child labour since 2013. In 2015, it began monitoring the harvest for forced labour and child labour as part of an agreement with the World Bank.

Interviews carried out by the monitors took place in all provinces of the country and included cotton pickers and other groups which are directly or indirectly involved in the harvest such as local authorities, education and medical personnel. In addition, a telephone poll of 1,000 randomly selected persons was conducted. Before the harvest, the ILO experts organized training for some 6,300 people directly involved with the recruitment of cotton pickers.

The results confirm that the large majority of the 2.6 million cotton pickers engaged voluntarily in the annual harvest in 2017 and that there is a high level of awareness in the country about the unacceptability of both child and forced labour. The report confirms earlier findings that the systematic use of child labour in the cotton harvest has ended though continued vigilance is required to ensure that children are in school.

Instructions have been given by the Uzbek national authorities to local administrations to ensure that all recruitment of cotton pickers is on a voluntary basis. In September 2017, an order was given withdrawing certain risk groups (students, education and medical personnel) from the harvest at its early stage.

Moreover, cotton pickers’ wages have been increased in line with recommendations by the ILO and the World Bank. The ILO recommends that the government continues to increase wages and also addresses working conditions more broadly to further attract voluntary pickers.

Last September, Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev spoke before the United Nations General Assembly in New York where he pledged to end forced labour in his country and underscored his government’s engagement with the ILO. In November 2017, at the Global Conference on the Sustained Eradication of Child Labour in Argentina, Uzbekistan also pledged to engage with independent civil society groups on the issue.

The ILO Third-Party Monitoring (TPM) project in Uzbekistan will now focus on the remaining challenges, particularly the need for further awareness raising and capacity building, which varies between provinces and districts. It will ensure that all those involved in recruitment will have the information and tools needed to ensure that cotton pickers are engaged in conformity with international labour standards.

The monitoring and results from a pilot project in the area of South Karkalpakstan also show that cotton picking economically empowers women in rural areas. The cotton harvest provides many women with a unique opportunity to earn an extra cash income which they control and can use to improve the situation of their families.

The ILO TPM Project is funded by a multi-donor trust fund with major contributions by the European Union, United States and Switzerland.

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Kazakhstan Launches Online Platform for Monitoring and Reporting Greenhouse Gases

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An online platform for monitoring, reporting and verifying emission sources and greenhouse gases (GHG) was officially launched today by the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the World Bank.

The platform is an essential element of the National Emissions Trading System of Kazakhstan, which was launched in 2013 as the country’s main instrument to regulate domestic CO2 emissions and to drive the development of low-carbon technologies. Today, the National Emissions Trading System of Kazakhstan covers all major companies in the energy, oil and gas sectors, mining, metallurgical, chemical and processing industries.

Since 2014, the World Bank Trust Fund Partnership for Market Readiness has provided technical assistance to Kazakhstan in supporting the implementation of the National Emissions Trading System of Kazakhstan and related climate change mitigation policies.

“Kazakhstan’s emissions trading system is the first of its kind in the Central Asia region,” said Ato Brown, World Bank Country Manager for Kazakhstan. “With support from the Partnership for Market Readiness, the country has made a great effort to develop policy options for mid- and long-term emissions pathways and to develop an action plan on GHG emissions reductions by 2030. The World Bank will continue to support the Government during the crucial stages of policy implementation.”

The platform enables Kazakhstan’s major emitters to transmit and record data on GHGs emissions, as well as trade online. The National Allocation Plan, adopted in January 2018, sets an emission cap for 129 companies for the period 2018-2020. Per the national allocation plan, quotas have been allocated until 2020.

“The electronic platform undoubtedly proves the evolution of the Kazakhstan emission control system, which will allow the monitoring, reporting and verification system to be upgraded to a much higher level,” said Sergei Tsoy, Deputy General Director of JSC Zhasyl Damu.

GHG data is confirmed by accredited bodies for verification and validation and transferred to the Cadastre using an electronic digital signature. To date, there are seven verification companies accredited in Kazakhstan, with five more in the process of accreditation.

The platform was developed by JSC Zhasyl Damu with the support of France’s Technical Center on Air Pollution and Greenhouse Gases. The system is administered by JSC Zhasyl-Damu, while the beneficiaries are the Climate Change Department and the Committee for Environmental Regulation and Control of the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Background

Kazakhstan is one of the largest emitters of GHG in Europe and Central Asia with total annual national emissions of 300.9 MtCO2e in 2015. The energy sector accounts for 82% of total GHG emissions, followed by agriculture (9.6%) and industrial processes (6.4%). More than 80% of produced electricity in Kazakhstan is coal-fired, followed by natural gas (7%) and hydro power (8%).

Kazakhstan proposed as its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) an economy-wide reduction of GHG emissions of 15% from 1990 emissions levels by 2030. Kazakhstan ratified the Paris Agreement in November 2016 and committed itself to the fulfilment of the proposed target as its first INDC. The objective will contribute to sustainable economic development as well as to the achievement of the long-term global goal of keeping global temperatures below 2 degrees Celsius. 

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Religious buildings in Kazakhstan to be labeled 16+

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New restrictions on religious activities are emerging in Kazakhstan. Will they help to fight extremism?

According to the Government bill introducing amendments to the laws on religious activities and associations, adolescents should be forbidden from attending mosques, churches and synagogues if they are not accompanied by one of the parents and don’t have written consent of another parent.

Schools and the media are going to be forbidden from talking about the belief systems of various religions as well.

By implementing these and other measures, Astana intends to combat religious extremism. However, the crackdown on religion has already set the country four years back: in 2017 the Republic of Kazakhstan returned on the list of countries where the religious situation arouses concern of the US State Department Commission on International Religious Freedom. Kazakhstan last appeared on the list along with Afghanistan, India, Indonesia and Laos in 2013.

Is the proposed bill really going to help to contain the spread of radical Islam, and to what extent does it conform with international human rights standards?

The Concept of State Policy towards Religion, adopted in 2017, shows that the authorities strive to expel religion from public space altogether and promote an ideology of “secularism”. Their thinking is understandable: with no contact between members of differentreligions, there will be no inter-religious conflicts.

However, according to the European experience, prohibitive policy does not bring the expected results. In a multicultural society, the lack of information about the beliefs of other religions only increases tensions. Silencing the matter of religion and obstructing religious education reduces the ability to critically evaluate the extremist ideologies,while increasing the opportunityto spread false information aimed to promote inter-religious discord.

In addition, various summer camps, excursion and pilgrimage activities organized by religious communities are going to be banned if the bill is adopted. It includes those traditional religious confessions that the Government routinely thanks for promoting the inter-civilizational dialogue, youth development and the maintenance of stability, peace and prosperity in the society. A large number of children and teenagers will be deprived of their usual social circles and leisure activities.

As a result of such unconstitutional state interference and bureaucratic obstacles, children and teenagers will be denied the right to practice the religion of their family even when outside educational, medical and other state institutions. Not to mention that parents will be entitledby law to restrict the right of their children under the age of 16 to choose their faith.

Moreover, according to the proposed legislation, if a minor is found in a prayer room“illegally”, the responsibility will fall on the religious organization in question. Consequently, the clergy will need to alienate and discourage the younger generations from attending their own churches, so as not to get fined and fall within the scope of the restrictions on the religious activities!

At the same time, actual extremist organizations will go underground and get more freedom than their peaceful competitors. Obviously, the unruly youth will turn not to those imams, priests or rabbis unable to go beyond the restrictive framework of formal prohibitions. They will go to the “real” preachers who offer communion, new religious experience, something to devote yourself to, a sense of self-worth (even if as suicide bombers).

It is in the interests of all religious leaders, and indeed the whole world, to prevent such a terrible scenario from happening and to return Kazakhstan on the path of civilizational dialogue and inter-confessional cooperation. Otherwise, any participation in the VI Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions in the Astana Palace of Peace and Reconciliation can be seen as not only dishonorable and hypocritical, but also unsafe.

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