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The Taliban’s Enablers

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Since the 9/11 attacks, numerous books have been written about the Taliban, documenting its history and resurgence.

Many writers fault the United States for failing to turn Afghanistan into the Shangri La that it could be, claiming that beginning with the Bonn conference in December 2001, the Afghanistan war has been a disaster punctuated by one missed opportunity after another, guided by a hubristic new imperialism.

Some recurrent themes pervade this literature. To begin with, it is believed that the Taliban is not as bad as is commonly thought and that its actions should be equated with those of others, thereby implying that bad behavior is the norm. It has likewise been argued that the Taliban can be coaxed into behaving better if only Washington will provide the right combination of carrots and sticks, and that isolating the movement, and holding it accountable for its atrocities, will only embolden it. Finally, there is the view that the West in general and Washington in particular must excuse the Taliban’s “excesses” as just another way of life: This requires treating Pashtunwali (the tribal code of behavior traditionally governing Pashtun society), Shari’a, and democracy as merely different approaches to living, none better, none worse than another.

Through often learned prose, plenty of repetition, and the kind of authorization conferred by academic presses, these placating chroniclers have greatly burnished the Taliban’s image in the West. As U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan shifts from surge to surgical strikes to peace talks, Americans had better get to know the real Taliban.

Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism

As a correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review, Ahmed Rashid reported on the rise of the Taliban as it happened. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, first published in 2001 prior to 9/11 and now in its second edition (2010),[1] was among the first book-length examinations of the Taliban. Rashid’s work is best known for the section, “The New Great Game,” which outlines a new colonialism in which Iran, Russia, China, the United States, and even Japan control the fate of the region. He faults Washington for the rise of the Taliban because it failed to provide the proper circumstances and funding that could have prevented its resurgence. As Rashid puts it: “The pipeline of U.S. military aid to the Mujahedin was never replaced by a pipeline of international humanitarian aid that could have been an inducement for the warlords to make peace and rebuild the country.”

In a chapter for the new edition—”The Taliban Resurgent 2000-2009″—Rashid argues that excluding the Taliban from the Bonn conference was a disastrous oversight but fails to acknowledge that the Taliban would certainly have opposed its goal—to create, in Rashid’s words, “a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government.” He goes on to blame the Taliban resurgence on U.S. failure to commit adequate forces to the country in its “rush” to move on to Iraq: “even a few more U.S. troops could have made a huge difference.” What he neglects to mention, though, is that even if the Bush administration had decided to commit every person, dollar, and piece of equipment that went to the Iraq war to Afghanistan, much of it would have spent years sitting at Bagram Air Base, awaiting transportation over Afghanistan’s nonexistent infrastructure.[2]

While Rashid acknowledges that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence has provided safe haven and intelligence to the Taliban since its founding, he downplays those efforts, putting them on equal footing with “problems within NATO and lack of U.S. focus.” These problems, however, are not on equal footing. Nothing short of a full invasion of Pakistan could have prevented the Taliban from resurging.

Rashid’s solution has always been to negotiate with the Taliban, bringing it into the civilized world, in part, by honoring it. He argues that the Taliban of the 1990s was “essentially a peasant army rather than an international terrorist organization. This is what they still are … not a monolithic organization, but one in which there [are] several interest groups, some of which could be won over.” Here Rashid makes the same error of omission made by many of the Taliban’s enablers: He pretends that Washington has never treated the movement with the same kind of diplomatic engagement it treats genuine governments. In fact, from 1995 until January 2001, the Clinton administration negotiated with the Taliban.[3] Michael Rubin has documented the steady stream of U.S. diplomats (Thomas W. Simons, Robin Raphel, Warren Christopher, John Holzman, Madeline Albright, Donald Camp, William B. Milan, and Bill Richardson[4]) who negotiated with the Taliban.[5] Clinton administration insiders Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon claim that Karl Underfurth, then assistant secretary of state for South Asia, met with “Taliban representatives at least twenty times between the August 1998 [African Embassy] bombings and the end of the Clinton administration.”[6] The Japanese government negotiated with the Taliban in an attempt to remove and purchase the fourth-century twin statues of Buddha overlooking Hazara before their destruction in March 2001.[7] Those negotiations too came to naught. And what is a diplomat to make of the fact that Mullah Omar will not meet face-to-face with non-Muslims?

In 2011, the Karzai government set up the High Peace Council (HPC) to pursue diplomacy, naming as its leader Berhanuddin Rabbani, the closest thing Afghanistan had to an elder statesman. U.S. ambassador Ryan Crocker marveled at the monumental accomplishment of getting the Taliban to the negotiating table. But soon the Taliban began behaving like the Taliban: On September 20, 2011, one of its “negotiators” detonated a bomb hidden in his turban, killing Rabbani and four other HPC members. When former “moderate Taliban” Arsala Rahmani succeeded Rabbani, he too was murdered, gunned down on the way to work. As might be expected, no one is currently clamoring to fill the job of chief HPC negotiator.

The Taliban Shuffle

In The Taliban Shuffle: Strange Days in Afghanistan and Pakistan,[8] Kim Barker, former foreign correspondent for The Chicago Tribune covering India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, describes her love affair with Afghanistan and Pakistan as “more all consuming than any relationship I had ever had.” If this kind of glib, colloquial prose, adored by Rolling Stone and New York Magazine, was her book’s only fault, it would not be so bad. Unfortunately, readers learn more about Kim Barker—what she eats, drinks, wears, or with whom she flirts, travels, and has sex—than about the Taliban.

Barker only shallowly explores the damage done to the image of the West caused by the collection of journalists who invaded first Kabul and then the rest of the country after the Taliban was toppled in November 2001. She describes toga parties, trampoline orgies, rooftop raves, and general drunken revelry at journalist hangouts but never speculates that such behavior may have presented the West in the most negative light possible to the Afghan people. Instead, she is quick to blame George W. Bush, the U.S., British, Canadian, German, and Dutch militaries, the CIA, and frequently India, for the woes of Afghanistan and Pakistan. To her mind, Western aid is never quite enough. (Even the non-Western Chinese government is faulted for its insensitivity in including pigs as a gift to the Kabul Zoo.) After complaining about the deplorable state of clinics built by U.S. Agency for International Development contractors all over Afghanistan, some of which had no medicine and no doctors, Barker blames Washington for the deficiencies rather than the Taliban who prevented the female half of the Afghan population from becoming physicians, regularly destroyed clinics before 9/11, and made life in Afghanistan generally miserable and unsafe for foreign physicians.

Alongside an explanation of the concept of jihad that is embarrassingly shallow, Barker has an astonishing penchant for tolerating shortcomings, including outright predatory sexual behavior, among the native peoples. She notes the irony of the situation of “Islamic clerics [who] forced me to wear a black abaya showing only my eyes, but then privately asked to see my face and hair,” but is unwilling to label it hypocrisy. After a lengthy description of the tendency of Pakistani men to engage in frequent “ass-grabbing free-for-all” sessions, she explains: “An ass-grab was about humiliation and, of course, the feeling of some men in the country that Western women needed sex like oxygen, and that if a Pakistani man just happened to put himself in her path or pinched her when the sex urge came on, he’d get lucky. I blamed Hollywood.” But why not blame Pakistani men? This condescending and infantilizing tendency to write about Afghans and Pakistanis as dependent on others, unable to think or act critically or curb their impulses, makes Barker’s book a useless exercise in West-bashing.

Captive: My Time as a Prisoner of the Taliban

A more insightful look into the Taliban comes in Captive: My Time as a Prisoner of the Taliban[9] by Jere Van Dyk, student, chronicler, and former prisoner of the Taliban. Having first ventured into Afghanistan in the 1970s on the so-called “hippie trail,” Van Dyk returned after the Soviet invasion, living and traveling with warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani and his followers. Those years were documented in his book In Afghanistan: An American Odyssey.[10] In 2008, believing he could get inside the new Haqqani network (now run by Jalaluddin’s son Sirajuddin) with the right fixers, he returned. In search of a group of Pashtuns identifying themselves as members of the Taliban who were to take him to meet up with the Haqqanis, he and his fixers were captured shortly after crossing into Pakistan and eventually released only when CBS paid a ransom.

In preparation for the mission, Van Dyk grew his beard, dressed like an Afghan, and wandered the streets of Kabul studying and imitating the mannerisms he observed. His one handicap? An inability to speak Dari, Pashto, or Nouristani. The whole enterprise smacks of Gonzo journalism and extraordinary naiveté:

I wanted to find out what the Taliban were really like, to see how different they were from the mujahideen. I wanted to learn what they thought and what their goals were. I wanted to go to their training camps. I wanted to explain the Taliban to the outside world. I wanted to go deep into the heart of Taliban country, to get to their leaders, men I knew from the 1980s, and through them perhaps even Osama bin Laden himself. I felt that with my contacts, my history with the mujahideen, and my knowledge of Pashtun culture, I could do what no one else could do. I knew these people. We had once been friends.

Van Dyk’s love of Afghan culture blinds him to its horrors as when a description of Pashtun tribal code ends with the blithe observation: “Under Pashtunwali, a rumor can end a woman’s life.” His jailer Gulob promises freedom and safety if he will convert to Islam. Van Dyk complies in order to save his skin, leading to effusive passages of admiration for his captors and their culture and a refusal to condemn the Taliban for what it did to his beloved Afghanistan. Stockholm syndrome overtakes him, and he soon begins to pray, speak, wash, eat, and even think (or so he says) like a Pashtun.

Nonetheless, there is a good deal of information to be gleaned from Van Dyk’s considerable experience in the region, and he comments on his own situation with humor and insight. In retrospect, the most interesting bit of information has to be Gulob’s comment that “Osama and al-Zawahiri are not in the tribal zones. They are being protected by institutions. Pakistan will never give them up.” It would appear that Van Dyk did get the inside scoop after all.

Taliban: The Unknown Enemy

Scottish journalist James Fergusson’s Taliban: The Unknown Enemy[11] incorporates every element of the pro-Taliban-anti-U.S. agitprop template. The title bespeaks the book’s thesis—we in the West do not really know the Taliban.

Fergusson even questions the validity of the term “Taliban,” or as one unnamed British special forces officer put it: “In 2006, when the fighting started, we called everyone who resisted us ‘Taliban.’ But they really weren’t necessarily. They were just the community’s warrior class who had always defended their community against outsiders and were bound to do so again. The ‘Taliban’ in that sense were an enemy of our own creation.” The anonymous officer may be correct in the sense that the Taliban has grown beyond the original Pashtun warlords who pledged loyalty to Mullah Omar between 1994 and 1996. But the term has not lost its significance or its usefulness. “Taliban” has become something of an umbrella term capable of signifying a movement of diverse characters sharing the same goals. Arguing whether those loyal to Hekmatyar, Haqqani, or Lashkar-e-Taiba are “genuine” Taliban is a bit like arguing whether al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Ansar al-Islam in Iraq, the Somalian al-Shabab, and Nigerian Boko Haram are “genuine” al-Qaeda. Their goals, enemies, tactics, and beliefs are the same. Taliban fighters may be Kashmiri or Punjabi; they have even been known to admit Americans like John Walker Lindh.[12]

Fergusson’s revisionist history of the Taliban portrays the regime as not quite as bad as the West has painted it. Women were not really treated as badly as was believed—denied education, barred from working, or forced to hide themselves. Fergusson reassures us that “women were not always automatically beaten for showing their faces,” which must come as quite a relief to all.

This intentional whitewashing of one of the most destructive regimes of modern times covers all bases. Fergusson underreports well-known Taliban atrocities like the (literal) poisoning of the wells on the Shomali plains in 1997. On the destruction of the Bamiyan buddhas, Fergusson quotes (but does not document) a decree from Mullah Omar to protect the statues as a source of tourist revenue but is unable to explain how the decree was ignored. As the “first Western journalist in more than two years to interview the fugitive warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,” Fergusson essentially becomes a cheerleader for the terrorist leader and his group by promoting what might be called the “wing theory” of terrorist organizations, whereby a group poses as a bicameral enterprise in which its “political wing” promotes an agenda peacefully while a “militant wing” promotes that same agenda violently.

Ameliorating the guilt of the Taliban requires playing up someone else’s to explain Afghanistan, and there is a long list of guilty parties in the book. Hamid Karzai bears the brunt of the scorn reserved for Afghans. Karzai’s greed and his government’s corruption are now well-known, but Fergusson goes too far in describing it as no better and perhaps worse than the Taliban’s. Offering no evidence, he refers to the current National Directorate of Security as “the successor to the KHAD,” the much-feared Afghan iteration of the KGB secret police run by the Soviet puppet Muhammad Najibullah.

But Washington is the true villain in Fergusson’s telling. Beginning with the cliché that after 9/11 the “international community” was sympathetic to the United States, he proceeds to lament that “Americans failed miserably to exploit this tide of goodwill.” And then it gets absurd when he writes that “with just a little more patience from the U.S., bin Laden might have ended up in a courtroom, al-Qaida might have lost its figurehead, and 9/11 and the entire War on Terror might never have happened.” The “U.S.’s reliance on proxy local forces” is faulted on one page and the U.S.’s excessive militaristic footprint on another.

So what should Washington do according to Fergusson? Invest in Afghanistan and coerce further investment from the “international community.” As his friend Mullah Abdul-Basit told him in 2007, had U.S. forces arrived in Afghanistan unarmed, solely to rebuild the country, “you would have been our guests … If your engineers and agriculture experts had come to us and explained what they were trying to do, we would have protected them with our lives.” Perhaps such an idea would not seem quite so absurd had the Taliban no history of (and penchant for) kidnapping and killing aid workers.

As a result of Fergusson’s partisan revisionism, in which the group is more sinned against than sinning, the real Taliban remains “unknown.”

Inside al-Qaeda and the Taliban

Unlike Van Dyke, who was ransomed from his captivity, Pakistani journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad paid the ultimate price for his inside connections. Nearly everyone, the U.S. government included, believes that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence killed Shahzad for his reporting on the close and growing ties between it, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda.

But Shahzad’s posthumously published book, Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11[13]—the go-to source for all the minutiae on the post-9/11 Taliban—is no antidote to the reflexive anti-Western tracts reviewed above. For Shahzad, the word “terrorist” only refers to the U.S. government as he prefers the term “militants” or “Commanders” (always capitalized) for the Taliban he befriended. Likewise al-Qaeda is “a resistance movement against Western Imperialism,” fighting the “occupation forces” of the “U.S.-NATO-led war machine.”

Inside Al-Qaeda does have some value, outlining in stunning detail the post-9/11 Taliban, comprised of extremist Taliban, malleable Taliban, Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, tribal Taliban, Taliban affiliates, and al-Qaeda-Taliban affiliates. He painstakingly explains the various rivalries that divide the tribal Taliban and seems to have known (and liked) everyone involved. Ignoring the pre-9/11 connections between al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Shahzad insists that the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan drove them to collaborate, rather than the other way around.

While still alive, and in this postmortem book, Shahzad gave credibility to the assortment of Taliban fighters, mullahs, and “Commanders” who spoke freely to him. Though they certainly said things they wanted the world to believe, stretching the truth in the process, if even half of what they told him is accurate, the West is still greatly underestimating the dangers posed by al-Qaeda and the Taliban in all their iterations.

Taliban Life, Poetry, and Myth

Alex Strick Van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn have become the Taliban’s most generous supporters and most prolific apologists. The two moved to Afghanistan in 2006, settling in Kandahar, where they set up the now-inactive blog, AfghanWire.com. By running cover for the Taliban, minimizing atrocities, and deflecting blame elsewhere, they ingratiated themselves with Mullah Mohammed Salem Zaeef and became the editors of his self-pitying and evasive biography My Life with the Taliban.[14] This work promised the ultimate insider’s history of the Taliban but delivered little more than an anti-U.S. polemic, peppered with passages of execrable (and unintended) irony: “The Taliban had also started to implement shari’a law: Women were no longer working in government departments, and the men throughout the city had started to grow beards. Life in the city was returning to normal.”

Another piece of Van Linschoten and Kuehn’s charm offensive on behalf of the Taliban is an anthology titled The Poetry of the Taliban,[15] the goal of which is to humanize the Taliban fighters. The poems themselves are inconsequential, neither great nor terrible by today’s admittedly low standards. As one might expect, there are poems about killing, waging jihad, confronting the enemy, glorious Shari’a, and so on. What is perhaps most interesting (and ignored by Van Linschoten and Kuehn) is that among the list of predictable Taliban obsessions (Bush, Obama, Karzai, Guantanamo Bay) emerges the true enemy: the Western invention of human rights and, collaterally, the nongovernmental organizations that oversee their implementation and report on their absence.

But far more important than the quality of the poems themselves is their utility in selling the idea that the Taliban is morally and culturally equal to the West. Take, for example, the back cover blurb where Harvard’s Michael Semple writes that the Taliban is not “culturally backward” but is in fact “inspiring a people to resist a dull global plan to modernize them.” The bulk of this rhetorical salesmanship is found in Van Linschoten and Kuehn’s introduction. One of their tropes equates poetry written by British combat veterans who fought the Taliban with examples of Taliban verse: “Both sets of poets take leave of their mothers before they leave for the front, both are in turns thrilled and fearful when the moment of battle arrives, and both grieve at the death of friends and family.” The sales pitch may convince some, but it fails on the follow-through: When their war is over, returning British soldiers will not try to close girls’ schools, compel non-Anglicans to join the Church of England, and force everyone to eat, work, and play as they do in a coordinated effort to efface and annul the very idea of human rights.

Van Linschoten and Kuehn’s latest effort is an academic revisionist history, An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban-Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan,[16] which tries to dispel the “popular discourse” that al-Qaeda and the Taliban have merged into a singular entity they call “Talqaeda.” The first problem is the failure to convince that such a discourse is popular; even Shahzad did not suggest a merger so much as a symbiotic convergence of interests leading to cooperation. Aside from its thesis, the book has serious methodological flaws. Nearly every important assertion hangs on a footnote that reads merely: “Interview,” followed by a location and date. While anonymity may be acceptable for a journalist’s fixers, drivers, and perhaps even translators, it has no place in “for-the-record” sources. It is simply impossible to gauge the veracity of the work without being able to assess the credibility of the sources. Ironically, the authors reject sources like the 9/11 Commission Report as being unreliable, along with information “extracted under duress from Khalid Sheik Mohammed.” The cumulative effect of this work of pseudo-scholarly journalism renders the project little more than a book of rumors cloaked in a veneer of academic paraphernalia.

Van Linschoten and Kuehn’s primary goal is to disassociate al-Qaeda from Mullah Omar’s movement, but history is not on their side. By their account, the Taliban leadership was completely unaware of bin Laden prior to 1996, and they even fatuously claim that the Rabbani-Massoud government invited bin Laden to Afghanistan. In seeking to absolve the Taliban of all guilt relating to the 9/11 attacks, they unconvincingly argue that its leaders neither knew the attacks were coming nor approved of them after. Even the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud on September 9, 2001, when he was leader of the Northern Alliance (and therefore the Taliban’s number one enemy in the region), caught the Taliban by surprise according to the authors. Their insinuation that al-Qaeda’s desire to restore the caliphate and the Taliban’s desire to restore Afghanistan to some kind of Qur’anic Khurasan are incompatible is based on scant evidence.

Finally, the book closes with what reads like an opaque threat: Unless “serious negotiations” conducted “on multiple levels” about the future of Afghanistan include the Taliban, the “escalated levels of conflict … will increasingly resemble the violent civil war of the 1990s.” Work with the Taliban, or else.

Conclusion

In Taliban lore, the indigenous Afghan mujahideen defeated the Soviet Union with very little help from the outside just as earlier generations of Afghans defeated a steady stream of foreign invaders from Alexander the Great to the British, each bent on enslaving them. The myth of Afghan invincibility endures today with the United States portrayed as the latest invader, no different than the Soviet Union. The myth-makers’ adherents are confident that history will repeat itself. In the April/May issue of Azan, Taliban propagandists push the U.S.-U.S.S.R. comparison by blending the names Obama and Gorbachev into Obamachev, “meant to draw parallels between … the USSR under the leadership of Mikail Gorbachev on the eve of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 with that of the United States under Barack Obama amid the upcoming U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.”[17]

This facile equalization of all foreign invaders, especially the Soviet Union and the United States, is understandable from Taliban sources, but far too many Taliban experts are complicit in these gross misrepresentations. Washington’s involvement in Afghanistan has always been motivated by the desire to oppose enemies (Soviet, Iranian, al-Qaeda) and to ameliorate the lives of the Afghan people. The Soviet Union, by contrast, sought to own Afghanistan. In the post-Kennedy era of U.S. largesse, so much aid went to Helmand province that it became known as “Little America.”[18] In the 1980s, Moscow’s top scientific minds devised bombs resembling toys so as to attract and maim children.[19] In contrast, in the days between 9/11 and the October invasion, U.S. planes dropped untold tons of food along with leaflets explaining to the Afghan people that better days were coming. Perhaps the Taliban leaders really cannot see the difference between Soviet perfidy and U.S. attempts to wipe out al-Qaeda and make life better for all Afghans, but Western scholars and journalists know better. Rather than lending credence to Taliban propaganda, they ought to admit that were Washington to adopt Soviet-style tactics, Afghanistan would never stand a chance.

As we enter a new era in which the Taliban is seen as a legitimate political force, there can be little doubt that it will eventually take over Afghanistan. From Vice President Biden’s claim that “the Taliban, per se, is not our enemy”[20] to the ongoing rewriting of history, its enablers, apologists, and admirers assist the takeover in big and small ways by denying that the era of Taliban rule was a travesty of governance during which abominable crimes were committed. And though the constant drumbeat of “negotiate, negotiate, negotiate” finds a willing audience in the Obama administration, the Taliban is interested in negotiation only to gain, not to compromise.

So when the announcement of three-way negotiations in Qatar between Washington, the Karzai government, and the Taliban were applauded this spring in the usual circles as positive progress, the Taliban immediately showed its true nature: On June 16, Mutasim Agha Jan of the Taliban praised the upcoming talks as “a major step in formulating a channel for talks between Kabul and the Taliban,”[21] but on June 18, the Taliban office in Doha opened bearing a plaque and the banner of the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”[22] (the name used under Mullah Omar from 1996-2001) and publicly denounced Karzai as a U.S. puppet (implicitly likening him to Najibullah and predictably prompting the Karzai government to pull out of the negotiations). As Davood Moradian of the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies recently put it: “A peace that is ‘Made in Pakistan,’ promoted by London, sold by Washington, and financed by Qatar is doomed to fail.”[23]

As of this writing, the diplomatic enterprise appears to be on hold, but it will surely be restarted. And if Mullah Omar is allowed to emerge from hiding in Quetta and revive his atavistic, seventh-century utopian fantasy, the world will see just how unregenerate the Taliban is. Only this time around, no one will be able to claim ignorance.

A.J. Caschetta is senior lecturer in English at the Rochester Institute of Technology. He can be reached at ajcgsl@rit.edu.

[1] Yale University Press.
[2] For information on Afghanistan’s infrastructure, see “South Asia: Afghanistan,” World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., July 10, 2013.
[3] Jayshree Bajoria, “Backgrounder: The Taliban in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., Oct. 6, 2011.
[4] For background on Richardson’s discussion with the Taliban, see Bruce O. Riedel, “Islamism Is Not Unstoppable,” Middle East Quarterly, Dec. 1999, pp. 51-60.
[5] Michael Rubin, “Taking Tea with the Taliban,” Commentary, Feb. 2010.
[6] The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002), pp. 272-3.
[7] Reuters, Mar. 5, 2001.
[8] New York: Doubleday, 2011.
[9] New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2010.
[10] New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1983.
[11] Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo Press, 2011.
[12] Peter A. Olsson, “Homegrown Terrorists, Rebels in Search of a Cause,” Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2013, pp. 3-10.
[13] London: Pluto Press, 2011.
[14] New York: Columbia University Press, 2010; see, also, “Brief Reviews,” Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2011.
[15] New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.
[16] New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2012.
[17] The Jihad and Threat Monitor, no. 5329, Middle East Media Research Institute, June 6, 2013.
[18] All Things Considered, National Public Radio, July 5, 2010.
[19] CBC News (Can.), Oct. 28, 2000; M. Siddieq Noorzoy, “Afghanistan’s Children: The Tragic Victims of 30 Years of War,” Middle East Institute, Apr. 20, 2012.
[20] ABC News, Dec. 19, 2011; Fox News, Dec. 19, 2011.
[21] Tolo News (Kabul), June 17, 2013.
[22] The New York Times, June 19, 2013.
[23]Taliban Guns Send a Message about Obama’s Peace Process,” The Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2013.

Intelligence

How security decisions go wrong?

Sajad Abedi

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Photo by Ryan Young on Unsplash

Information warfare is primarily a construct of a ‘war mindset’. However, the development of information operations from it has meant that the concepts have been transferred from military to civilian affairs. The contemporary involvement between the media, the military, and the media in the contemporary world of the ‘War on Terrorism’ has meant the distinction between war and peace is difficult to make. However, below the application of deception in the military context is described but it must be added that the dividing line is blurred.

The correct control of security often depends on decisions under uncertainty. Using quantified information about risk, one may hope to achieve more precise control by making better decisions.

Security is both a normative and descriptive problem. We would like to normatively how to make correct decisions about security, but also descriptively understand follow where security decisions may go wrong. According to Schneider, security risk is both a subjective feeling and an objective reality, and sometimes those two views are different so that we fail acting correctly. Assuming that people act on perceived rather than actual risks, we will sometimes do things we should avoid, and sometimes fail to act like we should. In security, people may both feel secure when they are not, and feel insecure when they are actually secure. With the recent attempts in security that aim to quantifying security properties, also known as security metrics, I am interested in how to achieve correct metrics that can help a decision-maker control security. But would successful quantification be the end of the story?

The aim of this note is to explore the potential difference between correct and actual security decisions when people are supposed to decide and act based on quantified information about risky options. If there is a gap between correct and actual decisions, how can we begin to model and characterize it? How large is it, and where can someone maybe exploit it? What can be done to fix and close it? As a specific example, this note considers the impact of using risk as security metric for decision-making in security. The motivation to use risk is two-fold. First, risk is a well-established concept that has been applied in numerous ways to understand information security and often assumed as a good metric. Second, I believe that it is currently the only well-developed reasonable candidate that aims to involve two necessary aspects when it comes to the control of operational security: asset value and threat uncertainty. Good information security is often seen as risk management, which will depend on methods to assess those risks correctly. However, this work examines potential threats and shortcomings concerning the usability of correctly quantified risk for security decisions.

I consider a system that a decision-maker needs to protect in an environment with uncertain threats. Furthermore, I also assume that the decision-maker wants to maximize some kind of security utility (the utility of security controls available) when making decisions regarding to different security controls. These different parts of the model vary greatly between different scenarios and little can be done to model detailed security decisions in general. Still, we think that this is an appropriate framework to understand the need of security metrics. One way, maybe often the standard way, to view security as a decision problem is that threats arise in the system and environment, and that the decision-maker needs to take care of those threats with available information, using some appropriate cost-benefit tradeoff. However, this common view overlooks threats with faults that are made by the decision-maker. I believe that many security failures should be seen in the light of limits (or potential faults) of the decision-maker when she, with best intentions, attempts to achieve security goals (maximizing security utility) by deciding between different security options.

I loosely think of correct decisions as maximization of utility, in a way to be specified later.

Information security is increasingly seen as not only fulfillment of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability, but as protecting against a number of threats having by doing correct economic tradeoffs. A growing research into the economics of information security during the last decade aims to understand security problems in terms of economic factors and incentives among agents making decisions about security, typically assumed to aim at maximizing their utility. Such analysis is made by treating economic factors as equally important in explaining security problems as properties inherent in the systems that are to be protected. It is thus natural to view the control of security as a sequence of decisions that have to be made as new information appears about an uncertain threat environment. Seen in the light of this and that obtaining security information usually in it is cost, I think that any usage of security metrics must be related to allowing more rational decisions with respect to security. It is in this way I consider security metrics and decisions in the following.

The basic way to understand any decision-making situation is to consider which kind of information the decision-maker will have available to form the basis of judgments. For people, both the available information, but also potentially the way in which it is framed (presented), may affect how well decisions will be made to ensure goals. One of the common requirements on security metrics is that they should be able to guide decisions and actions to reach security goals. However, it is an open question how to make a security metric usable and ensuring such usage will be correct (with respect to achieving goals) comes with challenges. The idea to use quantified risk as a metric for decisions can be split up into two steps. First do objective risk analysis using both assessment of system vulnerabilities and available threats in order to measure security risk. Second, present these results in a usable way so that the decision-maker can make correct and rational decisions.

While both of these steps present considerable challenges to using good security metrics, I consider why decisions using quantified security risk as a metric may go wrong in the second step. Lacking information about security properties of a system clearly limits the security decisions, but I fear that introducing metrics do not necessarily improve them;this may be due to 1) that information is incorrect or imprecise, or 2) that usage will be incorrect. This work takes the second view and we argue that even with perfect risk assessment, it may not be obvious that security decisions will always improve. I am thus seeking properties in risky decision problems that actually predict the overall goal – maximizing utility – to be, or not to be, fulfilled. More specifically, we need to find properties in quantifications that may put decision-making at risk of going wrong.

The way to understand where security decisions go wrong is by using how people are predicted to act on perceived rather than actual risk. I thus need to use both normative and descriptive models of decision-making under risk. For normative decisions, I use the well-established economic principle of maximizing expected utility. But for the descriptive part, I note that decision faults on risky decisions not only happen in various situations, but have remarkably been shown to happen systematically describe by models from behavioral economics.

I have considered when quantified risk is being used by people making security decisions. An exploration of the parameter space in two simple problems showed that results from behavioral economics may have impact on the usability of quantitative risk methods. The results visualized do not lend themselves to easy and intuitive explanations, but I view my results as a first systematic step towards understanding security problems with quantitative information.

There have been many proposals to quantify risk for information security, mostly in order to allow better security decisions. But a blind belief in quantification itself seems unwise, even if it is made correctly. Behavioral economics shows systematic deviations of weighting when people act on explicit risk. This is likely to threaten security and its goals as security is increasingly seen as the management of economical trade-offs. I think that these findings can be used partially to predict or understand wrong security decisions depending on risk information. Furthermore, this motivates the study how strategic agents may manipulate, or attack, the perception of a risky decision.

Even though any descriptive model of human decision-making is approximate at best, I still believe this work gives a well-articulated argument regarding threats with using explicit risk as security metric. My approach may also be understood in terms of standard system specification and threat models: economic rationality in this case is the specification, and the threat depends on bias for risk information. I also studied a way of correcting the problem with reframing for two simple security decision scenarios, but only got partial predictive support for fixing problems this way. Furthermore, I have not found such numerical examinations in behavioral economics to date.

Further work on this topic needs to empirically confirm or reject these predictions and study to which degree they occur (even though previous work clearly makes the hypothesis clearly plausible at least to some degree) in a security context. Furthermore, I think that similar issues may also arise with several forms of quantified information for security decisions.

These questions may also be extended to consider several self-interested parties. in game-theoretical situations. Another topic is using different utility functions, and where it may be normative to be economically risk-aversive rather than risk-neutral. With respect to the problems outlined, rational decision-making is a natural way to understand and motivate the control of security and requirements on security metrics. But when selecting the format of information, a problem is also partially about usability. Usability faults often turn into security problems, which is also likely for quantified risk. In the end the challenge is to provide users with usable security information, and even more broadly investigate what kind of support is required for decisions. This is clearly a topic for further research since introducing quantified risk is not without problems. Using knowledge from economics and psychology seems necessary to understand the correct control of security.

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Cyberspace: A Manmade Sphere for Wars

Anahit Parzyan

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Internet can be considered as one of the greatest achievements of humanity of the last century, which connected the entire world. It created a new space for connections, information and communications, as well as cooperation. Thus, it created also a new platform for conflicts which involved not only individuals but also states. The invention of the twentieth century, the internet, has become another sphere for international relations, and a new space for defensive and offensive policies for regulating and balancing those affairs. The space called cyberspace has become a platform for interactions not only between individuals, but also between states. The interactions on their side were not only developed in a positive manner, but were also transformed into attacks, which pose a real threat to the security of states. Thus, the following questions arise:

Can cyberspace be considered a new sphere for war? Can conflicts and offensive and defensive operations in cyberspace be considered a real war?

The aim of this article is to specify offensive and defensive actions occurring in cyberspace and to explain the differences and similarities between them and the classical approach to war present in other spheres: land, water, air, and space. Despite the overgrowth of offensive interactions in cyberspace and defensive strategies for enriching the cyber arsenal of states, military specialists have concerns over the reality of cyberwars in general. Parallels are drawn to show the similarities and differences between definitions and perceptions of war, and whether concepts from the classical approach can be transferred to describe wars in the cyber sphere.  This research puts cyberwars in line with other wars, thus analyzing their peculiarities, whilst Cyberspace is seen as another sphere for war and international relations in addition to the existing spheres of land, water, air, and space

Internet’s Two Sides of the Coin: From Good to Threat

The Internet that we use today, is based on the Transmission Control Protocol or just Internet Protocol commenced in 1973. The network became operational in January 1983. For the first two decades of its existence, it was the preserve of a technological, academic, and research elite. From the early 1990s, it began to percolate into mainstream society and is widely regarded as a General-Purpose Technology (GPT) without which modern society could not function.

Only half a century ago it was difficult to imagine that human interactions would be developed in a manmade sphere, totally virtual and artificial. It must have been impossible to imagine that it would penetrate our lives so closely that it would cover everyday life, from communication and information sharing to purchasing products and regulating temperature at home.

Now internet has connected the entire world breaking the land borders which lined geographically differentiating the places people live. It substituted land borders with digital ones, making it possible to connect the entire world into one sphere.

With the start of the World Wide Web in 1993, the greatest accretion of communication came into existence. Since then, information being secret for a limited groups or organizations that were historically used for military purposes as an intellectual advantage, soon became available for masses.

Moreover, equal access to information for all, one of the ultimate achievements of humanity and one of the supreme advantages of the internet, has started to provide information not only for good will, having also provoked irregular warfare.

These chaotic interactions, which Garnett called “fourth generation warfare” (4GW), through networks would become a wave of social reactions and pressure that would provide an opportunity for an asymmetric warfare. The tendency is obviously dangerous since not only states possess these “digital” weapons but also non-state actors including terrorist networks. Basically, the Internet allows anyone to join digitally and to be a force or power that could have a significant impact on states’ policies.

The sphere were those actions take place with the usage or within the system of information and communication technologies is broadly named cyberspace and the actions that take place in this sphere get their terminology accordingly; cyber-attacks, cyberwar, etc… Though states have various definitions of a cyberspace and with the scope it covers, it is meant to be a non-physical Information and telecommunication technologies environment (ICT).The term cybersecurity has been emerging from the US since the mid-1990s, which later have become widely used in other countries and international organizations such as United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD), North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe(CE), BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and many others.

A cyber-attack is not an end in itself, but a powerful means to a wide variety of ends, from propaganda to espionage, from denial of services to the destruction of critical infrastructure.

From the prism of threat, they may cause, cyberattacks can be implemented using methods, such as malicious programs, that can penetrate systems of specific or not specified group of people or entities causing dysfunctions of computer operations, stealing personal information, phishing stealing passwords of the user as well as infecting computer systems to slow down specific processes, etc.  In current internet-run infrastructure a single penetration can be fatal for a society and become a threat for a state. A penetration into the command-control system of critical infrastructures, for example, can cut the supply of energy, change the chemical construction of water thus making it poisoned, etc. and the anonymity can stand as an advantage as cyberattacks are still not attributable through international humanitarian law. Moreover, in a cyber conflict, the terrestrial distance between adversaries can be irrelevant so cyber weapon can reach its target much beyond its borders.

The advance of technology made it possible to give room for clashes between States and non-states actors involved in operations in cyberspace. These clashes have become a real threat for international security. As compared with kinetic weapons that are relatively expensive to obtain, as well as possible to detect their origin, malicious programs are available to download or buy and even create if there is a good specialist of it: even a teenager can formulate it.

Therefore, it is becoming nearly impossible to patrol all the purchase and supply chain of the cyber arsenal. Malicious viruses or programs can penetrate various computer systems of public and private usage and cause dysfunctions, changing the primary command-control systems, slowing their base speed of operation and causing very costly problems for state security.

Per media reports, the group which rampaged through and besieged part of Mumbai in November 2008 made use of readily available cellular and satellite phones, as well as overhead imagery from Google Earth, to coordinate and plan their attack.

However, this invention is an issue of arguments among scientist from the prism of war definition.

Theoretical Dilemma of cyberwars and cyber reality

Despite different conflicts occurring in cyberspace between state and non- state actors, state-sponsored operations, and developments in international relations, military specialists argue about the exact definition of cyberspace, whether to evaluate it as real war or not, and as whether to count operations in cyberspace as a real war between parties involved.

Various conflicts in cyberspace including attacks of regular and irregular origin performing symmetric or asymmetric tactic, do not correspond with the classical approach of the war including only some or one or even missing any aspect of the war characterization. Despite of the current actions and bilateral, multilateral etc., agreements signed by states and international organizations, associations on the cybersecurity issues and despite of the threats the world overcomes or will overcome in cyberspace, theorists have certain disbelieves while defining or accepting cyberspace as a new sphere for wars as well as cyberwars as already occurring facts.

The issue is that there had not been a single verifiable case of cyber terrorism nor has there been any human casualty caused by cyber-attacks, giving grounds for disbelief.

Thomas Rid a specialist of war, is among those scientists and experts who see debates about cyber wars exaggerated, moreover, he expresses mistrusts related to cyberspace as a new space for war in a classical approach of war definition. He believes that “Cyber war has never happened in the past, it is not occurring on the present and it is highly unlikely that will disturb the future.”

The fact that computer and internet assisted attacked may penetrate the operating systems of targets stealing data or causing dysfunction of potentiality of operations Rid, however, in this respect differentiates between sabotage operations and direct physical harm.

Rid refers to Carl von Clausewitz, a nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist, who defines war according to three criteria, “First, all acts of war are violent or potentially violent. Second, an act of war is always instrumental: physical violence or the threat of force is a means to compel the enemy to accept the attacker’s will. Finally, to qualify as an act of war, an attack must have political goal or intention.”

Theoretical description of war through centuries might have changed its primary strategies and instruments, while his goal is always the same. Within this respect, it is important to observe this definition on a broad way: Of course, computer warm or virus cannot kill directly a person, like it could have a sword, but it can cut the energy supply of a hospital causing a chain of violence, or it can penetrate the command control of the Airplane system and change the direction of the plane or to cause and a catastrophe.

In contrary to classical approach of war, the reality of cyber war is supported by those who believe that cyber wars have already occurred, are occurring and will, possibly, continue to occur in future, thus cyber strategies must be implemented.

In July 2016, Allies reaffirmed NATO’s defensive mandate and recognized cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land and at sea.

Former U.S. President Obama speaking about cybersecurity mentioned:

“America’s economic prosperity, national security, and our individual liberties depend on our commitment to securing cyberspace and maintaining an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet. Our critical infrastructure continues to be at risk from threats in cyberspace, and our economy is harmed by the theft of our intellectual property.  Although the threats are serious and they constantly evolve, I believe that if we address them effectively, we can ensure that the Internet remains an engine for economic growth and a platform for the free exchange of ideas”.

Thomas Reed, a former staffer on the US National Security Council argues that Cyber wars are even new. They occurred in past, in Cold War Era, and had devastating results. As an example, he mentions about the first ever cyber-attack- a massive pipeline explosion in the Soviet Union in June 1982, counting as the most violent cyber-attack ever. “According to Reed, a covert US operation used rigged software to engineer a massive explosion in the Urengoy-Surgut-Chelyabinsk pipeline, which connected Siberian natural gas fields to Europe. Reed claims that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) managed to insert malicious code into the software that controlled the pipeline’s pumps and valves. The rigger valves supposedly resulted in an explosion that the US Air Force rated at three kilotons, equivalent to the force of a small nuclear device.”

Although, neither there is a factual evidence of accident being a cyber-attack confirmed or supported by the official U.S, nor there are any Soviet media reports from 1983 also confirming that Reed’s mentioned explosion took place. Though Soviet Union media regularly reported about accidents and pipeline explosions at the time. In case of cyber-attacks, it is not an easy task to investigate fully and in a short period of time. Forensic examination is needed which presupposes experts and conditions for objective examination. Under the condition of Cold war, the parties would hardly agree to do such an investigation which will reveal secrets about their technical capabilities and the real cause of the explosion. Incase Reed’s claims are true, then the massive violence it could have done would theoretically rank cyber weapons among extremely dangerous means and cyber wars would have been defined accordingly.

Another example that speaks about possible cyberattack that will “suit” to the description of war can be considered the 2008th cyberattacks on Georgian most prominent websites, including those of the country’s national bank and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In August 2008, in the period of the military conflict over South Ossetia, Georgian Government blamed the Kremlin, but Russia denied sponsoring the attackers, and later NATO investigation found no conclusive “proof” of who had carried them out. The fact that the “proof” is not found can illustrate two possible judgments: first, the attacker is technically equipped well enough so it is hard to distinguish him, second: the attack was not carried out by a potential suspect. However, the situation can be judged by the following viewpoint: you are innocent unless your guilt is proved. And because the anonymity is a priority in cyber wars, so it is highly efficient especially for states to use it in hybrid war strategies.

In cyberspace the sides, that are involved in the attacks or counterattacks can be distinguished only in two ways: first, by their own wish (which may occur rarely, or even impossible to happen especially when attacks are carried out by States rather than other subjects) or, according to the evidence. The last one is directly connected with the technical capabilities of an attacker as well as technical competences of an attacked side to be able to detect.

According to Oleg Demidov, a Cybersecurity expert at the Russian Centre for Policy studies (PIR Center), the overview of the NATO experts suspecting Russia in attacking Estonian infrastructure in 2007, Georgian government and private sector networks in 2008, and U.S. financial institutions and private companies in 2014 Spring, as not fundamental, because there was no practical evidence of the proof of the attacker, or lack of technical capabilities to be able to define the source of the attacker.

In his contribution “Global Internet Governance and International Security in The Field of ICT Use”, Demidov stresses high possibility and risk of an international conflict between nuclear-weapon states. As he mentioned;

 “In the event of lighting-fats cyber-attack that imitates the ‘signature’ of Russian perpetrators (for example, Cyrillic code fragments and other linguistic patters) and targets the infrastructure of NATO countries using servers in Russian territory, there is a risk of NATO military retaliation against Russia. In accordance with NATO doctrine, retaliatory measures may include the use of kinetic weapons and the involvement of all NATO members in a retaliatory strike”.

These two cyber incidents- the Georgian cyber-attacks and Estonian cyberattacks, are regarded by the U.S. and other Western nations as causes for great attention and much reflection.

Estonian cyber incidents were followed by the establishment of cyber strategies for national and system level for EU members and partners.

Particularly, in 2008, a year after the attacks, NATO set up the Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) in Tallinn. The military-defense usage of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is one of the main purposes of the center. The center is technically equipped well enough to protect its members by providing technical support and human resource to protect internet infrastructure.

Another well-known and destructive cyber program that processed a worldwide discussion over the reality of cyber wars is the “Operation Olympic Games”, a large operation, that included the “development, testing, and use of malware against specific targets to collect information about the Iranian Nuclear program, as well as to sabotage it and slow it down as much as possible. It included such malware as Stuxnet, Duqu, Flame, and Guass (all of them targeting special operation for espionage and sabotage), active in between 2007-2013.The US presidential administration and Israeli secret services have been named as perpetrators.

Ex-head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Seyed Hossein Mousavian, in his “The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: memoir confirms Stuxnet as a malicious computer warm developed to target the computer system that control Iran’s huge enrichment plant at Natanz. Moreover, according to Mousavian, Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran’s Representative to the International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA) at that time confirmed that Iran was experiencing espionage at its nuclear plants. According to the IAEA, there was a big decrease in the amount of the operating centrifuges caused by the Stuxnet with a vivid decline to more than 100 – from 4920 in May 2009 to 3772 in August 2010. Despite of the Fact that Ahmadinejad mentioned about the problems directly related to the computer software, installed by the spies to slow down centrifuge’s operation, nevertheless, Mousavian does not think that this could have cause a big problem and an obstacle for enriching the centrifuges.

In fact, Stuxnet did affect the nuclear enrichment system, and did make problems for Iran’s nuclear program. The computer worm was operating inside the system for quite a long time unnoticed, slowing down the operational capabilities of both experts and technical equipment. If we note the fact that it successfully slowed down the system’s operation, then we can conclude that operations reached a certain level much later then they could have without the worm Now that sanctions have hit Iran’s economy and forced it to make concessions, we can conclude that the situation would have been different if Stuxnet had not affected Iranian programs; Iran would have finished its program faster, before sanctions could devastate its economy. But since Iran discovered the problem much later and the whole process was slowly altered by the worm, we can see that Stuxnet led to a longer timeframe for enrichment, and subsequently longer terms for sanctions.

The action brought not only psychological damage, as would be named and labeled by Israel and U.S. specialist, but it brought also to economical, technical(human resources as well as technical capabilities) crises.

According to M. Sahakyan, an Armenian researcher.

“…sanctions were hard and maybe they were the main reason why Iran agreed to the Interim agreement. Though Iranian leaders like to mention that sanctions were not problem, but the Iranian economy had been effectively hit hard by these sanctions. Iranian economy mostly declined when EU member states imposed an oil embargo on Iran. China also reduced its average oil import levels from Iran in a disagreement on Iran’s nuclear program. The depreciation of Iranian Rial, reduction of oil exports and shortages of foreign currency created hard social-economic situation in Iran. So sanctions were hard and maybe they were the main reason why Iran agreed to the Interim agreement.”

It is evident that, not directly but indirectly cyber war may influence politics of a specific State. Today cyber-attacks can target political leadership, military systems, and average citizens anywhere in the world, during peacetime or war, with the added benefit of attacker anonymity.

Stuxnet influenced the Iranians’ centrifuges, causing them to overload an intelligence program. This is a new type of and reason for war. While the basic definition of war presupposes physical violence, Stuxnet presupposes a psychological intent. In addition to the technical harm it did, it also influenced the psychology of those who had encountered the undiscovered cyber worm. Regarding the first, undiscovered phase of the computer worm, imagine a specialist working on the program, who faced long-lasting technical problems, becoming filled with doubt towards their personal professional skills and also doubting the capability of Iran in general to develop its program. This is a new approach in the definition of war, as it dramatically shifts the choice of instruments that can cause harm to a State.

From Wars with Swords to Cyber Wars: State Security is Still a Priority

Nevertheless, the war in cyberspace is real, it has happened in the past, it is happening now and it will certainly happen in future.

The classical approach to war sees physical violence carried out by military operations. Cyberwar presupposes physical violence as well as bringing a new, psychological violence, which may cause no less harm.  Ideas and things important for state security have changed over the centuries, as have the instruments and measurements of security, but the problem of state security is still a priority. Maybe unexpected ships won’t attack from the sea, but cyber-attacks will come.

In past centuries, population size was an important issue for the state in maintaining its governance. It determined the size of the workforce and the size of the army, and the strength of armies was measured by the quantity of troops.

Centuries ago, a human, a good soldier was to aim to harm the opposing side. To conquer the army was to win the war. Afterwards, the period of weapons and technology began, and would enable opposing sides measure their technical and tactical capabilities to win. At that time, to mobilize technical capabilities was to conquer the army. Due to growing population and technological achievements, in addition to the number of troops, now the amount of military equipment is of much importance. A single-pilot jet may cause greater harm than 1000 troops on the same territory. Nowadays unmanned aircraft can jeopardize enemies’ strategic targets in specific cases even without any physical violence, because in a certain situation to harm a strategical unit even without causing physical violence from neither attaching side nor from the attacked still may have fatal result for the states being attacked.

In current stage, the military parades mostly demonstrating technical capability of a certain state, will alarm a possible harm while attack or attacking. Aside from the traditional military spheres like land, sea, and air (added later),an epoch of adding a new sphere, cyberspace, has begun, in which technical capabilities do no less harm than in a traditional war. One of the ultimate advantage of cyberwars is the anonymity of the attacker, which makes it a reasonable choice for state’s foreign policy.

In addition to the traditionally distinguished types of harm for a state security, cyberwar brings the conception of psychological trauma for the sates making it doubt its capabilities on a certain level. In the case of Stuxnet, the attack was “emotional” and technical.

The definition of the emotional damage through cyberwars was used to describe Russia’s so-called internet interference in 2016. “The New Yorker” expresses viewpoints of national-security officials who believed that those series of cyber hackings were directed to destabilize the conception of democracy in the States.

For many national-security officials, the e-mail hacks were part of a larger, and deeply troubling, picture: Putin’s desire to damage American confidence and to undermine the Western alliances—diplomatic, financial, and military—that have shaped the postwar world.

To technically dysfunction a system just causing a technical harm is a small incident, while targeting CI with technically destabilizing them already has grown into a political scandal.

In turn, cyberattack may cause harm on a specific target without involving other sides especially in case of state sponsored attacks, as it remains undiscovered for a while and the stereotypes and cliché of the traditional war definition will empower the attacker to have “excuses” for the attack. Cyberwars will become more dangerous, if not included and named as war and not struggled as traditional wars.

Cyber Arm race has started

Despite of the distrust and interpretation of cyberwars within the framework of classical approach of war, states are accelerating cyber arms race. This development has several political and strategic implications that pose the need to find specifically political answers. What is often forgotten or neglected is the increasing importance of understanding cyberspace as a political domain and cyber politics is needed more than ever before.

While experts are debating over the exact description and definition of cyberwar, States are enriching their State defensive arsenal with cyber equipment and technical staff for better governance in cyberspace, as well as regulations and doctrines that will define the strategy for the defensive and offensive operations for ICT threat.

In November 2011, the Department of Defense of the U.S. issued a report to Congress confirming, that it was ready to add cyberspace to sea, land, air, and space as the latest domain of warfare – the military would, if necessary, use force to protect the nation from cyberattacks. This statement shape the interactions in cyberspace on the same level with other spheres making them equally important and in case of need, changeable and cooperative.

By this, next to the traditional war spheres: ground, sea, air, space, a new battlefield-the cyberspace is differentiated.

With the technological developments, nearly every aspect of our lives is technically run, so it becomes very sensitive to any cyberattack, since any non-functioning in a technical field may cause human harm, economic harm, and be a serious problem for the entire National security.  In this regard, the former Secretary of Homeland Security of the U.S.Jeh Johnson at The White House Cybersecurity Framework Event on February 12, 2014, specifying the seriousness of the cyberattacks on electrical substations specifically, mentioned:

“What the public needs to understand is that today the disruption of a critical public service like an electrical substation need not occur with guns and knives. A cyberattack could cause similar, and in some cases far greater, damage by taking several facilities offline simultaneously, and potentially leaving millions of Americans in the dark”.

The focus was on the electrical substations but it may refer to other sectors too: telecommunication, hospitals, libraries and federal departments courts and prisons. Any entity, that is functioning with technology may be in a real attack risk.

The technological developments of the last century bring the automated industrial control systems as well as most Critical Infrastructure (CI), the list of which may vary from state to state but have similarities, under possible cyber-attack which may be fatal for national defense. The range of facilities on the list of CIsmay include but not limited to nuclear industry, electricity, telecommunication, water supply, transport system on ground, sea and air, governmental buildings and their communication facilities, the financial and banking system, healthcare and defensive facilities etc. In 2017, the USA Department of Homeland security announced about its decision to include also election infrastructures into the list of Critically Important infrastructure for the State.

The cyber- defensive policy of states becomes an urgent issue and States are engaged in implementing special cybersecurity projects on national level to defend the CI of their countries.

Many states, for instance the U.S., Russia, China, Germany, UK, France etc. are enriching their cyber arsenals and developing cyber security system for defensive operations for their countries. Not only states are engaged in national mechanisms but they also are involved in developing global cooperative platforms for better and clean cyber environment of the World. Specifically, it would be interesting to mention U.S. Russia, China cyber triangle and their input of cyberspace as a significant priority for a State development and Security. The countries are involved in various discussions and cooperation agreements to maintain cooperation and peace in cyberspace globally. Despite of ideological differences in cyberspace and the attitudes of maintaining the policy for it, however these three cyber powers found a common ground for mutual understanding and possible fundamental cooperation. United Nations (UN) Governmental Group of Experts is one of the examples of that which is currently the only platform that has united the U.S. Russia, and China with commonly acceptable norms and suggestions. Since the scope of interests in cyberspace includes all groupings of society including governmental and federal entities private and public sectors as well as common citizens on a national level, private supra-powers regulation beyond borders and being responsible for larger audiences, there is an urgent need to focus on cooperation and establishment of fundamental rights in cyberspace as well as mechanism to establish security in this sphere.

Conclusion

Can a cyber-attack pose a serious threat to national security?

With the clear majority of undergone, ongoing and possible cyberattacks and with the current defensive strategy of the states, the cyberwar is nothing than a real threat for states’ national security as well as private sector. It enflames not only regular warfare which can cause as much harm as it is assumed to have by traditional approach of the war, it may also provoke irregular warfare with the privilege of the equal information access and anonymity.  The technological invention of twentieth century may considered to be a disaster along with such scientific invention as atomic energy. It may give a good, but it may harm severely.

The difficulty of cyberwar falls also on the lack of common norms and definitions as well as specifically composed legislation equally acceptable for all states for peaceful and collaborative regulations of problematic issues on this field.

I do believe that cooperation on this issue is of great importance. Joint legislation, understanding and definition of conceptual ideas, common cooperative grounds will bring to a better and secure life, eliminating or declining the possibility of occurring private or non-state organizational subjects to be involved in irregular warfare destabilizing the peaceful cooperation of states and people on internet sphere for a good and productive will.  The classical approach of war definition should be able to include a new sphere of violence before a certain violence occurs rather than defining right after it occurs, as mostly happens in historical approach. Aside from the traditional military spheres like land, sea, and air (added later),an epoch of adding a new sphere, cyberspace, has begun, in which technical capabilities do no less harm than in a traditional war.

Cybersecurity is an urgent, necessary strategy, which will lead to a secure sphere for cooperation, free and secure access to and sharing of information, and, due to its technical capabilities, to a more comfortable and economically developed way of life.

While Cybersecurity is an issue for the whole world, strategies for the development of cybersecurity may vary from state to state, in some cases occurring a national level, while in others limited to certain federal entities.

I believe that Cyberspace is very much like the environment; it is a digital environment, and just as a virus that penetrates a certain country is spread worldwide if not stopped, so is a computer virus. Just as pollution in one part of the world pollutes air or water that we all share, a cyberattack may cause a global problem. Networking, sharing information, and a global security approach are musts for a safe and productive global cyber environment and maintenance of all roads for better digital development for the sake of humanity.

(*) This essay adapted from the article Cyberspace – A Manmade Sphere for Wars, (21-st Century, N.1, 2017, pp.42-58). Used by permission. All rights reserved.

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The Importance of National Media in the World and its Structural Role in Preserving the Country

Sajad Abedi

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The media, information, and their influential role in governments are at the center of attention of all governments, parties and political movements. In recent decades, the role of the media has been enhanced in the field of information on the impact of governments and macro policies of the countries. In the colorful or velvet revolutions in the last decade, this role has become quite distinct and has led scholars to examine the dimensions of media power in recent political developments. Following the end of the Cold War and the formation of a unipolar world, the United States has changed its strategy from the Cold War to a cultural battle and a soft war to dominate the liberal values of its strategy, and by implementing colored or velvet revolutions, in some countries, such as Ukraine, Georgia and Lebanon, their foothold In these countries.

The radical neoconservatives of the United States have seen one of their options in dealing with Iran on the challenging issues of changing the Iranian government, the method of change through “soft power.” Here, we are going to explore the various dimensions of the American effort to realize the soft overthrow in the Islamic Republic of Iran and examine several methods to combat the threats posed by it. Whenever power sought to overthrow a state, if it did not have the military power or saw its cost heavy, it would try to achieve its goal in various ways other than a military attack, sometimes with security methods and sometimes on the method Cultural and propaganda use today due to the remarkable progress of human beings in different sciences and the emergence of a new generation of media, as well as the development of free societies and democracy, as well as the increasing power of governments to confront the military and security threats of the approach of arrogant governments to The overthrow of softness was more than the former Is. The use of new methods in this regard also seems to work as if soft overthrow is a new way of destroying the governments of the opposing powers of arrogance.

The soft war policy, in the United States, is becoming more and more popular every day. In their latest studies and studies, politicians and the American men have also considered the serious approach to soft war in the face of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the “Current Risk Committee”, which makes its members the most prominent political and military elements of the United States. , In its latest decision in October 2005, considering the strength of the Islamic Republic and the failure of dozens of strategies against the Iranian nation over the past years, considered the war as a useless war and called for greater attention from the US government to the software project “Subversion from within “Marc Palmarraz was a leading member of the committee and the influential figure of the foreign policy device Maryka recently opposed the idea of a military offensive against the Islamic Republic of Iran in a conversation with Deborah Solomood, an American military correspondent in the New York Times, saying: “Iran, in terms of territorial scope, population size, quality of manpower, military facilities, The rich natural resources and the privileged geographic location in the Middle East and the Hartland region have become a substitute for the international system that can no longer be overthrown by military invasion. ”

In the report of the Risk Committee, commissioned by Mark Palmer, the overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran was emphasized and advocated by concentrating its activities on the three pillars of inhibition, media outreach and the organization of civil disobedience. Political experts, inspired by the experiences of the editors of this report and the influence of the committee’s decisions on US government policies, believe that this report will be inspired by the general spirit of the future, even if it does not become an executive act. Delta’s plan was one of these projects that US politicians and statesmen used in their latest studies and studies to counteract Iran.

In order to achieve the above objectives, the strategy of pressure from outside and change from within is used. It should be noted that the slogan of creating democracy and civil change in the countries is based on the will and interests of the invading country, and therefore it is completely relative and the awareness and sense of the need of the people of the country is aimed at, leading to political demands or ultimately to change Not political.

Soft substitution is actually social in nature, in which social factors challenge the overthrow of the rule of the ruling political system. In this social-political process, society is the arena of struggle for power and competition between non-governmental organizations and institutions and the state for business Consolidation of social power.

In a soft subversion in a long and continuous process, part of the loyalty of the people of society and the acceptance of the system are transferred to other authority centers, such as non-governmental organizations or ethnic institutions.

In other words, the lack of proper and effective functioning of government functions such as social security, addressing specific patients, urban affairs, inflation, social security, population structure changes, emergence of new groups with new demands, political constraints and facilitators are considered.

Basically, the foreign actor can also manage soft overthrowing where the social contexts necessary for its formation and expansion in the target community are provided. The Subjects are such as political, social and economic disadvantages, with little hope for reform. Establishing and forming non-governmental organizations and organizations that are prone to control and organize a part of society and use various media and psychological tools to influence the minds of people. The attachment and membership of an important part of society to the goals of the above organizations give them the power of recall.

Therefore, the roots of soft overthrow should be sought in general discontent as a result of the ineffectiveness of the political system. This situation has led to the strengthening of non-governmental groups for social recall, in which society is divided into several categories, and the individual provides their financial, mental and social needs from different institutions of government. Whatever the extent of meeting these needs from non-governmental organizations is more than government institutions, the level of loyalty of the people and elites to the ruling system will be reduced. So, from the standpoint of opposition, until the state has a dominant call in society, the methods of subversion will not be usable.

It should be remembered that soft swooping is a social process, so it will at least be reached in the medium term. Therefore, governments with strong and powerful enemies are always subject to enemy action to create the ground for implementing plans to overthrow new methods. In this framework, the enemies are trying to make the election campaign and the maximum participation of the people in the elections very vague, and in contrast to the dual creation of the “People’s System” and the design of a kind of loss-of-game game, any election result would undermine national security. Give Within the framework of such destructive efforts, some prominent candidates are attempting to portray the system as representatives of the system and some as representatives of the people or opponents of the system. This dual destruction with special propaganda and negative subjectivity creates the initial ground for creating psychological and political tensions in society. Accordingly, controlling any deliberate or unconscious actions directed toward this type of duplication and dealing with them can prevent the election from becoming a challenge to national security.

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